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ABSTRACT 
The natural world presents opportunities to all organisms as they compete for the biological-value afforded 
to them through their ecological engagement. This presents two fundamental requirements for perceiving 
such opportunities: to be able to recognise value and learning how to access new value. Though many 
theoretical accounts of how we might achieve such selectionist ends have been explored – how ‘perception’ 
and ‘learning’ resonate with life’s challenges and opportunities, to date, no explanation has yet been able to 
naturalise such perception adequately in the Universal laws that govern our existence – not only for 
explaining the human experience of the world, but in exploring the true nature of our perception.  
This thesis explores our perceptions of engaging with the world and seeks to explain how the demands of 
our experiences resonate with the efficient functioning of our brain. It proposes, that in a world of challenge 
and opportunity, rather than the efficient functioning of our neural resources, it is, instead, the optimising of 
‘learning’ that is selected for, as an evolutionary priority. 
Building on existing literature in the fields of Phenomenology, Free Energy and Neuroscience, this thesis 
considers perception and learning as synonymous with the cognitive constructs of an ‘attention’ tuned for 
learning optimisation, and explores the processes of learning in neural function. It addresses the 
philosophical issues of how an individual’s perception of subjective experiences, might provide some 
empirical objectivity in proposing a ‘Tolerance’ hypothesis. This is a relative definition able to coordinate a 
‘perception of experience’ in terms of an learning-function, grounded in free-energy theory (the laws of 
physics) and the ecological dynamics of a spontaneous or ‘self- organising’ mechanism – Divergent 
Criticality.  
The methodology incorporated three studies: Pilot, Developmental and Exploratory. Over the three studies, 
Divergent Criticality was tested by developing a functional Affordance measure to address the Research 
Question – are perceptions as affective-cognitions made aware as reflecting the agential mediation of a self-
regulating, optimal learning mechanism? 
Perception questionnaires of Situational Interest and Self-concept were used in Study One and Study Two to 
investigate their suitability in addressing the Research Question. Here, Factor Analysis and Structural 
Equation Modelling assessed the validity and reliability of these measures, developing robust questionnaires 
and a research design for testing Divergent Criticality. 
In Study Three, the Divergent Criticality hypothesis was found to be significant, supporting that a Divergent 
Criticality mechanism is in operation: When individuals are engaging with dynamic ecological challenges, 
perception is affective in accordance with Tolerance Optimisation, demonstrating that a Divergent Criticality 
mechanism is driving individuals to the limits of their Effectivity – an optimal learning state which is 
fundamental to life and naturalised in Universal laws.
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PREFACE 
“All living things seek to perpetuate themselves into the future” 
(Cave, 2012, p2) 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis defines agential control within a phase of neural function: the 
efficiency of the individual towards engaging with the opportunities and threats the world affords. A 
Divergent Criticality ‘optimisation’ describes an agential affective mechanism – the regulation of 
entropy in neural-pathways, setting neural-function around an optimal state of ecological tolerance. 
Divergent Criticality driving Tolerance Optimisation provides a self-regulating, learning mechanism to 
adapt to a dynamic, ever changing world. Perception, here, is considered as awareness of entropic-
efficiency in the neural network; an awareness of a state of learning as the ‘relative’ state of 
function. This enables the goal-oriented mediation of agential ‘effect’ on affective cognitions and 
behaviours for Tolerance Optimisation. 
Rather than an optimisation of functional efficiency, an ecological ‘Tolerance’ provides a selectionist 
learning proposition for continued biological-life, driven, towards always inuring against an uncertain 
future. This is an evolutionary prerogative for dynamic environments, where surprise and challenge 
are affective, and adaptive cognitions and behaviours for possible future ecological demands can be 
naturalised as a Tolerance Optimisation in ‘Non-linear Dynamical Systems’ Theory. As such, 
perception becomes testable as a relative neural-function – an agential ‘Effectivity’ that is able to 
coordinate perceptions as ‘states’, relative to Tolerance Optimisation.  
As a theory formulated in Phenomenology and Dynamical Theory, Divergent Criticality provides the 
functional mechanism for ‘how the brain knows’ how efficiently it is learning: a self-organising 
regulating mechanism from the fundamental principles of entropy. The Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis is able to naturalise cognition and behaviour in neural function, providing better 
explanations for the cognitions and behaviours observed as agency and awareness in ecological 
engagement – a ‘perception for and of action’ (Noë, 2008).
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Thesis Overview 
 
Introduction
1 
 
1 CHAPTER ONE – Introduction 
We are not separate from the world we inhabit, we are shaped and grounded by our ecological 
experiences and our functional competence towards those experiences. The central hypothesis of this 
study is that of affective cognitions self-regulating around a Tolerance-Optimisation, explaining how 
perception and learning function towards optimising agential capabilities to engage, tolerate and 
thrive in relation to life’s opportunities and challenges. 
The findings of this study offer a fundamental mechanism for such a selectionist proposition. Rather 
than cognitions, affective towards efficiency and ‘present’ biological-value1, we see a drive towards the 
limits of agential capability and a ‘future’ biological-value. This is an evolutionary prerogative that sees 
adaption and learning as an essential factor in tolerating a dynamic world of surprise and novelty, one 
regulated by affective behaviours towards Tolerance Optimisation. What emerges is a perception of 
the state of neural functioning in terms of biological-value (Figure 1, below). This is a ‘model of 
perception’ for ecological engagement, one which can be parameterised by an agential Effectivity2 and 
ecological-tolerance, and able to be mapped as an efficiency function. Divergent Criticality now drives 
a functional Affordance towards a Tolerance Optimisation. 
Figure 1 – Tolerance Optimisation set Within a Biological Value Model 
                                                          
1 As selectionist any theory must acknowledge biological-value as a fundamental end-point. 
2 Affordance and Effectivity as functioning in perception models of ecological engagement (Gibson, 1966, 
1977). 
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 The Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis is one of self-regulation around a ‘relative’ Tolerance 
Optimisation through cognitions and behaviours affective towards a maximal state of Tolerance 
Optimisation. Effectivity is seen here as an agential capability allowing a ‘relative’ definition of 
Tolerance in terms of cognitive function and a perception of that neural state of functioning. 
Figure 2 – The Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
In providing a coordinating definition for a relative Effectivity, Tolerance, what emerges is how 
perception, as an agent-environment autonomy, functions and is adaptive towards dynamic agency 
and ecological determinants. As such, perceptions, as an ‘awareness’ of ecological Effectivity, are 
mediated through ecological demand and made conscious as an agential awareness - a functional 
Affordance.  
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As a relative definition, the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation may be 
empirically tested through agential-awareness. Accordingly, a ‘perception’ measure as a measure of 
functional Affordance was derived to infer a ‘state’ of Tolerance function. This Tolerance state, as a 
‘state of functional Affordance’, was able to be sampled from learning-domains considered to offer 
different ecological-demand3. Such differentiated function was then able to be triangulated against a 
self-concept measure of affective cognitive-function and used to test the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis. 
 The Research Question 
Perceptions as affective-cognitions are made aware and will reflect the agential mediation 
of a self-regulating, optimal learning mechanism – A Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
The central theme of this study is that of agential-regulated cognitions around a cusp-Criticality of 
Tolerance Optimisation. Ecological function is hypothesised to be mediated by agential perceptions 
as Affordances for biological-value made consciously ‘aware’ as affective-cognitions.  
Firstly, Structural Equation Modelling was able to provide an Interdependence Profile, able to model 
an inductive ‘state of functional Affordance’. In accordance with a Tolerance Optimisation of relative 
Effectivity, this state of functional Affordance is able to be differentiated in relation to ecological 
demand and tested in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis: 
H1 – Correlations of measures Self-Concept (ROPELOC) and functional Affordance, will report 
in accordance with agential-mediation of Tolerance Optimisation  
H2 – A measure of Self-Concept will be differentiated between high and low states of 
functional Affordance in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance 
Optimisation 
In the recognition of issues with homogeneity, a repeat measures research design was applied: 
H3: A repeat measures design will find significant difference between ‘Learning Outside the 
Classroom’ and ‘Traditional Classroom Learning’ in accordance with the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. 
                                                          
3 The sampling criteria of ‘domain-grouping’ provided perception measures reflecting ecological demand as 
functional Affordances  (of social and situational cognitive-determinants). 
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 What this study offers: The Functional Imperative 
In presenting Divergent Criticality as an ‘underlying mechanism’ with which to explain cognitive 
function, this study provides not only an agential-regulated ‘perception’ model of Tolerance 
Optimisation as a ‘selectionist’ function, but also naturalises4 such function in a ‘mechanism’ for 
ecological engagement. For Divergent Criticality to stand up to scrutiny in philosophical and scientific 
explanations, it  must address Chemero’s requirements: 
“the success or failure of the future (scientific) phenomenology depends upon its ability to show how 
higher-order experiences emerge from naturalistically conceived self-organisation” (Kaufer & 
Chemero, 2015, p217) 
This is explored in this study through an interdisciplinary approach across Phenomenology, Neuro-
psychology and Dynamical Systems Theory. It proposes that through the fundamental principles of 
Self Organising ‘Criticality’, our behaviour(s) are able to be shown as driven to the edge of function 
by Divergent Criticality and a maximal proposition for ‘entropy’ production. A proposition of 
Tolerance Optimisation is formulated in Complexity Theory as a selectionist prerogative for dynamic 
biological function – life. 
A ‘functional’ grounding of theory in first principles, is set within the laws of physics and has driven 
this research. What emerges is a complex landscape of agency and functionality, simple in its 
Universality, but able to accommodate the philosophical and empirical complexity we observe. This 
is a fundamental mechanism of function that would account for a brain ‘perceiving’ and ‘learning’. 
Perception, it seems, reflects not only an efficiency (tolerance) towards engaging with the world, but 
involves an agential prerogative that can be grounded or naturalised in such engagement. Ecological 
tolerance then, is mediated by agential cognitions and becomes parameterised as a ‘relative’ 
function – ‘relative Effectivity’ as a Tolerance Optimisation with which to define a state of functional 
Affordance. 
 Adding to the Body of Knowledge 
The overarching function of Divergent Criticality is one of a relative Effectivity or Tolerance 
Optimisation, and thus it proposes that all biological life must display Divergent Criticality (increasing 
entropy) within a self-organising and self-regulating system in order to tolerate ‘surprise’ and 
optimise biological-value. A selectionist prerogative operating at the cusp of functional tolerance 
                                                          
4 Naturalises – set theory in terms of universal laws (of physics). 
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sees perception as an agential appraisal of ecological tolerance, and therefore, observable as able to 
reflect and awareness of a state of functional Affordance. 
This study adds to the literature in Ecological Psychology and Dynamical Systems Theory. It explores 
a functional imperative of exploring perception as a mechanism of neural efficiency in relation to 
evolutionary theory. In presenting Divergent Criticality as a fundamental mechanism for neural 
function in perception and learning, this study makes the following contributions to the literature in 
Non-linear Dynamical System theory, Phenomenology and Neuro-Psychology: 
Non-linear Dynamical Systems Theory 
1) Divergent Criticality: There is a fundamental requirement in living things to counter 
dissipative entropy5. This study proposes an increasing entropy-production within neural-
function and suggests, Divergent Criticality as a fundamental requirement for life. 
2) Tolerance Optimisation: Divergent Criticality is formulated as entropy behaviour at cusp-
Criticality. In defining ‘maximal-entropy’ as a parameter of phase-stability, Divergent 
Criticality ‘drives’ agential affective-behaviour towards Tolerance Optimisation as a cusp of 
Criticality function6. Such a maximal ‘entropic’ proposition sees neural-adaptations emerge 
as learning, a selectionist prerogative for dynamic functioning. 
Neuro-Psychology 
3) An Interdependence Profile was developed to model perception in ecological and agential 
function, a composite of cognitive processes able to infer a state of neural function as a state 
of function Affordance in agential awareness. An inductive Interdependence Profile is able to 
parse cognitions into top-down and bottom-up attentional processes, as cognitive processes 
of relative neural function this presents – a state of functional Affordance. 
Phenomenology and Ecological Psychology 
4) Relative Effectivity proposes an agential definition of neural efficiency with which to 
coordinate a model of ‘relative’ tolerance. The formulation of agency in terms of Voluntary 
Control7 results in a ‘reduced’ capacity in Criticality function, providing an agential-
                                                          
5 Autopoietic – living things that seek to perpetuate themselves into the future. 
6 Divergent Criticality will be seen to be self-regulating around cusp-Criticality. 
7 Voluntary control as consciously controlled cognitive behaviour, in comparison to autonomic (automatic) 
‘involuntary’ regulation (of the body).   
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determined ‘functional’ landscape of Divergent Criticality. Relative Effectivity is an agential 
proposition of capability and tolerance, as such, a perception of relative Effectivity is able to 
be defined as a relative tolerance reflecting the functioning of agency and intentionality. 
 Guidance from Literature  
Previous approaches in explaining neural-function might be considered as providing ‘descriptions of 
behaviour’ rather than coordinating ‘definitions of function’. This is an important distinction as 
neural function demands ‘functional’ definitions in order to explain and ‘generalise’ cognition and 
behaviour. The defining of perception within an objective measure has been a fundamental issue in 
philosophical and scientific enquiry. Perception as subjective, presents a myriad of objectivity issues, 
not only what a ‘perception’ is, but ‘how’ we perceive and ‘what’ we perceive. This demands a 
coordinating definition that must accommodate agential subjectivity.  
In their exploration of perception through an ecologically embodied approach to perception, Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch (1991) gave perception a broad scientific basis in their explanations through 
philosophy, neuroscience and cognitive psychology. This has been reappraised by Chemero (2013) in 
the need for cognitive scientists to take phenomenology seriously and the need to provide a 
naturalised ‘Universal’ approach to perception through a radically Embodied Cognitive Science. 
In proposing a selectionist hypothesis, this thesis embraces this need for a wider, holistic application 
of phenomenology (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Lende & Downey, 2012). If cognitive complexity arises 
from a fundamental mechanism of Divergent Criticality, this requires not just adequate subjective 
description, but an objective ‘definition’ to be robust. An ontological proposition for perception as it 
pertains to the agential-environment experience.  
Neural science sets perception in terms of ‘cognitive-processes’, the neural attending to ecological 
determinants is increasingly drawn towards a cognitive approach, one of agential processes aligned 
to a ‘drive to survive’, a future or goal-oriented perception. What unfolds is a paradigm for defining 
perception through ecological experience, a capability in neural functioning able to align experience 
with agential Effectivity – consciousness as a ‘mind-body’ prerogative, or more prosaically ‘problem’ 
(Thompson, 2007, p6). This is not an attempt to answer Chalmers (1995) ‘Hard Problem’ of what 
makes ‘a consciousness’, but in an awareness of subjective perception, consciousness is entwined in 
an agential and phenomenological richness and aligned to a dynamic ecological function. 
It is in the selectionist axiom of an ‘ecological function’, that any theory for explaining perception 
must be made congruent with both an agential subjectivity, but also an objective Universality (of 
biological-value): Our subjective descriptions, if to be empirical,  must concur and be made ‘actual’ 
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through some form of objective definition in relation to biological-value. Only when such a 
coordinating definition has been parameterised, will it be possible to naturalise and explore 
perception. The exploration of Divergent Criticality addresses such prerogatives, first through the 
literature review, and then by developing the Divergent Criticality hypothesis from first principles. 
In a cross-discipline enquiry, three main epistemological areas of knowledge form the basis of an 
inductive literature review:  Phenomenology, Neuroscience and Complexity Theory. These areas of 
knowledge are explored towards their application in addressing the requirements for defining ‘a 
perception’. The literature review evaluates these in order to differentiate the key elements from 
historically, diverse bodies of knowledge, but draws together the interdisciplinary principles from 
each, in order to develop the Divergent Criticality hypothesis. This was necessary, as Divergent 
Criticality must not only be theoretically robust within contemporary neuroscience, but in order to 
adequately account for a perception ‘that reports on itself’, must be able to account for 
phenomenological descriptions of ecological function. 
 The Phenomenology of Agency and Intentionality   
From its philosophical underpinnings, Phenomenology is explored and an ecological tolerance 
hypothesis for perception, developed. In developing such a coordinating measure (i.e. a Tolerance 
Hypothesis), perception should be able to be relatively compared against different states of neural 
function towards ecological engagement.  
 Cognitive processes of Attention and Control  
An interdependence profile is then induced from the literature on attentional processes. What 
emerges is that ecological tolerance is able to be inferred from a composite of attentional processing 
(i.e. sensory bottom-up and agential top-down). 
 Dynamical Theory and Self-Organising Criticality 
In order to naturalise such a definition of ‘ecological tolerance as perception’, Self-Organising 
Criticality is set within a free-energy function, and perception, when formulated in terms of neural 
efficiency, provides an entropic optimisation that is able to infer neural functioning through the 
formulation of efficiency as ecological Tolerance – a Tolerance Optimisation in neural networks.  
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 Developing the Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
Life systems require a flow of entropy in order for dissipation processes to maintain Self-Organising 
autopoietic8 function. The proposed Divergent Criticality hypothesis is predicated on a necessity for 
a flow of ‘increasing’ entropy as fundamental for temporal stability in autopoietic processes. 
Biological life in dynamic flux maintains a ‘temporal stability’ through the self-organising of entropy 
dissipation, functioning at the edge of an efficiency or stability-phase of entropy ‘Criticality’, a 
Tolerance Optimisation affective through what can be seen as “temporal agency” (Bandura, 2001, 
p3), one required to self-regulate at this functional cusp as a Tolerance Optimisation relative to 
agential mediation – a relative Effectivity. 
It is in utilising relative Effectivity that agential-regulation of affective-behaviour (Panksepp, 1998) 
become selected for and that agential function resonates with entropic complexity. Both as 
mechanistic and agential, the Divergent Criticality hypothesis reconciles the seemingly separate 
‘Kantian’ principles of “antinomy of teleological judgement” (Kant, 1987, p70, in Thompson, 2007) in 
a definition of relative tolerance as an ‘agential mechanism’. The more dynamic the environment, 
the more complex the agential processes that emerge, with greater complexity and agency towards 
affective and adaptive cognitions as perceptions and learning reflecting Divergent Criticality.  
 
 Methodology 
In proposing Divergent Criticality as a neural ‘mechanism’, a nomothetic approach might have been 
considered the most accessible method to explore this hypothesis and indeed, to some extent this 
provides the statistical power in the study. However, there is the danger of making ‘observations of 
behaviour’ and not addressing the philosophical and theoretical imperative of ‘observations of 
function’ for perception, as discussed.  
Therefore, a phenomenological methodology was developed to coordinate an element of functional 
objectivity from conscious subjectivity. With perception reporting on perception, we are required to 
explore the philosophical foundations of enquiry as much as the theoretical hypothesis, thus, the 
functional imperative demands that a hypothesis and methodology for Divergent Criticality is 
derived from philosophical and scientific ‘first principles’. By integrating the three areas of scientific 
                                                          
8 Autopoietic –self-organisation for continued biological life (Maturana & Varela, 1972; Thompson, 2007). 
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knowledge, Divergent Criticality aims to naturalise neural function and address Chemero’s 
postulation for an ecological perception that: 
“it must be shown that the affordance-ability self-organizing, autonomous system and the autopoietic 
nervous system jointly constitute a higher order self-organizing, autonomous system” (p268, 2008). 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis was tested using self-report questionnaires which were designed 
to capture perception as awareness of attentional (processes), through Situational Interest and Self-
Concept reports of life-effectiveness. These measures were adapted and validated over three 
studies: Study One – Measure Investigation; Study Two – Questionnaire Development; and Study 
Three –Explorative study of Divergent Criticality Function. The methodology was a quantitative 
analysis of data collected from environments thought to offer differentiation of Divergent Criticality 
function in different learning environments. 
Study One (n=127), explores the possibility of an antagonistic mediator as an affective behaviour and 
its application to attention measures. Challenge is seen as antagonistic and an affective behavioural 
cognition for self-regulation towards life-effectiveness.  
Study Two (n=281), is used to adapt the questionnaires, what emerges is a requirement to report 
perceptions of Challenge as an antagonistic cognition, and attention to ecological control (a value 
proposition). 
Study Three (n= 870), an exploratory study sampled over 24 different learning-domains and across 
age bandings reflecting key stages in education. This study used Structural Equation Modelling to 
develop an Interdependence Profile (IP), allowing an IP-scale to infer a ‘state of functional 
Affordance’. Underpinned by contemporary literature on perception, attention and free-energy, the 
Divergent Criticality hypothesis was tested using the IP-scale against a self-concept (affective 
cognition) measure. 
As a new theory, significance was found supporting the research question and hypothesis, in both 
model building and associated triangulation tests. As exploratory, the developing research design 
provided robustness and validity in testing the Divergent Criticality hypothesis.                              
Future considerations are discussed in Findings and Conclusions.
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2 CHAPTER TWO – Literature Review  
Section 1: A Feeling of Perception 
 “the need for new research and for exponents of event perception to identify a theoretical 
motivation, within ecological theory, for why events should be perceived” (Stoffregen, 2000b, p93) 
What is the nature of perception, what is it to know or ‘feel’ a perception and why do we perceive? 
From a selectionist perspective there must be a biological-value in knowing of our existence.  
To explore perception we are not only exploring our experience of the world, but also reflecting on 
the reality of what we are perceiving (is what we perceive real?). Though this philosophical question 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, this study explores current literature to investigate a perception 
founded in the phenomenological and scientific traditions of empiricism, with the aim of setting 
perception within an objective-frame, i.e. enabling observation and measurement.  
In order to explain our subjective expressions (as they ever must be subjective), we look to our 
experiences to offer some objective or ‘coordinating definition’ that might be interrogated. What 
emerges is, that it is not in a perception of reality that we are able find such objectivity, but in the 
experience of perceiving itself.  
Perception set within a phenomenological tradition is one of empiricism, but also one skewed by 
subjective observation. Any theory of perception must be able to incorporate the exponents of a 
phenomenological explanation, but with the need to recognise and align our subjective experiences 
against an objective framework.  
This section explores the philosophical transition from a ‘rationalism’: looking for ‘reasons’ for 
perception (e.g. Descartes), through to a ‘relativism’ of experience; providing an inferred objectivity 
to perception (e.g., Husserl, 1913; Kant, 1781). We find that such relativist ‘transcendental’ and 
‘existential’ explanations fall short with their ‘necessity for an inherent ‘a priori of knowing’. Such 
issues have been more recently termed a ‘framing problem’ (machine learning, McCarthy & Hayes, 
1969); highlighting a major question in cognitive research – where does the a priori knowledge for 
knowing, come from? 
Such a ‘void of knowing’ needs filling in order to avoid the criticisms of idealism.  
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From the observation of the perception ‘as’ ecological engagement, emerges the promise of an 
empiricism through experience (e.g., Heidegger, 1927; Merleau-Ponty, 1945). Though still a 
phenomenological observation, in explaining experience there is an attempt to define an objectivity 
through the ‘experiencing a perception’. 
What emerges from the literature is an ecological construct, one grounding perception in 
evolutionary principles and requiring robust theoretical explanation to support such an ‘ecological 
perspective’. One such explanation, that of ‘Affordance’, is proposed and developed in this study as 
not only a model of ecological engagement (Gibson, 1966, 1977), but as a model that is able to 
reflect the possible cognitive functioning of perception as ecological engagement. 
In critiquing the current phenomenological literature, ecological-tolerance is presented as a ‘relative’ 
definition from the subjective experience of ‘being’. A proactive, agential proposition. In particular, it 
is how we tolerate and adapt to ecological feature-change through an agential capability (Chemero, 
Klein & Cordeiro, 2003), a proposition that sets tolerance in a functional Affordance model.  
Functional Affordance embodies an individual’s perception ‘in’ their experience of the world, an 
animal-environment prerogative of relational autonomy, one that now can be objectively and be 
theoretical grounded through a ‘Tolerance hypothesis’ and modelled in a functional Affordance for 
ecological engagement. 
This first section proposes a Tolerance hypothesis and sets this with a new model of ecological value, 
that of ‘functional Affordance’. 
 
 The Nature of Perception 
This chapter explores an epistemology of perception: do we even know what we are trying to 
observe? A phenomenological perspective explores the shift from a philosophical rationalism, to the 
problem of identifying a coordinating definition9 for a model of perception. 
Much of the enquiry into perception tries to make meaning of our experiences, subjective 
perspectives through the lens of an individual’s perception of life being lived. Though such 
perception, naturally, feels credible, it is only ever a phenomena of individual construction. Such a 
                                                          
9 ‘Coordinating definition’ is a term taken from the Philosophy of Space and Time (Reichenbach, 1937/2012): It 
provides a relative definition whatever the subjective experience, allowing a subjective-relativism to be 
defined, and objectively coordinated (measured against other ‘relative’ observations). 
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subjectivity, it might be suggested, is only valid for observation if it is evaluated in conjunction with 
some objective-reality with which to set the individual’s experience. 
In asking such questions, the contradictions within perception are exposed: our ‘awareness’ of 
experience, or the ‘actuality’ of experience. How are we to determine what is subjective and what is 
actual and how do we decide which definitions offer validation to our experiences, and therefore 
might be observed?  
In trying to frame our experience with an objective-reality, we need to not only explore the 
processes of our cognitions and behaviours, but also accommodate the phenomenological 
experience in constructing a functional approach to exploring perception. 
 
 Defining Perception 
Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650) would not only shape ways of exploring our ‘place’ in the world, but 
would also help frame the philosophical questions of our existence. However, his scientific-
reductionism and the theology of the day presented a dilemma: if we are to have free-will and the 
(religious) necessity of self-determinism, consciousness couldn’t be subject to such scientific-
determinism. This subjectivism has echoed throughout enquiry ever since the scientific renaissance 
and Descartes solution to separate the mind and the physical in a Dualism (1641) that has framed 
dilemmas for defining an objective determination and plagued scientific enquiry into the nature of 
perception and consciousness. 
This philosophical challenge was addressed by Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804). Kant attempted to 
reconcile the deterministic dilemmas of subjectivity in a way that Dualism had failed. Whereas 
Descartes dismissed objectivity of a ‘self’ as independent from nature, a proposition open to what 
would become, a critique of Idealism10 (Berkeley, 1709), Kant acknowledged the need for some 
objective perspective for perception and consciousness. He defined such objectivity through a 
‘transcendental’ relationship, reconciling idealism – ‘the truth as it appears’, with an external ‘the 
                                                          
10 The Reverend G. Berkeley (1709) developed a philosophy of  subjective ‘Idealism’ in, what was a religious 
counter-argument toward the scientific enlightenment. Berkeley asked, if we are  to base our reality on the 
observation of ‘qualia’ as an objective empiricism, given that our perceptions are transcendental, who in such 
reductionism is the last observer to offer objective-validity to observation if not God? Berkeley proposed that 
our observations are idealised rather than realised. Idealism sought to expose materialism’s reductionist 
dilemma by re-introducing a religious dualism – all observation eventually lead to an ideal of God’s choosing. 
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thing in itself’ (Ding en sich, Kant, 1781). In effect, we create a subjective perception of reality, 
accessible through our internal ‘a priori’ knowledge, though we will never truly know the reality we 
experience until it becomes ‘known to us’ as a perception – a transcendental idealism (Kant, 1781; 
Kaufer & Chemero, 2015; Wulf, 2015). 
In such transcendentalism there remains a reductionism open to critique: Where do such internal 
representations come from and how do they align with a reality? How can any idealism ever be 
considered a coordinating definition for objective knowledge?  
Nevertheless, the critical exploration of both subjectivity and objectivity evident in Kant’s ‘Critique of 
Pure Reason’ (1781) lead to new methodologies for exploring perception as a scientific 
phenomenon. This was a new empiricism that, though subject to the critiques of reductionism, was 
one that recognised a defining objectivity in not only ‘the thing’ in itself, but also of the experience 
‘with’ the thing. Kant had introduced a spatial and temporal definition for subjective ‘objects of 
cognition’, and in doing so, framed epistemological questions of enquiry into the nature of 
knowledge and how perception might be defined: an ontology of ‘being-in’ nature (Kaufer & 
Chemero, 2015). Transcendentalism would inspire the ‘absolute’ reduction of subjectivity from 
experience, Husserl (1913) and the ‘existentialism’ of Heidegger (1927), both fundamental in 
describing the nature of reality through the subjective experience – Phenomenology.  
 The Phenomenological Approach 
Hursserl’s (1913) phenomenological exploration gave prominence to ‘perception’ as a temporal-
journey from one state (a percept) to another. Unlike Kant and Descartes, Husserl attempted to 
dispel idealism through a ‘phenomenological-reductionism’, an approach to observation, focused on 
the essence of the percept rather than any subjective knowledge of the perceiver. However, this still 
necessitated an a priori ‘bracketing’: that of a reality inferred through ‘intentionality’ and of an 
objectivity ‘of’ experience rather than ‘from’ the experience.  
Husserl’s Phenomenology set perception and consciousness within an ontology that acknowledged 
that the ‘essence’ of the experience went beyond what is subjectively presented, but within such 
experienced subjectivity, a hidden ‘realism’ might be gleaned by careful exploration of the subjective 
experience. Husserl introduced ‘intentionality’ to perception in that, though reality might never be 
subjectively known, it could show itself through an experience when ‘intentionally-defined’.  
Husserl’s contribution was a recognition of the underlying ‘features’ of a perception, rather than a 
perception of objects in and of themselves. This freed subjectivity from the passivity of an internal 
reflection –“Cogito ergo sum”  I think therefore I am (Descartes, 1644) – to an objectivity of ‘agency’ 
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able to be inferred through an ecological interaction. Reality through experience rather than 
properties or knowledge awaiting observation: 
“a shift of the focus from the object of experience to the structures that constitute the act in which 
that object can be experienced” (Kaufer & Chemero, 2015, p35).  
One defining aspect of Husserl’s Phenomenology was the importance of ‘enduring’ flow of time in 
the construction of a conscious moment: Husserl sees perception as a ‘unity’ within a flow of 
precepts’; the past, realised in a now, but directed towards an agential future. Husserl took 
perception from the Kantian-idealism of a reductive epistemology (now widely discredited, see 
logical relativism, Reichenbach, 1937/2012, pp31-37), and introduced perception as a ‘flow’ of 
temporal existence. Perception, as moments in time, able to be defined through the stability of such 
percept-features, projected across time: 
“the unity of the temporal flow in which we experience objects is precisely the unity of the subjective 
consciousness of the experience of those objectives.” (Kaufer & Chemero, 2015, p46).   
Replacing transcendentalism with intentionality, however, is still open to reductionism: Though 
Husserl’s ‘intentionality in experience’ acknowledges the individual as an agent of anticipation in a 
temporal flow of perception, at some point in the idealism of reductionism, such a priori ‘brackets’ 
will need to be removed, and a ‘knowing’ – grounded. 
Husserl is criticised by Heidegger (1927) and Merleau-Ponty (1945), for not developing this  
ontological (animal in environment) imperative further. A perception of such temporal structures 
should relate phenomenology to the ‘dynamic’ experience. This is a perception in existence and 
action as an existential phenomenology, one allowing the ‘brackets’ around intentionality to be 
removed. Through Existentialism, Heidegger (1927) brought an ontology of ‘time’ and ‘being’ to 
phenomenology, one of ‘ecological engagement’ embracing Husserl’s intentionality as ‘goal-
orientation’ conferring a – ‘perception for action’ (Noë, 2008). 
 
 Affordance: an Ecological Perception for Action 
By approaching perception as a phenomenology from action, we conceive perception as a dynamic-
resonance of environment and of ‘being’. This offers a relational approach to perception as a 
dynamic-engagement in Gibson’s Affordance model for perception (1966, 1977). Gibson’s 
‘ecological’ model defines perception through an individual’s capability towards ecological 
functioning (here parametrised through biological-value, see, Figure 3, p18). It is in what the 
environment ‘affords’ or presents to the ability(s) of the organism, that determines a perception of 
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the biological-value in engaging with that Affordance – an ecological psychology proposition for 
Affordance. 
Gibson saw Affordance as an organism-environment relationship for an ‘optimal’ biological 
condition, an ‘implicit knowledge’ informed through engagement with the environment, a theory 
influenced by Gestalt11 perceptions: value-orientated perspectives from ‘experiencing’ the available 
information (see, Koffka, 1935).  
“Each perceptual system orients itself in appropriate ways for the pickup of environmental 
information, and depends on the orienting system of the whole body. ..... they serve to explore the 
information” (Gibson, 1966, p58) 
However, such ‘implicit’ knowledge implies not only an a priori idealism, but also a behaviourist 
approach to perception and is criticised as a disconnect between cognitive processes and behaviour 
(see, Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981). In an attempt to address this ‘behaviourist’ label, Shaw, Turvey & 
Mace (1982) provided a relational platform for constraining Affordance perceptions within an 
agential12 capability to engage with the environment. A perception of agent and environment is one 
accessible through the agential effectiveness towards what is presented. This is a ‘state’ of 
perceptual Affordance encompassed within an ‘Effectivity’ of capability (Shaw et al., 1982). Though 
this dispels behaviourism somewhat, however, in not addressing the transcendental and existential 
‘a priori’ dilemma, Affordance still needs to answer the reductionist critique of where such 
capability(s) come from. 
 Affordances: Properties or Features of Perception 
We might look to understand better, what an Affordance is through representing Affordance as an 
ecological perception.  
Turvey (1992) proposes that Affordances are unproblematic properties of perception, existing as 
independent, dispositional, properties made actual by the pairing of environment with agential-
knowledge (past-knowledge applied to a situational state of the now). Here perception is seen as a 
constructivist proposition: 
                                                          
11 Gestalt explorations of ‘form and function’ in an experience oriented perception, were a view running in 
conjunction with Husserl’s temporal-features of experience – engagement-ontologies to defining perception. 
12 Rather than organism, animal or individual; ‘agent’ is used here as a proactive term for all organism-initiated 
ecological engagement. It will be theorised that all biological life can be considered ‘agential’ in some 
behavioural form of the expression.  
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“dispositions never fail to be actualised when conjoined with suitable circumstances” (Turvey, 1992, 
p178) 
 
This viewpoint has been criticised by Chemero (2003) as invoking the ‘a priori’ dilemma. The 
properties of such a perception would not only have to accommodate a multitude of agential-
dispositions to actualise environmental-properties, but would need to select from an infinity of 
possible pairing-relationships. Such a proposition for a functional perception gets lost in this 
complexity of experience rather than emerging as 'readily available’ from it (Heidegger, 1927). 
Perception must be efficient to fulfil the ecological requirements of a selectionist proposition. 
Chemero (2001) therefore provides a viable argument to answer this ‘property-inefficiency’, one 
based on the ‘feature placement’ of Strawson (1959); here Chemero sees Affordances not as static 
properties, or dispositions of the environment and agent, but as ‘temporal-features’ that are 
dependent ‘on’ the environment and the agent. This is a relational-perception of the agent ‘in’ the 
environment and perception, a dynamic-construct of feature and agent as the agent moves through 
or experiences its actions. Though still dependent on the agent-environment autonomy of 
Affordance (Gibson’s situational-imperative and individual-context), perception is emergent as an 
independent feature or temporal ‘state’ rather than any dispositional-property. 
However, such emergent ‘features’ rather than dispositional properties have been argued by 
Stoffregen (2000b) to present a philosophical problem: If Affordance is feature-emergent, how can 
such ephemeral features be perceived as an ‘event’? Would not such ‘features’ evaporate outside of 
perception, not able to be fixed or set in actuality?  
Chemero (2003) sought to dismiss this: 
 “It is a small step from this to a rather silly global idealism, in which the world disappears whenever I 
close my eyes” (Pg193) 
 
However, it is not enough to dismiss such an existential paradox; the very subjectivity of our 
observations (to be dependent on an observer to become), leaves room for Idealism and implies 
that reality might not be available within observation. If Affordance is to be considered an 
‘unproblematic-feature’, one that may be used to ground our perceptions in reality rather than any 
‘Grand Illusion’ (Noë, Pessoa & Thompson, 2000), then Stoffregen’s criticism must be adequately 
answered rather than dismissed. 
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 Perception as Affordance Features awaiting Engagement 
Stoffregen proposes that although Affordances are relationally actualised between ‘environment 
and agent’, they should be considered as relational-opportunities, rather than relational-features. 
This is a view of Affordances as un-actualised, available to be actualised as “opportunities for action” 
(Stoffregen, 2003, p124). Affordance(s) exist now as opportunities independent from observation, 
removing the idealism by being ‘accessible’ through action.  
Chemero (2003) attempts to reconcile the idealism of ‘features’ and dismiss the reductionism in 
‘opportunities for action’ (how does the agent recognise these opportunities?), by suggesting a 
temporal-element to Stoffregen’s opportunities. Affordance ‘becomes’ through dynamic interaction 
a state(s) of feature-change. In this way, they may be considered as existing ‘independent of 
observation’ and as opportunities ‘from’ action.  
“Events as changes in the layout of Affordances” (Chemero, 2000, p37) 
By introducing the concept of feature-change, perception becomes a temporal-state actualised by 
changes in Affordance and a perception dependent on the Effectivity (capability) of the agent 
towards these features.  
“Effectivities are properties of animals that allow them to make use of affordances” (Chemero, 2003, 
p184) 
Though Affordances may be actualised by changes in the feature-landscape, it is in how these 
changes affect the agential functioning that determines how such Affordances are perceived. Events, 
as ‘opportunities for action’, must be set within the capability of the individual as an Effectivity 
towards feature-change. Perception as the dynamic ‘state’ of an individual’s capability.  
A model of perception is now presented through such a functional capability as a biological-value 
model of Affordance – a perception of dynamic Effectivity towards feature-change in ecological 
engagement. 
 
 Introducing a Biological-value Model of Affordance 
Ecological function may be defined within the concept of ecological or biological-value, (Figure 3, 
below). It is in the behavioural functioning towards biological-value that our perceptions may be 
evolutionally ‘grounded’ through cognitive processes for the regulation and stability of biological-
value across time. It is in this adherence towards optimal biological-value that behaviour and 
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cognition for life-regulation is seen as affective (Damasio, 2010; Panksepp & Biven, 2012; Pessoa, 
2013).  
An ‘ecological’ perception should reflect biological-value if it is to be considered evolutionary. 
Perception may therefore, be aligned with affective cognitions of ‘approach’ (accentuating life-
benefits) and ‘avoid’ (limiting life-costs). These are evolutionary responses to the opportunities and 
threats afforded through our engagement with the world and such a value-bias provides the 
template on which a behaviourally affective proposition for perception may be founded. 
For Affordance to be considered as a perceptual model, it is important that we align biological-value 
with phenomenological experience. Such a model must not only represent the individual’s dynamic-
relationship with the world it pertains to represent, but be able to functionally operationalise 
‘perception’ in accordance with affective behaviours for biological-value. 
 From Relative to Relational Affordance 
An environment may offer different individuals and organisms, differing Affordance opportunities 
and therefore different perceptual experiences. We might, therefore, first consider Affordance from 
a ‘relative’ perspective, defined within a phenotype-capability for interaction. Here, species 
proclivities, rather than the agent’s capabilities define the Affordance perception. 
Such blunt differentiation is ill-defined and implies an ‘implicit’ or innate species knowledge, 
criticised by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981). Affordance therefore, might be better approached in 
respect of the individual’s capability within a phenotype (Figure 4, over), this is an Effectivity (Shaw 
et al., 1982); Affordance made relational within an individual’s capability (Chemero, 2003; 
Stoffregen, 2003; Turvey, 1992). However, it should be remembered that though relational 
Affordance defines function within Effectivity, an Effectivity in itself may still be relatively considered 
against the Effectivity(s) of other(s). 
 
Figure 3 – The Cost/Benefit Parameters of Biological-value 
Literature Review – A Feeling of Perception
19 
 
Figure 4 – a) A Relative Affordance       b) Relational Affordance set within An Individual’s Effectivity 
 A Relational Affordance 
Effectivity, then, offers different individuals different Affordance perceptions dependent on their 
capabilities13. Effectivity allows a ‘knowing’ and a ‘not knowing’ as propositions of an Affordance 
perception within the concept of a capability reflecting biological-value (see, Figure 5, p21)  
However, by describing Effectivity as a capability-basis for Affordance, does not answer where such 
‘capability’ comes from. We are again thrown into the dilemma of the need for the prerequisites of 
such ‘knowing’. How such a knowing-function might be accommodated in an Affordance model of 
perception without necessitating an ‘a priori bracketing’  is addressed in the next section. 
                                                          
13 Affordances offer differing opportunities to differing individuals. For example, the way a  human might 
perceive the opportunities afforded by a chair, the “opportunities for action” (Stoffregen, 2003, p124) of; 
sitting, standing-on, etc. – an Elephant might perceive in a vastly different way - for the Elephant, a chair 
provides very few (if any) Affordance opportunities. 
Literature Review – A Feeling of Perception
20 
 
 An Ecological Tolerance Hypothesis 
By developing Affordance as a perception model of feature-change, the functioning of perception 
towards biological-value might be described through a state or moment set between past and 
future, a state of ‘knowing’, a state of functional Affordance. 
Functional Affordance, therefore, is a dynamic proposition, best considered in a flow from one 
feature to the next, moments or ‘percepts’ captured, relative to a state of biological-value in 
ecological functioning.  
It is in such functioning of perception towards an experience that a suitable definition may be 
sought. One that enables an objectivity in determining what an Affordance perception is.  
This section explores perception as a state of functioning in experience (as proposed by Husserl) . By 
considering the control parameters of functioning relational to biological-value, perception is 
investigated in terms of the agent’s functioning in relation to their capabilities. 
This section seeks define such dynamic-functioning and to hypothesis what a perception might be, 
perceiving. In doing so, it hopes to provide a coordinating definition for an objective measure of 
what a perception might be – that of a ‘functional tolerance’ to biological-value in feature-change. 
 Functional Affordance: A Model of Ecological Efficiency 
Ecological control is the requirement to constrain the feature-change presented to, or engaged-in, 
by the agent. A biological ‘value’ description allows perception to be described in terms of control 
parameters in its functioning towards ecological engagement. 
How then is perception parameterised in terms of the functioning of Affordance and Effectivity? 
When viewed through the perspective of a capability towards feature-change (Effectivity), 
perception as an Affordance may be seen to reflect the agent’s capability to constrain the ‘degrees 
of freedom’14 presented through engagement with the environment (Bernstein, 1967).  
A perception then, might now be considered in terms of ‘efficiency’ towards maintaining biological-
value in the face of such feature-change – the functional efficiency in an Affordance. 
                                                          
14 Bernstein defined musculoskeletal movement complexity in terms of ‘Degrees of Freedom’, a concept that 
expressed the parameters (feature-change) needing constraint or control in efficient functioning. The greater 
the capability to constrain the DoF, the more efficiency and therefore more ecologically robust the agent is.  
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Affordance is now explored, through an expression of functional efficiency towards ecological 
engagement. An Affordance model is proposed (Figure 5, below), displaying a trajectory15 of possible 
functional states of efficiency – states of functional Affordance. Perception as a functional 
Affordance, then, is able to be represented as an Effectivity (of efficient functioning) towards an 
Affordance event in term of biological-value. 
 The Control of Affordance 
Successful ecological-engagement requires, then, that the Degrees of Freedom presented by an  
Affordance event (feature-change), are controlled within an individual’s Effectivity. Effectivity 
becomes a boundary or ‘phase-parameter’ of efficient-function in biological-value. Perception here, 
then, is represented by the ecological demands in constraining feature-change as a state of 
Affordance relational to an Effectivity capability.  
Figure 5 – States of functional Affordance: A Trajectory of Efficiency in relation to Biological-value.  
                                                          
15 This is a trajectory of divergence from the known, and will be formulated in (3.4 – Formulating Divergent 
Criticality within an Efficiency Model of Function, p99).  
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This is a functional Affordance state parameterised by biological-value in the Effectivity of the agent 
(see, Box 1, below).  
 
 
Using the control parameter of biological-value, an individual’s state of perceptual functioning may 
be expressed in terms of the ratio between the Affordance presented and the individual’s capability 
(Effectivity). To represent a state within Effectivity and therefore within Biological-value (a viable 
selectionist proposition), requires this ratio to be equal to or be less than one (see, Figure 6, below). 
Figure 6 – Control Parameters of Effectivity and Affordance within Biological-value  
Ecological-value requires that –           
   1)          Benefit ≥ Cost  
An Equivalence statement in terms of Affordance may be written as – 
Effectivity to Control Degrees of Freedom for Ecological Value is greater or equal  (≥) to the Affordance Event itself: 
   2)          Effectivity ≥ Affordance 
Therefore, a Ratio for Affordance/Effectivity  for the functioning within Ecological Value may be written as:  
   3) 1 ≥  
𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
 
Box 1 – Functional Affordance as an Efficiency State of Effectivity 
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In terms of function towards biological-value, an Affordance represents a state that may be 
formalised in efficiency terms16 – An Affordance quantified by the state of function within the 
individual’s capability (Effectivity) towards ecological demand (see, Box 2, below). 
 
 From a fixed Dispositional Function to Generative Adaptability 
An ‘efficiency in Effectivity’ now allows us to consider perception through a functional-efficiency 
towards ecological engagement, however, this is still a dispositional ‘capacity’. That is to say that it 
still requires an Effectivity of prior-knowing in order to engage with the world. As such, Affectivity 
here is an a priori ‘definite’ or fixed capability proposition of a dispositional representation (Figure 7, 
below).  
                                                          
16 This is possible as Effectivity is able to be considered as an ‘absolute’ of functional ‘phase’ for biological-
value. Such an ‘absolute of phase’, allows an Affordance state to be expressed as an efficiency state within 
Effectivity and to be represented as a ratio of the Affordance and Effectivity parameters. 
            
From a statement of  Affordance as a Ratio within parametrised by Effectivity: 
1)         1 ≥  
𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
 
                              
An absolute (maximal) capability allows an Affordance event to be considered in terms of an efficiency function: 
                  2)                Efficiency  = 1 -  
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅 
𝑨𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 
 (adapted Efficiency, Carnot, 1824b) 
 
Therefore functional-Affordance may be expressed through an ecological efficiency function:   
                 3)                          Efficiency  = 𝟏 -  
𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
 
 
  We might also represent Affordance as an Effectivity state, a coefficient of a functional tolerance: 
4)   Coefficient of  Tolerance  = 
1
( 
𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
 −1)
  (Adapted from, Atkins, 2007, pg75) 
 
Box 2 – Ecological Efficiency in terms of Effectivity 
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Dispositional representation17, though able to support simplistic models of function (to perceive and 
to react), falls short when extrapolated to a dynamic engagement. Changing environments require 
representational models able to assimilate and ‘represent’ this divergence from the known. The 
components of a dispositional-perception of a known ‘capacity’ are ‘heavy’ they need lots of 
representational schemas or neural ‘mini-models’, invoking the reductionist dilemmas of a multitude 
of Effectivity(s) necessary for an Affordance to be actualised (Clark, 2015). 
Figure 7 – A Dispositional Model 
  
                                                          
17 Models of perception might be thought of as representational, an inner representation of what is ‘sensory’ 
experienced. As such, models might be labelled dependent on their functioning: dispositional fixed or 
generatively flexible. 
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Dispositional function could never confer the magnitude of resources needed to accommodate such 
representations for a perception as; 
 “the delicate opportunistic dance of brain, body and world……… a story about efficient, self-
organising routes to adaptive success” (Clark, 2015, p244). 
Through suggesting ‘self-organising states’ of ‘efficiency’, Clark recognises the necessity for a 
frugality or efficiency in perceptual functioning as a selectionist prerogative (2013, p22); and if there 
is efficiency, there exists also ‘inefficiency’.  
Any representational proposition would need to tolerate such inefficiency, but also provide ‘self-
organise routes to adaptive success’, in order to embrace inefficiency for a selectionist Affordance 
model.  
Disposition, then, does not adequately account for such selective adaptation. A functional 
Affordance model needs to accommodate the concept of a perception of efficiency in functioning 
towards biological-value through the modelling of tolerance and adaption.  
 
 Tolerance and Generative Models of Control 
A state of Tolerance might now be proposed as an efficiency definition towards future feature-
change: the availability of ‘degrees of tolerance’ from one state (now) toward a future state: the 
‘further’ dynamic change the system is able to tolerate. Rather than a dispositional definition of 
Effectivity towards Affordance. This is perception as a state of tolerance to an Affordance within 
functional parameters of Effectivity. 
“Affordances define the degrees of freedom available to the actor within the task” (Van Orden, Kloos 
& Wallot, 2011, p656) 
Tolerance demands that we move from a static dispositional perspective to one of dynamic (future 
oriented) ‘generative’ representation (Clark, 2013; Damasio, 2010). Real life is chaotic and complex, 
so no matter how accurate our representations of the world there will always be difference, the 
unexpected. Any generative representation, therefore, should be considered as a probabilistic 
internal state that can never be wholly represented or known, but may, in terms of efficiency (in 
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respect towards biological-value functioning), be represented as a ‘functional’ tolerance to such 
surprise18, and may be parameterised within a functional Affordance model (see, Figure 9, p27). 
Perception, as functional Affordance, is better represented through acknowledging the divergence 
or difference between the expected (generative) and what is subsequently experienced (sensed), 
the divergence or surprise ‘afforded’ as a statement of the tolerance functioning of the system. 
Figure 8 – Ecological Capability and Tolerance 
 
Perception, as representing feature-change, might therefore be better viewed as a tolerance-state of 
functioning. This sees a functional Affordance inferred through its tolerance to ‘feature change’ 
(Franchak & Adolph, 2014). Affordances may now be viewed as probabilistic states in relation to 
their Effectivity providing an Effectivity-tolerance state to feature-change or ‘surprise’. We now can 
re-formulate perception as an functional capability or Affordance state of Effectivity tolerance (see, 
Figure 8, above). Such a capability or Effectivity-tolerance enables perception to be considered 
through Husserl’s hidden reality in ecological engagement, a perception ‘from’ not ‘of’ experience. 
Effectivity-tolerance is now able to be define perception through tolerance towards an ecological 
‘surprise’ a functional Affordance state. Such a definition provides Affordance with a relative 
definition: as the surprise-state is set within an absolute of relational capability (see, Figure 9, below). 
                                                          
18 Surprise here denotes the uncontrolled Degrees of Freedom, the new, the different; a proposition 
impossible in a dispositional model. In Universal terms, ‘surprise’ refers to entropy production (see, Defining a 
Steady-State of function Within a Maximum Phase of Entropy, p75).  
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Figure 9 – Generative Tolerance: a functional Affordance 
 
The control parameters of functional Affordance are now set in ‘relative’ terms and are revisited in 
our biological-value model (see, , below). Effectivity-tolerance is able, then, to represent not only a 
state of functional Affordance, but as a dynamic flow of feature-change, tolerance offers a definition 
to the functioning of the agential capabilities to such Affordance flow (as would be required for a 
perception of feature-change from experience). Such tolerance can be represented as an efficiency 
function, this enables an efficiency definition for a state Affordance as a state of perception: a 
defining quality of a functional Affordance, where the greater the tolerance the greater the 
functional efficiency towards an Affordance; 
 
Tolerance as an ‘Efficiency in function’  (𝜺)  =  𝟏 -  𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
   (see, Box 2, p23) 
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Affordance encompassed in such a state of Effectivity-tolerance, allows a dynamic formulation for 
feature-change (Chemero, 2000; Chemero et al., 2003). This is an important distinction: tolerance 
may now be considered in relation to ecological engagement as reflecting the agential capability to 
tolerate feature-change – a selectionist proposition. 
 
Box 3 - A functional Affordance State as a State of Tolerance function 
 
 
From (Box 1, pg 22) from a dispositional proposition we require for Ecological-value: Benefit ≥ Cost  
                     1 ≥  
𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
 Affordance (Demand) Does not exceed Effectivity (Capability) 
From (Box 2, pg 23)  we derive a state of Affordance as a ‘state of efficiency’ in function towards Ecological-value: 
  Affordance State  =  𝟏 -  
𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
 
This allows an equivalence-statement of efficiency towards Ecological-value in terms of  Tolerance: 
 
𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
  ≡  
𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚
  
 1  ≥    
𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
  
Therefore Affordance as an efficiency in function ≡          (𝜺)  =  𝟏 -  
𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
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This state of perception as tolerance, is still ‘relational’ to individual capability (therefore subjectively 
experienced), but now framed within a definition of ‘Effectivity tolerance’ to feature-change, is able 
to be regarded as ‘relative’. As such, tolerance provides the possibility of differentiation between 
‘relative’ definitions: Individuals with greater ‘relative’ tolerance towards an Affordance will be able 
to better tolerate the surprise than those with relatively, less tolerance. They will be more efficient 
in surviving similar Affordance event(s)19 than those with lesser ‘relative’ Effectivity-tolerance. 
Tolerance  therefore, allows a selectionist proposition for perception (see, Figure 10, below) – as was 
ever the intention of Gibson’s ecological psychology (Van Orden et al., 2011, p658). Functional 
Affordance as a Tolerance proposition now provides a coordinating definition for perception, it can 
therefore be used to define different perception states. 
Figure 10 – Relative Trajectories of Effectivity-Tolerance 
In being ‘of’ experience, functional Affordance as a model of perception would seem to address 
Husserl’s (1913) phenomenological ‘intentionality’, whilst accommodating Heidegger (1927) and 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) existential engagement prerogative towards biological-value: a perception 
from action that is readily available to the individual.  
                                                          
19 Similar Affordance events, here, reflects that two Affordance (perceptions) will never be the same as they 
are from unique relational Effectivities (subjectivity). However, it is in the Effectivity-tolerance towards 
feature-change (as a perception), that we conceive of a relative quality of ‘function’ in defining perception. 
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 The a priori Dilemma 
However, Effectivity-tolerance is still a proposition that requires ‘some’ a priori knowledge in order 
to define an Effectivity ‘capability’. If functional Affordance is not to fall prey to the recurrent 
critiques in reductionism, two important prerequisites should be addressed: 
1) What is the a priori bases for Effectivity and therefore an Effectivity Tolerance – How do we 
know? 
 
2) How do we assimilate the new? 
 
 How Do We Know? 
In addressing ‘What is the a priori bases for Effectivity’, we might look to our evolutionary heritage, a 
lineage that takes us from simple affective behaviour (almost dispositional in its limited tolerance), 
towards the complexity and flexibility in behaviour through cognitive processes for a dynamic 
tolerance and engaging with the new. Such processes for a perception might then be ethologically 
grounded as ‘affective processes for life-regulation’. This suggests perceptions evolved from 
ecological determinants, an Effectivity of ‘evolved’ capabilities and learnt cognitions for engagement 
with the environment (Shapiro, 2010; Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 1991). Such an evolved 
proposition may then align perception with cognitive-emotional behaviour (a biophile of positive-
approach and biophilic avoid affect; Ulrich, 1993). This is a perception of innate drives for biological-
value, situated in a cognitive-emotional landscape of life-regulation in ecological engagement. 
Affective behaviour (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp, 2005) provides a basis to such cognitive regulation, 
one that may be traced back to the very beginnings of life. An inherent or ‘innate’ behavioural 
platform on which to build further cognitive processes. As such, affective drives for experience or 
engagement with the world may be seen across species (e.g., a SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST,CARE, 
GRIEF & PLAY ,Panksepp, 1998), an ecological management evident even in non-cortical biological-
value20 (Yanai, Kenyon, Butler, Macklem & Kelly, 1996). Though not advocating any neural correlates 
or simplistic-analogy that incorporates consciousness or intentionality, such a ‘seemingly’ affective-
                                                          
20 The chemo-kinesis of simple replication in single-cell organisms, becomes a seemingly, agential, ‘chemo-
taxis’ of the many, possibly displaying an early form of agential behaviour. Such agential-capability defines not 
only situated opportunity, but also the possibility of accessing future biological-value in response to contextual 
affective behaviour. 
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behaviour towards biological-value may suggest the foundations of such agency towards biological-
value (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016).  
Life-maintenance may be traced from primordial first principles, through to the evolution of more 
complex function and affective behaviour. The proteins necessary for inter-cellular communication 
reside in virtually all organisms from the single-cell domains of bacteria and archaea, to multi-
cellular organism neuronal-signalling. That such neuro-transmitters (dopamine, serotonin, cortisol, 
noradrenaline, etc.) are seen to propagate through the evolutionary lineage (Freestone & Lyte, 
2008), speaks of not a limitation in adaptive possibilities, but of an ‘efficiency and robustness in 
function’. Similar efficiency of function is found to be replicated through the structures of neural 
signalling, for example, the neural development found within vertebrates (Deacon, 1990; Krubitzer & 
Kaas, 2005). Rather than evolutionary adaptations in neural-structure being viewed as selected for in 
their increasing complexity, it is the functional efficiency that is seen to be conserved. The 
proliferation of ‘architectural’ adaptations are therefore better realised as differentiation of existing-
structure for supporting efficiency – function over structure (Karmiloff-Smith, 2012).  
Affective behaviour as evolutionary grounded, provides an a priori platform on which further cortical 
adaptation may be constructed (Damasio, 2010) and affective behaviour may be seen to be 
facilitated or regulated through cognitive-emotional constructs of agential drive towards biological-
value  (Wright & Panksepp, 2012). Such an agential relationship is  emergent through an ecological 
context (Chemero, 2008; Ulrich, 1993), as an autonomy between the environment and the capability 
of the agent to tolerate and adapt behaviour for functional-value. This requires that we not only 
accommodate the efficient function of the individual in any Affordance model, but if selectionist, 
account for how the unknown in ecological engagement, becomes known – how do we adapt.  
 How do we Adapt – Assimilating the New 
Such a functional efficiency and adaptive flexibility has been highlighted as necessary in cognitive 
function for an embodied Affordance of intentional behaviour (Chemero, 2008; Damasio, 2010; 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2012; Merker, 2007; Thompson, 2007). The adaption to able to constrain and 
assimilate the new and a cognitive flexibility that might be considered as an imperative to any 
functional model of perception: This is necessary to accommodate dynamic change. How then is the 
new and the novel be assimilated? What informs the neural system of its ignorance? How can 
unknowns become known and we learn to adapt to them? 
Hatfield (1988), outlined a possible approach for tackling such issues by proposing an alternative 
approach from symbolic representation. The processing of new information through a ‘complexity’ 
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approach and the spontaneous ‘emergence’ (from Self-Organisation) in Hebbian (1949, 2002) neural 
networks or schemas.  
Chemero admonishes the lack of such Self-Organising in theory in his critique; 
“Indeed, none of the extant views of affordances of which I am aware make it the case that animal-
environment systems are self-organizing, autonomous systems.” (p264, Chemero, 2008). 
Though much has changed since then in Self-Organisation, with Dynamical Theory providing fresh 
theoretical models and landscapes in Evolutionary and Cognitive Science traditions with which to 
explore perception and ecological learning (Chemero, 2013; Chialvo, 2010): 
“The ecological approach has been maintaining all along that movement and action functionality is 
fundamental in the greater scheme of the entirety of the human capacities…… For the purposes of 
the present paper movement is understood not merely as the efficient displacement of a limb from 
point A to point B, but as action—the real-time control of movement that is intentional with respect 
to a perceived affordance in the environment.” (Dotov, 2014, p795) 
A relative Effectivity-tolerance, provides for Gibson’s autonomous animal-environment prerogative, 
whilst also allowing complexity theory to answer the dynamic imperative of a self-generating 
perception of being in the world – a self-organising and assimilation of the new into the agent-
environment perception: 
“………… a conception of affordances according to which the affordances of the animal-environment 
system are dynamic relationships between animals and their environments.” (p265, Chemero, 2008) 
This ‘emergence’ of internal stability toward external experience is one that answers Idealism in its 
abandonment of a dispositional a priori representation. A non-symbolic approach, through action , is 
still able to support a generative-representation model for the processes of perception (Gregory, 
1972) by aligning the unknown with the known through an ‘efficiency to biological-value functioning’  
in neural networks. Our cognitions might be better considered through a functional efficiency 
processes, rather than dispositional or modular capabilities  (Karmiloff-Smith, 2012). 
 
 An Evolutionary Hypothesis 
In simplistic terms, we might hypothesise that adaptations in cognition and behaviour that facilitate 
a change from less-tolerant to more-tolerance (relative expressions of efficiency in agent-
environment autonomy), will be of biological-value and evolutionary retained (Chemero, 2013; 
Chialvo, 2010). Therefore, Effectivity-tolerance towards surprise if able to be shown as an ‘adaptive’ 
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capability, sees the individual ‘efficiently integrate’ dynamic states of tolerance functioning. Here, it 
is in the agential robustness towards surprise in dynamic environments, that tolerance is prioritised 
as a selectionist proposition. Chemero (2003) would be wary of the term selectionist in Affordance in 
its agential-implication for what, from an evolutionary perspective, is not the ‘hard’ ecological 
barometer of life and death. However, as a tolerance proposition, functional Affordance takes the 
agent-animal autonomy to a relative function, one that could be considered as selectionist.  
It is in the functional priority of constraining unknown degrees of freedom in dynamic environments, 
that agential directed behaviour for greater efficiency in Effectivity-tolerance, that a ‘Tolerance’ 
hypothesis emerges: – that affective behaviour will drive the agential-environmental autonomy 
towards an Affordance state ‘for’ maximum future tolerance through self-organisation. This is a 
tolerance (and therefore Effectivity) optimisation function that will be formulated (see, ‘3.1 – 
Developing a Divergent Criticality Hypothesis, p88). 
 
 Section Summary: A Feeling of Perception  
An Affordance of agency requires a ‘forward’ directed or predictive model to neural- function. An 
agency towards the ecological demands of future ‘projected’ goals. 
Tolerance allows such a ‘predictive processes’ (Clark, 2013) as a current Affordance state 
extrapolated forward to an ‘expected’ or generated future-state. If perception is to be considered an 
ecological proposition, it must be able to differentiate the ‘best possible’ future functioning in a 
model of ‘predictive-processing’ (Clark, 2015).  
In order to investigate the proposition of agential perception as a perception of ecological tolerance 
or efficiency, explanations are needed of why such perceptions not only infer a tolerance in 
ecological engagement, but provide for affective cognitions and behaviours to accommodate the 
functionality of agency engaging in a changing world. 
What is perception, how does it work and why do we have it?  The history of research into 
perception has dealt primarily with the subjective appraisal of ‘abstract thoughts’ in order to explain 
the functioning of this cognitive process. This might be expected, we are our own perceptual 
experiment of seemingly coherent thought. However, such is subjective-abstraction and a 
phenomenological projection of a ‘feeling of knowing’, with a subjectivity of only – what is accessible 
to us. Though such subjective-bias should not be dismissed (as it is from the cognitive processes at 
work in constructing such our awareness), this ‘feeling of knowing’ is not reality. As a definition on 
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which to base enquiry, reality then, is a ‘will-o-the-wisp’, and it is necessary to find some other 
definition with which to coordinate perception as an agential awareness able to be naturalised. 
This section has explored such a coordinating definition. It has looked at what a perception might be 
in terms of the phenomenological literature – the nature and philosophy of perception; and has 
been aligned to a necessity for embodied functioning and biological-value for life in dynamic 
environments. In acknowledging this dynamic prerogative (of flux and change), a definition of 
‘tolerance to ecological demands’ has been philosophically derived: If we are able to deconstruct 
perception objectively as an ‘awareness of cognitive processes’ towards what biological-value an 
ecological engagement ‘affords’ an agent (Affordance – a Phenomenological ontology), then it may 
be possible to measure and test perception to gain a better understanding of how a perception as an 
‘awareness as Affordance’ comes to be. 
It is evident that such cognitive awareness must come from functioning of neural-processes in 
relation to ecological demands. Perception, here, was aligned with biological-value through an 
ecological ‘Tolerance’ definition, the agent’s capability of Effectivity towards a dynamic world of 
ecological demand. Tolerance, in defining a ‘feeling of knowing’, is a ‘state’ of neural-function, and 
can be considered in relation to an agential Effectivity in accessing biological-value. Tolerance when 
coordinated objectively, provides a perception measure of neural function towards biological-value. 
In doing so, Ecological Tolerance answers Stoffregen’s (2000b) requirement for why Affordance as 
‘events’ should be perceived: an Affordance as a ‘state of Tolerance’ becomes a perception of 
agential capabilities toward accessing biological-value – a functional Affordance. 
It is now necessary to consider the neural processes that make such a functional Affordance salient; 
importantly, the agential or autopoietic imperative of cognition and behaviour for biological-value. 
In order to investigate such value processes, perception as a Tolerance, needs to be aligned with the 
necessity of engaging in a changing ‘dynamic’ world – the attending and controlling of neural-
function for engaging in the now, and predicting an uncertain dynamic future.  
In the next chapter, the neuro-scientific literature is explored in relation to how Tolerance as a 
neural efficiency proposition, might become an awareness. This approaches agential capability in 
relation to the cognitive functioning of attentional-processes – The Attention and Control of Agential 
Effectivity.
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Section 2: Attention and Control 
 An Awareness of Affordance  
One might approach a future that you ‘anticipate’ can utilise your existing abilities with less restraint 
than a future you anticipate as ‘beyond’ your capabilities. This agency speaks of a cognisant 
awareness, what Noë (2009) describes as an Accessibility.  Such an agency is found in our 
phenomenological experiences; our emotions, cognitions and behaviours oriented towards a an 
expectation – an ‘accessibility’ of our capabilities towards being-in the world (Heidegger, 1927; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Varela et al., 1991).  
Whereas Effectivity has been regarded as predominately a process from environmental or ‘bottom-
up’ sensory information, an ‘agency’ and ‘being in’ the world, suggests internal ‘top-down’ processes 
that co-opt and define the sensory process of life-regulation (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013). Such 
internal ‘top-down’ and external ‘bottom-up’ cognitive processes are a composites of attending in a 
duel-processing model towards life-regulation; sometimes harmonious, sometimes discordant. Clark 
has referred to this as ‘predictive processing’ (Clark, 2015). 
Rather than Affordance as a perception of simplistic animal-environment autonomy, perception 
becomes attention to the processes of Noë’s accessibility, agency, an agent-environment autonomy 
for a predicted future. 
In developing functional Affordance as a ‘conscious’ model of ecological function (as any perception 
model must be), it must not only represent simplistic function through sensory management, but 
also be able to accommodate top-down agential processes. If not able to define a consciousness, 
functional Affordance must at least provide an adequate explanation for why and how an 
‘awareness of attention’ as a cognitive processes for perception, might become ecologically selected 
for. 
This is the fundamental requirement in ecological science, that if theoretical models of perception 
are to be considered functional, then they must be naturalised21; 
“it must be shown that the affordance-ability self-organizing, autonomous system and the autopoietic 
nervous system jointly constitute a higher order self-organizing, autonomous system” (Chemero, 2008, 
p268). 
                                                          
21 Naturalised, theory set with Universality (i.e. perception coupled with the laws of nature). 
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 The Dilemma of Non-Symbolic Representation 
In rejecting pre-specified networks of symbolic representation in favour of a naturalised ‘ethological’ 
approach to perception (one of animal-agential embodied sense and sense-making), then meaning 
must still be built on ‘some’ foundation (Glenberg, Havas, Becker & Rinck, 2005). Glenburn et al. 
argue  that consciousness can’t come from ‘meaningless’ symbolisms that are just collected or 
experienced.  If not pre-specified, then meaning must be grounded somewhere.  
Though this hints again at a causal platform, we should avoid labelling specification or grounding as 
causal, but consider it as function in terms of its application rather than any neural-modality 
(Karmiloff‐Smith, 2009). It may be possible, however, to consider some behavioural pre-specification 
for cognition (we are born able to breath, along with other traits of our genetic heritage); we then 
build on these traits through experience. This is a neuro-constructivism in brain function (Plunkett, 
Karmiloff‐Smith, Bates, Elman & Johnson, 2006; Spencer, Blumberg, McMurray, Robinson, 
Samuelson & Tomblin, 2009). One that offers a way forward beyond the necessity for any 
dispositional (and as we have discussed, philosophically dis-functional) representation in cognitive 
processes. 
This requires consideration of the brain’s organisation not of one of fixed modularity, but one of a 
dynamic, adaptable holism (Anderson, 2016; Karmiloff‐Smith, 2009). A neural-network that responds 
within the constraints of its genetic heritage but is able to adapt to the situated demand with a 
contextual intent – the internal shaping the perception. This reappraisal of a functional flexibility 
holds the promise of an amalgam between symbolic-representation (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007) and 
dynamic-complexity (Bates, Elman, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi & Plunkett, 1998).  
By naturalising cognitive function through ecological engagement, we pursue an ethological 
perspective for “continuous sensorimotor interaction between an organism and its environment” 
(Cisek & Kalaska, 2010, pg270), requiring a ‘functionality’ to perception, one that ‘grounds’ symbolic-
representation in a landscape of agent-environment autonomy. 
 Modelling Agent-Environment Autonomy in Cognitive Processes 
One such area of research in the mid-twentieth century that has seemed to offer an autonomy to 
the modelling of action and behaviour, was the adopting of ‘symbolic’ computerisation, as a model 
for neural representational (Marr, 1982; Turing, 1936; Von Neumann, 1945). 
 “It is worth mentioning, that the neurons of the higher animals are deﬁnitely elements in the above 
sense” (Von Neumann, 1945). 
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Such an ‘abstract’ processing through a computational ‘model-based’ approach seemed to provide 
an alternative cognitive determinism displacing the dominant psychology of behaviourism (for 
example, Skinner, 1953). However, such mechanisms of symbolic input, memory and output, provide 
only a rigid-model; Though cognitive science ‘seemingly’ promised a way into the  cognitive ‘black 
box’22 of behaviourism, it is limited by the necessity of a priori dispositional representations. 
Such a ‘model-based’ approach, might then be considered within an alternative ‘model-free’ 
approach (free in terms of set or ‘fixed’ symbolic or dispositional-representations). Here, trial and 
error mechanisms (mistake contingent feedback), are action-driven through value derived inputs 
(see, Anderson, 2016; Dayan & Daw, 2008; Gläscher, Daw, Dayan & O'Doherty, 2010). This provides 
a ‘generative’ representation of ecological-value through action-control, one offering an alternative 
to the reductionism of cognitive science by aligning cognitive function with a value-driven behaviour. 
This is a dynamic ‘Self-Organising’ of function in ecological engagement (this will be explored in 
depth in 2.26 – Free Energy and Entropy: The Physics of Biological Function, p65); 
“time-dependent kinematics and dynamics of ecological engagement” (Warren, 2006, p359). 
 
 Ecological Control as a Functional Affordance 
Such free-modelling as functional towards neural processes necessitates ‘situated’ ecological cues to 
be accommodated in an internal representation, and a control of agential action towards ecological 
value. This is a ‘forward projection’ in representation, a ‘predictive-processing’ (Clark, 2013).  
Functional Affordance offers such a generative proposition in its Effectivity, but might be considered 
as limited or heavy in its ‘capability’ requirements (in representing sensory information towards 
modelling future states). However, when considered through Self-Organisation Theory, Effectivity as 
a generative-model is ‘lightened’ through only being required to represent model-free sensory 
information within an immediate sphere of reference: “the world is its own best model”  (Brooks, 
1991, p15). 
                                                          
22 The Black Box criticism: The inability of behaviourism to account for cognitive processes has long been used 
as a criticism in its lack of internal (cognitive) methodologies. Though the disposition of cognitive science has 
been largely discredited, Behaviourism in its ethological focus is now finding validity in observations of 
behavioural-coupling with cognitive function in dynamical systems (Chemero, 2009; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; 
Clark, 2013; Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner & Kiebel, 2010; Kelso, 1995).  
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What emerges is a ‘finitude of function’ from the multitude of possibility (Cisek, 2007). This is a 
representation of agential expectation, an expectation frugally weighted on past experience and 
continually compared against the sensory feedback of ‘acting out’ that expectation; 
 “learning of complex coordination dynamics is achieved by maximizing the amount of predictive 
information present in sensorimotor loops” (Clark, 2013, p12) 
There must be23 a divergence, a difference, between the generative expectation and the sensory 
experience; therefore, a generative free-model is an error contingent model (contingent on 
biological-value). It is in the effectiveness of both tolerating and adapting to such ‘freedom’ that 
‘divergence’ and ‘biological-value’ come to define a generative model-free approach to perception 
functioning. 
This parallel processing of generative and sensory representation drives dynamic, value-contingent 
actions as affective behavioural responses in order to reduce the ‘divergence’ state between a priori 
generative and sensory models, the dynamic redefining or emergence of adaptive function via the 
dynamic flow of information in a cognitive-landscape. This is an ongoing, iterative process, a 
dynamic self-generation of a perceptual generative ‘now’ contextual on an expectation (the past) 
towards a posterior future;  
“This generative model is decomposed into a likelihood (the probability of sensory data, given their 
causes) and a prior (the a priori probability of those causes). Perception then becomes the process of 
inverting the likelihood model (mapping from causes to sensations) to access the posterior 
probability of the causes, given sensory data (mapping from sensations to causes)” (p129, Friston, 
2010).  
Expectation as affective behaviour from agential and situational motivations. An agency biased on 
cognitive capability (Effectivity) to ecological interaction (an Affordance-event). 
Cisek and Kalaska (2010, p275), further support Effectivity through a “pragmatic representation” of 
ecological engagement: the need for a system of ecological value to respond to the dynamic flow of 
experience within the efficiency24 of a model-free approach. This approach, combining Effectivity in 
a soft-assembly of resonant ecological interaction, avoids a ‘too heavy’ a representational model 
reliance through a ‘flow’ of cognitive function and Self-Organisation (Gläscher et al., 2010; Kello & 
                                                          
23 No prediction of future events will be perfect, either due to the agential paucity or the infinite vagaries of 
dynamic interactions. 
24 A ‘cognitive efficiency’ was first commented on by Hughlings Jackson (1884). 
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Van Orden, 2009). This suggests a perspective of an embodied, ecological cognition, where both 
model ‘emotionally-biased’ and model-free systems are seen in an action-synergy towards dynamic 
environments: 
“adaptive behaviour does not consist in coordinated movement per se but in goal- directed action 
that is tailored to the environment. Hence, a few control variables must be left free to vary, which 
may be regulated by perceptual information. Thus, an action is some function of the current state of 
the action system together with informational variables, according to a law of control”  (Warren, 
2006, p366)  
This is a composite constructivism grounded on a priori cognitions (an Effectivity of innate-
behaviours and learnt-experience); cognitions that are projected towards a possible future and then 
tested through ecological engagement – a predictive-processing model of model-based tolerance 
and adaptive model-free function, in a dynamic world of action choices (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Clark, 
2015). 
Such an iterative representation in its parallel-processing of sensory and contextual information, 
compensates for both the dispositional-fallibilities of fixed models or schemas, and the knowledge-
paucity of free-models, by accommodating dynamic function through a ‘tolerance’ towards 
ecological engagement. This presents a self-referencing and self-generating model, one grounded on 
sensory engagement but contingent on contextual agency: This is a generative end-point (Won & 
Hogan, 1995), an outcome-expectation of cognitive function for optimising (dynamic) biological-
value. One that might be considered through a selectionist model that demands an ecological-
tolerance prerogative to expectation-divergence. 
 Complex Behaviour in Dynamical Systems 
Such free-modelling presents a cognition contingent on value through dynamic engagement, a value 
represented through tolerance to divergence or surprise; a probabilistic future for biological systems 
and the necessity of maintaining of a biological-value homeostasis within such dynamical demands 
(Bak, 1997; Dayan & Daw, 2008; Friston, 2010; McCune, 2006; Northoff & Hayes, 2011; Prigogine, 
1996). Here probability approximations from complexity theory permit a parallel-processing in the 
representation of a divergence between the expected and the encountered. This probabilistic ‘state’ 
is a cognitive-function has been explored through the qualitative coupling of behaviour for cognition, 
in dynamical theory (Iberall, 1970; Kello & Van Orden, 2009; Kelso, 1995; Zanone, Kostrubiec, 
Albaret J & Temprado J, 2010).  
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Such descriptions of neural network function25, allows us to consider the validity of generative 
optimisation models: They represent a function of work or energy minimisation and an 
‘optimisation’ propensity towards functional equilibrium (to reduce the divergence signal through 
affective behaviour). This action and representation cycle self-references on itself to minimise 
divergence and is congruent with the 2nd Law of thermodynamics; a dissipation of dynamic variability 
towards an equilibrium of stability as an invariant end-point. However, in dynamic environments, 
new variance or surprise does not allow such linear function, a static stability cannot be the desired 
end-point for affective behaviour. What is required for divergence is ever more divergence as a 
dynamic actuality (see, 2.35.3 – Divergent Criticality: Functional in Entropic Tolerance, p81), this 
demands a tolerance-capability ‘optimisation’ as the desired end-point or selectionist outcome26. 
Affective behaviour might be better explored through a ‘Tolerance Optimisation’ function in 
dynamic environments, for the maintenance of biological stability across time. 
 Efficiency in function as a measure of Tolerance 
Generative models, by allowing dynamic stability to ‘emerge’ through cognitive processes associated 
with complexity theory, is an approach that allows a real-time interactive coordination-dynamics, 
deemed as ‘informationally’ dominant  (Haken, Kelso & Bunz, 1985; Kelso, 1995). This 
representational perspective is one supporting a cognitive-landscape as an agential-environment 
interaction. However, there is still a disconnect between such agential ‘autopoiesis’27 and a 
mechanism that is able to objectively regarded as a naturalistic process, an ethological and 
intentionality requirement (Chemero, 2008). We, therefore, look to the lack of naturalistic 
                                                          
25 Complexity and Dynamical System theory, are manifestations of the functioning of free-energy principles, in 
particular the 2nd law of thermodynamics and non-linear, far from (classical) equilibrium functioning. This 
branch of physics is more often referred to in the pejorative term, Non-linear Dynamical Systems theory. 
26 A selectionist end-point is the function or behaviour that evolutionary principles will select (adaptations) for. 
This see selectionist principles sometime select less than obvious agential behaviours: see ‘The Selfish Gene’ 
(Dawkins, 2006), and Game Theory (Maynard Smith, 1982), e.g. Altruism and empathy, and maybe now – 
‘tolerance optimisation’ with is not an efficient proposition of the now, but an insuring of future surprise in a 
dynamic world. 
27 Autopoiesis refers to the unique self-organising individuality of biological physicality over physical form – an 
agency towards stability in existence (Thompson, 2007; Varela & Maturana, 1972; Varela et al., 1991).  
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grounding, criticisms to dynamical theory that have not yet been adequately addressed (Chemero, 
2013; Chialvo, 2010). Can these direct a possible way forward to address these Universality issues? 
Non-linear Dynamical Systems (NDS) theory suggests an efficiency in optimisation by providing 
‘frugality in function’, but is open to the criticism of being one-dimensional as “mirroring the medium 
rather than expressing the mechanism” (Warren, 2006, p361). This misses accounting for the 
‘agential-imperative’ of a composite function and a “communication frugality” (Clark, 2013, p22). By 
addressing this lack of a suitable definition between differing states of agential-perception 
(phenomenology) and function, we should again address the agent-environment ‘outcome-delivery’ 
of biological-value for a truly ‘dynamic’ functional proposition. Tolerance again acts as the functional 
end-point, a ‘mechanism over the medium’ and one that is able to accommodate ‘less than optimal’ 
function inherent in any subjective agency (the top-down ‘intentionality’ within all dynamic models).  
Ecological optimisation, then, in a composite model of neural function for biological-value, might be 
better addressed through its ‘functional tolerance’ in acknowledging the agential-inefficiency 
towards a generative divergence model. Tolerance towards inefficiency becomes relational to the 
functional capabilities of the agent as a tolerance parametrised within the agential capability or 
Effectivity. Importantly this as a functional-definition rather than a feature-definition, therefore 
transcends the perceptual-subjectivity by providing a contextual measure of functional efficiency to 
situated ecological demands. A relative state of efficiency in function – one able to be compared 
‘relatively’ to other functional efficiencies and therefore, provide coordinative definition.  
Regardless of the composite of function (agential or situated) Effectivity-tolerance provides such a 
coordinating-definition of an ‘efficiency in function’. This is compositely-encapsulated however, as a 
state of ‘relative’ Effectivity that is dependent on the interplay in dominance between agential and 
situated interdependence: The state of a Effectivity becomes ‘relative’ as an outcome-state that will 
be able to be objectively-defined functionally through this relative outcome. 
If we recognise that a selectionist paradigm sees agential-environment autonomy reflecting the 
environments they are situated in (i.e. niche-defined), therefore, a perception of relative Effectivity 
may also be considered as dynamically-defined: Environments of greater dynamic demand, will 
require greater tolerance functionality. This sees agential perception orientated towards Tolerance 
Optimisation, a selectionist proposition. 
 Mechanisms of Control: Affective Behaviour for Ecological Tolerance 
It is possible to propose a Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis and trace niche-defined affective 
behaviour(s) from the first cellular proto-types of chemico kenestics and chemico-taxis, to complex 
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affective-behaviours for life-regulation, reaction and a perception of agency have manifested 
themselves (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Panksepp & Biven, 2012): It is in 
the propensity for action as value-oriented, that a predictive hypothesis may be exprapolated to an 
affective-behavioural ‘drive’ moderated by ecological engagement and mediated by agential goal-
orientation (Damasio, 2010; Panksepp, 1998, 2003; Thompson, 2007). In defining such a drive, we 
address the paucity in aligning agent and environment within a functional mechanism for 
perception, Warren’s call for “ … a law of control”  (2006, p366). 
When considering dynamic environments, the parameters of such an affective drive will still need to 
operate within ecological value, but a Tolerance Optimisation outcome takes the system to the edge 
of  efficiency function, as, in Non-linear Dynamical Systems, it is at this ‘state of function’ that 
greatest ‘future’ tolerane in produced in the increase in Complexity and Criticality.The Tolernace 
hypothesis is one for future ‘dynamic’ ecological robustness. The agent-environment at the edge of 
control rather than the comfort of control (see, 3.7 – Affective Behaviour for a Divergent Criticality 
Hypothesis, p107). 
We might reasonably question to what extent agential-mediation is in effect in such affective-
behaviour?  Such questions are to be explored in the ‘nature’ of the construct of cognitive-processes 
towards tolerance: Perception emerges as an ‘affective’ agential perogative congruent with affective 
drives and behaviour, an agential perception of ecological functioning. This suggests a perceptual-
awareness from such cognitive-processes predicated on agency and encounter (Berridge & 
Kringelbach, 2013; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Clark, 2013; Craig, 2014; Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Niv, 
Daw, Joel & Dayan, 2007; Northoff & Hayes, 2011; Pessoa, 2013; Schroeder, Wilson, Radman, 
Scharfman & Lakatos, 2010; Van Orden et al., 2011; Wilson, Laidlaw, Butler, Hofmann & Bowman, 
2006; Zahm, Parsley, Schwartz & Cheng, 2013).  
A seemingly simple ‘value-contingent’ mechanism that ‘drives’ perception function to the ‘edge of 
control’ (Tolerance hypothesis), may now be aligned with more complex neural-moderation and 
mediation as ‘intentional’ (Bandura, 2001; Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Ryan & Grant, 2009; Walker, 
Brooks & Holden-Dye, 1996). Damasio (2010, p92) describes perception through affective-cognitions 
as “action programmes encoded by emotion”.  
Perceptions, might then be considered, emotionally-constructed cognitive processes that ‘become’ 
as a phenomena, but are a subjectively-constructed percept of a state of affective-functioning. 
Perceptions ‘become’ states of tolerance in function defined through agential goals and neural 
efficiency in approaching those goals. 
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 Tolerance as a Neural Efficiency  
The dynamic prerogative for a cognitive functioning of parallel-processing, demands an amalgam 
between environment, agency and an innate ‘drive’ for ecological engagement. This innate drive 
assists somewhat in framing Chemero’s and Warren’s call for a functional or naturalistic 
‘mechanism’ of Affordance and therefore, perception. Such a mechanism should be grounded (on 
biological-value) and phenomenologically moderated as a cognitive-emotional process (Chemero, 
2008; Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp & Biven, 2012; Warren, 2006).  
Functional Affordance in defining a Tolerance hypothesis provides a situated, affective perception, 
biased by agential mediation28.  
 
 Generative Models of Representation 
Generative models immerse the agent in ecological interaction, allowing for the emergence of 
regularities in cognition and behaviour, a complementary synergy of “stability and flexibility” for 
perception (Warren, 2006, p358). 
Phenomenological or ‘higher-order generative processes’ are the evolution of ever more complex-
cognitive-processes or ‘perceptions’ towards life-regulation. This is reflected in ever more dynamic 
ecologies through ever more complex composite processes. Such processes and perceptions that 
may be considered ‘grounded’ in affective-behaviour (life-regulatory drives) and made emotional-
cognisant in a value-orientated agency and action (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013). Perception then, 
becomes defined by affective-behavioural ‘programmes’ or drives for action, regulated by cognitive-
emotional agency in relation to ecological-value. 
Such a selectionist proposition would see affective cognitions that optimised not only for the 
present, but be able to anticipate and optimise future situations. Such anticipation sees agency as a 
‘top-down’ drive, an agency that amalgamates ‘bottom-up’ situated with contextually-generated 
cognitive processes towards a tolerance optimum. 
                                                          
28 For example, the cognitive experience of Disgust, an innate affective-behaviour associated with ecological 
value (such as the mouth-closing effect to sour or stringent foods that would have posed a biological-cost or 
threat – poisoned or ‘off’ food): These affective cognitions may be experientially mediated as is observed in 
cultural-learning bias. e.g., Some cultures give great value (pleasure) to some food-stuffs (rotten fish / 
fermented lactic proteins [cheese]), whilst other cultures are disgusted to the point of vomiting (see, Curtis, 
Aunger & Rabie, 2004). 
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How such a ‘generative’ composite of bottom-up and top-down cognitions is attended-to requires 
the following questions be answered: how and what does ‘attention’ find salient and how does the 
brain model this information? An attending and attention of cognitive processes for a perception.  
Knudsen (2007), approaches such attentional prerogatives through resource-biasing along 
situational and contextual pathways:  
1) Bottom-Up stimulus; situational information-cues from and of ecological-engagement. 
 
2) Top-Down cognitions; contextual-information ‘generated’ by our own neural apparatus.  
 
These notions are now explored further in order to operationalise a mechanism of function for a 
perception of ecological tolerance.  
 
 Cognitive Processes of Attention 
From a broad ethological perspective, Panksepp (1998) and Pessoa (2013) consider that cognitions 
are fundamentally emotional-constructs from an affective-behavioural base. Panksepp and Biven 
(2012) extrapolate further: in that the foundations of such affective-behavioural cognitions are 
‘innate’ life-regulatory drives for engaging with the environment29, action motivations that become 
emotionally affective as cognitions (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013). Therefore an attention for 
engagement and action-control would see emotionally adapted cognitions contextually acted out 
within a situated ecological landscape. 
“action programme and the respective feeling are often referred to by the same name, although they 
are distinct phenomena. Thus ‘fear’ can refer to either an emotion [the set of programmed 
physiological actions triggered by a fear-inducing stimulus] or a feeling [the conscious experience of 
fear]” (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013, p144). 
Attention, then, as an agential emotional-construct of action and control is grounded by a bottom-
up actuality of being in a situated landscape of experience. Therefore attention might be described 
through action-control as an ‘informed’ agency:  That is to say, bottom-up attention mediated by 
top-down agency becomes an informed, generated – action goal. 
                                                          
29 Evolutionary affective behaviours such as; seeking, playing, lustful reproduction, nurturing, fear, anger, etc. 
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 A Parallel Processing of Information 
This resource-biasing through a bottom-up sensory approach to perception, is one that resonates 
with Panksepp (2003) in its ethological bases, but also accommodates the functional duality in being 
sensory ‘and’ action orientated (Hickok, 2014). This is an informational-perspective to perception: 
‘informed’ attentional processes as a composite construct of attention, an ecological-cognition from 
the environmental ‘information’ transponded through sensory apparatus30, then integrated within 
an internally generated affective-emotional model (Clark, 2013; Craig, 2014). 
Much research had viewed attention as a cause and effect paradigm, where neurons were viewed as 
either sensory-responsive (causal) or motor-active (effect), a cognitive entrainment to action as a 
perception (Hickok, 2014). Such linearity has been challenged through the need for cognitive  
(parallel) processes in a perception function to accommodate both situated and contextual neural-
information (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi & Rizzolatti, 1996; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; 
Schall, 2004). In advocating the increasing recognition of the role of action ‘selection’ in information 
processing, control theories for perception should be reappraised and “viewed from an ethological 
perceptive” (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010, pg16) if to be considered, truly ecological.  
It would seem that two worlds are brought together through the engagement of the individual with 
the environment: an internal agential-representation ‘grounded’ in sensory information for the best 
Biological-Value. These parallel processes generate an affective cognitive perception as a generative 
representation. Here attentional-bias within such a composite is defined by the resonance between 
the internal representations and external information (engagement informed). Ecological resource-
biasing requires a  generative-attention to be value oriented in accordance with biological-value; 
therefore engagement behaviour becomes ‘affective’ as emotionally-constructed cognitions of 
bottom-up and top-down processing (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Panksepp & Biven, 2012; Pessoa, 
2013). Agential mediation through goal-oriented agency provides for a ‘controlling’ moderation of 
Affective behaviour towards optimal Biological-Value. 
 Attending to a World of Ecological Information 
When perception as Affordance is viewed through feature-change (Chemero et al., 2003), this 
directs us towards neural-processes for information becoming functional through attentional bias 
                                                          
30 Transponders as relating to sensory information receivers (of information as electro-chemical signals). These 
manifestations of energy (e.g. pressure for hearing and touch; light-waves for vision; chemical-potentials for 
smell and taste, etc.) are turned into the electro-chemical language of the brain. 
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towards that feature-change. We might then ask, how is that information represented through our 
sensory and neural systems, and how do we resonate, control, and agent-ally inform, cognitive 
processes in view of this information complexity? 
Contingent in this exposition, is that, in defining the processes for accessing biological-value 
becomes action-biased and may be explored through an attention-directed approach to such action-
bias. Perception from the ‘Tolerance’ proposition we have outlined in (2.6 – Tolerance and 
Generative Models of Control, p25), is a perception of the information through feature-change 
(divergence) accessible to the individual (Chemero, 2003; Gibson, 1977; Noë, 2004; Stoffregen, 
2000a). Affordance then might be conceived as an perception of ecological engagement from the 
information available ‘and’ the agential capability towards accessing that information. An 
autopoiesis of relational-embodiment of the individual ‘in’ its perceived world, not one ‘of’ 
perceiving its world (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). 
 
 Self-Organisation in Neural Networks – Information is King 
Sensory stimuli for such a bottom-up ‘informing’ of attentional processes might be better considered 
in terms of its information-signature rather than any symbolic representation of the world. This is a 
bottom-up ‘signature’ that is a composite of the cognitively-represented (known) and the unknown 
(surprise). Information is afforded a primacy over any modal representation in the context its 
functionality (Anderson, 2016; Karmiloff‐Smith, 2009) and such a primacy is evident in observations 
of functionality over modality, where efficiency in action and cognition is orientated to the 
information available or accessible (Anderson, 2016; Bach-Y-Rita, Collins, Saunders, White & 
Scadden, 1969; Held & Hein, 1963; Hubel & Wiesel, 2005; Sur, Angelucci & Sharma, 1999; Uttal, 
2011).  
Perception and phenomenological research is pursuing such a ‘grounded information’ approach in 
neural-functions through a radical enactivism approach to perception, movement and cognition 
(see, Kello & Van Orden, 2009; Kelso, 1995; Macklem, 2008; Thompson, 2007; Van Orden et al., 
2011; Wallot & Van Orden, 2011; Zanone & Kostmbiec, 2004). Increasingly, perception and 
behaviour is being found to be influenced by a primacy of the information-accuracy. Attention as a 
cognition embodied for ‘information’, allows the consideration of neural function through such 
information theory, the functioning of perception as the efficiency of the information to function. In 
cognitive processes for perception it seems – ‘information’ is king.  
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This study looks at cognitions and behaviours in terms of such ‘neural-function’ towards information 
over representational-symbolism or modality (Karmiloff‐Smith, 2009). This is a function of neural-
efficiency towards ecological information, requiring that we question previous ‘cognitive science’ as 
symbolic processes and therefore, cannot fundamentally represent the complexity in function 
needed for an ecological perspective of biological-value for perception31.  
In this study, Self-Organisation is explored as a self-informed ‘fundamental mechanism’ of 
information function for biological-value. This is seen agential behaviour and cognition where Self-
Organising criticality drives ecological engagement and will be hypothesised to provide a mechanism 
for a Tolerance hypothesis for perception. 
 
 Representing the Information 
The essence of an ecological perception is one of function and control in relation to the ecological 
determinants. This is achieved through an information ‘stability’ concept in non-symbolic 
representation, information that the brain uses to decipher, predict and resonant in its sensory 
engagement with the world. 
Though we reject the linear processing of information, we are still able to employ the conceptual 
schemas and ‘arcs’ of Hebbian networks (1949), but these should be conceived as whole brain 
representations of flowing functionality (Anderson, 2016). This sees a ‘perception’ as attention, 
through the representation of bottom-up sensory information informing an agential capability to 
feature-change, through top-down mediation and moderation. Though such an ‘information’ 
approach implies a mechanistic processes, an approach that should be cautioned against as ‘quasi-
computational’ by Cisek and Kalaska (2010), it is in the considering of a Self-Organising resonance 
between agential goals and information-function that an ‘attentional-mechanism’ allows a 
                                                          
31 The dominance of this computational approach may have obscured more fundamental mechanisms for 
cognition and behaviour by tying to constrain informational divergence rather than tolerance it. Uttal (2011) 
similarly appraises much of our current brain research as an over-reliance on positivistic approaches to 
scientific inquiry, how are we to be able to determine network-input with network-output in such network of 
biological complexity31 (Burton, 2008; Stein, 2013). The computational specificity of Cognitive Science that 
hoped to  validate cognitions as causal effective, provides only causal-description be it of ever of more 
refinement and reduction 
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theoretical-space for a perception of agency and intentionality. A perception embodied for 
information: 
“patterns of activity, and cognition as a process in which a network of connections settles into a 
particular state depending on the input it has received and the connection weightings it has”  
(Shapiro, 2010, p47) 
 Information, Accuracy and Agency 
Affordance as feature-change (an Affordance event or surprise) may be electrochemically 
represented as an information signature, and it is the ‘quality’ of knowing, (our capability in 
representing that information), where we might conceive of an ‘accuracy’ in neural function towards 
biological-value. This is our neural-efficiency towards representing the information accurately, a 
neural-efficiency that creates a ‘stability’ or equilibrium point, ‘constructed’ through a composite of 
bottom-up and top-down information (or more accurately self-emerges, see, 2.33.2 – Local 
Criticality in Self-Organising Dynamical Systems, p77). This representation is then given salience 
through the accuracy of situational adherence to that stability-point, a mistake-contingent 
divergence in the flow of situational information. 
A functional-efficiency towards biological-value is a representation of the accuracy in this 
conveyance of the external (situated) information to the internal-generated representation. This 
allows an agential (capability) measure of accuracy towards an Affordance event as an agent-
environment perception, an autonomous proposition. 
In describing perception through informed agency as information-stability, the equilibrium point 
may be considered an agential end-point (Won & Hogan, 1995). Perception as attentional-stability 
(or more accurately, the divergence from stability-equilibrium) comes to represent the perturbation 
from that agential ‘end-point’. In considering attentional processes defined through ‘agency-
accuracy’, we can consider a perception of attention with regards to a ‘tolerance’ to such divergence 
from that agency end-point. Generative agential ‘stabilities’ become predictive agency end-point 
goals, and engagement informs the accuracy of such generative-representations, a perception 
through the divergence of internal representation and external actuality. 
Rather the symbolic-representation of the information, this definition allows a neural efficiency 
function ‘making’ a perception rather than any ‘taking’ a perception from the world. Perception 
becomes a process of feature-change information represented in terms of the quality of its agential 
information capability. Efficiency in cognitive-function towards feature-change is seen as a moment 
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of percept-stability in the flow of information, an ‘episodic’ moment as a state of functional 
Affordance. 
This amalgam of a ‘sensed’ and ‘agential’ perception construct, ‘tolerated’ in its accuracy of 
representing the information flow (a mistake contingent model), will form the bases of a neural-
efficiency towards resonating with the information for biological-value. Indeed it will set the 
foundations for perception as an attentional construct as a state of Effectivity-tolerance to the 
ecological information engaged with; 
“Each perceptual system orients itself in appropriate ways for the pick-up of environmental 
information, and depends on the orienting system of the whole body ………. they serve to explore the 
information” (Gibson, 1966, p58) 
Effectivity-tolerance implies a relationship between ecological information and neural-
representation that can never be, perfectly resonant. There will always be the different. Any 
information-signature therefore will be distorted by ‘noise’ and is at best, a ‘probable’ 
representation.  
This probabilistic quality of representation relies on; the degrees of capability in our situative 
Effectivity and agential context. Noë (2009) refers to this as an ‘Accessibility’. However, as a 
composite construct, this is still encapsulated in the Effectivity or cognitive-capability of the 
individual’s ‘available’ neural-stabilities32  to constrain the degrees of freedom presented in any 
feature-change.  
As Effectivity defines neural tolerance as a state of cognitive-efficiency toward life-effectiveness, 
Tolerance comes to represent the functional ‘attending’ to situated sensory and contextual agential 
information in order to utilise biological-value. A functional Affordance then, is the resonate-
relationship between our Effectivity-capabilities and the dynamic demands of ecological 
engagement – the informational environments of; the situation, the social and the self. 
                                                          
32 Perceptibility might be considered as one description of the ‘agential’ end points (top-down goal oriented) 
of neural stability. These become better defined in the concept of relative Effectivities to reflect the agential 
inhibition on Effectivity. As a perception, is able to be modelled in a reduced Voluntary Control (Control and 
the Agency of Voluntary Control, p62). 
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 Perception an Attending to Ecological Tolerance 
A perception as a temporal information-state, then, is a ‘moment’ in neural processing as perception 
‘flows’ through and an ecology of feature-change in a flow of cognition precepts: temporal states of 
efficiency-functioning defined through Efficiency-tolerance.  
Our senses, rather than internalising a reflection of an external world, are better conceived as 
‘transponders’ detecting ecological information, that is then attended and cognitively-constructed 
into goal-oriented action for ecological engagement. This is a perception of tolerating ecological 
engagement and agential mediation whilst maintaining biological-value. 
 
 Perception as an Attentional Awareness State 
Attention, then, as a neuro-psychological description may be considered a cognitive-construct of 
competing neural resources. This is a biased ‘attending’ of top-down and bottom-up cognitive 
processes towards to ‘salient’ information (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Clark, 2013; Milner & Goodale, 
1995). This differentiation of ‘attending’ and ‘attention’ hints at the biases that might affect such 
attending and salience, the cognitive-resource processes towards a perception of ecological 
tolerance.  
By considering an ecological tolerance directs us towards exploring the construct of ‘attention’ 
through naturalistic and ethologically value propositions (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010) and to adopting an 
agential approach to neural processing (Chemero, 2009). Such a competitive, agential and as we 
shall see, hierarchical, composite of attention processes has been widely documented across many 
affective domains: e.g. physical performance (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007; Miyake & 
Friedman, 2012; Wilson, 2008); neural function (Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert & Viding, 2004)  (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974; Posner & Boies, 1971); social interaction (Graziano, 2013); motivation and interest 
(Chen, Darst & Pangrazi, 2001a; Deci, 1992); learning (Illeris, 2003b; Knudsen, 2007). What seems 
ubiquitous across such diverse reporting is that attentional-bias is both ecologically-situative and 
relationally-contextual (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Franchak & Adolph, 2014; Schroeder et al., 2010).  
 Attention Models of Composite Construct and Control 
Hardy and Fazey (1987) presented such  a composite of cognitive and physiological demand through 
attentional processes as affective on behaviour (performance). This was formulated as an alternative 
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to the historical ‘Inverted U hypothesis’ (Yerks & Dobson, 1908), of cognitive habit forming learning 
and physiological demand (electric shock)33. 
However, since its initial psychological-physiological application, attempting to incorporate cognitive 
top-down demand into physiological performance, Hardy, Beattie and Woodman (2007) have 
encountered a richer and more complex landscape of cognitive-physiological interaction and 
confounding function (see Discussion, 8.4.3 – Divergent Criticality: Contributions to Cusp 
Catastrophe Theory, p229).Though the attentional constructs in the Hardy and Fazey (1987) 
Catastrophe model takes account of interdependent cognitive constructs (the influence of either 
top-down or bottom-up cognitive processes), this model might be critiqued as a static landscape, 
one that does not adequately account for the dynamic effects of these attentional biases on 
cognitive resources (Cohen, Pargman & Tenenbaum, 2003; Tenenbaum & Becker, 2005). That is to 
say, that though the catastrophe model (below, Figure 11) ‘seems’ to accommodate attentional 
demands and agential mediations (in an anxiety construct), this is done in fixed landscape of situated 
‘physiological arousal’ and contextual ‘cognitive anxiety’ – the ‘performance surface’ is seen as 
static). As we shall see, in Self-Organisation, a more dynamic ‘landscape of function’ needs to be 
considered, one that reflects the double edged sword of agential cognitions on function: the 
reducing of attentional resources for bottom-up surprise, but also, top-down demand on attentional 
resources changing the profile of the  functional catastrophe performance-surface. 
However, the recognition of performance (surface) parameters in Catastrophe models (Thom & 
Fowler, 1975; Zeeman, 1976), does allow us to consider parameters as efficient functioning in action 
from attentional processes of cognition (e.g., Figure 11, below). A perception for efficient attention 
and control. 
  
                                                          
33 It should be noted that these experiments were conducted on rodents. With the application of Divergent Criticality in a 
Tolerance hypothesis we are able to offer an ethological perspective to these results that aligns the inconsistencies that 
inspired the catastrophe model of attentional behaviours.  
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Figure 11 – From Inverted U Model (Yerks & Dobson, 1908) to the Catastrophe Model adapted from 
(Zeeman, 1976) 
 Attention and Control  
As an agential construct for ecological engagement, attention has been described as the action-
control of seeking of stability through intentional ‘end-effect’ actions (Merton, 1972; Rothwell, 
2012). An agential control that has been described as a Voluntary Control by Van Orden et al. (2011) 
One necessitating action or action-control to achieve that ‘end-effect’.  
Such action-control has seen a re-application of Motor Theory, a theory originated from research in 
language perception (Galantucci, Fowler & Turvey, 2006; Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler & Studdert-
Kennedy, 1967). Motor Theory as a perception for the ‘control’ of action, is a perception theory of 
sense and action to engage and facilitate biological-value in a world of opportunities and threats.  
It views cognitive-processes as a complex synergy of control variables and recognises the interplay of 
both internally generated variables and ecologically entrained variables for action to be constructed 
in the maintenance of a cognitive ‘efficiency in action’. In defining thresholds of efficient-function in 
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these interrelated variables, an ‘Equilibrium Point’ (Feldman, 1986, 2011), is a stability ‘controlled-
for’ in an equilibrium of information processing (this will be explored as a entropy steady-state in, 
2.30 – Neural Functioning in the Free Energy of Phase: Entropy Principles, p69). This is a theory 
where each variable is influenced and affective on all others through competitive biasing. A stability 
end-point (a finitude of function from the multitude of possibility) is produced from the internal and 
external information available in a Voluntary Control.  
Such self-organisation toward an intentional end-point is a ‘soft-assembly’ of neural function for 
behaviour34 (Kello & Van Orden, 2009). This highlights the perspective of function over form: No set 
‘schema’ or ‘arc’ could account for such end-point stability across so many possible Degrees of 
Freedom. However, a ‘generated’ and iteration of self-organising representation, can, assemble 
body-environment information and attempt to reduce sensory divergence from the perception –
intentionality, in the enactment of that end-point. The agency defines the equilibrium-stability or 
efficiency in function, as much as the Affordance demands on Effectivity. This is the self-organisation 
in agency as a neural-capability towards ecological demand.  
Accordingly, an attentional-model, is a self-organising model of action-control that needs to address 
the core issues of such an end-point stability – what variable(s) become salient and selected for 
efficient control, between the situational demands and agential context (Posner & Boies, 1971). 
 
 Competitive Resources for Action Selection:    
Neuroscientists (Chialvo, 2010; Cisek, 2007; Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010), outline this composite 
demand on neural resources in a functional action model of attention. This is the recognition of not 
only contextual (top-down) and situated (bottom-up) cognitive pathways, but also of the 
interdependence of these pathways working in parallel. Such interdependence becomes agential 
through what has been described as the ‘Executive’ functioning of attentional processes (Baddeley, 
2007; Eysenck et al., 2007; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). It speaks of a cognitive resource-biasing in a 
model of attentional function, as a competitive process for cognitive resources that requires an 
attending to the most salient cognitions for most efficient end-point (outcome) delivery. These are 
                                                          
34 End-point or goal soft-assembly can be graphically demonstrated in the completion of a personal signature 
(Strawson, 1959): Whether on paper or on a wall, essentially the same signature is created in the face of the 
many ‘different’ degrees of freedom available through differing body-environment variables as a stability end-
point in intentional action 
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processes of frugality and optimisation in neural function and a tolerance towards the cognitive 
demands made on attention. It is this ecological ‘Tolerance’, that defines effective neural-function 
for biological-value and allows us to consider ‘attention’ and ‘biological-value’ as constructs of an 
efficiency-biased perception (Clark, 2015).  
 
 Affective Bottom-Up and Top-Down Cognitions  
Action-selection might then be considered as an affective-cognitive accommodating the parallel, 
situational and contextual pathways (bottom-up and top-down), for an attention of composite-
complexity. If selection pressures favour increasingly agential contextual-complexity, then 
increasingly complex contextual constructs of agential cognition would be selected for; If the 
environment demands situational interest, then bottom-up cognitions would become dominant.  
Importantly here we can surmise, that increasingly dynamic environments would select for greater 
tolerance via greater anticipation and intentionality towards future oriented goals (stability end-
point) for biological-value. We see here intentionality increasingly becoming a dynamic driver of 
ecological tolerance in increasingly dynamic environments. One extreme example of this composite 
selection is the behaviour of a Sea Squirt (Llinas, 1989). Here a neuronal network is present in sea-
squirt lave, as they search for an environment that optimises their biological Effectivity. When such 
an ‘ideal’ niche has been found, the sea squirt stops moving, buries its head in the sand and then 
ingests its own brain as it no longer requires such a complex contextual response to access optimum 
biological-value. This highlights several ecological determinants on cognition processes: a) the 
importance of neuronal-networks for a composite of agential (parallel) processing – a perception of 
agential action; b) It illustrates the biological-cost such a complex function – agential function is 
inefficient to biological-value as top-down cognitions are expensive: there must be an overall (goal 
oriented) benefit and therefore; c) Dynamic environments ‘demands’ agency in goal-oriented 
cognitive constructs to present better future biological-value via a greater ecological tolerance. 
What should be noted from a any theory for action selection, is that attention is represented as an 
affective-cognition from external information: We imbibe information into our own emotional 
attending. This should not be confused with an ‘awareness’ of attention, indeed, as such, this is an 
introspective attending to that might be viewed as a non-conscious processing of information. This is 
still a generative approach as the individual ‘brings’ their relational context (an agency of past for 
future to the situated ‘now’). However, if we are to use perceptions the test out Tolerance 
hypothesis, we need to answer Stroffengen’s ‘why’ question: why such introspective attention(s) 
should become known as a perception. Maybe by asking ‘how’ affective cognitions and behaviours 
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become known to us as awareness of attention – perceptions, might allow for perceptions to be 
inferred as attentional processes made cognisant. 
 
 Attending to Attention: Motor Theory as Awareness 
It is in the information application of Motor Theory, that how such attention information may 
become an awareness of attention, a perception of attending to attentional processes  (Hickok, 
2014).  
To be able to attend to an ‘other’s’ proxy experiences, an internally represent from attention to 
external (bottom-up) information, is efficient for an action perception as ‘information at a distance’. 
This is the observation and representation of another’s Affordance state from sensory information-
cues observed of that ‘other’s’ functional state of ecological tolerance. Cues such as facial features, 
warning calls etc. Importantly this is highly valuable information, information that has already been 
attention-distilled by the ‘others’ cognitive processes. This is an end-point cognitive-emotion cue 
without agential engagement and its ecological cost (maybe knowing about a tiger before 
experiencing a tiger!). As an intentionality of cognitive-value from predictive processing, such extra-
perception represents a selectionist saving and therefore tolerance frugality in Ecological Cost. 
This is not mimicry or empathy, but an attending to ecological-information from the attentional or 
functional state of another. Nothing more than the vicarious use of another’s attentional-behaviour, 
just as the many extra-perceptual information-gathering (ecological) opportunities. Another 
information ‘source’ to be agent-utilised such as heat, cold, food, etc. The observer ‘internalises’ the 
information from another’s attention-state for an affective emotional-cognition of their own.  
The informational ecological-landscape, now not only encompasses the physical environment (be in 
inanimate or biological), but allows a societal environment of information to emerge. This has been 
conceptualised in Social Cognitive Theory as a societal agency (Bandura, 1986; Bandura, 2001) 
Such awareness as experienced through the ‘extra’ perception of Affordance-states seems 
ubiquitous; from the entrainment behaviours across the species, warning signals and calls spanning 
many species; to more nuanced emotional-cognitions passed between individuals. Ethnological 
research is seen to support such agential attention to affective-state(s) of others, and is observed in 
societal behaviours seen across species that utilize not only the attention of ‘other’, but many other 
‘societal’ functions of information (for example, Emery & Clayton, 2004; Gómez, 2005; Graziano & 
Kastner, 2011). This has the advantage of inculcating the costly processing-product of another’s 
ecological experiences, into your own intra-perceptive feelings. Attention at a distance, feelings for 
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free. This is a neurally efficient proposition in agential anticipation and therefore, one of selectionist 
value that seems to support an attentional ‘bias’ towards attending to attention (Anderson, 2003; 
Clark, 2013; Craig, 2014; Graziano, 2013; Hickok, 2014).  
Rizzolatti and Gallese (1996) in their action-control research found that neurons considered as 
‘sensing-only’ were also seen to fire as motor-neurons, a seeming duality in modality of neuronal 
function. Though a ‘mirroring’ hypothesis of empathy and altruism is often cited as the purpose of 
such duality in neuronal function (mirror theory – monkey see, monkey do), many of the 
assumptions and assertions that have been made as to the veracity of such mirroring as a shared-
awareness have been found wanting. There seems little direct evidence of such a mirror hypothesis 
as an effective or causal functioning (see, Hickok, 2009; Kilner & Lemon, 2013). 
Rizzolatti’s (et al.) neuronal-duality, fits more comfortably into a ‘motor’ theory interpretation. 
Hickok (2014) has appraised the ‘duality’ seen in neuronal functioning as processes best viewed from 
an ecological information perspective: an ‘Awareness of other’ becomes merely a representational 
information source for agent’s own ecological function (not for the ‘other’ as in an empathetic 
cognition). Hickok views such awareness as; treating another’s attentional state as, just one more 
ecological information source for your own survival, rather than any empathetic ‘awareness’ as in 
mirror-theory.  
It can be conjectured that it is the ‘information’ in such encounters that is observer-affective: You 
may attend to your own ecological needs through an attention process oriented towards another’s 
emotional functioning. Awareness of ‘other’ becomes ‘one’s own’ affective emotional cognitions, 
projected. Again a functional Affordance of individual-environment autonomy. 
As attentional-information (attending to the informational cues from another), has the attentional 
effect of the projection of one’s own attentional-state onto the source. This notion is one of 
perception as a phenomenological perspective (Merleau-Ponty, 1945) and such self-anthropological 
conceit was poetically focused in Nagel’s (1974) “What Is It Like to Be a Bat”: Even though these are 
sensory expositions towards an others agential projections, Nagel succinctly expressed the 
uniqueness and primacy of the individual’s own agential cognitions towards any appraisal of other’s 
state of cognitive function: You do not ‘mirror’ another’s emotions, you can never truly know them, 
you merely project your own attentional-state and associated emotion, towards them.  
Sensory and motor neurons Hickok (2014) suggests, fulfil a duality of function in ‘sensory’ 
information processing and ‘action’ affective-behaviours. This is an important distinction, it moves 
‘perception’ towards cognitive-processes that elicit an awareness through affective processes. Here 
sensory-information from bottom-up information-cues (of other) becomes attentional biased and 
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internalised as an agential (observer) emotional cognitions, an amalgam of sensory and action 
processing for a cognition-emotional ‘affective’ behaviour. Affective behaviour that biases a best 
behavioural outcome by the accuracy of constructing and representing others emotions as self-
agency; stolen emotions able to advance one’s own biological-value. Perception as an awareness 
was ever a truly selfish selectionist-behaviour (Dawkins, 2006). Such an information-approach then is 
able to account for the many iterated affective-behavioural adaptations associated with models of 
societal and evolutionary theory (e.g., see game theory, Maynard Smith, 1974). 
 
 Awareness of Attention – Affective Emotional Cognitions  
One of the biggest issues in a Phenomenology is that of how a consciousness or a perception is made 
subjectively aware. Here we address not the ‘hard’ problem of how consciousness ‘comes to be’, 
[Chalmers’ (1995) ‘a consciousness of self’], but in proposing a possible efficiency-model for 
awareness, we seek to provide a mechanism for such awareness to ‘be’. Not an attempt to unravel 
the complexity of self-consciousness, more so the exploration of a theoretical and conceptual ‘space’ 
for a ‘perception’ as an ‘awareness’, to become. 
How attentional resource bias might result in awareness can be considered through information 
theory: By treating all attention-states as information-states, an ‘attention of other’ becomes an 
information-cue providing the agent with a richer ecological information source of biological-value 
(an agential emotional state built on another’s ecologically-distilled information). This has 
selectionist worth, favouring attending to the outcomes of other’s attentional states, and 
appropriating a cognitive-emotional state of your own (i.e. projecting or externalising your emotion 
to the other). 
However, though the ‘attending’ to other’s attentional-states might allow us to consider attention 
processes as cognitions made feeling or aware, this externalisation merely shifts the problem of 
‘why’ any attention states might be known from the intra-perceptual to the extra-perceptual, as Noë 
puts it (2009, p9) “ the machinery of mind is extended”, but still does not answer why perceptions 
become known to the agent. 
 
We might take this hypothesis of projection-similarity further, however, through a societal-similarity 
hypothesis (Bandura, 2001; Graziano, 2013; Graziano & Kastner, 2011). Such a projection-hypothesis 
is at its most acute and accurate when the projections of ‘our’ attentional-state are in relation to an 
organism of close (species or behaviour) similarity. The accuracy of the attentional projection will 
Literature Review – Attention and Control
58 
 
correlate ‘better’ between species-similarity. The more accurate your representation of the world, 
including your projection of other’s attentional-states, the greater the biological-value conferred.  
What differentiates this accuracy in societal approaches to attending to others, in biological-value, is 
the accuracy of recursive feedback ‘between’ one or more organisms of a similar species. This allows 
a resonance of observation and feeling to be more accurately perceived.  
 ‘Attention of Attention’ becomes ‘Awareness of Attention’ 
Societal adaptations for biological-value are seen across many species from ‘sub-sociality’ solitary 
animals that may only share limited communication (say information for procreation), to highly 
advanced ‘eusocial’ groups such as ants and colony bees (Nowak, Tarnita & Wilson, 2010; Smelser & 
Baltes, 2001). Quintessential to societal associations is the operation of a recursive feedback process 
between the individuals. Such bi-directional feedback presents many biological-value opportunities 
for societal organisms in complex (dynamic) environments. Attention, informed by similar ‘others’ 
provides information for efficient engagement with the environment. Societal information therefore 
has a selectionist bias – we pay more attention to the ‘similar’, in the recognition of a more 
biologically resonant information source. Such a proposition is seen in entrainment behaviour. 
Graziano (2013) suggests that a similarity of phenotype allows iterative feedback to become resonant 
in real-time, thus allowing emotional cognitions (the cascading neural processes for responding to 
the biological-value) from another to be ‘affectively-graduated’ by one’s own behaviour.  
Again, no causal inference is offered here, merely the selectionist-space for attending ‘to other’ to be 
considered as one’s own cognitive-emotional state. As affective cognitions are graduated in a 
‘similarity of action’, projected emotion presents an opportunity for social perceptions to become 
graduated to affective behaviour (if they do that, I feel this; therefore, when I do that, I feel this also). 
An awareness of the affective cognitions of another, can becomes an awareness of self-affective 
cognitions35. It may be that we had social awareness before perception (Graziano, 2013). 
                                                          
35 Note: This is not proposing a self-awareness hypothesis; only, that the complementarity of action-control 
and emotional regulation (for affective behaviour), there exists the selectionist bias ‘of’ why a perception of 
self, no matter how and why it might become, can be used to infer attentional processes for biological-value as 
an ‘awareness’ of those cognitive processes towards biological-value functioning  –   Perception as an 
awareness of attention. 
 
Literature Review – Attention and Control
59 
 
By hypothesising that extra-perceptual attention of other’s emotional states, as they are projections 
of the agent’s own attentional processes, may be extrapolated to representing the agent’s own 
neural-function. Such awareness becomes graduated, allowing for neural-process to be conceived, 
through behavioural engagement, as ‘operant-discriminative’ cognitive processes (Bandura, 2001; 
Linden, 2003; Pavlov, 1927; Skinner, 1938; Thompson, 2009). 
In dynamic environments, societal communication can confer greater evolutionary robustness, 
allowing for greater operant-conditioning through efficiency in ecological engagement. This 
relationship between agential awareness and functional efficiency, promotes a known perception 
through agency towards ecological control and goal-oriented agency.  
Awareness, as a societal construct, allows a perception to be considered as drawing on the same 
agential control processes as attention, and therefore of control. This societal imperative of an 
awareness of agential control can be observed across anthropocentric evolution (Dawkins, 2006; 
Dunbar, 1998; Dunbar, 2003; Harari, 2011; Maynard Smith, 1974, 1982).  
Graziano (2013, p132) dispels the necessity for any causal determination to this proposition. 
Whether it be socially founded or self-founded in some respects, does not matter. Therefore no ‘cart 
and/or horse’ hypothesis is needed for societal attentional processes of attention being made, 
aware. All that is necessary is the selectionist understanding, that as a functional construct, 
awareness of attention as a ‘perception’ has biological-value: An agential perception permits greater 
‘agency’ toward goal oriented ‘societal’ outcome behaviours or agential end-point. In a dynamic 
world, the greater the perceptual ability to tolerate future surprise, the greater the biological-value.  
When now approaching Stroffengen’s ‘why we perceive at all’, an ecological prerogative 
necessitates that we acknowledge our animal condition: a bald, weak, social ape in an ever 
challenging world. To evolve an agential perception confers greater biological worth for the 
individual from the many. Whether from social agency or some other agential-selectionist 
adaptations, agential perception confers greater ecological worth, so is selected for. The primary 
life-regulation of ecological attending evolves to an agential perception for ecological efficiency. 
 Perception as Attentional Functioning and Tolerance Awareness 
Cognitive-emotional affective behaviour is functionally associative on attentional processes, 
therefore, as perception reports on attention, so perception reports on function. We may now 
define attentional processes through an awareness of perception: perceptions of affective cognition 
representing the neural functioning for biological-value. Perception is an awareness of the neural 
processes of engagement: the state of efficiency and tolerance – an agential awareness as ecological 
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learning. Perception is learning and learning – perception (whether it be the direct inculcation of the 
engaged new, or the iterated re-formulation of the internal known). 
What is important is that perception is seen as attentional operant as an affective-cognitive-process: 
a cognitive awareness reflecting ecological functioning towards biological-value. Perception, then, is 
seen as both contextually agential but, importantly, situationally affective in its reflecting a state 
functional tolerance. Our perceptions, feelings and phenomenological appraisal will reflect our state 
of ecological efficiency in biological-value functioning. Our perceptions are not only of the ‘surprise’ 
divergence afforded by the environment(s), but also of our ‘agential-demands’, a divergence of a 
reduced accessibility to bottom-up cognitive resources from top-down cognitive demand. 
 
 Control and the Agency of Voluntary Control 
It has been suggested by Van Orden et al. (2011), that a relative Effectivity (via a ‘reduced’ Voluntary 
Control, see below, p61) might be considered as indicative of an ‘agency’ evident as cognitive 
function, a contextual volition of the individual towards the environment rather than of the 
environment, affective on the organism. Whereas Bandura (2001) would have it that agency is a 
temporal extension of a consciousness: an agency operating through differing expressions, from 
functional (motivational) to phenomenal (intentionality and volition). Though expressed as social 
cognitions in  his ‘Social Cognitive Theory’ (Bandura, 1986; Bandura, 1999), agency is seen as life-
regulating information to drive a cognition of “emergent interactive agency” (Bandura, 2001, p4). 
As such a cognitive-construct, agential perception infers a ‘reduced’ Voluntary Control [reduced 
efficiency in function has been termed “reduced Voluntary Control” in Van Orden et al. (2011, 
p658)]. This is a top-down drain on attentional resources (there is a cost when top-down processes 
become ever more dominant in a composite of bottom-up and top-down attentional-cognitions, 
‘reducing’ the efficiency of in neural-function. In societal evolution (as discussed above), such ‘top 
down’ processes or ‘awareness of attention’, confers greater evolutionary solutions through agential 
intentionality towards greater future biological-value. 
This neural efficiency function is able to be formulated through the Voluntary Control of Motor 
theory and applied to an Affordance tolerance model. As a perception of attentional biases (top-
down and bottom-up), Voluntary Control can be thought of as ranging from the most stable, an 
automation or ‘habituation’ of attentional processes (Thompson, 2009), through to the least stable 
and functionally-effective, i.e. requiring greatest cognitive-attention to function. Such efficiency is a 
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divergence from ‘accuracy prediction’ and allows a continuum of functional efficiency, as an 
attention state towards the ecological demand moderated by the contextualisation of agential goals. 
This enables the conception of perception as efficiency in a Voluntary Control model, and can 
graphically represented as a state of Voluntary Control in terms of tolerance (see, Figure 12, below).  
This allows the interdependence of top-down and bottom-up process of attention in terms of 
efficiency, to be explored, in a revised model of ‘reduced’ Voluntary Control. 
 
 Reduced Voluntary Control 
When attentional interdependence changes its processing biases from bottom-up ‘reactive’ to ever 
more top-down ‘predictive’ processing (Clark, 2015; Damasio & Carvalho, 2013), suggests an 
agential-perception and moves Voluntary Control from one of bottom-up dominance towards an 
ever more complex-composite of top-down processes.  
Such agency in a Voluntary Control ‘acts on’ rather than ‘acts out’ events: A moderation of Effectivity 
through ever more resources being spent on a top-down agential cognitions. Such agency must be 
paid-for and therefore, has a functional cost. This produces a ‘reduced’ Effectivity-tolerance and  
Figure 12 – Tolerance represented in Voluntary Control 
Figure 13 – Reduced Voluntary Control 
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In functional terms, top-down cognitions restrict Effectivity-tolerance as they demand a cognitive 
effort and therefore a cost. This therefore reduces the efficiency in function towards ecological 
management and a ‘relatively’ lesser Effectivity-function results. This is relative in comparison to the 
absolute Effectivity of the individual – you do not lose your neural capabilities, but you will exhibit a 
perception of tolerance as a reduced Effectivity, i.e. attentional processes and functional Effectivity 
will reflect the reduced Voluntary Control as an inefficiency in function more typical of novice 
functioning (relatively – reduced Effectivity, see, Figure 14, below).  
Figure 14 –reduced Relative Effectivity reduced Voluntary Control  
Reduced Voluntary Control as an attentional model for a perception for action, resonates with many 
attentional-biased approaches to attentional states. The top-down neural functioning affecting 
ecological-control of an Affordance via a reduced functional performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; 
Eysenck et al., 2007; Friston et al., 2010; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, 
Howerter & Wager, 2000). 
 Reduced Voluntary Control in Working Memory 
Voluntary Control has been formulated into a cognitive efficiency approach in neural function, one 
that has attempted to match behaviour and perception in neural modulation36 [e.g. the functioning 
of a ‘Working Memory’ Baddeley (2007); Baddeley and Hitch (1974)]. 
                                                          
36 Though we might be cautious of this modularity over functionality, this is explored in the discussion of 
Divergent Criticality as a possible functional approach to working memory (see, Discussion 8.6.6 – Agential 
Capabilities and Control in Cognitive Processes, p257). 
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Here attention is able to be subject to agency and control (Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 
2000; Yantis, 1998) in what ‘must’ be top-down cognitive functions of effect. Hence, any attention 
(as agential and therefore, top-down) may be considered as a ‘reduced’ Voluntary Control to some 
extent. Though a working memory provides a hypothesis of neural modularity and architecture (e.g. 
Executive Function, Episodic Buffer, Visuospatial-Sketchpad, Phonological loop); one ‘seemingly’ able 
to offer a fairly comprehensive description of the neural process towards observed behaviour37; it is 
however, open to the behavioural criticism of being, ‘behaviourally descriptive’ rather than ‘causally 
functional’: Such a module-modality risks that observation confounds explanation (see, 8.6.6 – 
Agential Capabilities and Control in Cognitive Processes, p249), and requires better explanations 
how any unity function in attentional demand and control might be grounded. 
 
 A Naturalised Drive for Agency 
It has been suggested by Van Orden et al. (2011), that reduced Voluntary Control might be 
considered as indicative of the ‘intentionality’ evident in cognitive function, a contextual volition of 
the individual towards the environment rather than of the environment affective on the organism, 
grounded in Dynamical Theory and Self-Organisation.   
In implying the need for a naturalised ‘drive’ for ecological engagement and agency, any mechanistic 
law or formulation of Self-Organisation must be able to: 
a) Differentiate between relative Effectivity behaviours with regards to their ‘efficiency in 
function’ and therefore a relative to an ‘absolute’ continuum of an objective or coordinating 
measures of empirical observation. 
b) Describe not only agency, but be able to define the ‘mechanism or drive’ that governs 
agency. 
 
 Section Summary: Attention and Control 
When viewed through cognitive function and behaviour, perception is able to align with ecological 
engagement through a parallel approach to sensory and contextual ‘information-processing’ in 
neural function, and can be modelled within a phase of neural control. This function can be aligned 
                                                          
37 In particular, the interdependence of composite bottom-up and top-down attentional processes – what 
Eysenck et al. (2007, p338) refer to as the “bi-directional influences of each system on the other” 
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with the cognitive processes of ‘attention’ and the functioning of bottom-up (situative) and top-
down (contextual) neural processes. 
This chapter has considered a proposition of neural-efficiency in perception through the context of 
Motor Theory and the agential mediation of Voluntary Control. As such, agential-mediations have 
been able to be attributed to the attentional-processes of bottom-up and top-down functioning and 
can be set within a Tolerance landscape of relative Effectivity. Perception is derived as an ‘awareness 
of attentional processes’, affective cognitions and behaviours that resonate with biological-value. As 
such, attentional processes are able to describe a reduced Voluntary Control and be modelled in 
agential Effectivity. The definition of ‘Tolerance’ can then be made relative in an affective agential-
model of attention and neural function, objectively defined in a perception of functional Affordance 
and able to be empirically investigated.  
Though the cognitive processes for a functional Affordance are outlined and supported in this 
Chapter, they still lack a functional ‘mechanism’ necessary to be able to naturalise perception in a 
Universal theory. It will be shown in the next section, that such a defining ‘functional’ Affordance 
may be ‘mapped’ in Self-Organising Criticality (entropic behaviour) as a Divergent Criticality 
behaviour. When formulated in Voluntary Control, this is able to align neural function with the 
cognitive processes of attention and allow a testable perception measure to be developed – 
functional Affordance. 
In the next chapter, Self-Organisation as a Non-linear Dynamical Systems theory is explored and 
coordinated in relation to functional Affordance. This enables the observation of perception as a 
composite of attentional processes (cognitions of top-down and bottom-up) to be formulated as a 
state of criticality functioning. If an attentional-awareness as a state of  Voluntary Control is able to 
infer the Self-Organising Criticality function and align a ‘feeling of knowing’ with a ‘state of function’, 
then perceptions become testable as neural function.
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Section 3: Non-linear Dynamical Systems Theory 
 Free Energy and Entropy: The Physics of Biological Function 
“What an organism feeds upon is negative entropy. Or, to put it less paradoxically, the essential 
thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds in freeing itself from all the entropy it cannot 
help producing while alive.” (Schrödinger 1926, p71) 
 
This chapter provides some background to the functioning of criticality in Non-linear Dynamical 
Systems theory. It is in understanding the components of Self-Organisation through free-energy, 
that allows us to interrogate the behaviours entropic functioning, in particular, the ‘phase-breaking’ 
behaviour of ‘criticality’, for a better understanding of self-organising phenomena and the function 
of Voluntary Control and agency. 
The concept of ‘tolerance’ in Neural Functioning is founded on the ‘emergence’ of Self-Organising 
stability in complex networks such as the neural-network of the brain. The emergence of stability 
tolerates divergence or ‘perturbation’ from a stability point of equilibrium (this perturbation is the 
ecological ‘surprise’ encountered, i.e. change or novelty). Free-energy theory grounds functional 
tolerance in such stability formulations, and offers an approach that aligns perceptions with the 
Universal laws that govern our existence. 
The study proposes that through a mechanism of Self-Organising Criticality in the emergence of 
stability, it is actually the ‘tolerance’ of the system in maintaining stability within parameters of 
ecological-value that informs our perceptions and behaviours. 
 Defining a Stability and Equilibrium for Neural Systems 
Stabilities, in energy terms, might be considered as function around an equilibrium – a point of 
behaviour in energy, order and change.  
 ‘Classical’ Stability 
Equilibrium is one of the fundamental expression of energy and the laws of thermodynamics 
(Clausius, 1856; Gibbs, 1876; Helmholtz, 1847), in particular the functioning of free-energy available 
as ‘work’. To consider such equilibrium and how it accounts for energy-stability in neural function, its 
simplest manifestation is considered: that of a stability around an equilibrium. Such ‘classical’ 
equilibrium represents a deterministic, static expression of energy that is known as Time-Symmetry 
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(T-symmetry) around or ‘near-to’ a point of idealistic predictability. This is a linearity of existence 
where the energy in a linear-equilibrium diffuses in ever decreasing variation, to a final-point of 
finality.  
Contrary to such ‘classical’ equilibrium, we have to reconcile our observations of a world of 
existential prevarication, one of diverging evolution at odds with such a deterministic finality. 
 ‘Non-Liner’ Stability 
There is another approach to stability, an equilibrium of energy in systems that are ‘not-near’ to 
classical equilibrium. Such are asymmetrical stabilities of non-linearity, or ‘far-from’ equilibrium 
(Onsager, 1931; Prigogine, 1945).  
Non-linear dynamic systems (NDS) permit a non-linear equilibrium to be considered. This is a 
dynamic stability (Close, 2014), that though able to tolerate perturbations within a defined phase of 
stability, when reaching a local tolerance parameter boundary, moves away from one equilibrium in 
a way dependant on the equilibrium and the perturbation – a hysteresis or  “sensitivity to initial 
conditions” (Prigogine, 1996, pg 30).  
Such equilibrium begs the question: where can stability exist for life and order in such conditions of 
flux? Onsager (1931) provided a ‘reciprocal’ stability, a stability held within non-linear dynamics and 
analogous to classical equilibrium: A stability, subject to, irreversible or an asymmetric trajectory of 
‘initial conditions’, but held in a ‘detailed balance’ of phase (Boltzmann, 1887), an equilibrium of 
stability held in place for a moment in time and space.  
This emergence of equilibrium and non-linear ‘asymmetry’, constrains behaviour and function within 
a localised equilibrium or ‘phase of stability’. Phases of stability build on the intensive features of 
hysteresis, bounded within an extensive quality or phase of reciprocal equilibrium. Further 
perturbations or ‘changes in energy’ takes such a phase through intensive states of stability and 
instability, until local ‘extensive’ phase parameters are exceeded, and ‘symmetry breaking’ instability 
evolves the system to ever new phase transitions. 
Importantly, such stabilities can be considered and observed as macro or ‘extensive’ qualities 
dependent on these micro or ‘intensive’ features. As systems are taken through conditions of phase 
‘far from equilibrium’, as the system evolves (Glansdorf & Prigogine, 1971). New stability structures 
of energy and matter emerge through symmetry breaking (Nicholis & Prigogine, 1977; Prigogine, 
1945). 
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 Mechanisms of Self-Organisation in Non-linear Dynamical Systems (NDS)  
Described here is the process of biological function as a product of Self-Organisation in complex, 
open systems, where matter and energy may be exchanged (dissipate) with its surroundings (Atkins, 
2007). Non-linear Dynamical Systems (NDS) are dissipative (Guastello, 2009), and the spontaneous 
flow of energy defines the dynamic system by its dissipation properties. Such spontaneous 
dissipation in neural networks will be regarded through the theoretical concept of a “general 
evolution criterion” (Prigogine, 1996, pg 65), one that takes systems ‘far from equilibrium’ to 
behaviours that become “mechanism dependent”.  
Crucially, NDS behaviour provides a landscape of stability through non-linear steady-states, 
‘features’ analogous with classical descriptions of stability and structure that through Self-
Organisation, provide for biological-networks as complex systems, but are able to tolerate the 
prevarications of ecological engagement. It permits a ‘Tolerance’ principle to be applied in terms of 
energy efficiency in neural networks, and offers an biological-value definition to our conscious 
experience. 
 The Self-Organisation of Neural-Information 
Neurally, we might consider the world in terms of the information signature presented to our 
sensory system and how that information resonates with the complexity networks of self-organising 
in the brain. This is the quality and accuracy of energy information as it is able to be represented in 
our sensorium of experience; our subjective experiences as ‘states of information’ represented as a 
‘state of stability’ in the information available to us. Neural ensembles of information as energy 
become functional as phases of stability in relation to ecological engagement.  
Energy and stability in terms of neural function are able to be represented in action programmes of 
cognition and behaviour. Though the linear computational ensembles or schemas of a cognitive 
science might now be questioned as to their efficacy, the neuronal network principles first proposed 
by Donald Hebb (1949) in an ‘ensemble paradigm’ provides in its complexity and networks of 
interconnected properties, a non-linear approach to cognition through the formulations of Self-
Organisation. Non-linear dynamic systems evolve transient or soft-assembly equilibriums of stability, 
not as a set-behaviour or features of the system, but as a functional ‘whole’ of its parts, expressing 
complexity, interdependence and dynamic behaviour: “the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts” (Durkheim, 1895/1982). Attaching the descriptor of ‘complexity’ to such interdependence 
should not deflect from interrogating NDS, but should compel the investigation into not only the 
behaviour of the ‘whole’, but importantly, understand the effect(s) of the parts. This offers a rich 
field of analysis for neural functioning in psychology (Chialvo, 2010; Guastello, 2009). 
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 Emergent Stability: Micro States and Macro Phase 
“we cannot understand the second law of thermodynamics and the spontaneous 
increase in entropy it predicts, by starting with individual dynamical trajectories; we 
must begin instead begin with large populations” (Prigogine, 1996, p20)  
Self-Organisation sees stability as emergent within a defined space and time; a phase or phase-
space38 as a ‘locality’ for functional behaviour to exist. Non-linear Dynamical Systems constitutes a 
stability emergent at many ‘levels’ within a network ensemble (Deutsch, 2011)39, but when 
observed, this is at the ‘local’ level of phase – an observational subjectivity to phase-stability that 
promotes the behaviour of the phase overlooking the function of the ‘whole’. 
Non-linear stability should therefore be viewed as an extensive property of phase-emergence, 
supported by the intensive micro-states of its ensemble. Phase stability might be better considered, 
then, as a ‘feature’ or ‘quality’ rather than as any classical concepts of disposition or property40. As 
such, the emergent local stability as a ‘phenomena’ in Self-Organisation, must be considered 
through the cascade of stability ‘features’ in the neural ensemble or ‘system of energy function’. This 
recognition of functioning stabilities as ‘features’ or ‘qualities’ at all levels of an ensemble has been 
proposed for investigating the mechanisms of neural function (Clark, 2013; Friston et al., 2010).  
We should therefore look to the function of stability, not to properties or behaviour of a system, but 
through the ‘phases’ of stability and behaviour in function. Rather than try to define the properties 
of phase, they are better considered by defining the parameters of their functioning. 
 Phase Parameters of Stability Function 
Parameters of phase then, recognises stability in respect of feature-change as a change in the 
dissipative (functional) qualities of energy. It is an emergent macro stability, built on the micro-
                                                          
38 Phase-space is the recognition in population space, of a local or ‘observational’ level of emergence. It is by 
definition; a transient phase of order and stability. As an NDS feature, phase, time and space are eddies in the 
dynamical flow, and formulations of classical definition are not appropriate.  
39 Stability becomes a matter of perspective, the level of our observation. This ontology has defined scientific 
inquiry, and continues to provide an empirical-onion of almost infinite layers (Feynman, 1994). 
40 Property might not be the most accurate description for NDS observations, features or qualities of 
ensembles more accurately describe the emergent phenomena. 
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stabilities which themselves are emergent from every decreasing, intensive populations – ad 
infinitum. 
Phase-space (Gibbs, 1885; Liouville, 1838), is the defining of emergent behaviour at local or 
‘observed’ levels, providing a way of bounding the complex interdependent variance of such 
intensive features, and a quasi-autonomous stability for function to be defined by:  
“the behaviour of that whole class of high-level phenomena is quasi-autonomous”  
(Deutsch, 2011, p108) 
 Neural Functioning in the Free Energy of Phase: Entropy Principles 
The second law of thermodynamics is fundamental with regard to the flow of energy. In terms of 
thermodynamics, the available-energy or ‘energy for dissipative work’ is expressed in the concept of 
free-energy (Gibbs, 1876; Helmholtz, 1847). Free Energy embraces concepts of a potential or 
‘availability’ able to be expressed through stability. Entropy41, as a statement of disorder or 
instability, constrains a systems functional capability and provides a quality concept with which to 
                                                          
41 Though entropy is described and thought of as a property, this would be incorrect. Rather than defining a 
property of energy, entropy describes the functioning of energy or an accuracy of observation in energy 
behaviour. Entropy is better thought of as a concept of ‘description’, it provides a way of describing the 
functioning of energy as we observe it. 
In saying that a system imports or exports entropy implies a tangible property, but it should not be considered 
such; instead entropy should be considered as a working metaphor for the changing qualities of system 
function at a level(s) of observation.  
Statistical formulations of entropy (Boltzmann, 1886), though representing a theoretical ‘state’, should 
likewise be considered as a metaphor of energy behaviour describing a state of function: as a point-space of 
‘probable’ behaviour. Entropy is therefore not a property, but better considered a description of feature-
change or information-divergence. Such entropic-flux can been described as a functional ‘quality’ of energy 
through entropy potential relative to Maximum Entropy Potential (Jaynes, 1957; Massieu, 1869).  
Entropy then, better defines the qualities of energy through dissipative flux, as it can be considered as an 
intensive property of feature-change in point-space. Rather than considering entropy an extensive state,  
Entropy represents the functioning of general evolution principles as a system optimises to a state of 
maximum entropy (Prigogine & Stengers, 1997), or stability. Entropy does not exist as a property, the observed 
energy phenomenon that entropy describes, such as phase-breaking and energy-evolution (Criticality) – do. 
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measure the ‘state’ of usable or available (stable) energy. Entropy therefore defines a system’s 
functioning with regards to stability. 
As phase represents a transient feature in energy (information) and its dissipation functioning, it is 
dependent on the uniqueness of its intensive properties in describing its behaviour. Function is 
therefore described through the intensive features rather than the observed local stability or 
behaviour, to better define system-behaviour. This functioning of phase offers ‘relative’ coordinates 
(to phase) able to be a coordinating-definition for function.  
Phase stability observing entropy principles offers a way of defining function founded in the 
intensive micro features of the phase, its entropy features: and as such, provide an approach to 
defining functional behaviour. 
 
 Maximal Entropy Production 
NDS stability is open to criticism, and the veracity of using principles of entropy to describe non-
linear thermodynamic properties has been questioned by Silhavy (2013). Entropy as a property in 
defining NDS is problematic, in that a Non-linear Dynamical System’s stability might be considered a 
transient feature not able to represent entropy function. However, considering ‘local’ stabilities of 
phase as entropic features of ‘change’ (flux), provides some support for the argument of using 
extremum boundaries of as an entropy-flux function in defining phase at macro-extensive local 
equilibrium (Kuzmin, 2012; Niven, 2009). This is able to be functionally-defined by is ‘relative’ flux 
behaviour, the change in entropic (flux) density as intensive-features display dissipative inequality 
behaviour as states of system function (Onsager, 1931; Prigogine, 1945; Prigogine & Stengers, 1997).  
This approach of extremum-properties derived from the flow and flux of feature-change, is further 
supported through the principles of Maximum Entropy Production (Jaynes, 1957; Niven, 2009).  
For NDS features to be described as entropy formulations requires us to consider how dissipative 
flux-density provides a definition of stability of ‘phase’ within the system to be considered:  
1) How to define rather than describe a local equilibrium of ‘stability’ in the transience of 
feature-change, and to; 
2) Define such non-linear ‘phase’ through formulations of free-energy. 
 Defining Free-Energy Through Entropic Flux 
Entropy was formulated by the ‘statistical’ application of Ludwig Boltzmann (1872) in his attempt to 
define an energy-evolution in much the same way that Darwin had defined biological evolution 
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(Atkins, 2007). Boltzmann recognised that Entropy could be used to describe free-energy in terms of 
energy ‘states’ of ensembles or populations, extensive properties around a ‘state of equilibrium’42 
(Boltzmann, 1886). 
S = klogW  (Plank’s formulation) 
S=Entropy 
K=Boltzmann’s Constant 
W=Number of possible states (energy) a system may occupy 
Boltzmann’s entropy was an expression of a closed thermodynamic system and therefore, locked in 
classical invariance, one of ever decreasing variation in energy-flux. It did, however, provide a 
springboard with which to explore the statistics of probability in population-statistics –  probabilities 
able to describe the entropic features associated with ‘states of equilibrium’ (Gibbs, 1902; Jaynes, 
1957).  
These probabilities describe free-energy through their potential behaviour or, the probabilistic 
behaviour of ensembles system functioning. Stability in complex systems becomes described 
through their usable free-energy, as determined by their entropy or entropy potential. This is a 
‘probabilistic behaviour’ bounded within the proposition of ‘equilibrium from extremum principles’.  
 Extremum Principles - Spontaneous Dissipation and the Self-Organisation of Free-
Energy  
Far from equilibrium, non-linear dynamic systems (NDS) are characterised by spontaneous entropy 
exchange. What is important is the dynamic-exchange or ‘flow’ of entropy necessary to export the 
entropy associated within an equilibrium-phase or ‘bounded-absolute’ of stability.  This export is to 
counter entropic production and avoid a thermodynamic-equilibrium of maximum entropy 
(Boltzmann’s entropy of invariance) and minimum free-energy. Entropy export is the basis of non-
linear ‘system evolution’, and the emergence of complex dynamical structures from such export and 
dissipation are the hall-mark of biological life (Prigogine, 1996): 
It is at the maximal or phase boundaries of equilibrium that spontaneous-change and new stability(s) 
emerge (Prigogine, 1945, 1996). An ‘evolution criterion’ resulting in ‘dissipative structures’ able to 
                                                          
42 An equilibrium is a state of invariance. Here, no free-energy is available to dissipate or work. The stability is – 
absolute, with no prevarication, fluctuation or exchange. 
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constrain a stability within maximum entropy through free-energy principles (Prigogine & Time, 
1977, p263).  
Where Boltzmann had failed43 in his Darwinian ideals of an all-encompassing ‘universal’ entropy, 
statistical mechanics is developing ‘probability’ approaches towards evolving energy systems 
through the application of non-linear population dynamics. 
Dynamic systems evolve and avoid thermodynamic equilibrium through the exchange of entropy 
with the environment. Irreversible ‘symmetry-breaking’ drives a system’s functional behaviour 
through evolving entropy-stability(s) at all levels of a stability-phase. Entropy export or flux, is able to 
constrain entropy through intensive dissipation, producing greater stability able to reduce further 
entropy increase, therefore tolerating even more entropy production.  Dissipative structures provide 
the stability-landscape for Free Energy to function (Sundarasaradula & Hasan, 2004). For this reason 
free-energy is sometimes referred to as a negative entropy or a ‘negentropy’ (Brillouin, 1953; 
Schrödinger, 1944). 
NDS function can now be defined through entropic stability and behaviour. The defining of local 
phase in spontaneous or dissipative Self-Organisation through the concept of a maximum entropy 
stability, and in doing so we define function within phase as ‘states’ through their relative 
functioning to this extremum (phase) absolute of entropic behaviour. 
 
 Steady-States of Equilibrium through Maximum Entropy Principles 
Supporting the hypothesis that population-behaviour can be generalising through intensive-
behaviour description, Jaynes (1957) utilised statistical methods to formulate Maximum Entropy 
Principles (MEP). MEP enable the representation of a system in terms of its probable ‘state of 
entropy’. Probability, therefore, is at the heart of complexity in NDS theory. 
Jaynes (1957) formulations of Maximal Entropy Principles, support extremum principles in his 
analysis of the probability of entropic functioning in stability. This allows system function to be 
statistically defined through maximum entropy (Smax) as an absolute and the formulation of 
potential state(s) of function within phase-stability, referenced through a (Smax) phase of 
equilibrium (Jaynes, 1957; Niven, 2009). Such extremum principles are incorporated in Prigogine’s 
                                                          
43 Boltzmann’s work on statistical evolution in systems, did not produce a time-variant (evolving) statement for 
non-equilibrium states; his formulations took the energy ‘system’ back towards equilibrium and invariance 
(that of an isolated system), rather than an evolving ‘open’ system of new expressions in energy and state. 
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(1997) theory of ‘Minimum Entropy Production’ to define a system’s behaviour in terms of 
asymmetric, non-deterministic behaviour.  
Though the suitability of defining extremum principles as ‘boundaries conditions’ of system 
description has been questioned (Nicolis, 1999; Silhavy, 1997), Niven’s (2009) formulations on 
steady-state MEP provide a ‘local’ consideration for extremum principles, one that embraces the 
‘probabilistic’ features underlying NDS in defining and differentiating a steady-state of entropy 
function within an extremum of phase-boundary.  
It is in dynamic formulation or the ‘entropic-flux’ that a NDS function and Maximum Entropy 
Principles provide some veracity as to providing suitable definition or ‘boundary conditions’ with 
which to define phase functioning (Kuzmin, 2012).  
“thus the possibility of finding negentropy through maximum entropy value isn't excluded”  
(Kuzmin, 2012, p71). 
 Defining a Steady-State of function Within a Maximum Phase of Entropy 
Maximal Entropy Production (MEP) more precisely termed “maximum rate of thermodynamic 
entropy production” (Niven, 2009, p1), defines a probabilistic-approach to local flux densities 
through a generalised formulation of steady-state for systems of dissipative flux. This enables the 
consideration of self-organising, dissipative, structures of stability (equilibrium), to be defined as and 
in respect to maximal entropy features44 (Ebenbauer, Raff & Allgöwer, 2009; Niven, 2009; Sontag & 
Wang, 1995). 
Within a phase, then, Self-Organisation ‘drives’ a non-linear dynamic system towards a ‘gradient-
stability’, a steady-state (Niven, 2009). Here, MEP principles create the probabilistic equilibrium akin 
to Onsager’s (1931) ‘reciprocal relations’, stabilities dependent on an asymmetrical proposition for 
energy, rather than classical symmetrical equilibrium – MEP steady-state is a non-linear ‘space’ or 
stability for free-energy to emerge at a local definition. 
“In consequence, Jaynes’ generic approach can be applied to the analysis of steady state, as well as 
equilibrium, systems” (Niven, 2009, p6) 
                                                          
44 NDS steady-state recognises the macro emergence from micro feature-change. Steady, stable and phase, all 
describe time-dependent system behaviour. The emergence or ‘landscape’ for such spatiotemporal features to 
exist as is contingent on symmetry-breaking Criticality (phase) at some intensive level of the ensemble. 
Extensive properties or behaviour is then able to be defined by maximal entropy at a local-level of observation.  
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This emergence of ‘steady-state’(Jaynes, 1957; Niven, 2009) is one of a dynamic quasi-equilibrium, 
robust to change and able to tolerate prevarication (of entropic-flux or ‘surprise’) within defined 
local- phase boundaries of function.  
A NDS state may now be viewed as able to be defined through ‘steady’-state(s) of equilibrium, states 
that allow the consideration of energy held within an entropic-potential or ‘negentropy’ of 
functional phase (Brillouin, 1953; Gibbs, 1873; Hens & De Hemptinne, 1996; Jaynes, 1957; Kuzmin, 
2012; Massieu, 1869; Niven, 2009; Planck, 1945).  
Observation of such states of entropy-potential within emergent phase presents the possibility of a 
coordinate of relative-phase for the functional behaviour of NDS. 
Such steady-state fulfils Gibbs (1885) ‘phase-space’ by ensemble populations of micro-states that 
support a local (macro) emergence of phase-stability; this is a local observation, subject to the 
function of its intensive-features and their functional evolution. NDS systems are ‘driven’ to Self-
Organise through minimisation principles (Prigogine & Stengers, 1997), this is an ‘Optimisation’ and 
evolution of an ensemble as micro ‘states’ reach criticality in entropic function and evolve new 
features of intensive stability and ever greater complexity. Such systems are often referred to as 
‘systems of complexity’, reflecting a seemingly, indeterminate probability, associated with the 
multitude of intensive criticality-states that ‘might’ be operating within the system.  
 Determining the Dissipative Quality of Non-Deterministic System functioning 
Phase-space is a stability analogous to a classical equilibrium condition. It allows a potential-state to 
operate within ‘absolutes’ of phase, these are potentials bounded by maximal entropic-behaviour. 
Maximal Entropic-Behaviour (MEP), bounds function within an equilibrium-absolute and 
importantly, enables function to be defined in relation to this absolute. States of behaviour within a 
phase (a stability of equilibrium), are then able to be described through an entropic-potential 
(Massieu, 1869; Planck, 1945), a concept of the ‘potential’ or the functional behaviour of free-energy 
within an equilibrium.  
Free energy as a function of energy stability, therefore represents the potential-state within an 
equilibrium absolute. Complex systems (as will be determined) may therefore be described through, 
a potential of ‘efficiency in function’ relative to the absolute of function (their ‘state’ of phase-
stability). This is the state of quality of the stability, defined by its Entropic-Potential (Massieu, 1869). 
Entropy, then, defines both the maximum capability and the quality of function in a steady-state. A 
ratio function between the ‘relative’ potential to constrain entropy-production, within a defined 
local or ‘absolute’ of phase. 
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 The Entropic behaviours of Optimisation and Criticality in Dynamical Systems   
Self-Organisation is driven by entropy minimisation as a system ‘spontaneously’ optimises stable 
function in NDS. This is an ‘Optimisation’ founded on the function of its micro-states. Self-
Organisation recognises the function of asymmetrical dissipation of free energy. Fundamentally, the 
behaviours of Self-Organisation are to be recognised, if not observed, at all levels of an ensemble. An 
evolution of symmetry-breaking (criticality) throughout a ‘complex’ ensemble, not just at the 
observed level of ‘phase’. 
“Levels of emergence – Sets of phenomena that can be explained well in terms of each other without 
analysing them into their constituent entities … .” (Deutsch, 2011, p123).   
Therefore, dissipative systems displaying Self-Organisation behaviour minimise entropy through a 
cascade of ever dissipating criticality45, there will be criticality at some ‘micro’ level of the system ad 
infinitum, resulting in an emergent behaviour of ‘Optimisation’ in a system. Optimisation takes a 
system towards a local (steady-state) of equilibrium via Prigogine’s ‘general evolution criterion’ and 
such convergence is dependent on the dissipative-criticality of the ensemble. Importantly, 
Optimisation requires criticality, a flow of energy and ‘general evolution criterion’ at ‘some level’ of a 
system’s ensemble. 
NDS, then, are dependent on change, an entropic-flux through energy dissipation in open systems. 
Therefore, steady-state(s) as the observed functioning of emergent phase and potential, are 
transient states from the features of change. Hence, phase and state are non-determinant 
spatiotemporal features, captured in a moment of time.  
Rather than trying to define such a ‘will-o-the-wisp’; it is in the flow dynamics of the entropic-
function, that we might consider such feature-change in terms of free-energy and be able to define 
the functioning of the system at that ‘moment in time’ – a state of function. 
 A State of Function: Defining Dynamical Behaviour   
As a dynamic behaviour, such a state of optimisation is best described through the flow of state(s) of 
equilibria and the observation of such flow behaviour within phase. 
                                                          
45 A ‘cascade’ describes the flow of stability through ever decreasing ‘levels’ of emergent stability, from macro 
to micro emergence, ad-infinitum. This sees changes in stability, feature-change states of equilibrium, as states 
constructed on micro-Criticality – built from the bottom up.  
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Crucially this allows NDS to be described through a ‘singularity’ of equilibrium and in the transition 
from one singularity (steady-state) to another, providing a definition through entropic flux for 
functional behaviour. That is to say, it may exist as a steady-state in phase-space, but it makes itself 
known through dynamic feature-change, observable through self-organisation as an equilibrium 
state, a temporal-stability within the constant flux of state(s). A moment of stability that may be 
considered through the observation of entropy-function as feature-change, a procession of steady-
state(s)46 and their relative association with MEP or phase behaviour (Niven, 2009). 
States of flux behaviour, that when ‘within’ a local MEP phase, determine and are determined by 
that phase of entropy, i.e. the system and its functioning are dynamic, so of no fixed function. Such 
system characteristics are defined through their entropy-potential as a state of flow and may be 
represented as a phase efficiency of such state-function. State in relation to a boundary of phase (a 
maximal MEP proposition before local-phase efficient-functioning47 is exceeded).  
Though the entropic-functioning of the system here, then, is a dynamic property, it is able to be 
defined relatively (to phase extremum) as a system processes through steady-states within a phase 
of function. Entropic potential as relative to MEP parameterises entropy production, a relative 
functional efficiency definition that may be considered as a coordinating definition for NDS function. 
However, it is in criticality going ‘beyond’ a phase of emergent (at some level) function from which 
new phase(s) of behaviour evolve in a “general evolution principle” (Prigogine, 1996, pg 65).  
A state of non-linear ‘dynamic’ function can now be described in terms analogous to a classical 
entropy-function at a local level through the potential or tolerance for free-energy (feature-change) 
before the phase of entropic functioning is exceeded, a tolerance defined through a relative state in 
relation of entropic-capability or MEP. Maximum Entropic Principles offer a coordinating definition 
of Self-Organising Tolerance. 
Importantly, in dissipative Self-Organisation, dynamic flux demands there will be criticality at some 
intensive level of emergence even though this may not be the local level of observation. Even a 
steady-state in spatiotemporal terms, requires criticality at some level of emergence as entropy 
                                                          
46 Change or procession from one phase-space of steady-state to another, invokes the issues of infinite-
reductionism that have plagued questions of determinism. An interesting consequence of Self-Organisation is 
that criticality, as nested proposition, exists as an (theoretical) infinite cascade of intensive micro-features 
building stability or emergence from the bottom-up, acts to counter such reductionism in a neo-determinism ?  
47 Efficient function as in, maintaining biological-value. 
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cascades throughout an ensemble and therefore, an Optimisation principle is observed, suggesting a 
non-zero proposition for criticality (see, 2.35 – Divergent Criticality – Maximal Entropy Production 
for Biological , p79). If criticality converges (dissipates) toward an equilibrium throughout an 
ensemble, it takes the system toward a diminishing spatiotemporal state of phase and eventually, 
invariance.  
An increase in entropy production will change the dynamics of Optimisation and Criticality at all 
levels of an emergence, but will be parameterised by a phase of function, dynamically changing the 
functioning or stability of that phase.  One; ‘within’ phase parameters where existing stability(s) are 
strengthened; or when the parameters are exceeded, local criticality overwhelms the system (even 
at a local ‘observation’ level), and the system goes onto exhibit phase-breaking criticality and 
evolution. 
The balance of stability and entropic-function in Non-linear Dynamical Systems is driven then by 
optimisation and criticality, but really, all is criticality. It is in the functional behaviour of criticality 
that defines whether the system is behaving ‘within’ a phase of behaviour, or beyond (breaking) 
local phase equilibrium.  
From this, though, function in terms of optimisation and criticality is observed at the macro-phase of 
function, criticality-functioning at all levels should be recognised. Dissipative complex systems that 
evolve or minimise entropy production through an Optimisation towards equilibrium, do so 
throughout a nested intensive functioning with criticality at ‘some’ level of the ensemble (Jaynes, 
1957; Niven, 2009; Prigogine, 1947; Prigogine, 1996).  
It is in the equilibrium-stability breaking of criticality that new ‘dissipative structures’ emerge or ‘self-
organise’ new complexity, and subsequently, a minimisation of entropy through an increase in the 
stability-tolerance towards further surprise. However, though the local level of emergence is 
observed, criticality will – must, be occurring at some level as an optimisation or minimisation 
principle (Prigogine, 1947). 
 Local Criticality in Self-Organising Dynamical Systems  
Such local criticality behaviour is described in non-linear dynamic systems as Self-Organising (Gleick, 
1997; Guastello, 2009; Haken et al., 1985), a probabilistic theory driven by non-deterministic 
intensive-features. Self-Organisation, as spontaneous behaviour of entropy optimisation, provides 
information on the entropic functioning of the system and therefore, an opportunity for such 
information to describe complex network behaviour.  
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Self-Organisation is a theory of networked populations that inform or effect each other. As such, 
information-theory may be used to look at NDS function in neural-networks through the population 
statistics of probability and the emergence ‘soft-assembly’ behaviour in the complexity of neural-
function (Friston, 2010; Friston & Stephan, 2007; Kello & Van Orden, 2009).  
Systems that are considered as self-organising display functional behaviours of Optimisation and 
criticality in association with their functional properties of their complexity, ‘properties’ of stability in 
behaviour and the evolution of new properties in relation to feature-change48 (Bak et al., 1987; 
Prigogine, 1996). 
Entropy optimisation (minimisation) in such neural complexity, provides for increasing stability and 
therefore expertise in network-function (the application of functional efficiency and a frugality 
through emergent self-organisation as an evolved response to surprise). However, it is a static 
diminishing proposition. Local increasing or Divergent Criticality a concept applicable for neural-
functioning to be applied to biological-value for expansive or dynamic functioning (Chialvo, 2010; 
Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Clark, 2013; Gershman & Daw, 2012).  
 
 Optimisation vs Criticality and Tolerance Optimisation  
There seems a dichotomy in criticality functioning, i.e. between optimisation and local criticality (as 
both are behaviours from the functioning of criticality): Surprise and its associated increased in 
entropy take the system to greater entropy producing criticality, which in itself counters maximum 
entropy through increasing optimisation. Entropy production to reduce entropy increase, seems the 
requirement for a ‘steady-state’ of emergent ‘phase-space’ (Gibbs, 1873; Helmholtz, 1882; Niven, 
2009). Criticality, then, (the dissipation of entropy) may be seen as providing ‘space’ for entropic-
potential and the phase-space of function, a function bounded within phase parameters.  
 The Defining Property of Relative Entropy Potential 
NDS steady-state(s) of function can therefore be considered through the concept of entropy-
potential in relation to a maximal phase-space entropy production (production, not entropic 
increase). This functional state in phase-space and a dynamic ‘relative’ set within a phase-absolute. A 
                                                          
48 Behaviours of: critical slowing down, hysteresis, catastrophic collapse etc. Interestingly, the breakthrough in 
identifying the functional behaviours of criticality came from work on sand-pile avalanches (Bak, Tang & 
Wiesenfeld, 1987). 
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dynamic proposition rather than any ‘set’ relational property(s). States of function might, therefore, 
be considered through their entropy potentials (negentropy, Brillouin, 1953), rather than any 
classical ‘static’ propositions:  This enables phase and state-function, to be considered through 
entropic-potential, a proposition relative to a Maximum Entropy Principles (MEP), as a dynamic 
maximal or absolute phase of entropy (Jaynes, 1957). 
As every ‘state of function’ is defined by its own intensive steady-state(s) of equilibrium, system-
function becomes an intensive procession through steady-states defining their own extensive 
behaviour at a local phase(s) of observation or function. It is in the fluxes of entropy-production and 
feature-change that steady-states are observed locally as products of their own intensive function. 
Such functional-behaviour not only describes a system in terms of criticality, but in defining the 
system’s functional parameters, MEP allows a relative measure of system-tolerance in terms of 
functional efficiency, as able to define such behaviours as state-behaviours: If a functional maximal is 
represented by a dynamic phase-maximal MEP and Tolerance Optimisation , Tolerance then defines 
the entropic-potential of the functioning ‘state’. This is Tolerance in a ‘moment’ of function, able to 
be considered through a concept of relative system-behaviour in terms of entropic-flow dynamics: 
 
 Divergent Criticality – Maximal Entropy Production for Biological Tolerance 
Entropic-Tolerance, then, may be used to define system-behaviour relative to entropy-function. This 
is a state of entropic-capability able to be considered through the concept of tolerance to ‘further’ 
entropic-flux. Tolerance represents a system’s (neural) state of behaviour relative to its own entropic 
functioning. Though this would seem a relational proposition, one system’s tolerance not able to 
relate to another’s, however, it is in the ‘capability towards surprise’ that the systems are able to be 
relatively compared or ‘coordinated’ against other states of entropic tolerance. Tolerance then, 
provides a coordinating-definition for system function in terms of entropy. 
Tolerance is the capability of the system for ‘free-energy function’ (as an available entropic-
potential), before criticality evolves local-phase (MEP) and macro stability function breaks-down. 
 Behaviour Characteristics of Self-Organisation in Neural Function 
Optimisation and criticality are therefore dependent on the initial conditions or complexity of phase 
of the system, as the state of tolerance; and the flow and dissipation of entropy.  
This allows three possible entropic-flux conjectures for the interplay of criticality and optimisation 
and their behaviour Bak et al. (1987). These are observed as states of phase behaviour in Self 
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Organisation: a) a steady-state, b) symmetry breaking criticality as a local observation, and c) a 
diminishing state of function. We might extrapolate these observations to reflect the functional 
dynamics NDS steady-states, and the entropic-behaviour of the system: 
1) Stable Criticality (steady-state of entropy production) 
A steady rate in the production or flow of entropy, is able to balance a system’s criticality 
commensurate with Optimisation. This produces a stable ‘steady-state’, within NDS phase. Here 
dissipative Optimisation towards invariance and minimal free-energy, is countered by entropy 
production maintaining a dynamic entropic-potential (free-energy). 
2) Divergent Criticality (increasing entropy production) 
Increasing entropy-production with its resultant increase in criticality throughout the ensemble, 
takes the system through ever increasing entropy states. This is a Divergent Criticality: an 
increase in the rate of entropy production and intensive criticality taking the system through an 
evolution of steady-state(s). Such Divergent Criticality as dependent on the initial conditions of 
the system (tolerance) and the rate of entropy-production to display behaviours of: 
 
a) Divergent Criticality remaining ‘within’ a phase of functional stability where entropic-
production takes the system to greater state(s) of criticality and entropy dissipation, 
therefore greater (potential) or tolerance within a phase of stability. 
b) Entropy production goes through phase extremum as criticality overwhelms the system’s 
dissipative (Optimisation) capabilities and local-phase evolves to new stability features. 
 
3) Convergent Criticality (diminishing entropy production) 
Diminishing entropy production, or flow, will result in optimisation dominant over criticality 
and a phase-convergence towards equilibrium-stability (and entropy)49. This results in the 
decline of the dynamic properties of negentropy (time variant) and the functional behaviour 
of the system, as it increasingly adheres to classical equilibrium and invariance. 
                                                          
49 Maximum entropy is different from Maximum Entropy Principles (MEP). MEP produces phase of stabilities of 
function in dynamic systems – free-energy of negentropy. Maximum entropy is more an expression of classical 
T-symmetry and invariance. 
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 Formulating Tolerance Optimisations through Entropy Flux Dynamics 
Maximum Entropy Principles (MEP) are supported in describing dissipative behaviours of criticality 
and Optimisation, behaviours that describe a system’s state of function through Entropy dynamics, 
i.e. Input (dSi), the Output (dSe) and the Product Overtime (Sp) of a system’s entropy. Entropy 
dynamics, then, as dynamic features of ensemble complexity, that might be considered through flux 
dynamics. 
In accordance with Bak (1997); Bak et al. (1987) and Self-Organising Criticality (SOC) , entropy-
production (Sp) may be considered as describing the functioning of criticality within a system and 
therefore, a non-convergent or non-diminishing functional stability might be expressed as: 
dSi + dSe
dt
≥ 𝑆𝑝                           (De Donder & Van Rysselberghe, 1936) 
 
Entropy production (Sp) in describing criticality as a product of the increase of entropy in relation to 
the system’s capability to export entropy, might therefore be considered in relation to extremum 
principles (Ebenbauer et al., 2009). 
 Divergent Criticality: Functional in Entropic Tolerance 
The dynamic behaviours in complex ensembles are seen in the entropic flux (Sp) and are dependent 
on entropy import and export. However, both import (dSi) and export (dSe) of entropy in 
complexity, are propositions not only of that systems behaviour, but from that system’s ‘state’ of 
behaviour. They reflect not only the functioning of Optimisation, but the capability of the system to 
export entropy. 
As an entropic-flux proposition, i.e. increasing entropy production (a Divergent Criticality), though 
importing entropy (surprise), results conversely in a system’s ability to dissipate entropy to better 
effect, i.e. it increases entropy export potential and Optimisation ‘minimisation’ (Prigogine, 1947), 
resulting in increased entropy dissipation making the system more robust to further entropy. 
An increase in the system’s functional tolerance then, in terms of Self-Organising Tolerance (SOT), is 
dependent on a Divergent Criticality and an entropy increase in the system, a temporal-inefficiency 
before increased entropy-flux evolves greater Self-Organising Efficiency and therefore, Optimisation. 
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It is therefore in the import of entropy (dSi) in Divergent Criticality that, though initially increasing 
system inefficiency (as the phase approaches local criticality50), this results in greater tolerance 
through increasing the Optimisation (the intensive behaviours of micro-criticality). The system 
evolves to a greater phase of complexity and therefore stability. This results in an absolute increase 
in the entropy-potential of a phase, reducing the ‘relative’ effect of surprise and therefore a greater 
tolerance towards ‘future’ surprise. Divergent Criticality provides a future functional-robustness or, 
increase in relative stability. 
 Tolerance Optimisation – An Ecological Proposition 
The functioning of Self Organisation Criticality in biological systems might now be described through 
a Tolerance Optimisation based on entropic flow dynamics. This allows Bak’s (1997) behaviour 
descriptions of criticality to be expressed in terms of ‘tolerance’ to further entropy or surprise:  
1) Steady-States of Criticality – Stable Tolerance 
Here, stability seen in the maintenance of a steady-state of entropy-potential (i.e. no ‘overall’ 
change in entropy production – this is a flux definition relating to ‘rate of change’, therefore, 
Sp = the rate of change in entropy production), is via increasing internal entropy production 
being balanced by the export of entropy. This balance is dependent on entropy import (dSi) 
and the dissipation or export of entropy through Optimisation (dSe). However, as 
Optimisation properties themselves dissipate as equilibrium approaches, causing a loss in its 
functional ‘Optimisation’ capability to export entropy, there is a decrease in the rate of 
entropy export and entropy increases. 
A steady-state (Bak et al., 1987), then, requires that tolerance be maintained 
(𝑑𝑆𝑖 + 𝑑𝑆𝑒 = 𝑑𝑆𝑝). As there should be ‘no change’ in entropy production as a flow or flux 
formulation (rate of change) then (𝑑𝑆𝑝 = 0), we can express a steady state as 
(𝑑𝑆𝑖 + 𝑑𝑆𝑒 = 0). However, recognising the non-zero proposition (Optimisation in constant 
dissipation), then maintenance of a functional stability where entropy-flux change is equal to 
zero, requires a constant increase in entropy-production (import) in maintaining this steady-
state. Therefore steady-state requires Divergent Criticality through surprise (𝑑𝑆𝑖 > 0) to 
                                                          
50 Approaching a MEP phase maximal, criticality function is seen in three behaviours: critical slowing, 
hysteresis, and then catastrophic. 
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compensate for the decrease in Optimisation (𝑑𝑆𝑒 < 0)51, then, for steady-state (𝑑𝑆𝑖 > 0) as 
dSe  is a decreasing negative in (𝑑𝑆𝑖 + 𝑑𝑆𝑒 = 0).  
Therefore, stable-state requires (𝒅𝑺𝒊 > 𝟎), i.e. Divergent Criticality. 
2) Divergent Criticality (symmetry breaking Criticality)  
Here, entropy-production increases within phase (𝑑𝑆𝑖 + 𝑑𝑆𝑒 > 𝑑𝑆𝑝). In accordance with 
complexity theory and micro-criticality as an intensive feature; greater Optimisation is 
dependent on increase in entropy production, thus entropy increase begets entropy 
dissipation. In an increase in dissipation properties, steady-state(s) of greater complexity 
emerge. Such entropic-flux recognises the duality of Divergent Criticality, an increase in phase-
potential at the cost of temporal (entropy-potential) efficiency. Greater entropy initially 
decreases the efficiency of phase, but in doing so increases future Optimisation phase-
potential. This might be considered as a Tolerance-lag: as entropic-flux first stresses, but then 
‘general evolution criterion’ drives new dissipation structures to emerge, creating greater MEP 
and entropic-potential (entropy is exported to better effect), greater relative tolerance 
emerges.  
Tolerance better defines a system as it moves through steady-state(s) towards new 
complexity and functional capabilities. As a relative expression of behaviour over time, more 
entropy is able to be exported from the local system than produced.  
Therefore Divergent Criticality (𝒅𝑺𝒊 < 𝟎) makes the system more tolerant or robust to 
future provocation or ‘surprise’.  
3) Convergent Criticality 
The proposition (𝑑𝑆𝑖 + 𝑑𝑆𝑒 < 𝑑𝑆𝑝) expresses a diminishing dynamic-flow and convergent-
criticality as the system diminishes towards a state of phase equilibrium. Though 
optimisation dissipates entropy, in doing so it itself dissipates entropy-flux function, reducing 
future entropy-Tolerance, and therefore, entropy production increases within the system. As 
an asymmetric stability, criticality is still taking place as some level of the ensemble, but it is 
a convergent criticality with diminishing phase-space. This convergent-criticality takes the 
                                                          
51 These are flux or flow approximations around a datum of entropy production stability (𝑑𝑆𝑝), therefore will 
be greater (>𝑑𝑆𝑝) of less than (<𝑑𝑆𝑝) the current state of stability in flow. 
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system towards equilibrium and invariance as progressive steady-state(s) driving the system 
toward classical equilibrium (Niven, 2009). Convergent-criticality then, sees the local 
capability of phase to tolerate surprise, diminish.  
 
Therefore Convergent Criticality (𝒅𝑺𝒊 + 𝒅𝑺𝒆 < 𝒅𝑺𝒑) behaviour contravenes a functional 
autopoiesis for continued biological life . 
 Self-Organising Efficiency: An observation of Tolerance as an efficiency of phase  
As a functional-capability to ‘tolerate’ entropy, Divergent Criticality comes to defines biological 
function in terms of entropy. 
The definition of entropy-potential is analogous to the functioning of classical free-energy and 
observable as efficiency in entropic function (Carnot, 1824a; Massieu, 1869; Planck, 1945). It is this 
‘efficiency of behaviour’, that a system’s functional tolerance is observable, a coordinating-definition 
able to differentiate systems with regards to their entropic optimisation (Bak et al., 1987; Deutsch, 
2011; Prigogine & Stengers, 1997). 
Steady-state (Jaynes, 1957; Niven, 2009) as analogous to formulations of free-energy and entropy 
(Gibbs, 1873), allows a functional capability or Tolerance to be generalised through formulations of 
free-energy function as described through entropic-potential. This allows an entropic-potential 
(Massieu, 1869; Planck, 1945) to describe Tolerance functionally through a partition-function of 
efficiency (Carnot, 1824a): 
𝜀 = 1 −
ф
ℌ
 
𝜺 = Efficiency 
 
ф = Entropy potential 
ℌ = Entropic capability (MEP)  (see, Box 2 – Ecological Efficiency in terms of Effectivity, p22)  
 Observing Tolerance   – From Thermodynamic to Statistical Mechanics  
Intensive states of criticality account for the differentiation seen between states within a phase of 
behaviour and such differentiation manifests itself in a ‘state of Tolerance’ to surprise. As a 
behaviour parameter, Tolerance is observable as an efficiency of function towards surprise. (see 
also, 3.9 Formulating a Tolerance Optimisation Hypothesis in Criticality, p110). 
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 Biological Life Demands Divergent Criticality 
An evolutionary principle of ecological engagement is that a biological system would want to avoid 
classical equilibrium and, therefore, avoid a NDS ‘diminishing state’ of entropy production (see, 
Convergent Criticality, p83). This leads to a simple functional statement for criticality based on 
biological-cost: To avoid equilibrium and a diminishing state of entropy a system will need to import 
entropy at a rate, at the very least, equal to the dissipation (dSi + dSe ≥ dSp).  
In accordance with the ‘non-zero’ principles of Self-Organising Criticality for biological life, the 
maintenance of ‘Tolerance’ in the face of diminishing Optimisation (diminishing entropy export), 
demands a ‘positive-definite’ entropy production in order to counter convergent criticality. Criticality 
must increase (Divergent) the entropy export and maintain or increase the functional Tolerance 
(entropic) of the system (dSe>dSp) – biological life as temporal (future oriented) demands a 
Divergent Criticality function. 
Such a statement may be further extrapolated with regards to selectionist principles that: ‘dynamic 
environments of greater (temporal) change require greater dynamic adaptability in the organisms 
that inhabit them’ – Life in dynamic environments of greater entropic surprise, requires 
correspondingly, greater Divergent Criticality.  
 
 The Beginnings of a Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
In a dynamic environment, a system that is able to adapt to surprise with greater ‘relative’ efficiency, 
will have a selectionist advantage. As such, dynamic environments will evolve functionally robust or 
tolerant organisms that are able to better respond to increases in entropic-flux. 
Divergent Criticality, therefore, may be used to define biological systems in terms of functional 
effectiveness with regards to dynamic environments.  
As a selectionist proposition, greater dynamic flux (ecological-surprise) requires a Divergent 
Criticality, which requires a greater engagement with ecological-surprise in order to maintain 
Divergent Criticality. We see this ‘drive’, as the evolution of an affective behaviour(s) towards 
maintaining Divergent Criticality in ecological engagement. This resonates with the ‘core’ affective 
behaviour as observations of Divergent Criticality ‘drive’ are observed in core affective behaviours: 
e.g. ‘wanting’ (Richard & Berridge, 2012; Zahm et al., 2013); and ‘seeking’ (Damasio & Carvalho, 
2013; Panksepp & Biven, 2012).  
As a parameter of future robustness toward surprise, an optimum selectionist proposition of 
Divergent Criticality would see a maximal proposition for Divergent Criticality, where it operates at 
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the edge of functional tolerance, Tolerance Optimisation. This is observed as a complexity behaviour 
– a critical slowing down, but would be better considered as a temporal complexity function creating 
greater entropic robustness (Bertschinger & Natschläger, 2004; Chialvo, 2010). 
 
 Section Summary: Non-linear Dynamical Systems 
This Chapter developed entropic behaviour as an imperative for biological function through a 
proposition of ‘Divergent Criticality’, as a spontaneous, agential requirement for life in dynamic 
environments. Divergent Criticality, through increasing the entropy in a system, conversely, 
increases the capability of the system to export entropy by ‘optimising’ (criticality) the system’s 
Tolerance towards further entropy. This is a prerequisite for biological life – “freeing itself from all 
the entropy it cannot help producing while alive” (Schrödinger 1926, p71). 
In Section 1 – A Feeling of Perception (p10), a coordinating-definition of ‘Tolerance’ was developed 
for subjective perceptions to be considered as an objective measure, and in Section 2 – Attention 
and Control (p33), aligned Tolerance in cognitive processes of Voluntary Control and attentional 
awareness. Attentional-awareness as indicative of neural function, is viewed as a perception 
‘awareness’ of functional Affordance set within an agential or ‘relative’ Effectivity and defined as a 
state of neural efficiency (Tolerance) towards ecological demands.   
This chapter, developed Tolerance as an entropic-function within an agential or relative Effectivity, 
and provided a naturalistic ‘drive’ for Tolerance Optimisation, that of Divergent Criticality. However, 
such a simple ‘mechanistic’ approach is still not able to accommodate the agential-complexity and 
functional-nuance in perception. The next Chapter takes the above proposition of entropic 
behaviour in biological cognition and functioning – those of Tolerance, relative Effectivity, 
Optimisation and Divergent Criticality – and formulates a new theory of neural function for cognition 
and behaviour. This is a Divergent Criticality hypothesis for perception as a biological-value 
construct. This hypothesis requires that the following tenets be addressed: 
Neural stability and tolerance to entropy (surprise) will reflect the dynamic features of the ecological 
landscape, informing a Tolerance Optimisation for entropy production. 
1) Environments of greater dynamic-change require entropic features of greater dynamic-
flexibility and therefore greater Divergent Criticality and Complexity. 
2) Continued biological replication (a selectionist autopoiesis) requires that biological-value 
functions within control parameters of agential Effectivity. 
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3) Neural function for biological-value (cognitive) will select action-control(s) (cognitive-
Voluntary Control and behaviour) to ‘affect’ a Divergent Criticality and Tolerance 
Optimisation. 
4) Such ‘affective’ behaviours are characterised as cognitive-emotional behaviour and are 
made cognisant as a sensory awareness or ‘attending’. This awareness is relational to a 
‘state of neural functioning’ as a functional Affordance state of relative Effectivity. 
5) Functional Affordance is therefore an awareness of agential Effectivity and a measure of the 
‘state’ of the neural functioning as an entropy proposition. 
6) Perception, as an attentional-awareness, is able to be empirically observed as an awareness 
or ‘perceived-phenomenon’, of and from the functioning of neural entropy. This is a self-
organising (naturalistic) response to an agent-environment resonance with biological-value.  
A perception measure able to self-report as a functional Affordance state, therefore, will reflect 
entropic-function and can be objectively coordinated as an agent-environment, Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. 
If Divergent Criticality is able to be formulated in terms of agential-mediation of Tolerance 
Optimisation, self-report of perception in terms of neural function should be able to predict 
cognition and behaviour in accordance with the  Divergent Criticality hypothesis and naturalise 
perception in entropy function. 
The next Chapter considers affective cognitive behaviour then, as ‘driven’ by Divergent Criticality 
towards Tolerance Optimisation, and the agential maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation. This is 
now formulated in a Divergent Criticality Hypothesis:
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3 CHAPTER THREE – The Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
 Developing a Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
In dynamically changing environments, organisms that are able to evolve greater tolerance to 
change (surprise) will have a greater selectionist advantage. Increasing surprise tolerance through 
Divergent Criticality becomes dependent on engagement with uncertainty and surprise, therefore 
Divergent Criticality provides a framework for affective behaviours that seek and engage with 
surprise, and might be considered through a selectionist approach as fundamental to our 
understanding of cognition and behaviour. This asks – how does the brain know Divergent Criticality 
and Tolerance? 
Neural function may be explored as an agential proposition ‘from’ and ‘of’ Divergent Criticality, a 
‘predictive processing’ of selectionist worth for a possible ‘anticipated’ future predicated on our 
perceptions of the now and our phenomenological experiences of the past. 
Divergent Criticality and ‘affective’ behaviours are constrained within the complexity capabilities of 
the system, and therefore dependent on increasing criticality. Such a suggestion for the functioning 
of Divergent Criticality is theoretically evident and supported in cognition and behaviour with 
respect to maximal propositions of free-energy function (Bertschinger & Natschläger, 2004; Chialvo, 
2008, 2010; Chialvo & Bak, 1999; Friston, 2010; Friston & Stephan, 2007; Grigolini, 2015; Kello, 
Rodny, Warlaumont & Noelle, 2012).  
Affective behaviours are an agential drive for entropy production (and therefore entropy 
minimisation through Optimisation) in dynamic environments, and as all life might be considered as 
dynamic to some extent, Divergent Criticality might be considered as ubiquitous and differentiated 
dependent on ecological constraints of entropy surprise. Such a biological mechanism of life 
maintenance and replication through affective criticality should be evident throughout the biological 
record52. 
  
                                                          
52 There is some support for this proposition: see slime-moulds (Yanai et al., 1996), bacteria quorum sensing 
(Hastings & Greenberg, 1999), etc. 
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 Formulating Tolerance as a Self-Organising Function 
Tolerance becomes defined through a system’s functioning in relation to surprise (entropic-flux) and 
efficiency, and represents a dynamic-capacity for free-energy in this function (Friston, 2010). NDS 
States might be better represented by their tolerance to surprise, a relative ‘efficiency of function’ in 
terms of surprise, and it has been suggested by Grandy (2008) that the ‘dissipation rates’ of a system 
might provide a more useful formulation for determining boundary conditions of phase transition in 
non-linear systems than other ‘extensive’ properties. 
The greater the complexity of an ensemble, the greater the tolerance in accordance with Divergent 
Criticality. Non-linear dynamic systems might therefore be defined by their tolerance as described 
through Self-Organising Criticality processes and behaviours. The observational functioning of the 
system’s entropy tolerance towards the surprise encountered. MEP and steady-state in dissipative 
flow, enables an analogy with state(s) classical equilibrium (Niven, 2009) and enables us to derive a 
statement of such tolerance as a statement of entropy potential. 
The Self-Organisation found in Non-linear Dynamical Systems theory has been applied to 
neuroscience and complexity in many formulations (Guastello, 2009). In the psychology of behaviour 
and control, the most prominent and successful experimental formulations has been through 
Dynamical Theory (Haken et al., 1985; Kelso, 1995) . Entropy and steady-state stability in behaviour 
through Dynamical Theory. 
 
 Dynamical Theory – a Basis for Describing Criticality Behaviour  
Dynamical theory provided a window into the workings of such self-organisation in neural function 
through the coupling of behaviour and agency control (Haken et al., 1985; Kelso, 2012; Kelso, Del 
Colle & Schöner, 1990; Tuller, 2005; Tuller, Case, Ding & Kelso, 1994; Wallot & Van Orden, 2011; 
Zanone et al., 2010). Through ‘Coordination Dynamics’, Haken, Kelso & Bunz (1985) developed a 
dynamical model that has become one of the most used models in Non-linear Dynamic System 
(Guastello, 2009; Kaufer & Chemero, 2015). The Haken-Kelso-Bunz (HKB) model, is one able to 
model the stability of behaviour in an environment-behaviour function as a ‘potential of probable’ 
function: A Stability of coordination in relation to environmental surprise engaged through control 
parameters. Entropy (at some level of the ensemble) increases and the system goes through 
“Criticality-points” until a catastrophic (local) phase collapses in behaviour.  
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The function that models the data as a Potential Function  𝑉(ɸ) is: 
𝑉(ɸ) = −𝑎 cos ɸ − 𝑏 cos ɸ (Haken et al., 1985) 
Here ɸ is used to represent the maintaining of a phase stability in coordination dynamics, a measure 
of the ‘quality’ or robustness of behaviour across a control parameter a – b. Control parameters can 
be thought of as creating a ‘divergence’ entropy flux or ‘surprise’ between (a) and (b). It represents 
the divergence from a steady-state where (a – b = 0)53. 
This has been extended by Kelso et al. (2012) as a formula to generalise for multiple control 
variables: 
𝑉(ɸ) = − ɗ𝑤ɸ − 𝑎 cos ɸ − 𝑏 cos2 ɸ 
Where (ɗ𝑤  = w1 – w2) represents intrinsic differences between the components (multiple 
intensive variables). 
Though dynamical theory has provided an experimental design for the measurement of affective 
behaviour, it uses a cognitive correlation ‘theory of behaviour’ and we should be wary of the 
behaviourism trap (behaviour not function). As a measure, the HKB (1985) model utilises ‘behaviour-
coordination’ to couple phase accuracy with neural function, this cannot be considered with great 
certainty, only a ‘functional’ outcome.  
However, the influence of such coupling theoretically aligns self-organisation with behaviour 
through its agent-environment control parameter(s) and is formulation through coordinating 
(behavioural) dynamics. This accounts for the success in the models accuracy of modelling behaviour 
and Self-Organisation, but does not define neural function objectively. The behaviour accuracy does 
not adequately accounting for the possibility of duality in control parameters (as being dependent 
and/or independent) when defining the functional mechanism at work. If we are not able to isolate a 
functional ‘causal’ mechanism, we cannot adequately predict and test our understanding of how the 
brain works. This is the objectivity dilemma of phenomenal observation.  
We consider those behaviours below from a Dynamical Theory perspective and then provide a 
Tolerance hypothesis function (see, Figure 15, p92). 
  
                                                          
53 dSi+dSe=0 (see, 2.35, Divergent Criticality – Maximal Entropy Production for Biological , p82) 
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 Criticality in the KHB Model of Dynamical Coordination 
Here, the entropic behaviour of intensive features of a phase stability are represented through 
steady-state behaviour, this provides a landscape of stability emergence or ‘dynamical attractors’ for 
behaviour control (Kelso, 1995). An agential end-point of ‘nested’ stability(s) for a macro or local 
phase of function and behaviour. This has been extensively modelled in limb coordination or bi-
manual behaviour dynamics; e.g., fingers, leg swinging, etc. (Haken et al., 1985; Kelso, 1984; Kelso, 
2012; Kostrubiec, Zanone, Fuchs & Kelso, 2012; Zanone et al., 2010). The limitations of bi-manual 
phase have been highlighted however in Zanone et al. (2010), where ‘other’ phase propositions 
become emergent within the dynamical landscape: behaviour outcomes of increasing complexity 
that question the validity of the HKB model as to what is being modelled and the accuracy of the 
measurement as a functional proposition. Though a behavioural phase-stability (as representing the 
coordination of limbs) is displayed through coupling (‘phase’ as an entropic behaviour of Self-
Organising Criticality), such coordinating Dynamical Theory should be critiqued through its entropic 
function validity: The HKB model (1985) as a model of extensive behaviour provides a graphical 
representation of criticality at a local ‘extensive’ level (Bak, 1997), but does not accommodate for 
the intensive functioning in considering its behaviour. The neural mechanisms of functioning are 
hidden under emergent local-phase behaviour.  
We might therefore apply a functional Tolerance hypothesis to the Kelso (2012) model (see, Figure 
15, below). 
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Figure 15 –Trajectories of the extended HKB model of coordination dynamics illustrate how new 
phases of metastability (c) emerges from a multistability (a) as a control parameter (b/a) changes. 
Adapted from Kelso (p913, 2012). 
In Figure 15 (above), a steady state of (a) Mutli-stability within phase is possible via efficient neural 
function allowing many stabilities to be nested in response to the demands of dynamic animal-
environment coupling. As control parameters stress the system (b), there is an increase in entropy 
production (𝜎′ > 𝜎), and a decrease in Self-Organising Efficiency. This is a proposition of less 
tolerance, and the model moves through (a) Mutli-stability to Mono-stability (b) 
Increasing criticality throughout the system should take the system to Meta-stability (c), and there 
will be an evolving local phase representing a cusp phase function and with it, the criticality ‘phase’ 
markers and possible catastrophic loss of behaviour, stability and function and catastrophic 
behavioural change. This becomes observable at a local level of phase as (c). 
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However, there is the tendency to avoid Meta-stability (c) and a seeming, tolerance-inefficient, self-
regulation around Mono-stability (b). This we would suggest is the Tolerance Hypothesis evident in 
behaviour. 
This leads to the question of the interpretation of coupling dynamics in explaining function: 
Primarily, coupling reflects neural behaviour that is control (parameters) dependent. Though 
extensively viewed as independent variables, control variables in NDS assume a complex relationship 
that also become ‘dependent’ (Guastello, 2009). Within a changing landscape of entropic flux 
dynamics, control parameters become both functionally independent and dependent in the 
criticality outcome behaviour: What function are we observing – the behaviour of the cognition or 
the behaviour of the control parameters? That is to say, that though HKB-stability reflects the 
constraints of the control parameters on neural function, this might actually be behaviour reflecting 
externally dependent variables (of the control parameters) rather than agency neural function54. This 
proposition offers a functional critique to contemporary Dynamical Theory (see, 8.4.1 – Divergent 
Criticality: A Theory supported in Dynamical Theory, p224). The Application of the Divergent 
Criticality Hypothesis In NDS Theory did not specifically experiment to parse functional 
determinants. However, in not adequately accounting for such situational and contextual 
determinants, they might be critiqued on using a limiting theoretical approach as to isolating and 
distilling behavioural into a function from its many behavioural manifestations. The function is 
simple – the behaviours are not – complexity.  
 A Functioning Critique of HKB Modelling 
It is in the consideration of flow dynamics and entropy flux, effective intensive-micro and therefore 
extensive macro criticality, that system or phase ‘Tolerance’ functionality might better reflect neural 
functioning and stability rather than its emergent, extensive, macro-level. Tolerance considered an 
exoentropogenic effect55 of a micro-macro symbiotic system. Though macro-phase is able to define 
behaviour in Dynamical Theory, its lack of functionality determination questions the validity of 
coupling behaviour as, ‘function made evident’. We might better consider a criticality model through 
                                                          
54 Apparent function is specified in (Zanone et al., 2010). Here, dual processes or pathways to learning are 
specified, reflecting the coordinating dynamics of stability emergence. It might be argued that these stabilities 
reflect the function of the control parameters to a greater extent than reported in explaining neural function. 
This would cause us to question Zanone’s duel pathway explanations to learning.  
55 “From ancient Greek: exo-, outer or external; tropos, transformation (used by Clausius ) and -genic, 
generating or producing” (Niven, 2009, p9) 
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the Tolerance hypothesis of ‘efficiency in function’, an approach through the entropic functioning of 
all variables. Though the variables will exert the same ‘functional’ effects as the HKB model, a 
tolerance approach in neural-function provides a relative (coordinating) explanation of objectivity 
from behaviour observation. It is in being able to provide a relative differentiation that reveals actual 
neural function from the behaviour(s) of functioning. 
Through the relative functioning of tolerance in respect to feature change in ecological engagement, 
we might unravel the complexity in control variables into statements of how they (situational and 
contextual) impact neural function rather than impact behaviour. However, rather than dispel the 
findings of Dynamical Theory, this still recognises the agential-environment autonomy of perception 
but, Tolerance considers both internal and external control parameters, in its helping differentiate 
how functioning relates to behaviour. Here the function of tolerance better explains cognitive 
processes (such as perception and learning) rather than behaviour. 
 Unravelling Behaviour through a Functional model Tolerance 
As a measure of function relative to system capability, ‘tolerance’ can be considered an ‘efficiency in 
function’ and better defines the functioning of the system ‘and ALL its constituent parts’ in a state of 
stability or ‘entropic potential’. This is tolerance potential-function is in relation to neural capabilities 
(in consensus with Dynamical Theory formulation). However, we might better interrogate this 
entropy function through a tolerance approach of agential constraint (reduced Voluntary Control 
creating a ‘relative’ Effectivity of reduced functional landscape). Rather than unravel the multitude 
of control processes; through defining of effects of agency on the system we might extrapolated an 
objective measure of function. This is done using the Tolerance hypothesis to represent the 
behaviours of a functional ‘relative’ Effectivity, enabling agency and its function to be identified, 
therefore, absolute and relative function to be revealed.   
The model of tolerance in functional Affordance (Figure 16, below) is therefore re-represented, 
formulated within entropy equivalence statements for Effectivity-tolerance and Affordance Surprise. 
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Figure 16 – Functional Affordance as an Expression of Entropy 
 The Application of Entropic Potential Within a functional Affordance Model 
It is in entropy potential (entropy-potential = ф), relative to an Effectivity phase in the functional 
Affordance model, that enables function as a ‘state’ of relative Effectivity to be graphically 
represented as a ratio. It is then possible to consider this entropic state against an Effectivity 
tolerance (Smax = ℌ – as the maximum entropy the system can tolerate before local phase collapse). 
This entropy point represents a capability for Maximum Entropy Production (MEP) in the system. 
The realising of such MEP however, as exoentropogenic, is determined and determining of the 
entropy-potential ф, a state of functional Affordance reflecting Effectivity capability of entropy 
function (as tolerance to further entropic flux).  
The entropy-potential ф, therefore, determins the ability of the system to tolerate further entropy 
within a maximal functional state –  its tolerance to further entropy flux as opposed to static or fixed 
capability. Such tolerance can be formulated from first principles from an expression of Carnot’s 
(1824a) ‘functional efficiency’ (see, Box 3 - A functional Affordance State as a State of Tolerance 
function, p28). 
We might therefore represent an Affordance state as a coefficient of tolerance: 
Coefficient of  Tolerance  = 
1
( 
𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚
 −1)
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Therefore, a state of functional Affordance as an efficiency formulation, might also be derived as a 
represented an Optimisation or functional-efficiency (an equivalence statement of efficient function 
within Non-linear Dynamical Systems derived from a coefficient of tolerance): 
Coefficient of  Tolerance  = 
1
( 
ф
ℌ
 −1)
 
A tolerance state of Affordance as a functional efficiency:  
𝜀 = 1 −
ф
ℌ
 
ɸ = An Affordance State as an Entropic Potential taken from (Massieu, 1869; Planck, 1945). 
ℌ = Statement of the Maximum Entropy Production (MEP) allowed in the system (a local S-max). 
𝜺 = Efficiency in relation as ecological engagement. 
Though tolerance provides a coordinating definition, this is a snap-shot of a moment in function 
describing the system, it does not describe the system’s dynamic functioning in order to explain for 
behaviour in relation to feature change. A formulation of tolerance as such a dynamic proposition is 
now discussed. 
 Tolerance as Efficiency in Entropy Optimisation: a Dynamic Function 
Entropy potential as an entropy steady-states (ɸ) also defines its Maximum Entropy (Smax= ℌ) as an 
exoentropogenic relative function. Such a relative measure allows neural function towards 
behaviour now to ‘relatively’ differentiated between different phase states, therefore presents the 
opportunity to explore behaviour in the flow from one tolerance function to the next.  
 
 Formulating Divergent Criticality within an Efficiency Model of Function 
Revisiting the formulation: ℌ presents as a phase, ‘absolute’, in that, potential entropy (ɸ) is relative 
to this ℌ MEP (whatever the antecedents of the entropic flux and boundary conditions in NDS). This 
not only allows the formulation of an entropic potential to represent an ‘efficiency of function 
towards surprise’, but also as a relative function, allows a ‘continuous’ formulation for ‘probable’ 
dynamic behaviour (this ‘relative’ Effectivity landscape of function is ‘continuous’ on both an 
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agential and a contextual behaviour: the  multi-dynamic components of entropy surprise)56. This 
‘continuous’ function enables dynamic efficiency to be modelled from the relative formulations from 
Carnot’s efficiency statement (efficiency = 𝜺). 
Entropic efficiency (𝜺) can now be used to determine not only the state of function relative to phase, 
but be extrapolated to an efficiency of dynamic functioning and a trajectory of relative efficiency-
behaviours. 
 A Trajectory of Entropic Behaviour as Efficiency Behaviour 
As a ‘continuous’ measure, entropy derivations allow the application of the divergence between the 
absolute and a relative (potential) measures. These can be approached through a Kullback-Leibler 
(DKL) divergence formulations (Kullback, 1959). Such a statistical representation of the functioning of 
entropy as an intensive feature, recognises the flux dynamics of entropy production as a statistical 
probability or ‘density’, as such, a state of functional Affordance is able to be conceptualised through 
probability densities: 
Firstly, a generative ‘probability’ density is a statistical-statement of the absolute or Effectivity-
tolerance of the systems dynamic function (in entropic capability terms of both situational demand 
and contextual (agential) approximations). This might be considered as a maximal proposition 
(Smax) of system entropic function (ℌ). This generative density is then compared against a second 
‘actual’ information signature or posterior (expectation informed by experience). In probability 
density terms, this is the divergence from the generative a priori (ℌ) of the sensory informed 
posterior state of entropic function (ɸ). 
The Kullback-Leibler divergence (DKL) is formulated as: 
DKL(𝑃‖𝑄) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑖)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖
𝑸(𝑖)
𝑷(𝑖)
  where: 
P = ɸ – The posterior distribution (entropic-potential or state of ‘functional Affordance’) 
Q= ℌ – The generative or a priori distribution (defined MEP or ‘Effectivity’) 
 
As a continuous variable, entropic flux may be used to model a state of functional Affordance 
through a Hessian tensor (Pearlmutter, 1994), as a state of information transference. What is 
                                                          
56  Top-down intentionality will change the continuous landscape by its reduced Efficiency potential, therefore, 
will change the formulation of continuous efficiency behaviour. 
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produced is a second-derivative as a function of ‘rate of change’ in the divergence, one that allows 
the DKL function, as rate of change in the functional efficiency  of a phase of behaviour, to be 
modelled as an efficiency tensor or trajectory. 
As ‘continuous’, the divergence may be formulated as an integral function: 
DKL(𝑃‖𝑄) = ∫ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑄
)
 
𝑥
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑄
 𝑑𝑄  
This is a statement of the divergence between entropy states as finite propositions (defined within a 
relative maximal – entropy production 𝜎 and 𝜎′ being within a maximal proposition (ℌ). 
𝜎  = Entropy produced and exported from system 
𝜎′ = Rate of production of entropy  
ℌ  = Local entropy production maximum 
As a flux potential, entropy, here, is an exoentropogenic state in that it helps define its own system’s 
emergent behaviour. If we consider behaviour commensurate with entropy production in criticality 
and optimisation, where we derived a Divergent Criticality proposition for biological function as 
(𝑑𝑆𝑖 > 0 ≡  𝜎′ > 𝜎) see, Tolerance Optimisation – An Ecological Proposition, p82). This finite 
proposition allows the accommodation of the Radon–Nikodym derivative of function (Hobson & 
Cheng, 1973): 
a) At a steady-state (𝜎′ > 𝜎), as the potential for stability increases (the attractor 
deepens). Through criticality principles this can only happen if finite (𝜎′ < MEP). 
b) Or as an increasing state of stability, but within-phase (𝜎′ > 𝜎). 
c) Within a finite proposition of phase (𝜎′ < ℌ), continuous function defines behaviour. 
At state of  ‘phase breaking’ (𝜎′ > ℌ) the system is taken beyond local phase and the distribution 
cannot be considered continuous and therefore the Radon–Nikodym derivative needs to be re-
formulated to ‘new’ continuous parameters. 
An integral function (below) for determining efficiency can now be used; one that can be graphically 
mapped. 
DKL(𝑃‖𝑄) = ∫ 𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑔
 
𝑥
𝑝
𝑞
 𝑑𝓊 : (Where p and q are continuous to 𝓊) 
This allows differentiating efficiency behaviour of different continuous landscapes or ‘relative’ 
Effectivities to be considered (see, Figure 17, below):  
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Figure 17 – Relative Effectivity Trajectories of DKL relative to Effectivity Tolerance (adapted from, 
Mundhenk, 2009, p254) 
Using the Kullback-Leibler divergence function it is possible to map efficiency behavior. The 
distributions above (Figure 17) are represented as Gaussian probability densities. However, a better 
approximation would be to use a Non-Parametric Regression (NPR) in a process formulation of 
density function for NDS. The dashed approximations in (Figure 17, b) define this NPR at collapse as 
phase approaches maximal approximations (𝜎′ > ℌ). Non Parametric approximations are referred 
to as a training or training of Mean Square Error regression, Predictions predicated on previous 
iterations in a multi-variable regression model of a priori and posterior densities (James, Witten, 
Hastie & Tibshirani, 2013).  As the regression curve approaches a relational target point (a shared 
absolute between entropic variables). The inability to maintain function in the model is observed in 
the deviance and a collapse from linear to non-linear ‘catastrophe’ as entropy stabilities are 
overwhelmed. As such, NPR has been found useful for modelling failure in tolerance in biological 
(organism) parameters in Non-parametric (multiplicative) regression (McCune, 2006). Therefore NPR 
is a better regression model for Effectivity tolerance. 
Considering the model Figure 17,above (a) Displays three relative Effectivity propositions for 3 
Relative Effectivity-tolerances. (b) Sees approximations of the DKL function of efficiency (as derived 
from the functioning of entropy ‘within phase’). Here a continual function allows functional states as 
effectivity, to be mapped along (c) exponential trajectories (of entropy efficiency). As the functional 
Affordance state approaches maximum entropy and goes beyond phase-boundary, a catastrophic 
collapse in function occurs (see dotted line (b) above). 
Of interest here are the relative trajectories of efficiency in function (b) & (c): It is not only the 
capability limitations of the Effectivity that define differing relative function, but important is the 
‘rate of efficiency change’ in relation to the surprise.  
Efficiency in function is seen to be steeper in its efficiency ‘rate of change’ in reduced Effectivity.  
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It is in this efficiency-trajectory behavior as reflecting relative function, that we can differentiate 
tolerance-behaviour through its reflecting of a reduced Voluntary Control in relative-Effectivity its 
efficiency behaviour (slope of). This therefore allows us to probe Dynamical behaviour to better 
effect through attentional processes and their reduced Voluntary Control behaviour(s). 
 
 A reduced Voluntary Control and Steepening relative Effectivity Function 
Criticality functions in Voluntary Control, through the sensory engagement with the world, in being 
dependent on being represented by an Effectivity capacity. Any internal top-down cognitions exact a 
cost and are ‘limiting’ on that generative capacity, reducing the Effectivity. Increasing top-down 
components not only reduce the relative tolerance to constraining the surprise from bottom-up 
sensory information, but also effect the efficiency-trajectory in a (relative) entropy landscape 
resulting in a steeper functioning of the criticality slope (the rate of temporal flux). Top-down 
demands on the generative reservoir are reflected the relative Effectivity function and its ‘reduced 
Voluntary Control’.  
Figure 18 – Reduced Voluntary Control 
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This provides the prospect of differentiating functional efficiency (in Affordance – as relative 
Effectivity) as determined through the trajectories of a reduced Voluntary Control. These relative 
Effectives are applicable to differentiate not only difference as ‘relatives of function’ – relative to 
each other in the concept of tolerance (i.e. different Effectivity capabilities), but also relational 
(within system) as function of different reduced states of reduced Voluntary Control due to agential 
functioning. These are all ‘relative’ Effectivities, that through a Tolerance hypothesis, are able to be 
defined through their efficiency behaviour as steeper trajectory profiles (Figure 18, above).  
Top-down cognitions exert a reduced Voluntary Control effect on the generative model of 
Effectivity. Relative-Tolerance is therefore reduced in the effect of  a ‘relative function’. As affective 
behaviour of decreased tolerance to Affordance and a steeper efficiency slope of behaviour, as 
displayed in the trajectories (Figure 18, above).  
 To Maintain Criticality: The Reduced Catastrophe Effect 
Once an Effectivity ‘phase’ is reached, an absolute of catastrophic function ensues and phase 
transitions become evident at the macro level, as phase breaking behaviours display: critical slowing 
down, hysteresis, and then catastrophic-collapse. However, ‘relative’ phase, if a reduced Voluntary 
Control (within system or phase), may avoid catastrophe by the re-appropriation of attention 
resources (here Affordances are re-appropriated towards relative Effectivity): Though the rVC 
function of phase transition is consistent with catastrophe (and therefore similar affective cognitive-
emotions are present: worry, anxiety avoid etc.); Importantly, a ‘reduced’ functional Affordance is 
not an ‘absolute of function’ – Criticality has somewhere to go.  
It is possible for a change in a cognitive landscape of attentional processes to permit the 
maintenance of tolerance (Effectivity), as top-down attentional processes are diverted to bottom-up 
processes – an agential mediation on sensory behaviour and performance over of contextual 
cognitions. Such ‘extended’ catastrophe might be better explained within a Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis, rather than previous Cusp-Fold model(s) (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; Thom & Fowler, 1975; 
Zeeman, 1976). Here we present Divergent Criticality hypothesis as a Cusp-Hopf formulation (Buzzi, 
De Carvalho & Teixeira, 2012; Guardia, Seara & Teixeira, 2011; Harlim & Langford, 2007; Hopf, 1942), 
allowing better modelling of catastrophe (and therefore cognitive) function and behaviour. 
Divergent Criticality is primarily a hypothesis of the maintenance of control in a phase of ecological 
function. Such a phase of control or cognitive and behavioural stability is defined by an expression of 
efficient function in relation to ecological demand. It is in performance surface (see,  
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Figure 19, over) that such entropic functioning postulates two dominant ‘theories of function’: 1) A 
smooth equilibrium of stability such as the ‘Inverted U-Theory’ (Yerks & Dobson, 1908), as a ‘fold’ 
model sees control or performance oscillate around an optimal of performance and; 2) A Cusp 
Catastrophe model where an optimum of performance, function and behaviour/performance, is 
followed a collapse of functioning (e.g. Cusp  Catastrophe Theory (Hardy & Fazey, 1987)). Both are 
manifestations of two dimensions of control (e.g. cognitive demand and anxiety) and have been 
formulated in Catastrophe theory as a Cusp-Fold (Thom & Fowler, 1975; Zeeman, 1976).  
Thom and Fowler (1975), in developing catastrophe theory classified seven elementary models of 
catastrophe function, a hierarchy of the more complex models subsuming the fundamental function 
of lower order models. Such is the ‘intensive’ complexity of Non-linear Dynamical Systems, that 
Divergent Criticality would seek to theoretically-ground catastrophe theory in a simple mechanism, 
but with a complexity of functional possibility or outcome.  
Psychological and philological applications of Catastrophe Theory (Guastello, 2009), as it offers a 
response-surface (performance outcomes) that can observe ‘change’ in cognition and behaviour, 
modelling dimensions of control in physiological performance and neural function. 
It is in a Cusp-Fold catastrophic model, that much interest in the psychological sciences has been 
instigated as a model that accommodates the basic symmetric ‘fold’ of smooth function,  
extrapolated to an asymmetric ‘Cusp’ of sudden change and local collapse of phase and stability.  
These two approaches to catastrophe theory with which to explain function and behaviour, 
represent a ‘Cusp-Fold’ approach (Guastello, 2009; Thom & Fowler, 1975) is able to be described as 
a two dimensional manifold of (unfolding) behaviour, and is formulated around two control 
dimensions of criticality – (a) the asymmetric landscape and (b) bifurcation function where potential 
function surface (y) may be mapped as a 2nd derivative of criticality,  ɗ𝑓(𝑦) = 𝑦3 − 𝑏𝑦 − 𝑎: 
The Divergent Criticality Hypothesis
103 
 
 
ɗ𝑓(𝑦) = 𝑦3 − 𝑏𝑦 − 𝑎   
 
ɗ𝑓(𝑦) = Performance Surface (landscape) 
𝑎   =  Asymmetry in Physiological Control 
𝑏   =  Bifurcation dimension as Cognitive 
anxiety 
𝑏𝑦 =  Internal criticality dimension  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 – Cusp-Fold Catastrophe Model, adapted from (Yerks & Dobson,1908; Hardy & 
Parfitt,1991; Zeeman, 1976) 
Above, two of the more popular applied catastrophe theories: Yerks and Dobson (1908) Fold 
Inverted U-hypothesis and Hardy and Parfitt (1991) Cusp Catastrophe Theory, are reformulated 
applying an agential control dimension, therefore, able to accommodate the variation and vagaries 
that have confounded previous literature on the function of catastrophe in perception and 
behaviour (performance): 
Though ‘cusp’ and ‘fold’ formulations of catastrophe produce a two dimensional surface for function 
in ɗ𝑓(𝑦), this formulation still might be considered as linear and static, in its functionality as co-
dimensional, ‘two fold’ bifurcation (Gavrilov, 1978; Langford, 1979). Hardy et al. (2007) have 
encountered a richer and more complex landscape of cognitive-physiological interaction 
confounding such two dimensional function. Though they have tried to accommodate this 
confounding of model behaviour in a cognitive ‘effort’ and control-function, they have not 
fundamentally altered the two dimensionality of the Cusp-Fold catastrophe models therefore, might 
have not provided a functional 3rd ‘agential dimension: Though Hardy’s use of the cusp-fold model 
takes account of cognitive (agential) variation, it is still a model that could be considered as a static 
landscape of functional processes, processes that do not adequately account for the attentional-bias 
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and the behavioural dynamism seen in research (e.g., Cohen et al., 2003; Tenenbaum & Becker, 
2005).  
The catastrophe model ‘seems’ to accommodate attentional (cognitive) demands, but in Cusp-Fold 
catastrophe modelling, this is done on a trajectory that utilises an absolute or normal ‘landscape of 
Effectivity’, one that is negotiated in two dimensions of control. This landscape, provides a 
psychological and cognitive ‘diffeomorphism up to transversely’ (Guastello, 2009, p29), one that 
does not adequately account or explain the agential dimension or mediation in naturalised function 
(rather Hardy et al. cusp-fold models are an observation of behaviour rather than function). The 
outcome is that affective behaviour is incorrectly allocated function, therefore, further behaviour 
can be contradictory to the modelling of such incorrect, ‘cusp-fold’ functional expectations or 
predictions (e.g. behaviours thought to be reflective of a catastrophe function landscape are 
observed as ‘both’ cusp-catastrophic and  fold-catastrophic (Inverted-U), confounding expectations 
based on Cusp-fold models (ibid)).  
This confounding between modelled and observed behaviour, Hardy explains through the 
functioning of cognitive anxiety control (e.g. effort) in catastrophic behaviour. Though this has been 
vigorously defended (Hardy et al., 2007), the inability of the cusp-fold model to explain such 
behavioural-duality persists. Hardy, however, does recognise an ‘agency’ in cognitive processes in 
the acknowledgement of the ‘effort’ function (a concept from Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007)), however, this does not provide adequate functionality to 
delineate and describe the variation observed in Cusp-Fold behaviour. 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis, in a ‘relative’ formulation of Effectivity, requires a dynamic 
‘diffeomorphism’ of three-dimensions; the re-formulation of catastrophe theory’s ‘two-fold’ 
dimensions (process of cognitive and physiological arousal or demand), to accommodate ‘all’ 
functional determinants on cognition (including agency) for a Dynamical System to be truly 
functional. Divergent Criticality hopes to address these inadequacies (observed between model and 
behaviour in the Cusp-Fold model), by introducing an agential ‘dimension’ to relative Effectivity – a 
reduced Voluntary Control dimension effective on criticality behaviour as a ‘limited’ function in 
catastrophe theory – a Cusp-Hopf formulation (Buzzi et al., 2012; Harlim & Langford, 2007; Hopf, 
1942) for criticality behaviour. 
 Cusp-Hopf Function: An Agential Approach to Criticality and Catastrophe 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis in modelling a ‘beyond’ relative Effectivity function as an 
‘agential’ dimension in criticality and Catastrophe function), is better explained through a ‘Cusp-
Hopf’ formulation in Self-Organising Criticality for neural function and behaviour.  
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The problems of cusp-fold catastrophe seen in Hardy and Fazey (1987), are accommodated in a 
Divergent Criticality hypothesis, by bringing an extra dimension of agential control, an intentionality 
– to the functioning of criticality in a Tolerance Optimisation. A Cusp-Hopf Tolerance-maintenance 
function (of optimisation) can be defined and modelled through an agential ‘control’ dimension. This 
allows two probable behaviours from a Cusp-Hopf formulation in catastrophe modelling, the 
criticality functioning of ‘near’ and ‘far’ from cusp (relative Effectivity), and emergent as the 
observations of ‘fold’ and ‘cusp’ behaviour (behaviours that have incorrectly been attributed as 
function in previous cusp-fold models, e.g. Hardy and Fazey). 
It is in the Divergent Criticality hypothesis that agential-mediation can be considered as the control 
parameter in a ‘Cusp-Hopf’ proposition, a ‘three-fold’ co-dimensional model providing an agential 
dimension that is in addition to the cognitive and psychological demand parameters (see agential 
dimension A-B, below). This is a ‘limited’ behaviour (non-normal temporal-optimisation, i.e. 
dissipative), of criticality function at the ‘edge of stability’, with the behavioural outcomes of a 
shifting-phase criticality as it maintains and/or collapses (bi-furcates) a phase-cusp of stability. 
Rather than a ‘normal’ trajectories of fold or cusp (which, functionally, cannot now be considered as 
‘behaviour’ from ‘normal’ function), an agential goal-oriented ‘intentionality’ dimension, prosaically, 
‘surfs’ the cusp optimisation and the behaviours associated with catastrophe of cusp and fold 
emerge dependent on the agent (see, below): 
(A) The first, a collapse, if function goes far 
(beyond) ‘cusp’ with stability-breaking, then 
performance-collapse behaviours are observed; 
(B) The second, a maintenance of stability 
‘close to cusp’, allowing functioning to maintain 
Tolerance Optimisation, but at the cost of ‘relative’ 
phase as a dissipative or a ‘truncated-normal’ (Harlim 
& Langford, 2007); a temporal equilibrium (non-
stable) that allows smooth or ‘fold like’ catastrophic behaviour along a cusp-optimisation dimension 
(this will be aligned with an ‘Intentionality-dimension’, see, 8.6.6 –  Agential Capabilities and Control 
in Cognitive Processes, p249). The red-dashed line represents a 3rd dimension of Agential 
Intentionality and a ‘Limited’ Tolerance Optimisation function 
Such theoretical formulation of three fold criticality is described by the Tolerance Optimisation 
within a congruent hypothesis of agential relative-Effectivity. Divergent Criticality provides the 
theoretical formulation to answer how intentionality in ‘cusp’ behaviour might self-organise (and 
Figure 20 – A Cusp-Hopf Agential Mediation 
(A – B) dynamic dimension: adapted from 
(Zeeman, 1976) 
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come to be). Three-fold cusp catastrophe ‘allows’ ‘beyond’ criticality function to thermodynamically 
persist as a cusp-maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation, a non-stable equilibrium, in dissipative 
systems. Intentionality is, therefore, able to be functionally grounded in self-organising theory as a 
Catastrophe Theory of a reduced Voluntary Control function: 
 “concept of local structural stability in Ωr is naturally obtained” (Buzzi et al., 2012, p8). 
(Ωr) represents a ‘Non Smooth Vector Field (Filippov systems), allowing a topological extension of 
stability to exist: “if there an orientation preserving homeomorphism” (ibid). This is an agential 
‘orientation’ permitted with ‘relative’ Effectivity ‘preserving homeomorphism’ in a functional buffer-
zone (not exceeding absolute Effectivity). Here, agential ‘mediation’ may be ‘paid’ for at a cost to 
Effectivity and efficient functioning. Such a relative agential mediation of Effectivity is formulated in 
the Divergent Criticality hypothesis as a ‘reduced Voluntary Control’. 
In such agential-mediated ‘Voluntary Control’, function can either display: (A) collapse, as an 
absolute (normal function) 57, or (B) a cusp-maintenance behaviour (through a reduced relative 
Effectivity) as the ‘orientation’ of reduced Voluntary Control, and phase function able to maintain 
stability. As a behaviour of optimisation, Tolerance ‘maintenance’ is seen in a temporal ‘cusp’ state 
of ‘limited’ function. This, however, is not an easily realised cognitive-capacity or state; to extend 
such cusp-criticality requires the agential ‘mediation’ (as cognitive ‘effort’), and a functioning of 
inefficiency (from the demands of top-down cognitions), that still represents a ‘less than optimal’ 
proposition for functional Affordance (Eysenck et al., 2007). 
Attentional components and their interaction can be graphically represented through the 
formulation of relative Effectivity as an entropic Kullback-Leibler divergence, but with Cusp-Hopf 
reduced function (in Voluntary Control). It is in the interplay of reduced Voluntary Control and the 
functioning of Divergent Criticality (the steepness of the functional slope), that differentiation 
around function in relative Effectivity is able to be defined in behaviour terms, reflecting the 
functioning of agency in Self Organising processes. 
Considering the behaviour of criticality in biological functioning (see, 2.35, Divergent Criticality – 
Maximal Entropy Production for Biological , p79). If Tolerance in (neural) functioning provides a state 
of optimum function for ecological engagement and surprise (entropy); how does such Divergent 
Criticality function become affective in cognition and behaviour and the ‘affective’ mechanism that 
                                                          
57 ‘Limited’ in catastrophe terminology refers to behaviour outside or beyond ‘normal’ function. 
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connects Divergent Criticality with biological function and behaviour. This is discussed in the next 
section. 
 
 Affective Behaviour for a Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
One possible approach to achieve the optimal tolerance hypothesis would be to align behaviour with 
ecological engagement for ‘surprise’ (change) through life-affective behaviours. 
Affective behaviour for life-regulation has provided neural mechanisms that epitomise biological-
value: good for survival (reward and attraction); and bad for survival (repulsion anxiety and 
aversion). One of the relationships between affective cognitions and behaviour is that of the 
reticular activating system – the ‘Dopamine Reward System’ (DRS) (Olds & Milner, 1954). Here, the 
importance of neurotransmitters and ecological function in neural networks was aligned with 
affective behaviour. More recently, DRS as ‘the reward’ mechanism, is found to be nuanced, parsed 
between eliciting a hedonic ‘pleasure’ or ‘liking’, but with a ‘wanting’ that might be considered as 
the mediator of motivation, rather than liking. This suggests multiple components to reward-based 
affect, one that combines a) the liking or hedonic-affect for pleasure, with  b) a volition or 
motivation for the ‘wanting’ of that pleasure (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013; Thompson & Swanson, 
2010; Zahm et al., 2013). 
Here importantly, it is the volition or wanting agency that is seen to be innate, a sub-cortical 
affective drive or ‘seeking’ (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Damasio, Grabowski, Bechara, Damasio, 
Ponto, Parvizi & Hichwa, 2000; Panksepp, 1998; Richard & Berridge, 2012). Such innate ‘drive(s)’ of 
affective behaviour provide the possibility of an affective base for constructing adaptive behaviours 
on. 
Research has prioritised such innate sub-cortical propositions as our affective behaviours (see, Craig, 
2014; Damasio, 2010; Merker, 2007; Panksepp, 1998; Thompson, 2007) as primary in what Damasio  
has termed the ‘brain-body’ loop (2010) – a resonant feedback of brain, body and environment; 
communicating sensory, and homeostatic information for life-regulation. Damasio describes these 
behaviours as being encoded in ‘programmes of affect’, a cascade of affective behaviour in response 
towards life-regulation.  
These programmes of affective behaviour are ‘emotions’ of hereditary neural programming for 
survival, replicated and refined through their ‘selectionist’ worth. This evolution lineage may be 
traced back to the emergence of trophic behaviour from the first organic life, exhibiting behaviour 
towards biological-value (see, Hastings & Greenberg, 1999). However, it can’t simply be an affective 
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behaviour for Divergent Criticality (however well this affective behaviour might be informed); as an 
uncontrolled, run-away process, Divergent Criticality would be a catastrophic biological-value 
proposition, taking the body-environment system through increasing criticality to collapse. How, 
then, does the brain know when its functioning is optimal, and then moderate Divergent Criticality? 
As a behavioural regulatory system acting on an innate drive, neuro-affective regulation has been 
found in a similar, but ‘counter-opposing’, moderating, response behaviour to reward stimuli 
(Nithianantharajah, Komiyama, McKechanie, Johnstone, Blackwood, Clair, Emes, van de Lagemaat, 
Saksida, Bussey & Grant, 2013). Genome research is providing support for not only the evolutionary 
robustness of a ‘moderated’ affective behaviour hypothesis, but behavioural regulation and 
diversification in the biological lineage. This is now being experimentally observed in neural 
diversification (Ryan, Kopanitsa, Indersmitten, Nithianantharajah, Afinowi, Pettit, Stanford, Sprengel, 
Saksida, Bussey, O'Dell, Grant & Komiyama, 2013).  
It is in the how such a Divergent Criticality might regulate or inform ‘affective behaviour’, both as to 
an optimal, but in the maintenance of biological-value, that we might consider to a self-regulation 
for a Tolerance Optimisation. If Divergent Criticality were able to self-regulate around a Tolerance 
optimal, then this would provide for a ‘brain-body/environment’ Tolerance hypothesis. The question 
is posed: ‘How does the brain know when its functioning is optimal’. If this is going to be answered, 
such self-regulating ‘affect’ needs to be naturalised through Divergent Criticality in order to avoid 
the theoretical and physiological pitfalls of idealism – the brain needs to know (not through an a 
priori knowledge), but through affective optimal functioning in reference to biological-value. 
 
 Criticality has a Noise 
It is in the functioning of Self-Organisation Criticality that we again find a possible way forward: 
criticality (as entropy function) has a noise, a signature of criticality emergence in the brain. 
With increasingly accurate measurement, correlations of differing amplitude and frequency start to 
emerge from brain-environment behaviour, this is seen in electroencephalography [EEG], but also 
coupling behaviour, limb movement, bird singing, social interaction, etc. – this is the emergence of 
‘fractal scaling’ in neural ‘noise’. Fractal-scaling is a ‘state’ where the whole system resonates with 
itself throughout its levels of criticality and self-organisation; it is when correlation with the ‘scaling’ 
of observation level becomes a power-law ‘scale of similarity’ in criticality behaviour (entropic 
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dissipation), that a scaling-exponent58 emerges. Functioning is now able to be differentiated through 
a neural-function as fractal scaling. 
A scaling-exponent reflects a change or divergence in the scaling-relationship between wave 
amplitude and frequency scales of an observed (data) sine function. This scaling relationship when 
spectrally plotted, delivers a scaling exponent () as a measure of just how similar the fractal level(s) 
of emergence are (consider Russian Doll similarity: similar within similar). It is the signal of the 
similarity in ‘criticality’ functioning of the intensive-features of a self-organising system, that the 
‘state’ of entropic function may be determined. If no similarity exists, this emergent scaling-
exponent would approach the value of =0; conversely, if similar in ‘all’ parts (levels), then the 
scaling exponent would approach the value of =2.  
The data that from the seeming chaos of complexity systems, stability (as a temporal states 
description) reveals a scaling exponent of  approaching 1 (≈1), a scaling-exponent that in ecology 
science is described as a ‘Fractal Pattern’. This should not have been a total surprise: from the initial 
break-through in avalanche behaviour59 (Bak et al., 1987), observations of ‘nature’ often display this 
fractal pattern of 1/f1  (e.g. branching of trees and geometric patterns of flowers; heart rate 
variance, etc. – all are described as fractal scaling ≈1 [1/f1 ]).  
With the scaling-exponent of ( 2) interpreted as Brown-noise and (  0) interpreted as White-
noise, then (≈1) is Pink noise, and seen as an emergent behaviour between White and Brown-
noise, neither rigid nor random. This duality has been called a “third Kind of Behaviour” (Van Orden 
et al., 2011, p654), and as ubiquitous in nature, it has been suggested that (≈ 1) represents an 
entropic attractor for Non-linear Dynamical Systems (Van Orden et al., 2011).  
This would seem to suggest Pink noise as a possible attractor to which a self-organizing system 
would be naturally draw – a stable-state of criticality. This might be questioned in relation to a 
                                                          
58 This is done through a power-law/lognormal distribution, here ‘power’ is used in its statistical context; a 
power-law relationship using logarithmic-coordinates. 
 
59 Although not organic, avalanches express a dynamic self-organising proposition. 
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Tolerance Hypothesis where, a stable-state of criticality as we have shown, requires a non-zero 
proposition for Divergent Criticality: A Divergent Criticality in fractal scaling is a ‘White-shift’60. 
White-shift represents a shift in entropic-flux that causes ‘entropy production’ (𝜎′ > 𝜎) and a ‘shift’ 
from the basis of Pink noise (≈ 1), ‘towards’ White-noise (≈ 1minus). Its antithesis is a Brown-shift 
(𝜎′ < 𝜎) towards Brown-noise (≈ 1plus). As a flux, such ‘shift’ represents a change in the ‘rate’ of 
production; a second derivative function represented in the Tolerance hypothesis as the system 
diverges toward optimal tolerance function. From this White-shift, a self-regulating Affective 
mechanism is able to be formulated informed by scaling emergence, and aligned with differentiated 
surprise as a tolerance demand in dynamic environments: 
 
 Formulating a Tolerance Optimisation Hypothesis in Criticality  
As a dynamical effect, White-shift is an attraction to the chaos and surprise of a Tolerance 
Optimisation maximal. We see a phase being taken to the edge of control by increasing entropy 
production (𝜎′ > 𝜎). The White-shift is the rate of change of criticality as entropy ‘cascades’ through 
intensive levels of emergence, with decreasing scaling similarity (≈ approaches 0). Therefore 
increasing White-shift as a signal able to coordinate61 surprise-affective behaviour (seeking, play, 
increased cognitive demands etc.), that drive the system towards a Tolerance Optimum ‘attractor’. 
What makes White-shift applicable as an attractor is its ‘inflection’ point in criticality as it reaches 
‘maximal’ parameters of behaviour (≈ 0). At this point of ‘seeming’ collapse in complexity, two 
behaviours can be exhibited in biological systems dependent on Tolerance capability of the agent 
(phase stability to export entropy); a relative or an absolute (like) Effectivity in relation to the 
dynamic demand on cognitive resources: 
1) In an absolute of functioning (Effectivity-tolerance) and a catastrophic behaviours see a 
White-shift collapse of the system – Divergent Criticality as a ‘runaway’ proposition. 
 
                                                          
60 ‘Shift’ as in White-shift, Brown-shift etc. is analogous to ‘noise’ in its fractal signature (≈ 1minus ). Shift is 
used here to define the behaviour of criticality, however, noise and shift are fungible in this respect. 
61 How the signal is ‘perceived’ and able to coordinate affective behaviour is not  in the scope of this study. 
However, it would represent just another ‘bottom-up’ sensory information signal to be appropriated by the 
neural system. 
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2) However, in a reduced-Effectivity ‘cusp’ state of criticality, going beyond the ‘relative’ 
optimal will result in White-shift (≈1minus) becoming Brown-shift (≈ 1plus), as only the 
‘relative’ criticality capability is exceeded not an absolute. The cusp-function can be 
moderated by its access to ‘Effectivities’ available within a reduced Voluntary Control 
mediation (until the ‘absolute’ of entropic behaviour is reached). The resultant cusp entropic 
behaviour results in entropy loss as more entropy is dissipated, and therefore will see an 
attractor of fractal scaling move towards a brown stability (≈ 1plus).  
This agential behaviour around a cusp-criticality provides; a naturalised, self-regulating, entropic 
mechanism of ‘White-shift’ for Divergent Criticality’s adherence tolerance parameters. When 
agential mediation is applied as a third dimension to a relative Effectivity, a Cusp-Hopf formulation 
of criticality permits the self-organising attractor to ‘drift’ or be mediated towards Brown-shift as a 
volition or intentionality affective on Tolerance Optimisation – This is how the brain knows. 
All organic life may considered as ‘reduced Effectivity’ in displaying agential self-replicating 
behaviour (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Macklem, 2008; Thompson, 2007), then biological life might be 
considered to be on a continuum of reduced Effectivity and increasing agential volition. This allows a 
simple hypothesis: that Tolerance Optimisation is self-regulated or orientated to a White-shift signal. 
In this fundamental simplicity, criticality is easily and universally extrapolated to animal-environment 
autonomy. 
Figure 21 – White Shift Continuum 
In avoiding entropy, all organic life must display non-diminishing entropy production for flux 
dynamics to export entropy. This might be translated as, ‘tolerance in an animal-environment 
autonomy is relational to dynamic demand, therefore, as dynamic demand increases, entropy 
production increases, requiring greater White-shift for optimal tolerance’. This allows a tolerance-
demand ‘continuum’ for increasing Divergent Criticality to be visualised: from trophic (almost 
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dispositional); to agential predictive (Figure 21, above). Instead of parsing dispositional and 
predictive models, here, they form part of the same evolutionary lineage of generative agential 
affective.  
It can now be surmised that a minimum Divergent Criticality scaling of (≈1minus), a White-shift 
would need to be found in all biological-life behaviour. Therefore, much of nature thought to be 
displaying 1/f will actually have a small White-shift (≈1minus) from pink noise. Findings of this ‘pink’ 
noise are fairly ubiquitous in biological studies (Hausdorff, Zemany, Peng & Goldberger, 1999; Kiefer, 
Riley, Shockley, Villard & Van Orden, 2009; Kloos, Kiefer, Gresham, K. Shockley, Riley & Van Orden, 
2009; Wijnants, Bosman, Hasselman, Cox & Van Orden, 2009); however, rather than a pink attractor, 
a white-shift at a level just below 1 is predicted. It may be that fractal-signals from many studies 
have not accurately been extrapolated from the fractal scaling (He, 2014).  
Indeed Hausdorff et al. (1999) in their gait analysis found “while exponents for adults were 
distributed narrowly and closer to pink noise (on the white side of pink noise)” (Van Orden et al., 
2011, p650):  
This was in adults performing what might be considered the most ‘expert’ / habituation example 
(gait/walking), therefore of little surprise (dynamic demand). Of interest, is that children reported 
Brown-noise in these gait experiments. Here, the Tolerance hypothesis has two possible 
explanations: 1) There was so little surprise/challenge, that they were in a neural-state of 
‘convergent criticality’; or 2) They were in a neural-state of cusp criticality ‘beyond’ a relative 
criticality in an extreme learning state. The latter explanation would be suggested here. 
At the divergent end of the criticality-phase, one would expect to see greater white-shift closer to 
(≈ 0). This, it seems, is becoming more evident in neural scaling for human behaviour: (Bertschinger 
& Natschläger, 2004; Chialvo, 2010; Clayton & Frey, 1997; Correll, 2008; Grigolini & Chialvo, 2013; 
Kello & Van Orden, 2009; Tuller, 2005; Tuller et al., 1994; Ward, 2002). 
Of particular interest is Grigolini (2015, p586) where temporal criticality was found at a power index 
of(µ = 1.6) equivalent to (≈ 0.4). 
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 How the Brain Knows: Tolerance Optimisation 
It is hypothesised that affective behaviour is informed by White-shift, this is how ‘the brain knows’ 
how to self-regulate around a Tolerance Optimal state of criticality-function. 
A White-shift in criticality-function, enables the brain-body emotional system to function at the edge 
or ‘cusp’ of criticality, an optimal learning state conducive to the ‘dynamism’ in the environment. 
This is a true agent-environment autonomy – a Tolerance hypothesis for Divergent Criticality. If a 
Brown-shift occurs, then there has been loss of ‘capability’ to dissipate entropy: either as the system 
dissipates62 towards a ‘convergent criticality’; or the relative ‘tolerance optimal’ has been exceeded.  
Figure 22 – White Shift of Divergent Criticality: Self-Regulation in Relative Function 
                                                          
62 Such ‘dissipation’ is the dynamic flux characterising all entropic systems, and is referred to as an entropic 
‘optimisation’ in Dynamical Theory. It is named here as ‘dissipation’ in order not to confuse Tolerance 
‘Optimisation’. 
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In all cases, a white-shift elicits returning the system to tolerance optimal behaviour in reduced 
Effectivity/ Voluntary Control (see, Figure 22, above). 
White-shift self-regulates organisms and biological-life at all levels of complexity. As an ecological 
tolerance proposition, organisms in dynamic environments are driven through affective behaviours 
(wanting, seeking, etc.) to engage with surprise through reward and life-enhancing 
phenomenological feeling. If they exceed relative criticality (and optimal tolerance), then adverse 
cognitive-emotions (anxiety, dislike, aversion), affect avoid behaviours for dis-engaging with further 
surprise. 
These are ‘co-opted’, affective emotional-cognitions from the primary processes of approach-avoid 
in biological-value (Panksepp & Biven, 2012). We can therefore expect that primordial behaviours 
will be retained (primary affective 'systems' are often displayed in extremis, such a fear63), in 
addition to evolutionary moderated ‘tertiary-regulated’ emotions.  
 
 Summary of Divergent Criticality hypothesis  
As a selectionist proposition for explaining human cognition and behaviour, the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis, has made the case for entropic behaviour underpinning neural-function for perception 
and leaning as; a perception of and from the state of cognitive function for life-effectiveness. To be 
able to set perception in neural-function requires that we attempt the problem of coordinating a 
subjective perception towards an objectivity in explanation. This is approached through a state 
relative Effectivity considered as a ‘Tolerance’ definition – a measure of perception as ‘a state of 
functional Affordance’ is able to provide such empirical objectivity. 
The methodology now develops a perception measure able to be considered as such a ’state of 
functional Affordance’ and then tests the Divergent Criticality hypothesis through a number of 
research designs. It should be noted that this PhD study represents a constructivist approach in its 
evolving research question and methodology, in that both the research design and the validity of its 
methods evolve in a ‘maturing’ methodology that starts with a guiding research question –  
                                                          
63 As well as more obvious, fear-inducing cascades of uncontrolled emotional behaviour, it has been 
hypothesised that once you achieve what you are driven towards, e.g. ‘food’, that the ‘seeking-wanting’ 
motivations are ‘switched-off’ in order that you may actualise (ingest) biological-value (Berridge & Kringelbach, 
2008) 
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Can our perceptions of ecological engagement as reported through Situational Interest and 
Self Concept, be indicative of neural efficiency and a state of functional Affordance? 
To address this three studies were conducted: 
Study One – Measure Investigation 
1) A pilot study sets out to investigate if Divergent Criticality can be explored through 
perception measures of ‘attentional awareness’: First a Situational Interest measure of perceptions 
thought to infer a state of cognitive efficiency in function; and Secondly, a Self-Concept measure 
(self-effectiveness,  self-efficacy, locus of control, etc.) were used to infer cognitions of life-
effectiveness considered to reflect neural-function. It was thought that these measures might offer 
some inference of the functioning of Tolerance Optimisation, in accordance with the Divergent 
Criticality Hypothesis. 
Study Two – Questionnaire Development 
2) Built on the findings from the first study, further development to the measures of Situational 
Interest and Self-Concept in order that they might better align within the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis was conducted. This employed Factor Analysis to test the veracity of this questionnaire 
development. This study two was used to inform the final study, Study Three’s, research design and 
methodology. 
Study Three – An Exploratory Model of Divergent Criticality Function  
3) Study three brought together the findings of previous studies in a multi-faceted research 
design, to test Tolerance Optimisation (within a Divergent Criticality Theory), and Factor Analysis 
helped further develop a Structural Equation Model (SEM). In accordance with SEM protocols, the 
resultant structural model’s significance in assuming Divergent Criticality function is given further 
quantitative validation through a model building analysis using ‘Conditional Independence’. SEM and 
Conditional Independence  models require caution in inferring causality, as they may become 
confounded in a structural dependence on the data (Bollen & Pearl, 2013; Mueller, 1997); therefore, 
to provide further validity, an SEM (modelled) ‘Interdependence Profile’ as a state of functional 
Affordance was triangulated against an independent measure of affective-cognitions – Self-Concept. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR – Methodology Study One: Measure Investigation  
Can our perceptions of ecological engagement as reported through Situational Interest and 
Self Concept, be indicative of neural efficiency and a state of functional Affordance? 
 Study One: Introduction 
A pilot study was carried out to evaluate if there is support for a state of functional Affordance 
reflecting a Divergent Criticality Hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation in neural function, and 
investigate if this is accessible through perception measures of Situational Interest (Chen, Darst & 
Pangrazi, 1999) and Self-Concept (ROPELOC, Richards, Ellis & Neill, 2002). These perceptions are 
hypothesised as affective-cognitions of attentional processes made consciously ‘aware’, and infer a 
state of cognitive efficiency in relation to the ecological functioning of the individual – a functional 
Affordance state. 
This Study One addressed two exploratory hypotheses to investigate the use of perception measures 
in inferring a Divergent Criticality effect: 
1) The first, that a difference test using an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the constructs 
within both measures, to determine if situational domains had an effect on perceptions of 
Interest (Situational Interest) and life effectiveness (Self-Concept); 
2) The second, a correlation between Interest and Self-Concept using a Pearson’s Independent 
Correlation between the measure constructs64. 
This first Study One analysis would be found ‘not’ able to provide the power or questionnaire-
nuance necessary for investigating the complexity in cognitive function through these perception 
measures (as an awareness of a state of neural-function). However, the analysis of the ANOVA 
results for Situational Interest did point towards some form of differentiated-reporting dependent 
on the sampling criteria supporting the premise of affective cognitions of Divergent Criticality 
function. To provide some direction for future questionnaire item development, the Situational 
Interest measure was subject to a pathway analysis: 
3) A Post Hoc, Structural Equation Modelling of Situational Interest was conducted to 
investigate the construct relationships and interdependent effects. 
                                                          
64 Both main constructs and sub-construct levels would be investigated. 
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 Methodology Overview  
Figure 23 – Methodology Overview 
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Study One: Methodology 
 Date Collection 
 The Choice of Measures 
The sampling rationale was that learning-domains, as reflecting cognitive demand in ecological 
engagement, would illicit cognitions as states of neural function in relation to surprise and challenge. 
Therefore, different learning-domains as situational determinants ‘affective’ on cognition, should 
report differentiated affective-cognitions as perceptions of attentional-awareness concurring with a 
Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis. To adequately address the Divergent Criticality hypothesis, 
measures that might report affective cognitions as to their veracity towards the functioning of 
Divergent Criticality should be able to reflect:  
i) Ecological-demand or surprise65. 
ii) The composite effects of expectation demands and situative demands for action 
selection. 
iii) Hedonic perceptions of affective behaviour, a ‘seeking’ or innate motivation. 
iv) Like or dislike perceptions as ‘selectionist’ approach or avoid affective-cognitive 
behaviour. 
v) Agential drive or goal-oriented cognitions of approach towards end-point cognitions. 
To test the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation, two measures are explored: 
 Measure 1 – A State of functional Affordance within Relative Effectivity 
Awareness as a state of ecological functioning suggests a cognition situated within the agent’s 
experience; a temporal, real-time awareness or perception set within ecological engagement. Such a 
‘situated’ awareness has been a key determinant in theories of action, especially so in the 
philosophies of agency and intentionality (see, Dancy & Sandis, 2015, for overview) and explored in 
relation to the antecedents of ‘situational assessment’ (Endsley, 1995; Suchman, 1987; Tremblay, 
2017). Endsley (1988, 1995) proposed such an awareness of situated-intentionality in her 3 Level 
model of perception, comprehension and projection. According to Endsley, these are ecological 
situated cognitions of conscious sense-making, drawing from both knowledge and experience. To 
                                                          
65 The new, different or novel in an agents experience or knowledge. 
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this end, measures of Situational Awareness (SA) were investigated as to their veracity in addressing 
the situational awareness thought to infer a state of functional Affordance, namely measures of: 
 Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT, Endsley, 1988) 
 Situation Present Awareness Procedure (SPAM, Durso, Dattel, Banbury & Tremblay, 2004) 
 Situational Awareness Rating Technique (SART, Taylor, 1990) 
Though recognising many situational antecedents towards action-selection, these measures were 
considered ambiguous in relation to how an awareness might be affective, the ‘cognitive processes’, 
for an attentional-awareness as a perception (Bong & Skaalvik, 2003; Lave, 1988; Suchman, 1987). 
To address the ambiguities, the investigation of greater ‘immediacy’ and naturalistic sampling in a 
measure (real-time cognitions towards the sense-making and experience) requires the parsing of 
action and comprehension as separate constructs within a composite of cognitive processes 
(Suchman, 1987) – a more ‘dynamic’ appraisal of situational interaction. 
``the organization of situated action is an emergent property of moment-by-moment interactions 
between actors, and between actors and the environments of their action.'' (Suchman, 1987, p179) 
The suggestion that greater focus is needed as to the cognitive demand(s) of action and 
comprehension (seen as synonymous within situational awareness), sees a ‘situated agency’ 
constructed in action, requiring that the origins and functioning of ‘agency’ might be accessed (Lave 
& Wenger, 1991) – a cognitive ‘functioning’ that might be accessible through In Situ sampling. This is 
not a new ontology; Kant’s “antinomy of teleological judgement” presents ‘intrinsic purposiveness’ 
and ‘relative purposiveness’ (1987, p133); the ‘effect’ (or goal) possible, not only through the idea of 
that ‘effect’ as an agential ‘intentionality’ emergent through attentional processes as a ‘means 
towards an end’, but an ‘effect’ mediated through ecological effectiveness. 
Perceptions as attentional constructs from such intentionality in a ‘Situational Awareness’ then may 
present themselves through cognitive processes of bottom-up (action control) and top-down 
(conceptual sense-making, Knudsen, 2007). A cognitive demand-biasing along situational and 
contextual pathways as Kant’s ‘purposiveness’ of intrinsic and ‘relative’ value, presents a parsing of 
goal-orientation and comprehension in cognitive-demand and an awareness of such demand. This is 
the cognitive processes of attentional-awareness, therefore, better considered through a ‘Situated 
Cognition’ – that of ‘attending’ to such value-perceptions In Situ.  
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 Determining a Situational measure from a Composite of Attentional Cognitive-
Processes 
Perceptions or appraisals of intrinsic ‘purposiveness’ and goal-relatedness are extensive in Self 
Determination Theory (SDT, Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1991; Deci & Ryan, 2008), and out of the panoply of 
tests and measures, a subjective measure of perceived intrinsic motivations that offered a 
situational and agential ‘purposefulness’ is the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI, Ryan, Mims & 
Koestner, 1983). However, the prerogative of parsing action (goal-orientation) and comprehension 
(sense-making) was considered compromised in this IMI questionnaire. In particular, how the use of 
IMI was not able to differentiate ‘state’ cognitions (as required) – the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory 
constructs are longitudinal ‘trait-like’ perceived attributions of ‘competence’, ‘usefulness’ and 
‘relatedness’. However, the IMI did identify perceptions that could be considered intrinsic measures 
or ‘hedonic’ markers of cognitive-efficiency: those of Interest, Enjoyment and perceived Effort or 
Demand. Such constructs have been explored as a ‘Situational Interest’ (Deci, 1992; Mitchell, 1993; 
Renninger, Hidi & Krapp, 2014), particularly in learning environments (Chen & Darst, 2002; 1999; 
Harter, 1978; Hidi & Anderson, 1992).  
Situational Interest is, here, considered to offer a ‘state’ of cognitive function and intentionality as 
an ‘interest’ perception; this has been aligned with agential cognition and behaviour (Bandura, 2001; 
Chen et al., 2001a; Deci, 1992; Levesque, Copeland & Sutcliffe, 2008; Ryan & Deci, 2008). At the core 
of these studies is a composite-appraisal of subjective experience and intentional engagement. This 
would suggest that ‘Situational Interest’ might infer an affective-cognition as a hedonic ‘state’ (an 
affective cognition of like or dislike), mediated by agential sense-making as a goal-oriented cognition 
(approach or avoid). Such situational interest-awareness might therefore be considered as a 
perception measure for neural-functioning in ecological engagement, providing the necessary 
criteria for reporting a state of functional Affordance as an awareness of composite cognitive 
(attentional) processes able to be parsed into situational purposefulness and contextual relatedness. 
 A Situational Interest Questionnaire 
A multi-construct questionnaire of Situational Interest (Chen, Darst & Pangrazi,(1999; 2001a) as an 
examination of situational interest and its constructs, was used to measure perceptions of interest 
as inferring attentional cognitive-processes (Clark, 2013; Graziano, 2013). It is hypothesised that 
cognitive processes will be evident in an appraisal of Situational Interest (Chen et al., 1999), as a 
cognitive efficiency-function representing a state of functional Affordance.  
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Situational Interest delivered five constructs of Attentional Awareness: 1. Exploratory Interest (Eng); 
2. Instant Enjoyment (InsEn); 3. Novelty (Nov); 4. Attention Demand (Att); 5. Challenge (Chall), and 
also a universal measure of Situational Interest 6. (ToIn, see, APPENDIX II: Questionnaire 
Development and Providence, p294). 
 Measure 2: A Perception Measure of Contextual Sense-Making: 
To provide an alternative measure, one able to be correlated with the state ‘Interest’ measure, it is 
in the very composite of action and sense-making that an ‘agency’ in sense-making (comprehension) 
is considered to be synonymous with such perceptions (Lave, 1988): Situational determinants will be 
affective on sense-making in recognition of Kant’s ‘intrinsic purposiveness’, ‘trait-like’ cognitions 
made aware as perceptions of personal agency. Here, ‘traits’ are seen as affective-cognitions of 
greater longitudinal stability than a dispositional ‘state’. Importantly, here, traits themselves are not 
fixed or invariant to ecological demands, but self-attributions mediated through situational 
engagement. 
In order to adequately infer sense-making through an in-situ ‘value’ perception, such a contextual 
measure should be able to address constructs of: 
i) An attentional awareness of personal agency or Self-Concept. 
ii) An affective cognition of capability function (relative Effectivity) towards ecological 
engagement. 
This inferring of agential capability cognitions towards ecological demand as affective on 
‘comprehension’, offers a complementary ‘state’ measure of functional Affordance. If both 
measures correlate and are congruent with the Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis, this should be 
able to provide some triangulation to the Situational Interest model inferring  
 Determining a Contextual Sense-Making state through Self-Concepts of Functional 
Affordance 
Self-Concept perceptions of competency and control are thought to infer a self-belief or trait-like 
awareness of cognitive function accessible through self-report (Rickinson, Dillon, Teamey, Morris, 
Choi, Sanders & Benefield, 2004) and therefore, self-concept as an awareness, is hypothesised to 
infer that perceptions of competency and control align with ecological determinates (Cason & Gillis, 
1994; Hattie, Marsh, Neill & Richards, 1997; Marsh, Pekrun, Parker, Murayama, Guo, Dicke & Arens, 
2018; Miron-Shatz, Stone & Kahneman, 2009; Neill, 2002). 
What and how to measure such self ‘attribution’ has broadly fallen into two theoretical perspectives: 
that of perceptions of 1) self-concept including self-confidence, self-worth, self-acceptance, 
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competence, and ability (Shavelson, Hubner & Stanton, 1976); and that of 2) self-efficacy and agency 
(Bandura, 1997). A commonality between these various constructs is the increasing 
acknowledgement of domain and task-specification states, as being effective on both. However, 
these epistemologies diverge in their ‘frame of reference’ (Bong & Skaalvik, 2003; Pajares, 2009); for 
example, the influence of a negative self-concept in questionnaires, may lead to self-efficacy beliefs 
being perceived wrongly as outcome-expectations or global-specific ‘states’ of function. This is a 
particular issue with questionnaire items measuring ‘general’ self-concept items confounding self-
efficacy measures for outcome expectations. To obviate such confounding effects, a broad spectrum 
of psychological and behavioural items as a ‘measure of self-concept’ was investigated:  
Neill (2003) examined perceptions of self-concept through life-effectiveness, a measure that 
resonated with the desired criteria of a ‘state of function’ in a sampling domain (Ecological 
Engagement), and formulated a series of Life Effectiveness Questionnaires (LEQ -G, LEQ-H, LEQ-YAR, 
LEQ-Corporate). Of particular interest was the development of Review of Personal Effectiveness with 
Locus of Control (ROPELOC) (Richards et al., 2002), a measure specifically directed to ‘experiential 
interventions’ of Outdoor Learning and Personal Development. 
 A Self-Concept Measure – Review of Personal Effectiveness and Locus of Control 
For a perceptual measure of self-concept towards life-effectiveness, this study uses the measure 
‘Review of Personal Effectiveness and Locus of Control’ (ROPELOC). ROPELOC (Richards et al., 2002). 
ROPELOC is a multidimensional instrument with 10 scales that are factored to three constructs of 
Self-attributions and belief:   
1) Personal Abilities and Beliefs (PAB) – including sub-scales of; Self-Confidence, Self-
Efficacy, Stress Management, Open Thinking;  
2) Social Abilities (SA) – including sub-scales of; Social Effectiveness, Cooperative 
Teamwork, Leadership Ability;  
3) Organisational Skills (OS) – including sub-scales of; Time Management, Quality Seeking, 
Coping with Change).  
Four other scales are included: an energy scale called Active Involvement (AI), a measure of Overall 
Effectiveness (OE) and two attribution scales, Internal Locus of Control (IL) and External Locus of 
Control (EL). In addition there is a ‘check’ Control Item (CI), to flag the veracity in reporting (see MK1: 
APPENDIX II: Questionnaire Development and Providence, p294). 
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 Domains and Sampling Criteria 
As the central hypothesis explores neural states of function in relation to state(s) of ecological 
determinants, it was considered that ‘learning’ environments would provide affective ‘situational’ 
differentiation to enable such function to be reported.  
 Situative Learning Domains for best inferring functional Affordance States 
Learning that would seemingly confer a ‘dynamic functionality’ in neural states was conducted in 
many different learning environments thought to induce:  
“any process that in living organisms, leads to a permanent capacity change, and which is not solely 
due to biological maturation or ageing” (Illeris, 2007, p3). 
Learning environments were then delineated into two domains: a) the familiarity of Traditional 
Classroom Learning (TCL); and b) Learning Outside the Classroom (LoTC), environments that are new 
and different. Learning Outside the Classroom (LOtC) suggests a broad palette of experiential and 
situative learning and may be seen to encapsulate many dimensions of learning from experience, a 
major constructivist approach to learning in a resonance of body, mind and environment (Barrows & 
Tamblyn, 1980; Noë, 2008; Schmidt, Loyens, Van Gog & Paas, 2007). Learning is therefore classed as 
LOtC through the following criteria: 
1) They are ‘outside’ and removed from the individual’s ‘normal’ learning and/or educational 
situation. 
2) They embody experiential learning through some form of ecological engagement. 
  
This ‘embodied’ approach to learning as a cognition of experience in physical engagement and social 
environments may be aligned with key pedagogic learning perspectives:  The ‘Situative-perspective’ 
of collaboration within a social-cultural environment and the inclusion and maintenance of 
collaborative relationships (Bruner, 2009; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999); An  ‘Associative-reinforcement’ 
of experience and knowledge (Engestrőm, 1987; Kolb, 1984; Mezerow, 1985; Pavlov, 1927); and the 
‘Constructivist’ making meaning for experience past and present (Illeris, 2003a; Mezirow, 1985; 
Piaget, 1958).  
What seems evident from research on the perceptions of participants in these categorisations is that 
the implicit ‘context or situation’ of the learning is a fundamental property over and above 
‘knowledge and content’. For example, it has been consistently reported in longitudinal measures 
(see, Hattie et al., 1997; Nundy, 1999; Rickinson et al., 2004, for review) that long-term memories 
seem to be of the experience itself, with low content-knowledge. Situational and contextual 
experience is retained over specific knowledge.  
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“the self-perceptions of the participants, and to the way each person absorbed the experience into 
his or her self-structure” (Hattie et al., 1997, p.46). 
Differentiated Learning Domains 
Study one was conducted across six different learning domains (situated as LoTC or TCL), with the 
intention of providing differentiated data where sampling might reflect different states of neural-
function reported across perceptions of Situational Interest and Self-Concept (ROPELOC). 
The six sampling domains (Table 1, below) were allocated an apriori functional Affordance (state) of 
high (3), medium (2) and low (1). The participants in the sampling domains were sampled with both 
measures consecutively, after a specified learning period for that particular activity (e.g. a classroom 
lesson or residential fieldtrip). Important here was that both measures were presented together as 
close to the experience or ‘situated’ learning event as possible. 
Table 1 – Learning Domains 
Sample Description - Situational Domain Hypothesised Affordance State 
i (n=24) Half Day Problem Based Learning (PBL) 2:Medium(Beyond relative Effectivity) 
ii (n=18) Half Day Sport Activity Practical (Sport Act)  2:Medium(Beyond relative Effectivity) 
iii (n=27) One Hour Theory Lecture (Theory) 1:Low (Within relative Effectivity) 
iv (n=23) Recall -Half Day Learning outside The Class 1:Low (Within relative Effectivity) 
v (n=8) Five day Residential Outdoor Activities Out Act 5  3:High (Beyond relative Effectivity) 
vi (n=27) Two day Residential Outdoor Activities Out Act 2 3:High (Beyond relative Effectivity) 
 
 Study One: Research Design 
Statistical Analysis 1: Difference Analysis 
1) Learning domains as considered differentiated by ‘higher’, ‘medium’ and ‘lower’ functional 
Affordance states, will display difference effects when compared using a One Way ANOVA. 
Difference tests were applied to the both the Situational Interest and Self-Concept data. 
Statistical Analysis 2: Correlation 
2) A correlation of the Situational Interest constructs was conducted against the constructs of 
the Self-Concept (ROPELOC) measure. In considering the two measures as sampling the 
same ‘state’ of neural efficiency, a series of inter-measure correlations were explored for 
correlation, supporting such perception measures inferring states of functional Affordance. 
Post Hoc Pathway Analysis  
3) Partial-correlation and regression analysis was conducted on the Situational Interest data in 
order to suggest an apriori model for path analysis. This model was then modified to explore 
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a maximum likelihood to explain the variance observed in the data. Further pathway analysis 
was conducted using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM): AMOSIBM24. 
 Sample Size and Power Considerations for T-Test and Correlation 
To determine how many subjects would be required to achieve a power of β = .70 at the confidence 
level of p=.10 (considered reasonable in exploratory statistical terms) with an estimation of effect 
sizes between 0.2 – 0.5 (Cohen, 1988)66, a statistical power calculator (Kohn, Senyak & Jarrett, 2018) 
was used and suggested a sample minimum of 19 participants per predictor. This supports Hair, 
Black, Babin, Anderson and Tatham (2013) and Steven’s (2002) estimates for a generalised sample 
selection of “about 15 subjects per predictor for multiple regression designs when used in social 
sciences” (p.143). The minimum sample size in the 6 predictor design (based on Situational Interest 
constructs) would be n=90 – 114. The sample size achieved after cleaning and sorting was (n=127) 
and considered of sufficient power for this exploratory design. 
 
 Sorting and Cleaning of Data 
Sorting and cleaning of data was conducting using SPSSIBM24 and Microsoft Excel statistical packages.  
All questionnaire data was subject to the following sorting and cleaning procedures: 
Firstly the question sheets were transposed on to  Microsoft Excel sheet (MSO, 2013). All data was 
made either categorical (e.g. female=1, male=2); or ordinal (e.g. age banding reflected key-stages in 
education and agential-development: 1=age11-16; 2=age16-18; 3=age18-26; 4=age 26 plus). 
The Likert data of the questionnaires was considered quasi-parametric67 in this exploratory study, 
permitting the use of a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test68. Next the data was interrogated 
for outliers, missing values and unengaged responses. Likert scales as a bounded data set should 
limit any outlier issues more commonly associated with continuous data. However, inputting errors 
might lead to confounding values similar to outlier issues. To this end, a search for Likert data 
                                                          
66 Initial results from similar studies and meta-analysis reflect such ‘medium’ effect size (Chen et al., 2001a; 
Hidi & Anderson, 1992; Renninger et al., 2014; Zhu, Chen, Ennis, Sun, Hopple, Bonello, Bae & Kim, 2009). 
67 The Likert data is considered as polychoric (quasi-parametric under assumptions of normality). In the final 
study (three), the non-linear properties of the data would require non-parametric tests to be used. 
68  ANOVA offers a difference analysis with greater statistical validity than conducting a series of Student’s T-
tests when more than one Independent Variable is applied over multiple difference tests 
Methodology Study One: Measure Investigation 
126 
 
greater than 8 (the scale maximum), was conducted using Excel. Where found, such imputations 
were set to no-entry, allowing for treatment as missing data later.  
 Missing Variables and Maximum Likelihood Imputation 
All data is considered information, and therefore, should not be rejected. This follows an ‘intention 
to treat’ ethos, and according to Newman and Sin (2009) ‘‘a fundamental principle of missing data 
analysis’’. Accordingly, missing data treatment by Listwise-deletion and Pairwise-deletion were 
eschewed in favour of a Maximum Likelihood (ML) imputation (under multivariate normality and 
missing at random (MAR) assumptions). Maximum Likelihood is of particular efficacy in missing data, 
where a ‘mean and covariance’ matrix of multiple-items, may be parameterised through an 
‘expectation’ and ‘maximisation’ method (EM Algorithm), producing new estimates for the missing 
data.  
Omissions for ‘overall’ missingness of more than 10% (Newman, 2014), provide some guidance for 
the possible randomness of missing data (or not), and the inference of one variable and the 
missingness observed in relationships with at least one other variable. Given a spectrum of missing 
data (Collins, Schafer & Kam, 2001) from Missing Completely At Random (MCAR) to Missing Not at 
Random (MNAR), Little’s (1988) ‘test of missingness’ allows consideration as to which assumptions 
and guidance for replacing data might be applied (Allison, 2003; Gaskin, 2016c). 
However, there are caveats with the use of ML as to Standard Error. Such Standard Errors (SE) have 
been found not to be consistent in ML imputations (Glasser, 1964), and provides a validity issue in 
hypothesis testing (which require non-bias SE in imputation). If bias is introduced in ML imputation, 
then such SE assumptions cannot be met and negates validity in the confidence intervals and p-
values necessary for hypothesis testing. This Study One did not aim to make any such causal 
assumptions in its testing, therefore an Expectation Maximization method (using an EM Algorithm) 
was considered as a satisfactory method to impute missing data if ‘missing as random’ is able to be 
assumed (Newman, 2014). In order to meet these requirements (of multivariable normality), both 
measure data sets were subject to a ‘Missing Completely at Random’ test (MCAR, Little, 1988): 
Missing Completely at Random Test 
1) ROPELOC  – Little's MCAR test:   Chi-Square = 290.447, DF = 260, Sig. = .094 
2) SITUATIONAL INTEREST – Little's MCAR test:  Chi-Square = 77.432,    DF = 69,   Sig. = .228 
MCAR looks for missing data patterns or dependence. Here the null hypothesis is proved allows the 
assumption that there is no pattern in the missing data and we may accept the Missing Completely 
at Random (MCAR assumption).  
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Unengaged Responding 
The quality of the sampling data was interrogated for the possibility of unengaged responding. 
Identifying such issues was approached via a ‘diligence test’ using ‘paucity’ in Standard Deviation: SD 
<.8. The data rows that were flagged by these criteria where subject to a face-validity test (Gaskin, 
2016c). Here, a line-graph of the suspect data was compared against a background of complete 
sample data, this allowed overt reporting issues to be inferred (such as single value reporting across 
many consecutive variables). 11 rows exhibited poor SD, of which only 2 were thought to display 
overt unengaged responding (e.g. continuous reporting of only one value across the variables). This 
unengaged responding was thought to represent a ‘construct-level’ of missingness in the 
questionnaires (Newman, 2014), allowing the unengaged responding to be imputed using the EM 
Algorithm. 
Imputation of missing variables through EM was applied. Sixty five missing variables were imputed 
across the two measures using the EM Algorithm. They were imputed using sub-sets related to 
factor or scale (multivariable) to ensure the most appropriate conditional-imputation (within factor) 
for maximum likelihood (Allison, 2003; Little & Rubin, 1987). 
 Tests for Normality of Data - Skewness and Kurtosis  
SPSSIBM24 and AMOS IBM24 provide univariate and multivariate normality tests. If a multivariate normal 
distribution is assumed; “…..that will suffice. Multivariate normality of all observed variables is a 
standard distribution assumption in many structural equation modelling and factor analysis 
applications” (Arbuckle, 2016, p.36). Factor and scale data for both measures was investigated using 
Skewness and kurtosis was tested using SPSSIBM24 and thresholds for Standard Deviation (SD) from a 
normal distribution: (within ± 1xSD) = ‘Great’ or; (within ± 2xSD) = ‘Good’; alternatively cut-off or 
acceptable value not greater than three times the standard error of skewness (Sposito, Hand & 
Skarpness, 1983).  
Skewness  
Situational Interest Data  (within ± 1xSD) = Situational Interest not skewed  
Self-Concept Data (ROPELOC) Skewness (within ± 2xSD) = ROPELOC not skewed  
Kurtosis 
Situational Interest Data Kurtosis (within ± 1xSD) = Situational Interest not kurtosis.  
Self-Concept Data (ROPELOC) Kurtosis (within ± 2xSD) = ROPELOC not kurtosis.  
In both measures, the multivariate constructs exhibited no significant Skewness or Kurtosis Issues. 
Issues arising with Skewness and Kurtosis are able to be relaxed in Structural Modelling programmes 
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and Factor Analysis (see, 6.3.2 – Tests for Normality of Data - Skewness and Kurtosis, p170), where 
non-centrality model fit-indices are able to obfuscate, somewhat, such normality issues. This allows 
normality assumptions and parametric treatment to be applied to the data. 
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Study One: Findings 
 Hypothesis (1): One Way ANOVA between Learning Domain Groupings 
Research for Self-Concept measures, as being dependent on situational determinants, exists; There 
is support for ‘Novelty’ and ‘Problem Solving’ affecting perceptions of Self-Concept and affective-
motivation (Barker, Semenov, Michaelson, Provan, Snyder & Munakata, 2014; Greffrath, Meyer, 
Strydom & Ellis, 2011; Howard-Jones & Demetriou, 2009; Neill & Dias, 2001; Ofsted, 2008; Outdoor-
Council, 2010; Purdie, Neill & Richards, 2002; Renninger et al., 2014; Rotgans & Schmidt, 2014); in 
particular, Learning Outside the Classroom (LoTC) experiences (see, Fiennes, Oliver, Dickson, 
Escobar, Romans & Oliver, 2015; Kendall & Rodger, 2015; Rickinson, Dillion, K, Morris, Choi, Sanders 
& Benefield, 2006, for review).Therefore, different learning domains as ‘affective’ situational 
determinates should reflect differentiation in hypothesised functional Affordance states.  
Table 2 – One way ANOVA between 3 Groups (Differentiated Learning Group Domains) 
Scale  
Between 
Groups - Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Levene* 
Statistic Sig. 
AI ROPELOC 1.512 2 0.756 0.118 0.889 0.248 0.781 
OE  5.206 2 2.603 0.306 0.737 1.316 0.272 
IL  2.436 2 1.218 0.157 0.855 5.112 0.007 
EL  114.357 2 57.178 2.928 0.057 0.176 0.838 
PAB  72.820 2 36.410 0.341 0.712 0.693 0.502 
SA  7.417 2 3.708 0.055 0.946 0.270 0.764 
OS  36.964 2 18.482 0.236 0.790 0.635 0.532 
ExIn Situational 569.532 2 284.766 32.987 0.000 3.161 0.046 
InEn Interest 748.194 2 374.097 32.236 0.000 6.081 0.003 
Nov  67.806 2 33.903 3.312 0.040 1.599 0.206 
Att  391.974 2 195.987 15.444 0.000 5.961 0.003 
Chall  45.607 2 22.804 3.120 0.048 0.224 0.800 
ToIn  737.803 2 368.901 29.163 0.000 7.652 0.001 
Notes: *see Homogeneity Considerations (over).  
ROPELOC Constructs 
Action Involvement –           AI 
Overall Effectiveness –           OE 
Internal Locus of Control –          IL 
External Locus of Control –          EL 
Personal Attributes and Beliefs of Control  PAB 
Social awareness –          SA 
Organisational Skills –         OS 
Situational Interest Constructs 
Exploratory Interest –                                     Exp 
Instant Enjoyment –          InEn 
Novelty –                                  Nov 
Attentional Demand –                                Att 
Challenge –                                                       Chall 
Total Situational Interest            ToIn 
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 ANOVA Results 
Situational Interest Difference Results 
Significant difference is seen between the learning domains in all Situational Interest constructs (see, 
Table 2, above). 
ROPELOC Difference Result 
No significant difference is seen between the learning domains in the self-concept (ROPELOC) 
constructs. As to some explanation for the lack of significance seen in the ROPELOC measure; this 
may be due to the ‘model power’ not adequately isolating state effects in Self-Concept, where such 
perceptions are hypothesised as a composite of state and trait cognitions and subject to complex 
‘frame of reference’ issues confounding self-efficacy with self-confidence (Bong & Skaalvik, 2003; 
Pajares, 2009). This may be an issue with the multivariate factor modelling of ROPELOC constructs. 
To this end, it is thought that a Factor Analysis of the ROPELOC measures would assist model power 
for future testing of the ROPELOC measure. 
Homogeneity Considerations 
Though the SPSSIBM24 ANOVA adjusts for homogeneity between the groups, this assumption of 
linearity is questionable in consideration of the hypothesised Kullback-Leibler divergence as a non-
liner function (see, 3.4.1, p97).  An independent analysis of variance was therefore applied to all 
possible pairwise domain groupings using a Levene test (1960) to investigate this assumed 
homogenity (see Table 2  above). Though all the  Situational Interest measures displayed 
significance, Levene’s test suggested a significant variance (non-homogeneity) in grouping domain 
homogeneity. However, though questioning the veracity of normality assumptions, and therefore, 
the significance found; such varience supports the non-normality expectations of the non-liner 
Divergent Criticality hypothesis. Further studies will require the use of a more robust design(s) to 
account for such non-linearity and to accommodate homogeneity issues69. 
 Hypothesis (2): Correlation between Interest and ROPELOC measures 
As part of the exploratory nature of this design, correlations were conducted between the two 
measures and their constructs. This looked to provide support for the hypothesis that perceptions of 
Situational Interest and Self-Concept would reflect cognitive demand perceptions, as hypothesised 
as a functional Affordance state. 
                                                          
69 A repeat-measure sampling method to obviate homogeneity and non-parametric issues will be used in Study 
Three, 6.22 – Situative verses Contextual Learning: A Repeat-Measures Hypothesis (H3), p210). 
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If these correlations are seen to show significance, the inference is that some construct(s) are 
reflecting a differentiation in affective-cognitions dependent on the situational learning-domain. 
Though correlation is not causation, it is hypothesised that correlation between different measures, 
may be indicative of Divergent Criticality congruent in Situational Interest and ROPELOC measures. 
Table 3 – Correlation Between Situational Interest and Self-Concept (ROPELOC) 
 Scale AI OE IL EL PAB SA OS 
ExIn Pearson 
Correlation 
0.074 0.040 0.109 -0.114 .177* 0.046 .222* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.410 0.659 0.223 0.202 0.047 0.605 0.012 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
InEn Pearson 
Correlation 
-0.020 0.042 0.103 -0.125 0.095 0.102 0.132 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.822 0.643 0.250 0.162 0.286 0.253 0.138 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Nov Pearson 
Correlation 
0.153 0.117 0.024 -0.044 .176* 0.078 .243** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.086 0.192 0.791 0.621 0.048 0.386 0.006 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Att Pearson 
Correlation 
0.115 .176* .194* -0.023 .305** .223* .330** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.199 0.048 0.029 0.800 0.000 0.012 0.000 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Chall Pearson 
Correlation 
-0.069 -0.135 -0.083 0.130 -0.012 -0.122 0.027 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.442 0.129 0.354 0.144 0.894 0.173 0.766 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
ToIn Pearson 
Correlation 
0.007 0.012 0.070 -0.126 0.075 0.068 0.132 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.941 0.894 0.432 0.157 0.400 0.445 0.138 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Notes **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
ROPELOC Constructs 
Action Involvement –           AI 
Overall Effectiveness –           OE 
Internal Locus of Control –          IL 
External Locus of Control –          EL 
Personal Attributes and Beliefs of Control  PAB 
Social awareness –          SA 
Organisational Skills –         OS 
Situational Interest Constructs 
Exploratory Interest –                                     Exp 
Instant Enjoyment –          InEn 
Novelty  –                                  Nov 
Attentional Demand  –                                Att 
Challenge  –                                                       Chall 
Total Situational Interest            ToIn 
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 Correlation Results 
Situational Interest and ROPELOC Correlations  
Here, weak to medium effects (significance, p<.10) with the ROPELOC factors across Exploratory 
Interest (ExIn), Novelty (Nov) and Attentional Demand (Att) are positive and suggest that the 
hypothesised Divergent Criticality might be evident in an Exploratory Interest for Surprise (Novelty)70 
and be made aware through affective-cognitions of Attentional Demand, Novelty and Exploratory 
Interest as awareness of Divergent Criticality in cognitive processes (Table 3, above). 
There are no correlations supporting relationships with Challenge and Instant Enjoyment. This would 
seem unusual as these constructs were thought to infer a hedonic assessment of cognitive demand. 
However, it  might be that these constructs provide an influence on other dependent constructs of 
Situational Interest, that such a simplistic construct-model does not adequately represent these 
measure’s mediating effects (the intra-relationships between the Situational Interest and ROPELOC 
measure constructs).  
That Self-Concept of External locus of Control (EL) displayed no significant correlation across any of 
the Interest correlations may be a measurement issue: One conjecture is that the learning 
environments used in the study, predominately conferred a self-guided or internal locus 
environment, emphasises internal over external ‘locus of control’ (Barret & Greenaway, 1995; Cason 
& Gillis, 1994; Darley & Fazio, 1980; Hans, 2002; Hattie et al., 1997; Neill, 2002; Rickinson et al., 
2004; Weiner, 1986, 1997; White 1959). 
Active Involvement (AI) also displayed no significance. Again, this may be a bias due to the ‘active’ 
nature of the predominately experiential learning domains used most domains in the study one. 
ROPELOC Sub-Scale Correlations 
As the ROPELOC constructs (of multiple sub-scales): Personal Abilities and Beliefs (PAB), Social 
Abilities (SA) and Organisational Skills (OS), had all displayed significance with the Situational 
Interest measure of Attentional Demand, these ROPELOC constructs were further correlated at a 
Sub-Scale level of analysis in order to further extrapolate possible inference. 
  
                                                          
70 Surprise will be used interchangeably with ‘Novelty’ as terminology in free-energy and non-linear criticality. 
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Table 4 – Correlations for Interest and ROPELOC Sub-Scales   
 Sub-Scale  .   
Personal   Attributes   and  Belief Social   Awareness Organisational     Skills 
SC SF SM OT SE CT LA TE QS CH 
ExIn Pearson  0.118 0.126 0.095 .244** -0.029 0.084 0.093 .223* 0.073 .212* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.187 0.159 0.286 0.006 0.748 0.346 0.301 0.012 0.412 0.017 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
InEn Pearson  0.047 0.073 0.048 0.155 0.043 0.111 0.011 0.161 0.107 0.132 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.602 0.412 0.590 0.083 0.631 0.214 0.903 0.071 0.232 0.139 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Nov Pearson  0.137 0.117 0.086 .235** 0.033 0.136 0.151 .260** 0.032 .177* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.125 0.191 0.334 0.008 0.710 0.128 0.090 0.003 0.722 0.047 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Att Pearson  .253** .193* .194* .341** 0.146 .215* 0.145 .342** .198* .297** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.102 0.015 0.103 0.000 0.026 0.001 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Chall Pearson  0.066 -0.086 -0.133 0.129 -0.151 0.006 0.005 0.035 -0.140 0.022 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.459 0.334 0.136 0.150 0.090 0.950 0.954 0.698 0.116 0.807 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
ToIn Pearson  0.040 0.025 0.025 .180* 0.008 0.128 0.008 0.171 0.046 0.124 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.655 0.777 0.782 0.043 0.932 0.151 0.927 0.054 0.611 0.165 
N 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Notes ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
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In Table 4 (above), although correlation provides no causal confirmation, it does suggest possible 
sub-scales of the ROPELOC constructs that might be used to further explore ‘state’ cognitions as 
reflecting correlation with the Situational Interest measures. Of particular interest was the positive 
reporting of the construct of Organisational Skills (OS). This addressed variables for scales ‘Coping 
with Change’, ‘Quality Seeking’ and ‘Time Management’. Though OS is not immediately suggestive of 
a ‘situational’ perception of competence (it is hypothesised that OS cognitions represent more stable 
‘traits’71 ); that Time Management (TE) in particular is found to resonant with the Situational Interest 
measure, might suggest that this sub-scale is better considered a ‘state’ construct rather than trait. 
A functional Affordance state as congruent with surprise is supported in the positive reporting seen 
across the Novelty in the ROPELOC correlations. However, as all perceptions are considered 
cognitions of ‘Attention made Aware’, Attentional Demand not surprisingly, displayes the strongest 
correlations with ROPELOC. 
 
 Post Hoc – Analysis 
 Pathway Modelling 
The aim of Study One was to investigate if it is plausible to infer states of functional Affordance from 
the perception measures as Situational determinants towards cognitive functioning. If so, this  would 
enable some inference to how perceptions might reflect Divergent Criticality functioning in different 
‘learning’ domains and be able to test the Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis. 
Both the ANOVA and Pearson’s Correlation results would seem to infer the greatest state effect 
from situational or ecological influences observed in the Situational Interest measure. It would 
therefore suggest looking to the modelling of the Situational Interest measure to better understand 
the relationships of the constructs and how these might be in effect in future analysis (the mediating 
and partial effects that might be applied for more nuanced analysis). Pathway analysis, as a form of 
iterated model building, is used for the testing of a measures intra-construct effect(s) using modelled 
relationship-assumptions aimed at improving a model’s fit to represent the data under analysis. It 
may be that in any interpretive questionnaire (perception as subjective), that the convergence of 
items on factors or constructs is more complex than simple direct-relationships.  
                                                          
71 Here, we might consider a ‘trait’ as a temporally more stable ‘state’; that is to say, traits as ‘cognitive islands’ 
of stability in times of neural flux, a resilience that might confound situational measures.  
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Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) offers such analysis through the researcher informed 
‘assumptions’ of model function. Pathway analysis allows data to be ‘ideally’ utilised in an assumed 
model, by looking at the relationships between data-variance in the modelling of constructs (in 
particular the Standard Errors (SE) associated with the accuracy of the assumed-model of dependent 
and independent variables). This is an inference from the ‘unknown’ rather than the ‘known’ in 
assuming a model, and a ‘goodness of fit’, might be more accurately considered as; making the ‘least 
wrong’ assumption(s). It is in the model-fit of this variance that a model-quality (researcher 
assumed) is predicated: 
 “SEM does not aim to establish causal relationships from assumptions alone” (Bollen & Pearl, 2013, p309) 
What is produced is a model of most ‘probable’ interdependence between its construct’s effects, 
one reflecting the mediating and inferential effects between the model’s variables. The external 
validity of such a model is dependent on the quality of this data, the conditions of observation and 
the causal assumptions of the researcher as supported through model-fit to the data available. 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is a statistical technique that provides some validity to  
untangling these pathways and complex multivariate relationships. It parametrises a “causal 
knowledge” providing some veracity to the researcher’s assumptions (Pearl, 2011). 
 Situational Interest: Structural Equation Model Building  
In that such complex models contain exponential permutations72 in relation to the number of their 
factors (constructs), this demands that they are built on some a priori reasoning, which may then be 
further developed within a robust methodological paradigm. In this first ‘Study One’, guiding the 
initial pathway analysis was an a priori assumption based on correlation analysis: that perceptions as 
measured by Situational Interest (SI) were most effected as a hypothesised ‘state’ of neural function 
in relation to ecological determinants. Such correlations suggested a model that could be 
conceptualised as dependent on SI constructs of Novelty (as ecological surprise awareness), 
Attentional Demand (Cognitive Effort) and Exploratory Approach (Innate seeking cognitions).  
To this end, a procedure for building and developing an aprior pathway model was pursued in 
accordance with the author’s original procedures (APPENDIX I: Initial Pathway Analysis, p292) 
                                                          
72 Exponentially increasing permutation (pathways) in multi-factor modelling provides a mathematical 
uncertainty, that of being able to explore all the possible options in order to arrive at the correct solution.  
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 Findings –Twin Pathway Model 
What emerged was a twin-pathway model of perceptions from Novelty towards a dependent Total 
Interest (see,  Figure 24, below). The intention being to provide some justification for Situational 
Interest reflecting a cognitive-appraisal within a Divergent Criticality hypothesis. Here it is assumed 
that twin-pathways from Novelty and Exploratory Interest reflect life-regulation in ecological 
engagement:  
1) An ‘approach’ or hedonic ‘enjoyment’ pathway; mediated by Attentional Demand and Instant 
Enjoyment;  
2) A perception of ‘control’ or antagonistic ‘avoid’ pathway mediated by Challenge.  
Conceptually different from Chen’s model (1999; 2001a), in this twin-pathway model it was assumed 
that the ‘approach-pathway’ would work through Novelty perceptions being mainly mediated by 
Attentional Demand and Instant Enjoyment mediating (affectively rewarding) an ‘innate’ drive of 
Exploratory interest for surprise (aka, Divergent Criticality). However, it was conceivable that 
 Figure 24 –Twin Pathway MODEL 4 (AMOSIBM24) 
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Challenge might act as the ‘regulating’ or antagonistic ‘avoid’73 pathway to Instant Enjoyment and 
might be better modelled in a direct pathway toward Total Interest, acknowledging  such a possible 
mediator pathway concurrent with a self-regulation around a Tolerance Optimisation (limits of 
Effectivity function).  
 Goodness of Model Fit 
A twin pathway MODEL 4 ( Figure 24, above) emerged from this apriori model analysis, but with 
some question to the validity of this model. Although offering a model that would seemingly 
resonate with a life-regulating Tolerance hypothesis, guiding the analysis was ‘local’ fit through 
‘pathway-significance’ of the model’s assumptions; rather than a more robust statistical of ‘model 
goodness of fit’ . We therefore need to considered the model assumptions through ‘global fit’ 
indices as suggested by (Bollen & Pearl, 2013)74.  
Absolute Fit Indices 
Bollen and Pearl (2013) and Jöreskog and Sörbom (1978), suggest one of the bases for a Global fit 
indice, is in an ‘Absolute’ model. Here, coefficients are considered constant over all individuals and a 
Chi-square (χ2) produced to test for adherence to normality (i.e. the null hypothesis is accepted).  
This Chi-square (χ2) test forms the bases of many ‘fit indices’ and is almost ubiquitously reported in 
SEM. However,  χ2 comes with inherent issues in relation to the data used ((Newsom, 2012, p1) – 
see, APPENDIX III: Goodness of Fit Indices, p303).  
Choosing Global Fit Indices to best reflect Interest Modelling 
Though Study One did not reach the 200 participant criteria suggested by Newsom (2012) as 
effected by sample size, future studies were expected to exceed this number, therefore Bollen’s 
BL89 (‘IFI’ in AMOSIMB24) was considered a good normed-relative index to consider. Retrospectively, a 
number of global ‘fit’ indices were selected to test the model assumptions as recommended over a 
reliance on just one (Newsom, 2012). 
Therefore, indices considered appropriate for large samples and non-centrality fit indices (CFI and 
RMSEA) and an Absolute indices of fit, SRMR (considered as ‘less’ affected by χ2 than RMR (ibid)), are 
a menu of fit-indices that are intended to provide a ‘Goodness of Fit’ accounting for the assumptions 
and issues with Chi-Square (χ2). Model fit, was therefore based on broad fit-index spectrum, as 
                                                          
73 Such an avoid factor might be hypothesised to express overt challenge perceptions (e.g. fear, anxiety, 
uncomfortable or negative feelings). 
74 Future SEM would use relevant Global Fit Indices to guide model building. 
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deemed a ‘confirmatory requirement’ for determining ‘fit’ in multiple criteria (Hu & Bentler, 1999): 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990); Incremental Fit Index (IFI) – (BL89, Bollen, 1990) the Root 
Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) (Browne & Cudeck, 1993)& Standardized Root Mean 
Square Residual (SRMR).  
 As study one described an exploratory methodology, SEM sees a model development of improving 
fit indices. Therefore, Absolute indices of fit, though questionable, do provide some guidance for 
model iteration decisions75. Accordingly, CMIN (χ2 /df) and PCLOSE (Cochran, 1952), and Goodness 
of Fit Index (GFI) (Bentler, 1983; Tanaka & Huba, 1985) were also investigated (see, Table 5, below). 
 Post SEM: Memory ‘Recall’  
There is the possibility of an emotional-biasing of memory (Sample 4). Accordingly, the sample 
domain of RECALL used in the data collection may be of concern: Confounding memories and ‘peak-
end associations’ (Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber & Redelmeier, 1993), risk a ‘recall’ rather than 
a past-‘actual’ memory. This is a past-recall of ‘salient’ cognitive emotions within that experience 
over and above the actual experience. Recall memory might be considered then, as distilled 
cognitions of peak cognitive-emotions (instants of high emotional states) and it may be these that 
are recalled as peak ‘significant’ divergence over any specific ‘state’ – a bias or ‘difference from the 
mean’ (Kahneman et al., 1993; Kahneman & Riis, 2005).  
                                                          
75 (Newsom, 2012) recommends rather than over reliance on one or two model fit indices, that a number of 
‘Absolute’ and ‘Relative’ fit indices, that account for the confounding issues of Chi-Square (χ2) be chosen. Fit 
indices that reflect the sampling and research design.  
Table 5 – Model-Fit Thresholds for Twin Pathway Model 4   
Recommended Threshold Twin Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 2.834 good 
p-value for the model     <.05  .0001 *  
CFI >.95  .981   good  
GFI  >.95 .958   good 
IFI    >.95 .981   good 
SRMR   <.08 .0533 good 
RMSEA <.06  .121   poor 
PCLOSE >.05 .040   poor 
Note: Thresholds from Hu and Bentler’s “Cutoff Criteria and Fit Indexes” (1999)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
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Recall sampling risks confounding the hypothesised ‘state’ of functional Affordance in Interest 
perceptions. In consideration of this, the Twin Pathway Model (4) was run excluding the recall group 
data (n=104, see   Figure 25, below).  
  Figure 25 – Twin Pathway Group 4 NO RECALL 
 
The improved model fit with ‘recall’ removed suggests there may be a confounding effect from 
‘memories’ as state-measures of affective cognitions, and therefore recall should be avoided.  
Table 6 – Twin Pathway NO RECALL - Fit Indices 
Recommended Threshold Twin Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 1.441  
p-value for the model     <.05 .0001   
CFI >.95  .995 good  
GFI  >.95 .974 good 
IFI    >.95 .995 good 
SRMR   <.08 .0283 good 
RMSEA <.06  .065 accept 
PCLOSE >.05 .040   poor 
Note: Thresholds from Hu and Bentler’s “Cutoff Criteria and Fit Indexes” (1999)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
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 Study One: Conclusions 
The Difference and Correlation tests do provide some significant effects, though small, in suggesting 
a Divergent Criticality hypothesis and the affective cognitions of Tolerance Optimisation. These 
favoured the perception measure Situational Interest as most likely to report a ‘state’ differentiation 
towards situational determinants and possible inference of a state of functional Affordance  (i.e. able 
to measure differentiated functional Affordance in different learning domains).  
Using the Situational Interest measures in Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), when global fit 
indices are considered using Hu and Bentler’s (1999) thresholds (Table 5, p138), there is good 
‘model-fit’ found across all the primary, normed, relative goodness fits (CFI, IFI, SRMR), but not 
RMSEA and PCLOSE. However, that these indices approach ‘good-fit’ allows the consideration that a 
better model might emerge, especially if future sampling and measures are better aligned to the 
study’s investigation of Novelty, Challenge and Attentional Domains, in relation to a hypothesised 
Divergent Criticality.  
A way forward would be through improving the questionnaire validity [allowing a robust SEM to use 
such a measure for inferring a ‘state of function’ (see, 6.10 – Structural Equational Modelling: 
Findings, p185) and support future correlations of Interest with Self-Concept]. If a state of functional 
Affordance were able to be inferred from Situational Interest, this might then be triangulated with 
ROPELOC’s ‘salient’ scales to develop a SEM methodology for validating a Situational Interest 
measure as a perception of functions Affordance. 
Though the measures of Situational Interest and of Self-Concept ROPELOC (Chen et al., 1999; Neill, 
2003; Richards et al., 2002, respectively) had exhibited some significance in the correlation analysis 
(and in the difference test with the Interest measure), these effects may not be as powerful as 
required76 in reflecting perceptions of a state of affective awareness. It may be that the 
questionnaire items are not adequately addressing affective cognitive-emotions (Pessoa, 2013). To 
this end, adapting these ‘items’ to reflect Interest as a cognitive-emotional construct, and then 
validating through Factor Analyses (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), this new Situational 
Interest measure will better explore ‘pathway analysis’ and functional Affordance inference through 
SEM model building. 
Though there had been little support for the ROPELOC measure in the difference analysis, 
correlations of ROPELOC with Situational Interest ‘did’ exist. It was therefore considered that the 
                                                          
76 Type II error – a significance exists, but the research-design ‘power’ is not able to significantly identify. 
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ROPELOC model used did not reflect the required ‘state’ measures of perception powerfully enough; 
possibly a framing issue of  incorrectly identifying state as ‘trait’ in the measures (Bong & Skaalvik, 
2003). To address this, the pilot study’s results were used to identify the most probable scales within 
ROPELOC constructs that might best infer a state-effect due to ‘situational’ determinants. Going 
forward it was considered more relevant in providing a more focused ROPELOC measure of 24 items 
(similar in length to the Situational Interest measure)77 and would require factor analysis towards an 
adjusted ROPELOC questionnaire. 
Further Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) reflecting a better model fit, might allow future studies 
to better reflect construct interdependence and therefore improve the power of the measures by 
identifying the relationships in effect in the measure of situational interest as to states of perception 
function in any future analysis. Rather than using linear analysis of the constructs in difference and 
relationship tests, a more complex construct-relationship and modelling through SEM could better 
represent affective cognitions in terms of inferring a state of functional Affordance. This will be 
addressed in Study Three. 
As evident in the recall cognitive-emotional biasing, it is important to consider if the self-report 
measures used accurately reflects perceptions as a state of functional Affordance or whether some 
other confounding effect is being observed. That significant improvements in model fit (Table 6, 
above) are seen when recall perceptions are withdrawn, supports such emotional bias as a 
confounding issue. This requires that the possible confounding in sampling is adequately addressed 
and considerations of possible confounding should be made in respect of age, activity, duration, 
expectancy and ‘frame of reference’ issues78 (see, APPENDIX IV: Bias Considerations In Situational 
Domain Sampling, p304). 
The conclusions from Study One suggest that ‘Situational Interest’ offer the most probable ‘state’ 
measure of awareness able to be differentiated in sample learning-domains, and should correlate 
significantly with perceptions of Self-Concept (ROPELOC) to investigate a Divergent Criticality 
                                                          
77 It was also felt that ROPELOC exhibited a questionnaire fatigue. Focus group follow-ups of questionnaire 
participants had highlighted two key issues with the ROPELOC questionnaire: the language was not as easily 
understood as the un-ambiguous Situational Interest questionnaire (“I like” (Sit In) was though easier to 
cognitively-emotionally frame, than “I feel” (ROPELOC), and the length of the ROPELOC questionnaire resulted 
in some questionnaire fatigue when presented with another questionnaire (the Situational Interest 
questionnaire). 
78 The confusing of trait cognitions with state cognitions. 
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hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. This hypothesis may be explored through differentiated 
functional Affordance states in relation to these sample-domains. To achieve this, it is proposed that 
future studies should pursue the following elements: 
Study Two – Questionnaire Development 
1) The adaptation of the Interest measure to accommodate a more cognitive-emotional approach.. 
2) The reducing of the ROPELOC questionnaire to salient sub-scales and to 24 items. 
3) Provide validity to the adapted questionnaires through Exploratory (EFA) and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA). 
Study Three – An Exploratory Model of Divergent Criticality Function 
4) Final factor analysis. 
5) Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) of the Situational Interest measure; ‘goodness of fit’ and 
model-hypothesis testing (direct and indirect effects), towards inferring a functional Affordance 
measure through an Interdependence Profile. 
6) The triangulation of SEM through a purely quantitative ‘Conditional Interdependence’ analysis 
(Dawid, 1979). 
7) Correlation and relationship triangulation of the functional Affordance measure with self-
concept (ROPELOC), accommodating the function of the ‘non-liner’ Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis through non-parametric analysis.
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5 CHAPTER FIVE – Methodology Study Two: Questionnaire 
Development  
 Study Two: Introduction 
The aim from the Study One was to correlate Situational Interest questionnaire against the ROPELOC 
questionnaire, in that different learning domains would instigate differentiated states as ecological 
determinants, and investigate if this would be evident as ‘affective cognitions’ in perception.  
The findings from Study One were taken forward to further develop the two perception measures 
(Situational Interest and Self-Concept) with sufficient power to investigate the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis. Study Two aimed to provide validity to the measures and their modelling in order to 
build on the findings of Study One.  
In this way, more exacting statistical analysis was applied to the questionnaires through Exploratory 
and Confirmatory Factor Analysis, testing the validity of the questionnaire adaptations. Factor 
Analysis would further inform refinements in measures to take forward.  
Study Two pursues a questionnaire development methodology. 
Study Two: Methodology 
 Questionnaire Development 
Adaptations to the questionnaires were made, informed by Study One’s findings, but also in 
consideration of questionnaire feedback where concerns were expressed regarding the ROPELOC 
questionnaire length and language in the Situational Interest: 
1) Firstly, that some of the language was ‘culturally’ ambiguous in the Situational Interest 
measure; therefore the following changes were made: 
CHALL151  – “This is a complex activity” became “This activity is complicated” 
ATT141    – “My attention was high” became “My attention needed to be high” 
NOV434   – “This is an exceptional activity” became “This is a unique type of activity” 
EXIN111   – “I wanted to discover all the tricks of this activity” became     
                            “I wanted to discover all the ways of doing this type of activity” 
TOIN464    – “This is an interesting activity for me to do” became      
      “This is an interesting activity” 
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2) Secondly, it was thought that there were too many ROPELOC questions when the two 
questionnaires were presented consecutively, causing a possible reporting-fatigue. 
 
Using the correlation thought to reflect a ‘state’ cognitive affect from findings in Study One, the 
ROPELOC questionnaire was reduced from 49 items (15 scales) to 24 items (8 scales) see (APPENDIX 
II: Questionnaire Development and Providence, p294): 
 ROPELOC Scales to be Included 
Personal Abilities and Beliefs (PAB) (Factor constructs given in bold). 
1) Open Thinking (OT) 
2) Self-Efficacy (SF) 
3) Self-Confidence (SC) 
4) Stress Management (SM) 
Social Awareness (SA) 
5) Cooperative Teamwork (CT) 
Organisational Skills (OS) 
6) Time Efficiency (TE) 
7) Quality Seeking (QS) 
8) Coping with Change (CH) 
 ROPELOC Items Excluded 
The following scales were considered as not representing state differentiation in Study One so were 
questioned as to their suitability for Divergent Criticality hypothesis testing: 
Internal Locus of Control (IL) 
Though initially removed because of lack of support in Study One, this would be later reintroduced in 
Study Three as a locus of control/self-confidence factor emerged as significant in Study Two’s EFA 
(see, APPENDIX II: Questionnaire Development and Providence, p294). 
External Locus of Control (EL)  
This construct was seen to report only in Traditional Classroom ‘theory’ Lesson (TCL), in what was 
considered a low state of Affordance  (a didactic, theoretical lecture with little Novelty). That it was 
not seen in other ‘dynamic’ learning domains questions its veracity in Divergent Criticality reporting. 
This construct was therefore not taken forward in the study. 
Action Involvement (AI) 
Though seen in all (active) domains, this construct of perception measure was considered to be 
universal in learning, but was not considered able to clearly reflect any differentiation sample 
domains. This construct was therefore not taken forward in the study. 
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Overall Effectiveness (OE) 
This construct is considered as a ‘dependent’ scale within a questionnaire model. Though this would 
inform a causal pathway model building, this was not the aim of the ROPELOC questionnaire (to 
provide valid state perception that could be triangulated with a Situational Interest model). This 
construct was therefore not taken forward in the study. 
Control Item (CI) 
This control item was included in the original questionnaire as a quality measure of participant 
responding. It was thought that the sorting and cleaning of data would adequately provide for such 
participant-response quality. This construct was therefore not taken forward in the study. 
Leadership Ability (LA) 
Again, this measure did not display notable reporting or correlation across Study One’s domains, and 
so was not taken forward in the study. 
Social Effectiveness (SE) 
A measure of a Social Awareness construct that had not displayed notable correlations across Study 
One, and so was not taken forward in the study. 
The above changes were applied to the questionnaires and the adapted Situational Interest and 
ROPELOC questionnaires underwent Factor Analysis using a second study (Study Two; n=281). 
Study Two –Sampling Criteria 
To enable a form of embedded-triangulation from the two questionnaires (Creswell & Clark, 2011), 
the sampling criteria and sample-size considerations were made, reflecting direction from the 
literature and Study One’s findings, and applied to participants as a group-domain ‘stratified’ 
samples: Domains of Traditional Classroom Learning (TCL), or Learning Outside of the Classroom 
(LoTC - e.g. Physical or ‘Out of the Classroom’ Activities; Sport, Outdoor Activities, field trips, etc.) 
reflecting a range of age bandings reflecting key stages in education in the stratification79 : (1) 11-
16,(2) 16-18,(3) 18-26,(4) 26 +. 
                                                          
79 Stratified sampling (where homogeneity ‘within’ group is maintained), allows statistical analysis to reflect 
group-effect biasing, as much a part of any individual state perception and therefore, situationally valid in this 
studies ‘between’ groups (situational domains) hypothesis. 
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Sample Size for SEM 
Issues with sampling bias such as those associated with Multivariate Normality in Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM), is able to reflect some similarity to ‘centrality of normality’ in pursuing both 
Exploratory Factor Analysis  (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Such sampling bias may be 
minimised by accepted ratios of least 15 participants per predictor (Hair et al., 2013; Stevens, 2002). 
However, Multivariate Normality is not the only consideration necessary in SEM: Hair et al. (2013) 
consider five significant determinants for sample size in SEM:  
“(1) multivariate normality of the data, (2) estimation technique, (3) model complexity, (4) the 
amount of missing data, and (5) the average error variance among the reflective indicators.” 
          (Hair et al., 2013, p573) 
Though previous suggestions have set a base of 200 for SEM (Boomsma, 1982), Hair et al. (ibid) 
consider a rough guidance for sample sizes of between 150 and 300 dependent on the above 
determinants (with a convergence correlation of about r > .60 on the predictors and no more than 7 
predictors. 300 samples as a target sample would support similar proactive sampling for SEM 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Wolf, Harrington, Clark & Miller, 2013, e.g. Monte Carlo simulations). 
Sample Domains 
The sample ‘domains’ were categorised as ‘ordinal’, referencing a wide range of hypothesised 
functional Affordance states: low, Medium and high divergence (see, Table 7, below). 
Note: Study Two (n=281)  
 
Table 7 – Study Two Sampling Domains 
Sample  Learning Domain                                                                             functional Affordance        n 
Domain 
fA  
(n) 
1 Half Day Outdoor Problem Based Learning (Medium functional Affordance)   
 
2 47 
2 Half Day Outdoor Activity (High functional Affordance)   1 8 
3 Half Day Outdoor Activity (High functional Affordance)   1 8 
4 Recall of past LoTC (Low functional Affordance) 3 47 
5 Five day Residential Outdoor Activities (Medium functional Affordance)   2 31 
6 1 Hour Theory Lecture (Low functional Affordance)   3 35 
7 Half Day Outdoor Problem Based Learning (Medium functional Affordance) 2 28 
8 One day Outdoor Activities (High functional Affordance) 1 40 
9 One day Outdoor Activities (High functional Affordance) 1 37 
Methodology Study Two: Questionnaire Development 
147 
 
 Factor Analysis 
The Questionnaire Mk2 data set was first sorted and cleansed in Excel and SPSS as in Study One (see, 
4.6, p125). This cleansed data was then entered into SPSSIBM24. 
The missing data was subject to Little's MCAR test to help designate the imputation method best 
suited to the missing data. 
1) SITUATIONAL INTEREST – Little's MCAR test: Chi-Square = 320.899, DF = 329, Sig. = .615 
2) ROPELOC – Little's MCAR test: Chi-Square = 465.131, DF = 374, Sig. = .001 
Here, the Situational Interest only was found to be MCAR and presented for ML imputation (see 
.4.6.1, p126). 
The ROPELOC questionnaire did not prove to be MCAR. Investigating the data, 4 rows exhibited 
overt ‘unengaged’ responding presenting a ‘person’ and ‘construct-level’ of missingness in the 
ROPELOC data; however, as only a few cases (less than 5%) offer little loss of power in relation to 
sample size (kCheema, 2014, p61), and certainly within the 10% of non-response threshold of 
Newman (2014, p374), it was accepted to treat the ROPELOC questionnaire as MAR at an item or 
construct level. 
“In typical social science applications, I believe that such strong correlations between causes of 
missingness and outcomes are the exception rather than the rule, and assuming MAR will probably 
not lead us far astray.” (Schafer, 2003, p20) 
It should be remembered that missingness represents a continuum as to the inference of 
missingness observed in relationships with other variables (Collins et al., 2001). Though no ‘within-
construct’ issues were evident, there may be some systematic or other factor issues that cannot be 
ignored when imputing missing values. However, as Study Two is of a questionnaire investigatory 
design (non-hypothesis testing), there can still be value in the data set from such items (Schafer, 
2003; Schafer & Graham, 2002). A Maximum Likelihood (ML) imputation through an EM Algorithm 
was thought appropriate to impute the missing valuables at a latent construct level (previous 
research informed). 
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 Exploratory Factor Analysis: Study Two – Situational Interest  
 Measures of Sample Adequacy 
That the data collected is appropriate for the research design was first explored using Bartlett's Test 
of Sphericity and the Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (Kaiser, 1974) Measure of Sampling Adequacy Index (Table 
8, below). 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test assesses the data set for adequate correlation that will allow variance to 
factors, however, not too much variance to a common factor (common to all variables), as this 
reduce discriminatory power to identify other factors in effect. Using a threshold > .8 – 1. the KMO 
was seen to be >.90 (.93) implying an adequate sample for the Multiple Regression analysis 
necessary in order to determine the latent factor loadings. 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  
This uses a correlation-matrix to identify any shared variance between variable residues, might be 
attributed to a shared latent factor.  Bartlett’s test was significant, providing indication of at least 
one latent variable being significantly correlated with another. This suggests that at least one factor 
might be loaded from two or more variables presented to the factor analysis. 
Such positive reporting of KMO and Bartlett’s might be expected considering the sample size, i.e. -
large enough to provide sufficient power of ‘about’ 300 participants (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Wolf 
et al., 2013). 
 Factor Extraction  
Extraction is use to statistically identify the important latent factors or variables that the other 
variables relate to. Though not an exact analysis, it provides some guidance as to mapping possible 
extraction factors (Brace, Snelgar & Kemp, 2012). Factor Extraction was performed using a 
‘Maximum Likelihood’ method. This was selected to provide continuity of method in further analysis 
using AMOSIBM24  for Confirmatory Factor Analysis [CFA] and Structural Equation Modeling [SEM]. 
Table 8 – KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Measure                                                                                                                 Threshold Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin             
 
>.90  .925 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  
 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
  Approx. Chi-Square 4645.327 
  df 276 
 p <.05 Sig. .000 
Note: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)   Measure of Sampling Adequacy          
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Table 9 – Initial Maximum Likelihood Components  
Total Variance Explained   
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues   Parallel Analysis - Study 2 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative %   Mean SD 
95 
percentile 
1 10.134 44.061 44.061 F_1 1.5373 0.0502 1.6201 
2 2.478 10.774 54.835 F_2 1.4521 0.0357 1.511 
3 1.585 6.889 61.724 F_3 1.3785 0.0305 1.4288 
4 1.326 5.767 67.491 F_4 1.3142 0.0307 1.3649 
5 0.934 4.060 71.551 F_5 1.2631 0.0283 1.3097 
6 0.840 3.653 75.204 F_6 1.2091 0.0235 1.2478 
7 0.677 2.942 78.146 F_7 1.1649 0.0221 1.2013 
8 0.593 2.577 80.723 F_8 1.1223 0.0209 1.1569 
9 0.502 2.183 82.907 F_9 1.0757 0.0191 1.1072 
10 0.491 2.135 85.042 F_10 1.0352 0.022 1.0715 
11 0.430 1.870 86.912 F_11 0.9983 0.0214 1.0337 
12 0.401 1.745 88.657 F_12 0.9591 0.0182 0.9891 
13 0.390 1.694 90.351 F_13 0.9188 0.0168 0.9465 
14 0.376 1.634 91.985 F_14 0.8797 0.0185 0.9104 
15 0.316 1.375 93.360 F_15 0.8426 0.02 0.8756 
16 0.267 1.160 94.520 F_16 0.8093 0.0207 0.8435 
17 0.253 1.098 95.618 F_17 0.7731 0.0194 0.805 
18 0.232 1.009 96.627 F_18 0.737 0.0217 0.7728 
19 0.227 0.987 97.614 F_19 0.6983 0.0226 0.7355 
20 0.184 0.800 98.414 F_20 0.6546 0.0231 0.6928 
21 0.145 0.632 99.045 F_21 0.6125 0.0257 0.6548 
22 0.120 0.522 99.568 F_22 0.5644 0.0277 0.6101 
23 0.099 0.432 100.000 F_23 0.5434 0.028 0.5895 
Note: Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood Analysis. 
  
 
Factor extraction simplifies the matrix values from the linear transformations of correlation loadings. 
It provides an Eigenvalue for each possible variable that signifies how much of the variance in all the 
data is explained by a single factor (Eigenvalue values greater than 1.0 – the default in SPSS) might 
now be used to indicate significant discrimination and compare how the latent variables load 
towards significant factors). Four factors displayed Eigenvalues greater than 1.0 using SPSSIBM24 (see, 
above). As a comparative test, a parallel ‘Random Data Eigenvalue’ analysis was conducted using 
bootstrapped resampling (Vivek, Singh, Mishra & Todd, 2007). By comparing the Random Data 
Eigenvalue (Random-Factor Mean= Initial Eigenvalue) with the Maximum Likelihood Extraction, this 
should be equal to or higher than the ‘comparative’ means. Only the first 4 of the factors accounting 
for 67.491 of the total variance was confirmed (Table 9, above). 
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However, in lieu of the ‘a priori’ model from (Chen et al., 1999) suggesting Six factors, rather than 
discarding the 5th factor, it was investigated with a Scree Plot (Table 10, below). The Scree Plot was 
used to gauge the visual difference of the 5th factor when compared to the leveling-off of the scree-
profile. If considered above the mean, then some discriminatory validity in such a 5th factor might be 
considered acceptable. This, in addition to the Eigenvalue being close to 1.0, was considered to 
display sufficient face-validity in order for a 5th factor to be taken forward for further analysis. Five 
extracted factors were therefore taken forward. 
Table 10 – Scree Plot Displaying Independence of Factor 5 
  
Oblique or Orthogonal Factor Relationships 
 Next a further factor extraction was performed using a ‘Direct Oblimin’ rotation on the 5 latent 
factors. Oblimin was used to determine if the data could be considered Oblique (with strong 
correlations) or Orthogonal (not so strong) and determine the best fit of rotation for the data set: 
For  an oblique relationship between the factor data, rotation would be expected to produce a 
‘factor correlation matrix’ with correlations between factors greater than .50 (r > .50). This indicates 
relationships between factors as moderately to strongly related. If correlations are less than .50 (r < 
.50), then the factors are considered not obliquely related and therefore an orthogonal rotation is 
used such as Varimax (SPSSIBM24).  
 
 
 
 
In (Table 11, above), correlations between factor 1 and the other factors (bar factor 3), displayed 
strong to moderate oblique relationships. With such obliqueness, the matrix was considered best 
Table 11 – Factor Correlation Matrix 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1.000 0.621 0.182 0.509 0.433 
2 0.621 1.000 0.241 0.350 0.349 
3 0.182 0.241 1.000 0.201 0.369 
4 0.509 0.350 0.201 1.000 0.252 
5 0.433 0.349 0.369 0.252 1.000 
Note: Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.   
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kai er Normaliz tion. 
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investigated through an Oblimin-rotation and therefore Direct-Oblimin (AMOS IBM24) was used to 
extract factor loadings from the variables. 
 Communalities 
From an initial factor analysis, it is possible to explore the Communalities between the variables. 
 
Here, analysis expects variables that load sufficiently with a latent 
factor to display reciprocal communality with other similar variables. 
In this instance, strong communalities suggested that communality 
above .30 would provide a guide to the initial investigation of the 
variables, but a more stringent .40 could highlight variables which 
would be less likely to cause validity problems further down the factor 
analysis. 
(ATT141 = .27) was highlighted as having potential issues, and though 
not removed at this stage, it was monitored through the remainder of 
the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and future Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA). A Structural Matrix (Table 13) was produced 
suppressing loadings less than (0.40). 
  
Table 12 – Communalities 
INEN121 0.717 
CHAL151 0.577 
CHAL252 0.429 
ATT141 0.270 
TOIN161 0.724 
ATT242 0.636 
EXIN212 0.542 
NOV434 0.481 
EXIN313 0.458 
INEN424 0.714 
TOIN262 0.835 
NOV333 0.500 
INEN222 0.816 
EXIN111 0.646 
NOV232 0.557 
NOV131 0.458 
ATT343 0.800 
ATT444 0.818 
TOIN363 0.803 
CHAL353 0.496 
TOIN464 0.766 
INEN323 0.615 
CHAL454 0.502 
Note: Extraction Method: 
Maximum Likelihood. 
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Structural Matrix 
Many cross-loadings were seen at this .40 threshold. Of concern were variables (Chall353) as this did 
not express high loadings (r > .60) towards any one particular latent factor. This variable was not 
removed at this point, but was noted for future consideration (if there was a problem in later 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis). To help simplify the loading matrix further, a pattern matrix was now 
produced, suppressing loading less than 0.40 (Table 13, below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Confirmatory and Discriminatory Validity 
The end product of EFA is to produce a Rotational Pattern (Factor) Matrix with clear (singularity) in 
Convergence values and Discriminations values for variables with clear ‘distinction’ between these 
variables towards ‘latent’ factors. These properties are known as Convergent and Discriminatory 
Validity, and suggest that the sampling method (e.g. the questionnaire) is adequately assessing the 
separate factor constructs (in this case psychological interest and emotion constructs). A strong 
Table 13 – Structural Matrix Suppressed to 0.40 loadings 
  Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 
TOIN262 0.924 0.538   0.488 0.439 
INEN222 0.914 0.597   0.468 0.450 
TOIN363 0.867 0.684     0.492 
INEN121 0.829 0.592     0.400 
INEN424 0.806 0.531   0.601   
TOIN161 0.786 0.556   0.597 0.426 
TOIN464 0.777 0.657   0.559 0.543 
INEN323 0.724 0.590   0.496   
ATT444 0.614 0.937       
ATT343 0.600 0.935       
ATT242 0.658 0.731   0.413   
CHAL151     0.858     
CHAL454     0.655     
CHAL252     0.644     
CHAL353 0.410 0.413 0.599   0.429 
ATT141     0.461     
EXIN212       0.806   
EXIN111 0.603 0.430   0.796   
EXIN313       0.674   
NOV131         0.769 
NOV333 0.444       0.746 
NOV232 0.577 0.485     0.652 
NOV434 0.504     0.434 0.614 
Note: Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Convergence would expect to see loading above .70 (Convergence correlation r > .70) for variables 
within a factor, perhaps with an overall average above .60 towards a particular factor (Hair et al., 
2013). 
A strong Discriminatory validity would require loadings of below .80 (r < .80) between factor 
correlations (i.e. there is little cross-loading of latent variables on different factors). 
  Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 
TOIN262 0.922         
INEN222 0.863         
INEN121 0.775         
TOIN363 0.720         
INEN424 0.649         
TOIN161 0.576         
INEN323 0.484         
TOIN464 0.442         
ATT343   0.909       
ATT444   0.896       
ATT242   0.522       
CHAL151     0.880     
CHAL252     0.676     
CHAL454     0.602     
CHAL353     0.478     
ATT141     0.419     
EXIN212       0.825   
EXIN313       0.685   
EXIN111       0.662   
NOV131         0.803 
NOV333         0.689 
NOV232         0.469 
NOV434         0.456 
Note: Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Reliability of Factor Loading 
As part of this initial Structural Matrix analysis (see, Table 13, p152), Factor 1 displayed many 
variables with oblique rotations with three other factors (close to, or above r>.50). As this might 
infer a cross-loading, a further rotation using a Direct-Oblimin on only the Factor (1) variables was 
performed, to investigate the convergence and robustness of the variables towards this dominant 
Table 14 - Rotated Pattern Matrix Suppressed to .40 loadings 
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factor, and to identify if secondary or sub-factors might be hidden within the orbit of such a 
dominant factor.  
As an aprior assumption – the variables loading on factor 1 were thought to be indicative of 
Enjoyment and Total Interest constructs. This therefore highlights a possible divergent confounding 
of constructs or psychological domains of emotion (Instant Enjoyment) and attention (Total Interest) 
on one factor. Alternatively, as convergent variables, enjoyment and interest might be representing 
one dominant emotional-attentional factor that might be best treated as one construct (Factor 1). 
To this end, a further Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted using a 3 factor rotation on the 
variables loading to latent factor 1 (3 instead of the 1 recognised factor, acknowledging the 
possibility that other ‘unrecognised’ or ‘shared’ factors might be in effect). 
Variables that display cross-loading values that are similar (i.e. difference no greater than .2)  
question their convergence validity towards factor 1 and, might be in effect as factor confounding.  
Table 15 – Sub-Factor Structure Matrix 
  Factor 1 
1 2 3 
TOIN262 0.945 0.327   
TOIN363 0.945 -0.327   
INEN222 0.881     
INEN121 0.809     
TOIN464 0.774   0.357 
INEN424 0.755     
TOIN161 0.741   0.479 
INEN323 0.709     
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
a. 3 factors extracted. 12 iterations required. 
 
No such poor values are seen for all the variables in the Factor Matrix for the original Factor 1 items 
(Table 15). Therefore Factor 1 variables were considered convergent on Factor 1 only, and the 
Rotation Patter Matrix , (Table 14, p153) considered viable to be taken forward. 
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 Rotational Pattern Matrix  
Using the Exploratory Factor Analysis Pattern Matrix (Table 14, p153), a basic model with all factors 
co-varied was built in AMOSIBM24 (see below, Gaskin, 2016d), allowing the EFA to be taken forward 
for convergent and discriminatory validity within a model fit – a Confirmatory Factor Analysis. 
Figure 26 – EFA Pattern Matrix for Taking Forward to CFA (AMOSIBM24) 
 
 Exploratory Factor Analysis: Study Two – ROPELOC  
Exploratory Factor Analysis was now conducted for the adapted ROPELOC measure (Appendix V).  
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 Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Study Two – Situational Interest  
A standardised Pattern Matrix (Figure 26 – EFA Pattern Matrix for Taking Forward to CFA, above) 
was used to analyse Convergence and Discriminatory validity. 
Initial Confirmatory Model Analysis 
The following guidance metrics were used in an initial-fit model to gauge validity. 
Convergence  and Discriminatory validity 
High correlations on latent factor loading for convergence validity requires correlations greater than 
0.7 (r >.70) for variables towards a factor with an overall average above 0.60 towards a particular 
factor (Hair et al., 2013).  
Low factor co-variance for discriminatory validity requires correlations less than 0.8 (r <.80) between 
factors with strong discriminatory validity requiring loadings of below 0.70 (ibid). 
 Validity Issues 
Attention Demand 141 
The initial convergence validity (Figure 26, above) required the variable ATT141 (r=.49) to be 
questioned. This is seen to provide a significant effect on the poor overall convergence validity for 
Challenge, and  needs consideration in light of its poor ‘Communality’ Analysis (ATT141= .27). The 
variable ATT141 was therefore removed from this CFA model analysis.  
Exploratory Interest 313 and Challenge 343 
Although variables EXIN313 and CHALL252 approached a low convergent loading (r =.59), they had 
displayed sufficient ‘Communality’ (EXIN313=.458) and (CHALL=.429) and were therefore retained, 
but noted for possible future analysis. 
Modification Indices 
Available co-variances were applied to variables displaying high Modification Indices (AMOSIBM24) 
where a priori knowledge (e.g., item similarity) provided enough face explanation for covariance: 
Nov131 and Nov333 are thought to express the ‘unusualness’ of an activity. Nov131 and Nov333 
were therefore co-varied.                                                                                                                        
Chall151 and Chall252 described the complexity of a perceived challenge, Chall151 and Chall252 
were co-varied.                                                                                                                                                     
InEn424 and InEn222 were co-varied with ToIn262; these were all thought to represent hedonic ‘fun’ 
perceptions and so co-varied. 
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A model with ATT141 removed and co-variances applied (Figure 27, below) was now used for 
confirmatory analysis. 
Figure 27 – Initial Confirmatory Analysis Model AMOSIBM24 
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Study Two: Findings 
 Findings for the Structural Equation Modelling of Situational Interest 
Using the model fit indices (below) to test the validity of the model, the following was derived: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A poor fit was achieved from this Initial Model apart from the absolute indices of CMIN where 
significance might be considered questionable as number samples were 200-plus (Newsom, 2012, 
p1), resulting in Chi-square (χ2) being overly significant and so of little reliability for model fit (Kenny, 
2015). As ‘Confirmatory Factor Analysis’ reflects a suite of ‘increasingly’ stringent confirmatory tests 
applied to the data in a hierarchy of validity and reliability, if ‘Model fit’ is not met in the Initial 
modelling, this questions the efficacy in continuing with the CFA (Gaskin, 2016b; Hu & Bentler, 
1999). The analysis was considered as ‘better applied’ to improving the measure’s items, in order to 
reflect the new Situational Interest model of 5 factors emerging.  
 Improving the Measure for Situational Interest in Perception 
To investigate how perceptions of ‘challenge’ might be better represented in the questionnaire, the 
construct of Challenge was investigated through perceptions of control, in particular, emotional 
states relating behavioural or achievement appraisal of control and their associated affective 
cognitive-emotional perceptions (Bandura, 1997; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Hanin, 2003, 2007; Pekrun, 
Elliot & Maier, 2006; Pekrun, Goetz, Frenzel, Barchfeld & Perry, 2011; Weiner, 2000). 
Of particular note in Study One’s SEM pathway evolution (MODEL 2, APPENDIX I: Initial Pathway 
Analysis, p292), was that when a Challenge→ Total Interest  pathway was mediated through Instant 
Enjoyment, it produced an ‘inverse’ or negative reporting. When the twin pathway (MODEL 4, 
APPENDIX I, ibid) was assumed and Challenge allotted a separate pathway to the Dependent 
Variable of Total Interest, the negative reporting was diminished. This effect should not be taken as 
an indication of Challenge as a positively scaled factor (as Total Interest may be dependent on many 
Table 16 – Model-Fit Thresholds  
Recommended Threshold Twin Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 2.914 
p-value for the model     <.05 .0001   
CFI >.95  .917     
GFI  >.95 .836      
IFI    >.95 .787      
SRMR   <.08 .072       
RMSEA <.06  .083      
PCLOSE >.05 .000      
Note: Thresholds from Hu and Bentler’s “Cutoff Criteria and Fit Indexes” (1999)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
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mediating factors in the model); in consideration that Challenge might well be inversely related to 
affective hedonic cognitions of Instant Enjoyment, it maybe that Challenge should be reporting an 
inverse (antagonistic) scale in relation to Instant Enjoyment and the other Situational Interest 
measures. To infer a more tangible construct within the Situational Questionnaire, Challenge may be 
better investigated through a negative or inversed scaled Challenge construct: increasing Challenge 
representing an increasingly ‘avoid’ affective-cognition (i.e. increasing distress or anxiety). 
From this, a series of questions that might report such a factor of antagonistic ‘Challenge’ were 
adapted from an Achievement Emotions Questionnaire (AEQ, Pekrun et al., 2011); Perceptions of 
anxiety, uncertainty and control. These items were thought salient as emotional metaphors (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980), reflecting an ‘awareness’ of avoid-cognitions, perceptions of ‘beyond’ optimal 
control. This is a perception of how ecological engagement ‘feels’, rather than an actual or 
quantitative appraisal of performance. Such a phenomenological, situative-appraisal, was considered 
appropriate to fit the ‘reporting’ and ‘style’ of the Situational Interest measure, one able to align 
with the other Situational Interest’s constructs. 
Accordingly, a Challenge pathway was considered ‘better’ represented by antagonistic items (e.g. 
anxiety and uncertainty), as ‘avoid’ or ‘negative’ emotional metaphors, in such ‘overt’ (beyond) 
cognitive-function. These were considered affective cognitions of Challenge reflecting a regulatory-
pathway (antagonistic to the hedonic ‘agonistic’ pathway of Instant Enjoyment). Both pathways were 
thought to combine as a composite self-regulatory perception of attentional processes towards an 
Effectivity.  
As the learning domains were not expected (ethically) to result in undue stress for the participants, 
the Challenge-item questions were determined as emotional metaphors considered to reflect 
perception of engagement-control in activities considered as learning engagement (Hanin, 2003, 
2007; Pekrun & Perry, 2014). Here, Challenge becomes a recognition of the ‘intensive-accumulative’ 
nature of Divergent Criticality (where such a self-regulating ‘inhibition’ construct will increase 
functioning around a Tolerance Optimisation). These items were: “This was a tense activity”; “I felt 
nervous at times” and “I felt uncertain at times” (see, over). 
Challenge as an antagonistic pathway marks an ontological shift in how this Interest construct has 
been approached in learning and education, from one of an Interest perception or determination 
(see, Berlyne, 1971; Danner & Lonky, 1981; Harter, 1978, in predominately – classroom situated 'top 
down' reporting), to one of an emotional appraisal of attentional-awareness. Though Situational 
Interest had shown validity and reliance (Chen et al., 1999), its affective-cognitive function might be 
questioned as to its validity distinguishing between such differing theoretical bases of motivational 
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Interest and emotion. Such conflating of emotional arousal and of Interest has been cautioned by 
Chen (2014). It is considered that by approaching Situational Interest as an attentional awareness, 
reporting may be better representative of a conscious-awareness of behavioural affective regulation 
– attentional control-perceptions as hedonic appraisal (states of, Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; 
Northoff & Hayes, 2011). This is a new ecological perspective for Interest perceptions towards life-
regulation. One that sees the measure of Situational Interest able to infer perception as an 
attentional-awareness of a state of life-regulation function in accordance with the Tolerance 
Optimisation Hypothesis.  
To accommodate this new ontology of Challenge as ecological control, the original Challenge and 
Attentional demand items were re-considered in consideration of the hypothesised duel effective 
Twin Pathway Model– a Top-down bias of (Attentional Demand → Instant Enjoyment) pathway and 
a Bottom-Up bias (Challenge → Total Interest), and new items for both constructs considered:  
The following changes were made:  
Chall151 – ‘This is a difficult Activity’ - removed 
Chall252 – ‘This activity is complicated’ - removed 
Chall353 – ‘This activity is a demanding task’ – re-appropriated to Att242 (see below) 
Chall454 – ‘It is hard for me to do this activity’ – remains 
 
This now provided a Challenge construct which was considered as a better metaphoric-fit for 
representing an antagonistic of inhibitory cognitive-function80: 
Chall151 – ‘This was a tense activity’ – New 
Chall252 – ‘I felt nervous at times’ – New 
Chall353 – ‘I felt uncertain at times’ – New 
Chall454 – ‘It is hard for me to do this activity’ – remains 
 
As Top-down processes (contextual appraisal of the agent) are often associated with purposeful 
effort (Eysenck et al., 2007), it was felt that this was adequately reflected in Att343 – ‘I was focused’ 
and Att444 – ‘This activity is complicated’ but not in the two items that had displayed poor 
                                                          
80 It should be noted that the Divergent Criticality hypothesis recognises the ‘intensive’ functioning of such 
inhibition cognitions (Challenge): in that there will be always be some intensive ‘criticality’ in ALL functional 
states, and so allows a continuous scale for Challenge perceptions – there will always be uncertainty, be it a 
scintilla of control-doubt through to a collapse in cognitive control stability. 
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convergence reliability in the EFA: Att141 – ‘My attention was high’ and Att242 – ‘I was very 
attentive all of the time’.  
Att141 ‘My attention was high’ had a better fit with the construct, Total Interest (this item was 
thought to reflect an overall appraisal without overt cognitive-emotional value), so was moved to 
ToIn363 and replaced by ‘I was determined during this activity’. 
Likewise, Att242 ‘I was very attentive all of the time’ was removed and replaced with the re-
appropriated Chall353 ‘This activity is a demanding task’. Again, this was thought to better reflect 
the perception of cognitive-effort in Attentional Demand rather than Challenge. 
Att141 – ‘My attention was high’ – re-appropriated to Toin363 
Att242 – ‘I was very attentive all of the time’ – removed  
Att343 – ‘I was focused’– remains 
Att444 – ‘I was concentrated’ – remains 
 
This now provided an Attentional Demand construct made from the following items: 
 
Att141 – ‘I was determined during this activity’ – New 
Att242 – ‘This activity is a demanding task’ – re-appropriated from Chall353 
Att343 – ‘I was focused’ – remains 
Att444 – ‘I was concentrated’ – remains 
Adjustments to the Total Interest construct were made to reflect its hypothesised cognitive-
emotional state of Divergent Criticality function, and accommodate the Attentional Demand item 
Att141 – ‘My attention was high’: 
ToIn 262 ‘I was curious to try this activity’ was thought to be less hedonically-biased than ‘This 
activity looked fun to me’, and the following changes were made to Total Interest to better reflect 
an Interest construct derived from both the  Attentional Demand (hedonic affective drive) and 
Challenge (antagonistic-inhibitory regulation) pathways: 
ToIn161 – ‘This activity is interesting – remains 
ToIn 262 – ‘This activity looked fun to me’– removed 
ToIn 363 – ‘It’s fun to try this activity’ – removed 
ToIn 464 – ‘This is an interesting activity’ – removed 
 
Therefore: 
ToIn161 – ‘This activity is interesting’ – remains 
ToIn 262 – ‘I was curious to try this activity’ – New 
ToIn 363 – ‘my attention was high’ – from Att141 
ToIn 464 – ‘This can be considered a challenging activity’ – New 
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Further re-phrasing in accordance with the observations made in the sampling feedback (from 
questionnaire gatekeepers), provided further items that were considered culturally (language) 
sensitive; e.g. 
EXIN111 – “I wanted to discover all the tricks of this activity” became    
  “I wanted to discover all the ways of doing this type of activity” 
Situational Interest Adapted Questionnaire MkIII (See, APPENDIX II: Questionnaire Development and 
Providence, p294) 
 
 ROPELOC Factor Analysis 
 
Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis was performed on the ROPELOC questionnaire data   
(see, APPENDIX V: Study Two – ROPELOC Factor Analysis, p305) the following Pattern Matrix was 
derived. 
Figure 28 – ROPELOC Study 2: Confirmatory Analysis Model (AMOSIBM24) 
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 Findings for The ROPELOC Questionnaire Measure 
 Model Fit 
Using the model fit indices to test the validity of our model, the following was derived: 
Table 17 – Model-Fit Thresholds 
Recommended Threshold Twin Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 3.687 
p-value for the model     <.05 p<.0001 
CFI >.95  .862 
GFI  >.95 .829 
IFI    >.95 .863 
SRMR   <.08 .0745 
RMSEA <.06  .098 
PCLOSE >.05 .000 
Note: Taken from Hu and Bentler’s “Cutoff Criteria and Fit Indexes” (1999, p.27)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
 
 
The CFA model produced, did not mirror the sub-scale convergence on factors as seen in the original 
validated model, with much cross-Construct variation from the original, validated model. This was 
somewhat surprising as the sub-scales informing such factors were largely un-adapted. As with the 
Situational Interest measure, thresholds for fit were not adequately achieved from the model, apart 
from the absolute indices of CMIN and SRMR where the Chi-square (χ2) bias overly significant results 
and so of little reliability (Kenny, 2015; Newsom, 2012). As these ‘fit’ criteria are not met in this 
Initial Model, this questions the efficacy in continuing with the CFA and SEM (Gaskin, 2016b). Again, 
as with the Situational Interest measure, might better apply the results of the CFA to improving the 
ROPELOC measure’s items further, in order to better interrogate the Divergent Criticality hypothesis 
There emerged three factors of some concurrence to  constructs of Personal Abilities Beliefs (PAB) 
and Cooperative Teamwork (CT), though with sub-scales spread across the three emerging factors.  
This spread was thought to display perceptions of a state of ecological management as ‘locus of 
control’ attributions. As developing ‘perceptions of control’ theme was emerging in Study Two in 
relation to state cognitions, the sub-scale of Locus of Control (IL) was re-considered.  
In Study One, the Internal  Locus of Control (IL) scale had shown significant correlation with 
Attentional Demand (r=.195, p<.05). It was felt that IL might provide increasing convergence power 
to the SClocus factor. Stress Management had provided the least correlations in previous sub-scale 
analysis and was therefore replaced and Internal Locus IL items re-introduced.  
To accommodate the loss of a sub-scale within a construct of Social Awareness, the sub-scale of 
Time effectiveness (with strong correlations seeming to infer cognitive ‘state’ determinants (Table 4, 
p133) was reintroduced and Self Confidence (SC) as a trait-like scale that had displayed poor 
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correlations in Study One, removed. These changes were taken forward in the Study Three analysis. 
In addition, the Study Three questionnaires were re-worded to reflect the metaphoric and language 
thought better representative of participants perceptions as had been done in the Interest 
Questionnaire (see Questionnaire and Providence, Study Three, APPENDIX II: Questionnaire 
Development and Providence, p294). 
 
 Study Two: Conclusions  
Though the EFA and CFA supported somewhat a Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Novelty and 
Exploration, seemingly rewarded through a dependent variable of Instant Enjoyment for increasing 
surprise, the CFA for Study Two did not meet initial threshold criteria for further SEM analysis. That 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis reflects a suite of increasingly stringent confirmatory tests applied in a 
hierarchy of validity and reliability. To proceed with further Structural Emotional Modelling 
iterations would require an item validity not available from this initial Factor Analysis (any further 
SEM Pathway analysis requires validity assumptions that not able to be supported by current 
questionnaires items and factors). In not achieving ‘Model fit’ questions the efficacy in continuing 
with the SEM analysis. Therefore, the results of Study Two were thought to be better interrogated 
towards improving the Situational Interest and ROPELOC measure’s, in order to better interrogate 
the Divergent Criticality hypothesis. 
A new ontological shift in how to view Challenge now directed the adaptation of the Situational 
Interest questionnaire. To address the poor reporting in convergent and discriminatory validity of 
the constructs, significant changes were made to the measure: Particularly in the scaling of 
antagonistic items for the Challenge factor (see Questionnaire and Providence, Study Three, 
APPENDIX II). To accommodate the new items of anxiety, nervousness and discomfort, a re-appraisal 
informed by Studies One and Two was conducted in producing an ‘adapted’ Situational Interest 
Questionnaire. Such a shift required further Factor Analysis in Study Three. This should then allow 
pathway analysis using SEM to suggest a Profile of attentional processes between the new 
constructs. Such a SEM-profile may infer a ‘state of functional Affordance’, a scale or measure able 
to be triangulated against another perception measure (e.g. ROPELOC) in accordance with the 
Divergent Criticality hypothesis.   
The ROPELOC Factor Analysis displayed similar issues with Situational Interest in its Global Fit. Again, 
the constructs may be questioned as to their veracity in representing Self-Concept as a ‘state’ 
cognitions. It was considered that some of the constructs may be subject to more complex ‘frame of 
reference’ issues (Bong & Skaalvik, 2003; Pajares, 2009), confounding self-reporting with a bias 
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towards reporting more ‘trait’ like rather than ‘state’ cognitions. To this end, ROPELOC constructs 
thought to reflect state perceptions to better effect (considering the Divergent Criticality hypothesis 
and its sampling criteria of learning environments), were re-introduced, e.g.  ‘locus of control’. 
Again, such adaptations would require further Factor Analysis to enable salient construct of Self 
Concept (ROPELOC) to be able to triangulate against a Situational Interest measure derived – state 
of functional Affordance.   
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6 CHAPTER SIX – Methodology Study Three: An Exploratory Model of 
Divergent Criticality Function 
 Introduction 
A key objective of the methodology was to be able to differentiate ‘states of Functional Affordance’ 
from a questionnaire in order to test the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. 
Bringing together the findings from the Study One and Two’s Questionnaire Development required 
now, further factor analysis in order for the MkIII adapted questionnaires, to be to applied with any 
veracity toward a Structural Equational Modelling (SEM) of Divergent Criticality function. Study 
Three questionnaire data therefore undertook a number of methodological steps: 
I) Factor Analysis of the new questionnaires 
II) Pathway Analysis of the Situational Interest Constructs. 
III) Structural Equation Modelling for an Interdependence Profile of functional Affordance. 
IV) Triangulation tests with a self-concept measure (ROPELOC).    
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Study Three: Methodology 
Figure 29 – Situational Interest Factor Analysis and SEM 
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 Sorting and Cleaning 
Sample Domains 
In accordance with the sampling criteria and ethical submissions of Study One and Two, the final 
questionnaire was sampled across 24 learning domains (Figure 30, below). 
 
Figure 30 - Sample Domain-Groups 
Data Screening 
Sorting and cleaning of descriptive data from Phase Three followed the same procedures as the 
previous studies; however, rather than a Maximal Likelihood (EM algorithm) method for missing 
data, the pattern of ‘missingness’, determined a Multiple Imputation (MI) method be used. The 
Questionnaire MkIII data set was first sorted and cleansed in Excel and SPSSIBM24 as in Study One 
(see, Outliers, Missing Variables, Unengaged Responding, 4.6, p125). This cleansed data was then 
entered into SPSSIBM24. 
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 Missing Data and the Use of Multiple Imputation 
Missing data was evident at ‘item’, ‘construct’ and ‘person’ level in the questionnaire returns. In 
such large samples, item and construct missingness present few issues as imputation methods can 
be easily applied to account for such omissions (Allison, 2003). Greater consideration must be 
applied to person-level missing data, however, as it presents a system issue (in providing no 
empirical basis for imputation as there is no person-level data with which to draw information). 
Therefore, missing data was analysed; and if missing data was found to be missing at a ‘system’ level 
of missingness (no information evident in either questionnaire), was removed. 
Situational Interest Measure – 4 rows represented missingness at person-level and therefore, as a 
sampling system issue, removed: n =870 (person-level of missingness = 0.5%). 
Personal Effectiveness Measure (ROPELOC) – 20 rows represented missingness at person-level and 
therefore, as a system issue, removed: n =853 (person-level of missingness = 2.4%)81. 
The Situational Interest questionnaire exhibited 89 missing values (0.4% item-level of missingness) at 
item and construct level that were subject to Multiple Imputation (MI). In the ROPELOC 
questionnaire exhibited 106 missing values (0.5% person-level of missingness) at item and construct 
level that were subject to MI. 
 Multiple Imputation 
The quality of missingness and ‘level’ (item, construct and person/measure) provides some 
indication as to the treatment of the missing data, the imputation technique and the necessity (or 
not) of Sensitivity Analysis (Newman, 2014). The missing data therefore was subject to Little's MCAR 
test: 
Situational Interest: Little's MCAR test: Chi-Square = 1037.602, DF = 688, Sig. = .000a 
ROPELOC: Little's MCAR test: Chi-Square = 1169.990, DF = 755, Sig. = .000a 
Both measures displayed Missing Not at Random (MNAR) level of missingness. This might present 
problems with imputation, however, it should be remembered that missingness represents a 
continuum between Missing at Random (MAR) and Missing Not at Random (MNAR) as to the 
inference of one variable and the missingness observed in relationships with at least one other 
variable (Collins et al., 2001). Whereas the percentage of ‘missingness’, provides some measure as to 
                                                          
81 The person level missing data disparity between the Situational Interest and ROPELOC was thought to 
represent questionnaire fatigue (7.4.5, p213). 
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the randomness of missing data in a consideration for how MAR and MNAR might be differentiated 
and guide assumptions for replacing missing data (Allison, 2003; Gaskin, 2016c; Newman, 2014). 
Though bias issues cannot be ignored when imputing missing values, with such low levels of 
missingness in the observable data (n<10%), this may allow a MAR assumption in the data-set, even 
though Little’s (1988) test suggests none-MCAR (Allison, 2003; Schafer & Graham, 2002): This is 
acceptable in understanding how, the likelihood of obtaining a particular pattern in the missing data 
may ‘not’ be depend on the values of missing-data, but on how the values observed might have 
been effected in the data sampling, an understanding of how the data is missing82; 
“Of course, the importance of this rule (imputation model) depends on the proportion of cases with missing 
data. If that proportion is small, it is not so critical that the imputation model closely track the model of 
interest.” (Allison, 2003, p554) 
It was intended to use the data for further ‘hypothesis testing’, therefore, a Multiple Imputation 
method (Rubin, 1986) was applied to the data set. Multiple Imputation (MI) does not require such 
stringent MAR assumptions, especially when associated with large sample size n>60 (Schafer & 
Graham, 2002, p170) and the use of auxiliary variables has been highlighted by Collins et al. (2001) 
and Newman (2014): 
“Auxiliary Variables Can Convert MNAR Missingness Into MAR Missingness.”(Newman, 2014, p391)               
The use of Multiple Imputation has, in addition, been suggested for imputation for model hypothesis 
testing, as it has been shown to be less-susceptible to Standard Error bias with MI providing greater 
accuracy in confidence intervals for future hypothesis testing (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Schafer, 2003). 
A predictive mean MI imputation (SPSSIBM24/AMOSIBM24) was therefore conducted at a construct level 
to provide salient auxiliary variables for the MI. 
 Tests for Normality of Data - Skewness and Kurtosis 
Possible Skewness and Kurtosis issues are able to be relaxed in Structural Modelling programmes 
such as  SPSS IBM24 and AMOS IBM24, where non-centrality ‘Fit Indices’ are able to obfuscate such issues 
somewhat. However, in both measures, the variables exhibited no significant Skewness or Kurtosis 
Issues (SPSS IBM24). The data sets were now subject to Factor Analysis. 
                                                          
82 Missingness across the perception (psychometric) data here, is considered to reflect the interpretation of 
questionnaire items (e.g. Nov232 – ‘This activity is fresh’; though patterned as significantly missing, actually 
reflected some confusion in the contextual language “I don’t understand”). This item’s missingness is therefore 
considered as not dependent on missing data and MAR is accepted on the observed data. 
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 Factor Analysis: Study Three – Situational Interest Questionnaire  
The use of an ‘adapted’ measure of Situational Interest (Chen et al., 2001a) employed the adapted 
‘Interest’ and Emotional-control variables (e.g. an antagonistic Challenge factor). In this Study Three, 
the adaptation of Interest’s constructs and the re-allocation of ‘Challenge’ as an antagonistic factor, 
explored how ‘cognitive-emotional’ questionnaires can now infer a functional Affordance state, able 
to be differentiated between sample domains and groups. Such differentiation, in accordance with a 
Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis, is considered congruent with other perceptions of affective 
appraisals of self-concept. Accordingly, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) was conducted as per Study Two, to provide validity and define the variable loadings 
for the adapted Situational Interest measure (See APPENDIX VI: Study Three – Situational Interest 
EFA and CFA, p311). A model with Chal454, InEn323, ToIn262 and Nov333 removed and co-variances 
on (Chal353 &252) applied was now used for initial confirmatory analysis (see, Figure 31, above). 
  
Figure 31 - Initial Confirmatory Analysis Model (AMOSIBM24) 
Methodology Study Three: An Exploratory Model
172 
 
 Table 18 – Model-Fit Thresholds for Initial CFA 
Recommended Threshold CFA Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 5.731 
p-value for the model     <.05 .0001 
CFI >.92-.95  .923 
SRMR   <.06-.08 .061 
RMSEA <.06-.08  .074 
Note: Strict Thresholds (Hu & Bentler, 1999);                                                  
Acceptable Thresholds (Hair et al., 2013; Lomax & Schumacker, 2004)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
 
 
Model fit, was based on broad fit-index spectrum, as deemed a ‘confirmatory requirement’ for 
determining ‘fit’ in multiple criteria (Hu & Bentler, 1999) (Newsom, 2012). Therefore using (Byrne, 
2008) guidance the following ‘fit’ indices were considered suitable: Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
(Bentler, 1990); the Root Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) (Browne & Cudeck, 1993), 
and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). The ‘χ2 CMIN’ fit, utilises Chi-square (χ2)  
and is therefore susceptible to large sample and complex-model confounding. However, this indice 
was retained allowing ‘degrees of freedom’ to be considered in SEM model assumptions. The 
following indices were now used reflecting the sampling and research design. 
The model (Figure 31, above), did not achieve the model-fit thresholds (above) under Hu and Bentler 
(1999). However, Hair et al. (2013, p584) and Lomax and Schumacker (2004, p112) have suggested 
acceptable model-fit at ‘less strict’ thresholds in consideration of sample size and the number of 
measure-items (e.g. RMSEA < .06 - .08) and therefore, this Initial CFA was thought to be acceptable 
in confirmatory analysis as non-hypothesis testing and able to continue the validity metrics. 
 Measurement Invariance: For Non-independence threats 
There is a threat to the model validity if the sampling includes data sets where grouping parameters 
display a confounding bias effect through overt independence (i.e. groups display significant bias to 
the latent variables, questioning the homogeneity of the data and implying a possible threat to 
inferential results). Such data measurement bias is addressed through a number of measurement-
invariance tests that enable hypothesis analysis (AMOSIBM24) in multi-group analysis83, to be 
attributed to the specified hypothesis rather than unspecified group reporting differences. (e.g. male 
                                                          
83 Within the Divergent Criticality theory, social and situational reporting is hypothesised to exhibit 
stereotypical reporting (e.g. gender and age biasing) though these biases are expected ‘within’ domain groups, 
(and part of the social/situational milieu), here we examine ‘between’ domains to accommodate possible 
sample Type I ‘grouping’ bias effects. 
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vs female bias). To allow the assumption of model independence towards groupings identified in the 
Phase I (Study One), gender’ and ‘age’ were therefore subjected to invariance testing using Chi-
Square χ2 and multiple-group analysis in AMOSIBM24.  
 Measurement Invariance Tests for Age and Gender 
Measurement invariance tests are described in order of increasing stringency, where subsequent 
tests build upon ever greater constraining of model parameters in homogeneity testing. This focuses 
invariance with ever increasing constraints on the general model, the latent factors, and the variable 
items (Bialosiewicz, Murphy & Berry, 2013). 
1) Configurable Invariance – Running a model-fit test using freely-estimated parameters ‘across’ 
possible groupings to see if acceptable thresholds of model fit are maintained when the groups are 
considered separately. Here we look for significant model fit (AMOSIBM24). If found, invariance 
provides a measure of non-independence or non-variance in the grouping data across the model 
(Gaskin, 2016b).  
2) Metric Invariance – Running a ‘partially’ constrained (factor loadings) model across all groups, 
then using a Chi-Square χ2-test to compare between this partially constrained and a ‘Freely 
Estimated’ (unconstrained) model. Loadings on the latent factors should display equivalence (i.e. 
invariant) and the χ2-test found – non-significant (Van de Schoot, Lugtig & Hox, 2012).  
3) Scalar Invariance – This is conducted by comparing the partially constrained model with a fully 
constrained model (regression loadings and intercepts). If the two models are found to be 
equivalent (i.e. invariant), this would display no appreciable or significant difference in item variables 
towards the latent factor. Non-significance using a χ2-test infers no difference, therefore, Scalar 
Invariance is accepted. 
Invariance in both questionnaires data-sets  was accepted (for full Measurement Invariance tests 
see, APPENDIX VII: Measurement Invariance Tests, p321). The initial Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA) Model (Figure 31, p171), is accepted for the further metrics to establish factor validity and 
reliability:  
 Validity and Reliability Tests 
Construct Reliability vs Cronbach’s Alpha 
Though Cronbach's Alpha is often quoted for item reliability (that questionnaire items address the 
latent variables they are correlated towards, reliably across all samples). This presents concerns for 
multi-construct models with large sample sizes as Cronbach's Alpha has a positive relationship with 
increasing degrees of freedom questioning its reliability as a measure (Hair et al., 2013). More 
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accurate reliability may be found through Construct Reliability (CR). CR measures the internal 
consistency of the items towards a latent variable or construct, that is to say, the similarity in item(s) 
reporting towards a latent construct. Construct Reliability, as a more accurate measure of the 
reliability of the data (than Cronbach’s Alpha), and is required as an assumption for Construct 
Validity metrics (CR>.7 ideally – CR>.5 acceptable, Hair et al., 2013, pg 605). 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity Metrics 
Construct Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Maximum Shared Variance (MSV) and 
Average Shared Variance (ASV), are used to inform Convergent and Discriminatory Validity 
investigated through the following threshold metrics (Hair et al., 2013). 
For Construct Reliability – CR > .70                                                                  (Hair et al., 2013) 
For Convergent Validity – AVE > .50                (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988) 
(explained variance is greater than residual variance)                                                                        
Discriminant Validity  - MSV < AVE;                 (Hair et al., 2013) 
Discriminant Validity  - Square root of AVE greater than inter-construct correlations.                   
Construct Reliability tests are now applied (ibid). 
 
Challenge presented a concern above. It would be possible to further remove Challenge variables 
and improve the convergent reliability slightly (.426). However, an explanation for such moderate 
convergence on this Challenge factor is hypothesised to be a sampling-bias: a necessary sampling of 
‘within tolerance’ (for ethical reasons – not taking participants into a beyond control situations of 
fear and anxiety), may result in strong convergence being elusive with such a system-bias, but does 
not negate its influence. As discriminant validity is acceptable and considered the primary structural 
‘pathway’ feature for Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) and that Challenge displays only a minor 
Table 19 – Convergent and Discriminant Validity for Situational Interest 
   CR AVE MSV MaxR(H) Att InEn Chal App Nov 
Att 0.806 0.589 0.472 0.864 0.768         
InEn 0.917 0.688 0.514 0.923 0.687 0.829       
Chal 0.783 0.426 0.207 0.807 0.427 0.401 0.653     
App 0.874 0.636 0.514 0.882 0.543 0.717 0.394 0.798   
Nov 0.750 0.511 0.497 0.797 0.480 0.705 0.455 0.600 0.715 
Note: Metrics using ‘Validity Master’ (Gaskin, 2016e)                                                                                           
Convergent Validity: the AVE for Chal is less than 0.50 
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convergent issue, this validity metric was considered acceptable in moving towards investigating 
possible unknown (common) variables that may be in effect. With Metric Validity ‘assumed’ 
acceptable for the Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model (Figure 31, p171), this validity assumed 
model was taken forward to Common Latent Factor analysis. 
 Common Methods Bias: Shared Common Latent Factor  
It is possible that an unidentified ‘common’ item might share variance with the items as well as the 
factors identified through EFA. To test this, the shared-variance across all model items is tested for 
significance with a hypothesised Common Latent Factor (CLF) as a correlated residue across all items 
in the model.  
Shared Variance Test of a Common Latent Factor 
This is done by creating the Common Latent Factor (CLF) for all variables (Gaskin, 2016a), run as a 
freely estimated model (see, Figure 32, below), and a model where the CLF is constrained to zero. 
This is a first correlated residue from all the measures items to identify any latent factor, common to 
all items, who’s sensitivity may have been lost in the first extraction. 
If there is significance using a Chi-square (χ2) difference test between: 1) the freely estimated model 
and 2) a model constrained to zero; then there is a correlation residue bias from a Common factor 
with enough shared variance to warrant its inclusion as a latent variable in further analysis. 
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Figure 32 – Common Latent Factor 
 
Table 20 – Chi-square Difference Test CLF 
 
 Overall Model  Chi-square DF P Invariant? 
Unconstrained  641.1 141     
Fully constrained  947.2 159     
Number of groups    2     
     Difference  306.1 18 0.000 NO 
Note: Chi-square Difference Measure (Gaskin, 2017a) 
There is significance (p<.001), therefore shared variance with the CLF will need to be assumed. 
Validity Check of Model Including Common Latent Factor  
As shared variance was significant (not invariant), the model was investigated for convergence and 
discriminatory validity now that the variables are seen to share variance between the CLF and the 
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latent factors. This initial CLF discriminatory validity seemed confounded with negative-values and 
some poor discriminant (see, above). The Factor Instant Enjoyment (InEn) displaying considerable 
shared variance within the CLF model with factors 3 (Approach) and 5 (Novelty). This non-
discrimination matched analysis in the EFA, therefore some further adjustment was considered 
necessary in the model.  
Adjustment of Model Including Common Latent Factor  
The variables Att141 (Figure 32) displayed poor loading towards its latent factor suggesting cross 
loading. This concurred with cross-loading observed in the EFA (see, APPENDIX VI: Study Three – 
Situational Interest EFA and CFA, p311) that had caused the reliability of this Att141 item to be 
questioned.  Att141 was removed and Instant Enjoyment (InEn) constrained with Approach (App) to 
1 (to produce an acceptable model for imputing partialised values towards a factor whilst 
considering a CLF). 
Though some seemingly ‘low’ convergent validity is seen across bias corrected values84 (Figure 33, 
below), the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) exceeds a cut-off value of .40 across all factors and 
this model is therefore acceptable (Diamantopoulos, Siguaw & Cadogan, 2000). There is a negative 
regression for some of the CLF correlations, this is inverse effect is not unusual with residue-analysis 
and therefore such negative values are considered permissible and the model allowed to go forward 
(Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; Henseler, Ringle & Sarstedt, 2015). 
                                                          
84 Though Chal252 displayed poor loading – as co-varied with Chal353, Chal252 was allowed to remain. 
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A final model fit was conducted on the unconstrained model with 6 latent variables (including a CLF).  
Figure 33 – Final CLF Model 
 
Table 21 – Final Model Fit Metrics for the Situational Interest CLF Model 
Recommended Threshold CLF Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 5.000 
p-value for the model     <.05 .0001 
CFI >.92-.95  .944 
SRMR   <.06-.08 .048 
RMSEA <.06-.08  .068 
Note: Strict Thresholds (Hu & Bentler, 1999);                                                  
Acceptable Thresholds (Hair et al., 2013; Lomax & Schumacker, 2004)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
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Final Model Fit for Common Latent Factor Model 
As an acceptable model fit, the CLF model was used to create factor values for future analysis by 
partialised imputation of the latent variables, allowing for ‘Common Method Bias’ to be applied. This 
is a partialisation of the factor items reflected values in accordance with their CLF: All items are 
considered to co-vary with the CLF and their latent factor, that is, they are influenced by more than 
one pathway. Such partialised ‘standardised’ regression βetas (β) will be a more accurate 
representative of the true proportion of variance toward a latent factor. 
Using these adjusted values, Structural Equation Modelling could now provide a suitable model of 
Interest perception. Such a multi-relationship model requires multi-variate assumptions for such 
Interest factors to be made. The next CFA test, therefore, were factor ‘Influence’ and ‘Collinearity’ 
assumptions. No undue influence was found evident and Collinearity was found across the CFA 
model (see, APPENDIX VIII: Tests for Multivariate Influence and Multi-Collinearity, p324). 
The Confirmatory Factor Model for Situational Interest (with corrected and imputed factor variables 
for a Common Latent Factor) was now applied to Structural Equation Modelling (see, Figure 33, 
pg178). 
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 Structural Equation Modelling: Study Three – Situational Interest   
The purpose of Pathway model building is to provide a functional model for the Interest measure, 
one with acceptable global and local significance for the probable relationship between the 
perception constructs. This allows for the interdependence between such relationships to be 
analysed as to the functional effects at play (later formulated into a SEM Interdependence Profile). 
 Global and Local Statistical Tests of Model Fit 
The initial ‘Study One Twin Pathway’ model (Figure 34, below) had used predominately ‘local’ 
pathway significance to guide model building.  
Figure 34 – Study One Twin Pathway Model 
This does not ensure model fit, in the hierarchy of model fit indices, ‘Global tests’ of model fit should 
be considered first before local tests such as regression and significance. 
 Developing a Pathway Model  
The factor analysis for Situational Interest conducted in Study Three suggested a five factor model, 
not the six factors in the initial measurement tool. Here, the dependent factor Total Interest (ToIn) 
was observed to be assimilated into the other Situational Interest constructs of Challenge, Instant 
Enjoyment and Attentional Demand (see, EFA model)85, requiring such a fundamental change in 
                                                          
85 The original variable of Total Interest from a cognitive-emotional perspective might be considered to measure common 
latent effects of an Interest measure, possibly explaining the shared variance in the CFA constructs seen in the significant 
‘Common Method Factor’, but not self-defining enough in itself to warrant a divergent construct. 
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latent-factor item loading to be accommodated. In this Study Three, the pathway model is 
reappraised in accordance with the five factors from the Factor Analysis, with the aim of building a 
robust model of constructs with which to interpret and later apply an ‘SEM Interdependence Profile’ 
from Situational Interest perceptions – as an functional Affordance of affective cognitions. 
 Interest Perceptions as Cognitive-Emotional Awareness 
All measures of self-report are considered here as perceptions from an affective, ecological 
management perspective. A selectionist self-regulation for biological-value and life-effectiveness. 
When modelling ‘perceptions of Interest’, this is exploring the end-point of multiple cognitive 
processes as they become or are made, attention-aware. It is important then, not conflate self-
report measures as ‘the’ cognitive-processes, but see self-report as a phenomenological ‘feeling’, a 
subjective emotional-cognition state of perception, from which neural function may be extrapolated 
as a Tolerance state of functional Affordance within a relative Effectivity. Perceptions of Situational 
Interest are therefore revisited as constructs of an affective awareness and used to inform further 
iterations in the modelling. 
Exploratory Approach (Interest)  
Exploratory Interest is seen to be aligned with the affective behaviour of ‘Seeking-like behaviour’, of 
a motivational drive (Panksepp, 1998, 2003). This intentionality to engage with the world might be 
thought to align well with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation: an affective 
behaviour mediated or regulated by attentional constructs (of Interest). Exploratory interest has 
been seen to be robust across a number of studies as such a cognitive construct (Chen et al., 2001a; 
Hidi, 2006; Hidi & Renninger, 2006; Krapp, 2002). Within a Divergent Criticality hypothesis, the 
integration of affective behaviour that may suggest Exploratory Interest as a motivational drive, one 
mediated by hedonic ‘feeling’, suggesting a model development that re-assigns Exploratory Interest 
as a dependent variable of affective behaviour. This is a ‘drive’ or ‘motivation’ to Approach, 
mediated by other independent ‘Interest’ factors. In recognition of such a mediated behaviour, 
Exploratory Interest is changed to ‘Exploratory Approach’ (App) and is considered as a DV rather 
than the IV as in previous models86. 
                                                          
86 Though this re-appraisal of Exploratory Interest to a dependent construct (on all other perceptions) might 
seem to question the ‘Innate behaviour’ of Panksepp (1998) ‘Seeking’ it does in fact, support such behaviour in 
the life-regulation of such a fundamental drive as a hedonic appraisal of an Innate drive. The primacy of 
wanting but mediated by liking (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008). 
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Novelty  
Novelty as surprise-generating (a hypothesis of Divergent Criticality in dynamic engagement), 
remains an Independent variable and maintains its position as fundamental in a model of Interest, 
with pathways to all other interest variables. 
Instant Enjoyment 
Instant Enjoyment is seen as a hedonic agonistic-barometer of affect based in ecological-value in 
dynamic function. As a feeling of the state of Tolerance Optimisation, Instant Enjoyment retains its 
dependence on the other constructs of Interest as has been seen across previous studies (Chen & 
Darst, 2002; Chen et al., 2001a) , but rather than Instant Enjoyment being mediated by Exploratory 
Approach as in Study Two. Instant Enjoyment is now seen to be a mediating ‘dependent’, 
Exploratory Approach. 
Attentional Demand  
Attentional Demand as a perception cognition, might be considered to be an attentional-awareness 
of neural Effectivity or effort towards surprise or ‘Novelty’. Considered a top-down appraisal of 
neural function in response to a state of surprise (cognitive effort), it represents a composite of both 
bottom-up and top-down attentional processes as a cognitive appraisal as to the state(s) functional 
Affordance in a relative Effectivity. Therefore, though the individual’s Effectivity towards surprise is   
considered to influence Instant Enjoyment, rather than dependent solely on a bottom-up processes, 
Attentional Demand as provides top-down appraisal of this surprise (and further cognitive load as all 
top-down processes exert a price – a reduced Effectivity). Instant Enjoyment is therefore better 
modelled as a co-variant of Novelty in an Interest awareness or perception. 
Challenge 
Challenge is hypothesised as an antagonistic ‘avoid’ construct, to the hedonic drive of Instant 
Enjoyment via Challenge as an awareness of neural ‘inefficiency’ to the surprise as cognitive function 
approaches Effectivity (and relative criticality87). Challenge is seen as mediating Instant Enjoyment in 
in affective pathways from Novelty and Attentional Demand. 
                                                          
87 At some emergent level, there will be intensive criticality accounting for Challenge as antagonistic 
throughout a phase of Effectivity function , an extensive affective cognition. 
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 Model Building and SEM Hypothesis Testing 
Novelty and Attentional Demand as independent variables of bottom-up and top-down cognitive 
processes (not dependent on other model variables) are considered as control or extraneous 
variables and co-varied. In accordance with AMOS24IBM23 modelling protocol, these IVs are allocated 
effect-pathways to all other factors. 
The model was built including the extraneous variables of Activity (ActOrd) and Age (Age) as 
suggested from Study One. Though control variables can be applied to all latent variables, it is 
considered acceptable with sufficient a priori justification to identify primary targets: 
ACTIVITY – Here, it was thought that activity-type (duration and situation) as surprise generating, 
would be affective on all the dependent factors: Approach, Challenge and Instant Enjoyment.  
AGE – Age, was thought to influence awareness of surprise through biased88 perceptions of 
Challenge and Instant Enjoyment dependent on experience. This was based on the proposition that 
there will be age ‘effects’ in social and ecological robustness (e.g. the naivety of youth) and produce 
disproportionally affected perceptions of surprise (Novelty). Therefore, age biases are affective on 
perceptions of Challenge and Instant Enjoyment in Tolerance Optimisation.  
                                                          
88 Gender as grouping variable provided Measurement Invariance. However age, though providing some 
invariance, did not fulfil scalar invariance and so is included in the model as a possible independent variable. 
Figure 35 – Study Three   SEM Initial Model One (AMOSIBM24) 
Methodology Study Three: An Exploratory Model
184 
 
The adjusted pathway model of Situational Interest as an attentional-awareness of affective 
constructs is now presented for SEM testing. The Causal Model 1 (Figure 36, below), is presented to 
test a Divergent Criticality hypothesis. 
 
Figure 36 – Study Three SEM Final Model 1 Fit Indices AMOSIBM24 
Though achieving some model fit in the (above) model, it presented a limited number of ‘Degrees of 
Freedom’ for variance analysis (only 1), and was therefore considered saturated. To simplify the 
model and release Degrees of Freedom, a Final Model 2 was produced (over). A number of 
hypothesised pathway-effects are now considered in order to test the SEM’s application towards 
modelling Divergent Criticality: 
Mediation Effects Model Hypothesis (Effect) Testing 
SEM H1 – That Challenge would mediate a Novelty effect on Instant Enjoyment  
SEM H2 – That Challenge would mediate an Attentional Demand on Instant Enjoyment  
SEM H3 – That Instant Enjoyment would mediate Novelty effect on Exploratory Approach 
Recommended Threshold Twin Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 8.231 – df=1 
p-value for the model     <.05 .0004 
CFI >.92-.95  .995 
SRMR   <.06-.08 .013 
RMSEA <.06-.08  .091 
Note: Strict Thresholds (Hu & Bentler, 1999);                                                  
Acceptable Thresholds (Hair et al., 2013; Lomax & Schumacker, 2004)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
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SEM H4 – That Instant Enjoyment would mediate Attentional Demand effect on Exploratory 
Approach 
SEM H5 – That Challenge and Instant Enjoyment would mediate Attentional Demand on Instant 
Enjoyment 
Moderation Effects 
That Activity and Age would moderate Interest perceptions and so are included in the SEM model. 
 Structural Equational Modelling: Findings 
Fit Indices are now applied to the below (Final Model 2). 
Figure 37 – Final Model 2 (Standardised Regression) AMOSIBM24 
 
Table 22 – Causal Model 2: Goodness of Fit 
 
Recommended Threshold Twin Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 3.711 
p-value for the model     <.05 p<.0001          
CFI >.95  .964 
SRMR   <.08 .052 
RMSEA <.06  .025 
Note: Taken from Hu and Bentler’s “Cutoff Criteria and Fit Indexes” (1999, p.27)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
With good model fit found, a hierarchy further ‘model-fit’ tests may now be considered. 
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 SEM Final Model 2: R-Squared Model Fit 
In Figure 37 (above) R-values: Challenge r2 =.02; Instant Enjoyment r2=.48;  Approach r2=.42 
R-square values for Instant Enjoyment (InEn) and Approach (App) were considered permissible, as 
greater than r>.2 (r2>.04) in social research (Cohen, 1988). However, the low r2 for Challenge (Chall – 
r2 =.02) r2 is seen as a consequence of a ‘local’ testing ethical-sampling issue rather than a global 
model issue.  This is limited Challenge (or indeed the reporting of limited Challenge perceptions in 
relation to  feelings of anxiety, a criticality function of non-linear increasing sensitivity). 
 
When only ‘the’ domains thought to be more dynamic and Challenging are tested (ACTORD=1, see 
Figure 38, below), good r2values are seen supporting the models integrity:                                                
(Chal r2 =.31; InEn r2=.68;  App r2=.56). 
 
Figure 38 – ACTORD-1 R-square Tests (ACTORD and AGE invariant) AMOSIBM24 
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 SEM Final Model 2: Pathway Significance Model Fit 
 The following regression weightings were found significant (below), completing the final model fit 
statistics for the Final SEM model 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SEM Hypothesis Testing 
With Final Model 2 now providing permissible Model Fit, the SEM was considered good enough to 
explore the SEM hypothesis The hypothesised effects in the pathway model were tested by 
comparing indirect and direct pathway regressions between the factors in the model. The effect of 
indirect or ‘mediating’ factors was analysed by estimating the product of the indirect pathways in 
relation to the direct pathway.  
This was tested using a user defined ‘estimand’ algorithm (Gaskin, 2017b) allowing both mediation-
weighting and significance to be given. Significance was estimated using a Bootstrapping “bias-
corrected percentile method” (AMOSIBM24).  
NOTE: Age and ACTIVITY extraneous variables have been omitted from the diagrams below for 
clarity, though are include in the model estimate-analysis.  
SEM H1 – That Challenge would mediate a Novelty effect on Instant Enjoyment 
Table 23 – Regression Weights 
Predictor Outcome Std Beta 
ACTORD Chal .021 
Att Chal .137 *** 
Nov Chal .167 *** 
Chal InEn -.281 *** 
Nov InEn .471 *** 
Att InEn .398 *** 
Age InEn -.063 * 
Att App .096 *** 
Nov App .149 *** 
InEn App .584 *** 
Note: Significance of Correlations 
*** p < 0.001, **p < 0.010, *p < 0.050 
  
User-defined estimands: AMOS24IBM 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
   A x B    -.038 -.055 -.025 .001 
Table 24 – Significant Mediation by Challenge of Novelty on Instant 
Enjoyment 
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SEM H2 – That Challenge would mediate Attentional Demand on Instant Enjoyment 
 
 
SEM H3 – That Instant Enjoyment would mediate Novelty on Exploratory Approach 
 
 
SEM H4 – That Instant Enjoyment would mediate Attentional Demand on Exploratory Approach 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
User-defined estimands: AMOS23IBM 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
   A x B    -.035 -.054 -.020 .001 
 
 
 
 
 
User-defined estimands: AMOS23IBM 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
   A x B   .290 .248 .338 .001 
 
User-defined estimands: AMOS23IBM 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
   A x B   .276 .232 .321 .001 
Table 25 – Significant Mediation by Challenge of Attentional Demand on Instant 
Enjoyment 
Table 26 – Significant Mediation by Instant Enjoyment of Novelty on Approach 
Table 27 – Significant Mediation by Instant Enjoyment of Attention on Approach 
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SEM H5 - That Challenge & Instant Enjoyment would mediate Attentional Demand on Exploratory 
Approach 
 
 
 Triangulating the Structural Equation Model with a Conditional Independence 
Model 
The adaptation of Interest as a cognitive-emotional attention, though finding some contemporary 
support in Zhu et al. (2009) and Hidi (2006), is epistemologically different to that of the original 
Situational-Interest modelling (Chen & Darst, 2002; Chen et al., 2001a). It was therefore considered 
that some triangulation to this predominately, ‘quasi-parametric’ SEM design, might help validate 
the SEM Final Model 2. A quantitative approach not involving the qualitative inference of a priori 
modelling was conducted, that of Conditional Interdependence. 
In order to evaluate the validity of the SEM analysis, a method of bivariate correlation are 
considered as a means of investigating the causal model suggested in SEM. If using such an 
univariate approach, standardised correlations can be considered as bivariate-coefficients not 
subject to the regression (to the mean) issues of MLR (Lane, Scott, Hebl, Guerra, Osherson & 
Zimmer, 2014).  
Conditional Independence (Birnbaum, 1962; Dawid, 1979; Fisher, 1939) offers such a test and was 
conducted on the Situational Interest data to provide a quantitative model of variable influence. By 
providing a probability measure of information shared between pairwise variables (information 
conditional on population interdependence), bi-variable relationships are tested with significance 
emerging when unaffected by other influences. Conditional Independence (CI) provides a 
quantitative analysis and offers an alternative methodology to interrogate possible qualitative issues 
with Structural Equation Modelling (e.g. researcher assumptions).  
  
User-defined estimands: AMOS23IBM 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
   A x B x C   -.027 -.041 -.015 .001 
 
Table 28 – Significant Mediation by Challenge and Instant Enjoyment of Attention on 
Approach 
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The Conditional Independence (CI) approach to model building suggests an efficient and accurate 
approach than structural modelling in the face of large data sets and multi-step methodologies 
(Bacciu, Etchells, Lisboa & Whittaker, 2013). 
Conditional Independence, therefore, was conducted in this study to provide some triangulation to 
the Structural Equation Modelling and question its efficacy in relation to SEM (see, APPENDIX X: 
Conditional Independence, p339).  
From the CI, a graphical representation of an entropy measure (Ĩ) as a measure of mutual 
information between variables, provides ‘structural’ relationships between variables, and allows the 
pairwise relationships to build a multivariable model (Figure 39, below). 
Figure 39 – Conditional Interdependence – Structural Pathway Model  
 Interpreting the Multivariate Relationships 
The above (Figure 39) has been extrapolated from the raw graphical analysis (see, APPENDIX X) to 
clearly display significant convergent relationships. The weightings are in megabits (mbits) of mutual 
‘shared’ information. Of interest here are the significant intra-relationships within what might be 
considered, ‘latent factor groupings’. These generally display stronger grouped relationships than 
the shared inter-factor relationships (brown pathways). Its findings indicate mediating relationships 
between these item-grouping (factor) centres of shared variance. Again, we see support for a five-
factor model as with the EFA. 
Variables not obviously incorporated within a factor boundary: InEn323; Att141; Nov333; ToIn262 & 
Chal454 can be seen to be cross-loaded with another latent variable(s) through ‘multiple’ 
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relationships. This again would support the confounding seen in Factor Analysis, where it is these 
very items that are seen to be removed through EFA and CFA. 
Though the Conditional Independence approach would seem to offer a quick and efficient approach 
to model building when compared with CFA and SEM, the interpretation of the relationships 
benefited from some SEM guidance to help identify and understand the raw data output provided. 
This is discussed in (see, 7.4.4 – Is there a preferred method of Factor Analysis (SEM or Conditional 
Independence)?, p212) 
 
 From SEM to an Interdependence Profile of Functional Affordance 
One of the principle objectives of Study Three’s Methodology of Structure Equation Modelling (SEM) 
was to be able to differentiate functional Affordance states in relation to ecological determinates 
(sample domains), and explore if the reporting of affective-cognitions in measures of Situational 
Interest and Self-Concept perceptions, support the Divergent Criticality hypothesis. SEM informs an 
Interdependence Profile of ‘direct and indirect’ effects from the SEM, to infer not only a state of 
functional Affordance, but the ‘relative’ Effectivity of the neural system, and able therefore, to 
empirically able to define functional Affordance in a Divergent Criticality hypothesis, that of 
Tolerance Optimisation in a relative phase of Effectivity. 
It was hypothesised, that group and domain sample-analysis using the ‘Interest’ SEM Final Model 2, 
might be able to identify possible SEM pathway-profiles, that could infer the relative ‘functioning of 
a criticality’ and the Affordance state of tolerance. The SEM-analysis was investigated to see if direct 
and indirect effects might indeed provide a way of identifying ‘affective’ situational (bottom-up) and 
contextual (top-down) attentional processes in ecological engagement. Situational Interest, as a 
subjective ‘experiencing a perception’, is able to infer a functional ‘state’ in relation to ecological 
determinants, a state of objective – functional Affordance. 
Such a model or profile of construct interdependence in Situational Interest, might then be 
hypothesised as a ‘perception’ able to infer attentional processes made consciously aware. Through 
an inductive approach to SEM, an Interdependence Profile is able to infer a measure of functional 
Affordance states for experimental testing (see, APPENDIX XI: SEM Interdependence Profile – 
Congruence Assumptions, p344). 
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 An SEM Interdependent Profile as States of Functional Affordance     
In extracting only three SEM-pathways, 64 different possible regression combinations present 
themselves. Using the Divergent Criticality assumptions and Interdependence Profiles (IP) these may 
be reduced to seven congruent states on an IP-scale 1 to 7. 
 
 
Figure 40 (over), presents an overview of the functional Affordance states and their differentiation 
through the coordinated definition of tolerance in relation to relative Effectivity: These profiles have 
been induced in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. This 
represents a self-regulation around a relative-cusp of criticality function and may be used to 
differentiate subjective reporting of attentional awareness. This provides an ‘order’ for the reporting 
of functional Affordance states in accordance with their Interdependence Profile as a Tolerance 
Optimisation. Accordingly, an Interdependent Profile (IP) scale, from IP1 – IP7, infers functional 
Affordance states: with (1) the most optimal function and (7) the least89. When set within relative 
Effectivity this IP-scale of functional Affordance reflects an objective or coordinating definition or 
measure from Situational Interest reporting.  
  
                                                          
89 NOTE: The IP 7 profile represents a cusp collapse, an ‘amotivation’ or avoid cognition rather than 
congruence with Agential Approach. It therefore presents an anomaly in the Divergent Criticality assumptions 
(those of Agential ‘approach’ behaviour), and therefore these domains will not be used in further hypothesis 
testing. 
 
Table 29 – Rank Order of IP-Scale for functional Affordance  
IP-
Scale 
Slope 
Profile 
1)    
Nov→App 
2)                
Att →App 
3)           
Chal→ InEn 
Relative 
Effectivity  
Congruence Interdependence 
(Dominance First) 
1) + - - ↑↑ ↓↑ ↑↓ BEYOND  Effectivity Okay Bottom-Up Dominance 
2) + + - ↑↑ ↑↑ ↑↓ BEYOND  Effectivity Okay Shared       Dominance 
3) - + - ↓↑ ↑↑ ↑↓ BEYOND  Effectivity Okay Top-Down  Dominance 
4) - + + ↓↑ ↑↑ ↑↑ WITHIN     Effectivity Okay Top-Down  Dominance                  
5) + + + ↑↑ ↑↑ ↑↑ WITHIN     Effectivity Okay Shared       Dominance 
6) + - + ↑↑ ↓↑ ↑↑ WITHIN     Effectivity Okay Bottom-Up Dominance 
7) - -  - ↑↓ ↑↓ ↑↓ BEYOND  Effectivity NO Amotivation 
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 Interdependence Profile Scale: States of functional Affordance  
Figure 40 – functional Affordance inferred through an Interdependence Profile (IP-Scale) 
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 Validating the Interdependence Profile  
The Situational Interest constructs of Exploratory Approach and Instant Enjoyment, should correlate 
significantly with the Interdependence Profile in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis 
and concurring with Tolerance Optimisation.  
To this end a Spearman Rank Correlation was run between the Interdependence Profile (inferred 
functional Affordance state as an ordinal scale) and Situational Interest measures of Exploratory 
Approach and Instant Enjoyment, the SEM derived dependent variables thought to reflect a 
Divergent Criticality effect (n=768)90. 
Table 30 – Correlations 
  IPtrue App InEn 
IPtrue Spearman’s rho 
Correlation 
1 .317** .322** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 0.000 
N 767 767 767 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Here, Instant Enjoyment (r= .322, p.>0.001) and Approach (r= .317, p.>0.001) both support the 
Interdependence Profile as reflecting a Divergent Criticality of Tolerance Optimisation. In that both 
report positive, on first inspection, might suggest to express a reverse relationship with the IP -
scaling than expected (in that the scaling of IP-states;  IP=1 though a low scale represents a ‘high’ 
state of Divergent Criticality close to a Tolerance Optimal, therefore, a ‘negative/inverse’ reporting 
should be expected between the IP-scale of functional Affordance and the positive reporting in the 
two Situational Interest constructs).  
 An Agential-Mediation of Tolerance Optimisation 
It should be remembered that the Interdependence Profile value is not a continuous value but an 
ordinal approximation of the non-linear functioning of criticality. This, when mapped as an efficiency 
function in a Kullback-Leibler divergence (DKL), as a second-derivative of function, sees a non-linear 
‘spike’ of function towards maximal criticality or relative Effectivity (a functional Affordance bias the 
‘closer’ to Tolerance Optimisation an IP state is). Therefore these results should reflect Non-linear 
functioning in Divergent Criticality as not continuous, but non-linear around a Tolerance 
                                                          
90 The samples used were those that didn’t report an Interdependence Profile IP-7 (n=81) as these, when 
extrapolated from the Interdependence Profile, displayed an cognitive ‘confounding’ as criticality-collapse. 
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optimisation of criticality (relative Effectivity). In addition, when ‘beyond’ a relative Effectivity, the 
affective hedonic reporting is reversed in terms with its relationship with the IP-scale, therefore will 
reflect the Divergent Criticality hypothesis through inverted ‘positive’ reporting around beyond 
Tolerance Optimisation: 
a) IP6, IP5 & IP4 – as a decreasing scale ‘within-Effectivity’, should report increasingly positive 
affective-cognitions and therefore a ‘negative’ correlation would be expected. 
b) IP3, IP2 & IP1 – as a decreasing scale ‘beyond-Effectivity’, should report decreasing affective-
cognitions and therefore a ‘positive’ correlation would be expected (see, Figure 40, p193). 
With 69.8% of the sampling operating ‘beyond’ relative Effectivity (IP1,IP2 & IP3), a ‘positive’ 
reporting in both Enjoyment and Approach can be hypothesised to infer: that Divergent Criticality is 
in affect and inferred through the Interdependence Profile, reflecting a biasing of function ‘beyond’ 
relative Effectivity. 
That the SEM reporting of functional Affordance (IP-scale) reflects the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis so accurately in its nuanced-functioning, lends support not only for the hypothesis, but 
also to an Interdependence Profile ‘scale’, as a non-linear function, requires test-design 
considerations as to its future application within non-parametric research designs91.  
The power of the SEM and IP-scaling was always in its modelling of perception measures as 
informing a state of function. Using the SEM derived IP-scale allows differentiation of a state of 
functional Affordance to be allocated to the sample-domains as ecological determinants. It is in the 
triangulation of this IP-scale with a separate measure of affective-perceptions Self-Concept 
(ROPELOC), that the Divergent Criticality hypothesis may be tested. 
As the ROPELOC questionnaire had undergone significant alterations from its validated and 
published version (Richards et al., 2002), Factor Analysis was again conducted(see, APPENDIX IX: 
Study Three ROPELOC EFA and CFA, p326). 
                                                          
91 This requires the consideration of the IP-scale as a non-parametric, non-linear (assumptions of 
similar non-normality may not apply – see, 6.21.2, p202). To account for the relative Effectivity cusp-
inflection reversal in hedonic cognitions, the IP-scale need to be aligned with a tolerance 
optimisation hedonic scale, where IP6 is the least optimal (Figure 40, p216): IP6=1, IP5=2, IP4=3, 
IP3=6, IP2=5, IP1=4. 
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 ROPELOC Factor Analysis 
Figure 41 – Situational ROPELOC Factor Analysis 
 
With consideration to the use of a modified version of the ROPELOC measure (Neill, 2009) and the 
adaption of its constructs, changes were made to the questionnaire to reflect feedback and 
descriptive findings from the second phase of the study, therefore a Factor Analysis was necessary 
to: 
i) Confirm if the adapted questionnaire variables would display Convergent and 
Discriminatory validity on the ROPELOC factors. 
ii) Confirm if the variables map to latent factors of the adapted ROPELOC and if this can 
this be considered a valid model. 
An analysis of the ROPELOC questionnaire followed a similar EFA and CFA progression to the 
Situational Interest (see, APPENDIX VI: Study Three – Situational Interest EFA and CFA, p311). 
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The EFA provided eigenvalues for only 4 factors from Maximum Likelihood Extraction. This differs 
from the original measure, a final Confirmatory Factor Analysis produced the following model:  
 
 
The completion of the Factor analysis on the ROPELOC measure, found validity in Confirmatory  
Factor Analysis. ROPELOC now provides a triangulation-measure in for hypothesis testing. 
 
 
Recommended Threshold CLF Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 2.734 
p-value for the model     <.05 .0001 
CFI >.92-.95  .974 
SRMR   <.06-.08 .030 
RMSEA <.06-.08  .078 
Note: Strict Thresholds (Hu & Bentler, 1999);                                                  
Acceptable Thresholds (Hair et al., 2013; Lomax & Schumacker, 2004)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
 
Figure 42 – CLF Model for Self-Concept Measure ROPELOC (AMOSIBM24) 
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Study Three: Findings 
 Testing The Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
Perceptions as affective-cognitions are made aware and will reflect the agential mediation 
of a self-regulating, optimal learning mechanism – A Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
To address the central research question three triangulation hypothesis were tested: 
H1:  Correlations of measures Self-Concept (ROPELOC) and functional Affordance will report 
positive in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance 
Optimisation. 
H2:  A measure of Self-Concept will be differentiated between high and low states of 
functional Affordance in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance 
Optimisation. 
H3:  A Repeat Measures design will find significant difference between ‘Learning Outside the 
Classroom’ and ‘Traditional Classroom Learning’ in accordance with the Divergent 
Criticality Hypothesis. 
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 Hypothesis Testing (H1) 
H1 – Correlations of measures Self-Concept (ROPELOC) and functional Affordance, will report in 
accordance with agential-mediation of the Divergent Criticality hypothesis 
It should be possible to triangulate the Interest derived functional Affordance perception measure, 
with alternatively derived measure to test the Divergent Criticality hypothesis, i.e. functional 
Affordance States will correlate with affective-cognitions of life-effectiveness (ROPELOC92).  .  
The Interdependence Profile value as not a continuous value, but the functioning of non-linear 
criticality (see, 6.17, p194) and questions the ‘assumptions of non-linearity similarity’ (see, 6.21.2, 
p201). As such, the least effect on assumptions may only be assumed for ‘beyond’ Tolerance 
Optimisation (see, APPENDIX XIII: Hypothesis (H1) – Initial Correlation Analysis, p361). The following 
results were obtained through a Spearman’s Rank Order One-tailed correlation. The Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis predicted a positive correlation using SPSSIBM24 and was conducted on such 
‘beyond’ relative Effectivity functioning, IP-scales 1-3, n=535 (Table 31, below). 
 
 
 
 
Here, the Divergent Criticality hypothesis is supported across all life-effectiveness measures: 
Cooperative Teamwork –    CT (rho= .191, p<0.001) 
Locus of Control –     Control (rho = .129, p=0.001) 
Time Effectiveness –     TE (rho = .0125, p=0.002) 
Perception of Abilities and Beliefs –   PAB (rho = .187, p<0.001) 
                                                          
92 (ROPELOC): Awareness cognition, Self-Concept constructs determined through CFA analysis; Cooperative 
Teamwork  (CT); Time Effectiveness (TE); Locus of Control (Control) and Perception of Abilities and Beliefs 
(PAB). 
93 One Tailed analysis is used here, as the hypothesis predicts a definite relationship slope, and this is positive. 
Table 31 – IP Spearman’s Correlations BEYOND relative Effectivity  
                        IPcont CT Control TE PAB 
Correlation 
Coefficient        
n 
1.000 .191** .129** .125** .187** 
 p 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 
535 535 535 535 535 
Note:**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed93). 
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Of particular interest here, is the positive reporting. If congruent with an affective ‘behaviour’ 
hypothesis, the correlations would have predicted self-concept to be negatively correlated with 
functional Affordance the further away from a Tolerance Optimisation. That correlations reported a 
positive relationship with beyond (limited) Tolerance Optimisation reflects, the inverse ‘affect’ of the 
Tolerance Optimisation inflection in the Interdependence Profile measure (see, 6.16 – p194) 
Therefore, this contra-indicative finding supports the agential mediation of Tolerance Optimisation 
as a Cusp-Hopf inflection of criticality (see, p104). 
 
 Hypothesis Testing (H2) 
H2 – A measure of Self-Concept will be differentiated between high and low states of functional 
Affordance in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation 
If the Divergent Criticality hypothesis is in effect, there should be a significant difference in affective 
cognitions between high and low states of relative Effectivity. Here, a state of neural efficiency as a 
state of functional Affordance parameterised by relative Effectivity, will reflect affective cognitions in 
accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation.  
To differentiate high and low neural functioning in relative Effectivity, the Interdependence Profile 
was parsed into high tolerance function (states 1 & 294) and low tolerance function (states 3,4, 5 &  
6). 
 Difference Test: Mann-Whitney U – Two Group Independent Test of Medians 
The Mann and Whitney (1947) U-test was conducted using SPSSIBM24.  Here, the data is rank-ordered 
and the test approaches the data-set as similarly distributed around a median value (Tolfrey, 2004). 
A median approach to the analysis enables a ‘Mann-Whitney’ to test values when they are sorted 
(ranked) in ascending order and negates the confounding issues with ordinal data-sets (e.g. the 
influence of measure or reporting bias in non-parametric sampling). A Mann-Whitney U test (below) 
was conducted on all the data points and their median data values. A one-tail significance for the Z-
                                                          
94 Again, the non-linearity spiking of function close to Tolerance Optimisation biases the IP-scales 1&2 as ‘high’ 
functional Affordance states. 
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variable was able to be given, as the Divergent Criticality hypothesis predicts a direction of 
difference in relation to increasing Tolerance Optimisation95. 
Table 32 – Mann-Whitney U 
  CT Control TE PAB 
Mann-Whitney U 58547.000 56258.000 65005.500 58828.500 
Wilcoxon W 186818.000 184529.000 99196.500 187099.500 
Z -2.575 -3.362 -0.353 -2.478 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.010 0.001 0.724 0.013 
Monte Carlo 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Sig. .005b .001b .358b .006b 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
0.003 0.000 0.346 0.004 
Upper 
Bound 
0.007 0.001 0.370 0.008 
a. Grouping Variable: High Low 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 624387341. 
Result: This is found significant across all measures apart from Time Effectiveness (TE). 
Cooperative Teamwork –    CT (Z= -2.575, p=0.005) 
Locus of Control –     Control (Z= -3.362, p=0.001) 
Time Effectiveness –     TE (Z= -0.353, p=0.358) 
Perception of Abilities and Beliefs –   PAB (Z= -2.478, p=0.006) 
 Assumptions of Similar Non-Normality 
The Mann-Whitney U, though often treated as a test where homogeneity need not be assumed (i.e. 
identified as a non-parametric ranks around a median, able to be accommodated in a homogeneity 
of centrality of variance), it does therefore, actually assume a form of ‘non-normative’ homogeneity: 
‘that the ranked data groups are equally in their non-normality distribution’ (this provides the power 
in the Mann-Whitney tests of variance). Therefore, this assumption of ‘similar non-normality’ is not 
true-homogeneity. In recognition of the non-linearity of Divergent Criticality; this was considered not 
adequate to assume the validity of homogeneity (a TYPE-I issue where significance is confounded by 
non-homogeneity in the groupings/sample domains reflected in their IP-state). Therefore, a 
normative analysis for equality was considered necessary using a one way ANOVA between the 
groups (Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance), and requires the consideration as to whether 
significant homogeneity exists between the IP-scale groupings (despite the non-homogeneity 
assumption made of the Mann-Whitney U test). If the two groups’ data distributions are found ‘not’ 
                                                          
95 This is negative as the IP-scale is a reversed scale in relation to the self-construct perception scales. 
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to be significantly different (accepting the null hypothesis), then homogeneity of ‘normative’ 
variance might then be assumed and with it, the  significance above in Table 32.  
To be able to assume such homogeneity, further analysis of the IP-ranked data was conducted in 
order to validate the homogeneity assumptions in the Mann Whitney U test. If significant difference 
between the groups’ data distributions is found, homogeneity may NOT be assumed and the Mann-
Whitney results (above) are null and void. 
Table 33 – Levene's Tests for Equality of Variance (SPSSIBM24) 
Levene Statistic 
S 
df1 df2 Sig 
CT 
Control 
TE 
PAB 
 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 9.942 1 764.495 .002 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 24.932 1 749.893 .000 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 1.260 1 761.732 .262 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 9.547 1 762.710 .002 
Note: Levene Statistic for Rank Order of IP-scale – High and Low  
 
In Table 33 above, significance found in the ROPELOC measures Cooperative Teamwork (CT), Locus 
of Control (Control) and Personal Abilities and Beliefs (PAB) signifies that homogeneity differences 
exist in Leven’s test; the assumptions of homogeneity in the Mann-Whitney U are therefore 
questioned. Here, the true nature of non-linear function as hypothesised in a Tolerance Optimisation 
function is evident (James et al., 2013; McCune, 2006), and would display a spiking around the 
Tolerance Optimisation of relativity Effectivity. This would expect non-linear ‘skewed’ variance 
dependent on the IP-scale and should, therefore, not dismiss the result found in the Mann-Whitney 
U test. However, the significance found cannot be relied on without accommodating for such bias. 
To this end, it was considered that a repeat measures analysis using a within design would allow the 
Mann-Whitney assumptions of ‘similar’ homogeneity to be supported96.  
In addition, such an analysis may be subjected to an alternating of intervention or ‘mixed-box’ of 
sampling (alternated sampling-order ‘between’ different groups undergoing repeat sampling). This 
allows some quasi-control to the self-reporting measure through a split-plot of: ‘within’ interaction 
effect’; and any order-effects ‘between’ repeat measures.  
In a counter-indication to the traditional control design, if there is ‘not’ an order-effect on the 
interaction, this assumes that the ‘within’ effects between the repeat measures are not influenced 
by unknown determinants (alternated sampling would be expected to eliminate any order-bias from 
                                                          
96 Such ‘within’ group analysis addresses the homogeneity and sphericity assumptions above, allowing 
significance to be considered valid if found. 
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the proposed intervention, therefore, if bias is reported, this would infer ‘other’ influences on the 
effect and question any significance found towards the hypothesis. A null ‘between-order’ effect 
infers, then, a form of ‘control’ on any ‘within’ effect findings (Jones & Kenward, 2003). A mixed-box 
design utilises a Two-way factorial mixed ANOVA analysis, offering a more experimentally robust 
investigation for a ‘non-linear’ – Divergent Criticality hypothesis. 
 
 Situative verses Contextual Learning: A Repeat-Measures Hypothesis (H3) 
H3 - A Repeat Measures design will find significant difference between ‘Learning Outside the 
Classroom’ and ‘Traditional Classroom Learning’ in accordance with the Divergent Criticality 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis (H3) proposes that a ‘high’ state of functional Affordance would be seen in Active 
Learning Outside the Classroom (LoTC) and will elicit a greater effect in measures of affective 
cognition (ROPELOC self-concept perception measure) than Traditional Classroom Learning (TCL). 
This analysis used six test sample groups (n=126) that were subject to both interventions, LoTC 
sampling and TCL sampling in an alternate or ‘mixed’ order (different sampling order over these two 
interventions between different groups).  
 2 Way Mixed ANOVA for Cooperative Teamwork (CoopTW) 
Within Effects 
A within (repeated measures) difference-test investigates an overall Cooperative Teamwork (CT) 
effect, if any, considering ‘all’ samples independent of order (Table 34, below). This effect is 
regardless of Sampling Order (IV) on the dependent variable of (Cooperative Teamwork). 
Table 34 – Measure: Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts for Cooperative Teamwork 
(CoopTW) Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CoopTW Linear 6.333 1 6.333 9.481 0.003 
CoopTW * Order Linear 0.357 1 0.357 0.535 0.467 
Error(CoopTW) Linear 45.424 68 0.668     
 
Within-Effect for CT (f=9.481, p=0.003); Result – there is an overall difference-effect. 
Between Effects 
If the above CT effect has been overtly influenced by the independent variable (IV) order, then a 
significant influence would want to be seen ‘between’ the IV effects (order of sampling) on the 
Dependent Variable (DV), thus rejecting the null-hypothesis that there were no ‘order’ effects. 
However, importantly in this quasi-control mixed-box design, the (order-effect) IV is expected ‘not’ 
Methodology Study Three: An Exploratory Model
204 
 
to have a between-effect dependent on its sequencing. None-significance, therefore, in order 
(between) effects to then able to ‘accept’ the significance in the DV (within-effects). 
Analysis between sampling order (between effects) for Cooperative Teamwork  (f=0.357, p=0.552) 
are non-significant (see, Table 35, below): The null hypothesis (H0) for a between-effects is therefore 
accepted and the significance seen in the ROPELOC DV (cooperative teamwork) can be accepted as 
supporting the Divergent Criticality hypothesis. 
Table 35 – Between Effects for Cooperative Teamwork (Coop TW) 
 (Coop TW) 
 (CoopTW) 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept  4403.913 1 4403.913 3123.285 0.000 
Order  0.504 1 0.504 0.357 0.552 
Error  95.882 68 1.410     
 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis is supported in the DV of Cooperative Teamwork. 
The same test procedures were followed for the other Dependent Variables. 
 
 Two Way Mixed ANOVA for Locus of Control (Control) 
Within-Effects  (f=2.715, p=0.104) – Significance not found: The null hypothesis (H0) is accepted. 
Between-Effects  (f=0.609, p=0.438) – Non-Significant: H0  accepted and any confounding order-
effect rejected. 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis is not supported in the DV of Locus of Control. 
 Two Way Mixed ANOVA for Time Effectiveness (TE) 
Within-Effects  (f=8.088, p=0.006) – Significance found: The null hypothesis (H0) is rejected. 
Between-Effects  (f=0.002, p=0.965) – Non-Significant: H0  accepted and any confounding order-
effect rejected. 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis is supported in the DV of Time Effectiveness. 
 Two Way Mixed ANOVA for Personal Abilities and Beliefs (PAB)  
Within-Effects  (f=9.834, p=0.003) – Significance found: The null hypothesis (H0) is rejected. 
Between-Effects  (f=1.149, p=0.228) – Non-Significant: H0  accepted and any confounding order-
effect rejected. 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis is supported in the DV of Personal Abilities and Beliefs. 
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 Results from the Repeat-Measures Design 
All constructs of a self-concept measure (ROPELOC) reported coherent effects with the Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis; that of an increasing affective perception inferred through self-awareness, in 
relation to increasing inefficiency states of functional Affordance: 
Cooperative Teamwork –    CT (f=9.481, p=0.003) 
Locus of Control –     Control (f=2.715, p=0.104) 
Time Effectiveness –     TE (f=8.088, p=0.006) 
Perception of Abilities and Beliefs –   PAB (f=9.834, p=0.003)  
 Study Three: Conclusions 
This Study Three has opened up a number of new approaches to observing and understanding not 
only how we perceive and learn, but how the brain functions in regard to a fundamental ecological 
‘adaptive’ or ‘learning’ mechanism – Divergent Criticality. An Interdependence Profile measure was 
developed to model perception as the cognitive functioning of a composite of attentional processes 
and a perception Interest measure as an ‘attentional’ awareness has been able to infer neural 
function in an Effectivity state – that of a functional Affordance state. 
The measures used in this study were adapted from pre-existing questionnaires, refined to more 
‘accurately’ infer the cognitive processes explored in this study (Attention). Using a more accessible 
and nuanced questionnaire reporting cognitive-emotional constructs, it has been possible to align 
perception as a phenomenological tool, as an ‘empirical’ measure of brain function. 
In a series of hypotheses that triangulated a functional Affordance measure (Situational Interest) 
with a self-concept measure (ROPELOC), a series of relationship and difference tests provided 
significance in three designs of hypothesis testing. The findings also mirrored the hypothesised 
nuance expected in affective cognitive behaviour around a Tolerance Optimisation proposition. This 
not only aligned Divergent Criticality within a Kullback-Leibler divergence in neural ‘efficiency’, but 
supported a Cusp-Hopf formulation for criticality in an agential-mediated ‘beyond’ Tolerance 
Optimisation behaviour in the maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation. The findings from Study 
Three are now discussed. 
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN – Thesis Findings 
 Main Findings 
The central hypothesis of this study is that of affective cognitions self-regulating around a Tolerance-
Optimisation, explaining how perception and learning function towards optimising agential 
capabilities to engage, tolerate and thrive in relation to life’s opportunities and challenges. 
Tolerance-Optimisation is an optimal functioning proposition for neural-learning within such 
dynamic environments. Such an ecological function is hypothesised to be mediated by agential goal-
orientation (perceptions as Affordances or opportunities for biological-value made consciously 
‘aware’ as affective-cognitions). This enables a ‘state of Affordance’ to be set in terms of an agential 
Effectivity and Tolerance, a functional Affordance that is able to reflect an awareness of 
intentionality and capability as a perception. Functional Affordance is used to explore a Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis through agential perceptions – that affective cognitions of ecological 
engagement (an attentional awareness) will reflect the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance 
Optimisation: 
Perceptions as affective-cognitions are made aware and will reflect the agential mediation 
of a self-regulating, optimal learning mechanism – the Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
Using a Situational Interest perception measure, the functioning of the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis was modelled through Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) and Conditional 
Independence modelling. The hypothesis was significantly supported in both the SEM ‘effects’ and 
correlations between the dependent constructs (SEM) of Approach and Instant Enjoyment. These 
correlations reflected the expected behaviour of affective cognitions in accordance with the 
Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis: 
Table 36 – Structural Equation Modelling - Correlations 
  IPtrue App InEn 
IPtrue Spearman’s rho 
Correlation 
1 .317** .322** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 0.000 
N 767 767 767 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The Interdependence Profile scale as inferring a state of functional Affordance and neural function, 
was able to be triangulated against another affective measure of perception, that of self-concept 
(ROPELOC). 
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 Findings: Situational Interest Triangulated with Self-Concept 
H1            Correlations in measures Self-Concept (ROPELOC) and functional Affordance, will report       
positive in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. 
If a Divergent Criticality hypothesis is in effect, then perceptions of self-concept will report positive 
with states of functional Affordance closer to the cusp criticality of relative Effectivity. The following 
results were obtained through a Spearman’s Rank Order One-tailed correlation using SPSSIBM24. The 
correlation tests (6.21 – Hypothesis Testing (H2), p200) supported Divergent Criticality, subject to a 
Kullback-Leibler divergence in Tolerance Optimisation (a ‘preferred’ or behavioural bias, supporting 
the selectionist proposition of ecological Tolerance) and when applied to all Tolerance Optimisation 
(the Cusp Hopf functioning functional ‘states’ – IP-scale 1-3), the two measures were able to be 
triangulated. Correlations displayed a small but significant relationship for the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation across all of the ROPELOC self-report components. 
ROPELOC Correlations with IP-scale of functional Affordance  
Cooperative Teamwork –    CT (rho= .191, p<0.001) 
Locus of Control –     Locus (rho = .129, p=0.001) 
Time Effectiveness –     TE (rho = .0125, p=0.002) 
Perception of Abilities and Beliefs –   PAB (rho = .187, p<0.001) 
Such small correlations should not be unexpected; effect sizes in Social Science have been shown to 
be mainly small to medium, (0.2 – 0.5, Cohen, 1988). However, it is not that the effects observed are 
small, it is that they are observed at all that is significant. That such a ‘state’ of cognitive 
differentiation is able to rise above the noise of a cognitive-cacophony of motivational drives, traits 
and biases, offers support to Divergent Criticality as an affective ‘selectionist’ neural mechanism.  
Such correlation also provided ‘triangulated’ validity to the inductive IP-scale, as representing 
functional Affordance around a Tolerance Optimisation, and thus enables the IP-scale to address the 
central research question. If the IP-scale can be differentiated as perceptions of high and low 
functional Affordance, then such differentiation should also be expressed in perceptions of self-
concept as affective cognitions in accordance with Divergent Criticality hypothesis. 
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 Difference Tests between High and Low states of functional Affordance   
H2:      A measure of Self-Concept will be differentiated between high and low states of functional 
Affordance in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation 
This differentiation was tested using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test to reflect the quasi-
parametric data of self-report questionnaires (n=767). 
Cooperative Teamwork –    CT (Z= -2.575, p=0.005) 
Locus of Control –     Control (Z= -3.362, p=0.001) 
Time Effectiveness –     TE (Z= -0.353, p=0.358) – no significance 
Perception of Abilities and Beliefs –   PAB (Z= -2.478, p=0.006) 
The hypothesis was supported across CT, Control and PAB. That significance was found, not only 
reports differentiation in functional Affordance states reflecting the Divergent Criticality hypothesis, 
but again, reports the behavioural bias for Tolerance Optimisation in Divergent Criticality function 
[Time Effectiveness (TE) was not supported in this difference test]: this may question the value of 
Time Effectiveness as a state measure and it may be that this construct better reflects a trait 
cognition of life-effectiveness as discussed. 
As the Mann-Whitney test of ‘difference’ assumes similar non-normality (as non-parametric), these 
results must be considered in relation to the non-linear function of Divergent Criticality and 
accommodate the non-linear, and therefore non-similar, homogeneity issues (between high - low 
sampling groups). Therefore, a repeat measures test was conducted in order to be able to ‘assume’ 
sample Homogeneity and Sphericity (the participants being the same people). 
H3:    A Repeat Measures Two-way boxed-design will find significant difference between 
‘Learning Outside the Classroom’ and ‘Traditional Classroom Learning’ in accordance 
with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis 
Here, Divergent Criticality was predicted to favour 1) Learning Outside the Classroom (LoTC) in 
inducing high affective cognitive state(s) of Tolerance Optimisation over  2) Traditional Classroom 
Learning (TCL). That this was an  apriori classification that reflected post hoc IP-scale analyses 
provided further support for the IP-scale (i.e. Learning Outside of The Classroom domains displayed 
higher Divergent Criticality than Traditional Classroom Learning): 
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Mann-Whitney test of Difference between TCL and LoTC  Learning Domains 
Cooperative Teamwork –    CT (f=9.481, p=0.003) 
Locus of Control –     Control (f=2.715, p=0.104) 
Time Effectiveness –     TE (f=8.088, p=0.006) 
Perception of Abilities and Beliefs –   PAB (f=9.834, p=0.003) 
Three out of the four Dependent Variables (ROPELOC constructs) reported coherent effects with the 
Divergent Criticality hypothesis; that of increasing affective perception(s) in relation to apriori 
functional Affordance states considered closer to Tolerance Optimisation. That Locus of Control 
perceptions did not report significance can be explained, in that although greater perceptions of 
‘control’ might be expected in higher Divergent Criticality functioning, there may be extrinsic 
determinants in effect where an educational context is sampled (the environments of learning and 
goals may not always be the agential volition of the participant). 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation was significantly supported in 
rejecting the null hypothesis, in the SEM functional Affordance modelling, and was also supported in 
triangulation analysis with correlation tests (H1) and difference tests (H2) and in the repeat 
measures design (H3). There is also support in the multiplicity of the analysis: the Divergent 
Criticality theory as an inductive IP-scale, found significance at a modelling level of analysis (SEM & 
CI) and that such modelling when analysed against an independent measure of self-concept in 
correlation and difference testing, offered both control and triangulation to support the universality 
of the Divergent Criticality hypothesis. 
As an evolving methodology, this study has attempted to appraise the methods used in the research 
design as they were encountered. Further considerations are now addressed in Methodological 
Caveats: 
1) How can the inference of an Affordance state of Tolerance Optimisation be made and 
differentiated from other affective properties (e.g. of more sunshine or rain)? 
2) How can the Divergent Criticality hypothesis be inferred from such findings? 
3) Why is the null hypothesis found in some of the constructs and not others (e.g. Locus of 
Control)? 
4) Is there a preferred method of Factor Analysis (SEM or Conditional Independence)? 
5) Are there alternatives to the assumptions of bias made in the sampling? 
6) Does any ethical confounding introduce doubt to the findings (e.g. domain, homogeneity)?  
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 Methodological Caveats 
Throughout the methodology, considerations and questions regarding validity were discussed within 
each section; however, other methodological questions arose throughout the study and these are 
discussed here. 
 How can the inference an Affordance state of Tolerance Optimisation be made and 
differentiated from other affective properties? 
Is it possible to use subjective perceptions to infer not only a state of neural function, but also as a 
means of delineating top-down and bottom-up attention processes ? 
How do we know we are measuring a state of Tolerance Optimisation through the inductive 
Interdependence Profile, and that this measure (from Situational Interest) provides an indication of 
this functional Affordance state and are not reflective of some other property (e.g. the weather)? 
Previous studies into the construct of ‘affective perception’ have found positive report across many 
samples and many Learning Outside The Classroom domains (LoTC): This study’s sampling was 
developed from the recognition of such positive-effect reporting in LoTC (Cason & Gillis, 1994; 
Dillon, Morris, O'Donnell, Reid, Rickinson & Scott, 2005; Hattie et al., 1997; Malone, 2008; Neill, 
2002). However, might other factors, not associated with Divergent Criticality, be influencing and 
confounding one or more of the study variables. 
Such confounding considerations may have been an issue if the study had been conducted by only 
testing the hypothesis through ‘direct’97 behavioural measures, i.e. not functionally supported. 
In such a ‘behavioural defining’ of the effects and by not applying a functional prerogative to a 
hypothesis or methodology, studies may fail to account for the multitude of affecting variables and 
how these might influence such an empirical measure, regardless of the robustness of the factor 
analysis and construct-modelling. Without a ‘functional’ methodology, one formulated from first 
principles (i.e. the predictions made ‘for’ observation not from), such deterministic questions might 
be questioned in their veracity of the results. 
                                                          
97 ‘Direct’ referring to data when used in a methodology applied to use only observational data. This may seem 
behaviourally robust and applicable to the ‘seeming’ observation-target of the study, but not adequately 
address the functional determinants, and so cannot be inferred to be generalised in theory.  
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In order to address this functional imperative, the methodology used in this study was formulated 
from a ‘coordinating definition,’ and naturalised from physical ‘first’ principles. The Divergent 
Criticality theory was then able to be aligned in a central ‘functional’ mechanism. From this, an 
inductive-methodology for an Interdependence Profile was formulated using the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis. The formulation of a ‘functional’ hypothesis, enabled predictions to be made about the 
behaviours (e.g. Tolerance Optimisation) if operating in accordance with the central functioning or 
‘mechanistic’ – Divergent Criticality hypothesis.  
 How can the Divergent Criticality hypothesis be inferred from such findings? 
The findings were found to be statistically significant in both the Divergent Criticality model 
‘Profiling’ (SEM) hypothesis and the Tolerance Optimisation behavioural hypothesis (triangulation 
testing with ROPELOC). If the Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis testing had been predicated on the 
SEM profile, then there is the danger of internal confounding with the model effects influencing the 
model hypothesis (Mueller, 1997). However, that an alternative self-concept measure with 
counterintuitive predictions from Divergent Criticality function are made, and these are found 
significant, adds a triangulation generality to the findings supporting a Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis. 
This is a synthesis of application and theory supporting the validity of the hypothesis and dispelling 
the effect of other possible ‘confounding’ determinants affecting the findings. In this regard, this 
study’s methodology is considered as a nomothetic approach to function over behaviour, and its 
findings may be generalised. 
 Why is the null hypothesis found in some of the constructs and not others? 
The methodology employed to investigate the central hypothesis was an exploratory approach, 
aligning life-effectiveness constructs to an attentional Interdependence Profile. The constructs 
chosen were to provide the necessary power for a life-effectiveness ‘measure’ able to parse bottom-
up and top-down affective cognitions, and not to investigate the overall life-effectiveness influence 
cognitions towards a perception. Therefore, to comment on such ‘null’ results at the construct level, 
is to speculate as to their function and relevance to perception rather than on the Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis as affective on perception. 
What remains important, is the significance that there was ‘any’ positive reporting supporting the 
functional hypothesis, that of agential effect on top-down and bottom-up cognitions, as a functional 
Affordance state. That ‘any’ empirical observation is able to report such a functional hypothesis 
significantly above the noise of the multitude of perception iterations (the traits and bias of 
consciousness and perception), is exciting. 
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However, there are some considerations supporting the perception constructs used: That the 
Personal Abilities and Beliefs (PAB) construct and the Cooperative Teamwork (CT) were considered 
significant across all analysis, may well be an indication of the ‘situated’ learning domains affecting 
the agential attentional demands and therefore, the functioning of perception. Indeed, the sampling 
was conducted to access the hypothesised ‘social and situational’ determinates of ecological 
function in humans (we are social, niche-dynamic organisms). However, this social and situational 
‘state’ may affect ‘self’ oriented perceptions and traits, such as Locus of Control and Time-
Effectiveness: If you are not in an environment you can control, such as a social environment, you 
might not have ‘situational’ perceptions of self-oriented ‘Locus of Control’. Here, the PAB and CT 
perceptions are socially situated perceptions where the ‘agency of perception’ may well be 
reflecting the ‘environment’ over the ‘self’. This would seem to support a ‘grounding’ of cognition in 
bottom-up sensory perspectives, with top-down abstractions reflecting (to some extent) this 
‘situational’ prerogative over contextual-abstractions such as Locus of Control. 
This ‘situated’ perspective might go some way in explaining why findings based on the constructs of 
Locus of control and Time Management where not consistent across testing: They reflected a 
perception that was not exercised to great extent in these socially-situated ‘learning’ domains.  
 Is there a preferred method of Factor Analysis (SEM or Conditional Independence)? 
Rather than dismissing or promoting either method of model building, the strengths of both are 
valuable in using a quantitative triangulation: Though Conditional Independence (CI) will provide a 
quantitative result, it is, like all tests, subject to the quality of the data used and the interpretations 
of the researcher. CI as a probabilistic model ‘at input’ (that is to say, an unbiased reflection of the 
data inputted), though truly quantitative in respect of data-processing, it is such a ‘sharp’ instrument 
that its appropriateness could questioned for the unravelling the ‘fuzzy’ complexity in psychological 
relationships (a non-deterministic complexity) or its appropriateness towards the quasi-parametric 
(questionnaire) data of the sampling method.  
Alternatively, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) are 
subject to issues of homogeneity and sampling bias, together with the bias brought by the 
observation (researcher ‘apriori’ assumptions). This bias provides both information but also 
subjectivism to the observations. However, within such empirical dissonance, a richer understanding 
of the data-set is possible, allowing post-hoc adjustments, an idiographic-tendency that would seem 
to allow function to emerge from the complexity within the research. However, such SEM 
confounding is ‘subjective’ and, therefore, open to criticisms as to any causality in research design. 
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In Study Three, the use of both methods served to support and inform the research design. This is 
particularly useful in an ‘exploratory’ study such as the Divergent Criticality hypothesis: The 
knowledge acquired through the CFA and SEM, helped inform interpretations of the Conditional 
Independence data and accordingly, assumptions made in the SEM ‘should’ be supported in the 
Conditional Independence and, if not, the model may not be assumed. This is a mixed-methods 
approach; if we consider the Conditional Independence as  ‘truly’ quantitative method and SEM (as 
quasi-quantitative), a subjective or Qualitative method. 
 Are there alternatives to the assumptions of bias made in the sampling? 
The development of measures to reflect the hypothesis of attentional awareness can be 
interrogated: These measures were suited to the exploratory nature of the study and underwent a 
robust factor analysis, supporting the adaptations and the modelling through two distinct methods 
(Structural Equation modelling and Conditional Independence modelling). This approach has been 
constructed within a robust qualitative methodology, reflecting the statistical power of ‘population 
analysis’ in its application. It was in the situated and social determinants sampled in the learning 
domains, that such a statistical approach was thought to reflect best, the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis for social-situated organisms towards biological-value (see, 2.21.1, p58). If such an 
approach is applicable to isolated populations or individual analysis is open to reliability questions. 
It may be that a more targeted measure (i.e. in the choice of ‘state’ constructs), can be derived as a 
specific attentional-cognition questionnaire, in accordance with situational awareness as an 
attentional constructs of bottom-up and top-down cognitive processes (see, 7.5, A Way Forward, 
p215); this might enable a refined measure with which to apply the Divergent Criticality hypothesis 
for individual analysis. Such an individual application of an Interdependence Profile would allow a 
mixed approach of inferential phenomenology (a functional Affordance state) and empirical 
measurement (the use of neural-scanning, e.g., electro-encephalogram EEG) and offer more causal 
evidence for the Divergent Criticality hypothesis as to its behavioural predictions. 
Sampling 
To extend the scope of the study across the different learning domains and age samples, ethical 
approval was sought for the use of third party sampling of the questionnaires. It was thought that in 
recruiting third party samplers, a greater sample reliability would provide the following 
improvements: 
1) There should be a better participant-investigator relationship in getting students to complete 
questionnaires; 
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2) There would be a greater opportunity for a true situational ‘state’ to be measured with the third 
parties intimately involved within the learning domains; 
3) It was thought that a multiple investigator application would reduce investigator-influence across 
a number of potential confounding biases (heuristic bias, expectancy bias, stereotypical reporting, 
euphoric effect, social surprise effect, etc.). These issues might be alleviated by not having the same 
investigator at more than one sample-taking. This seemed particularly important during the repeat 
measure design, Hypothesis (H3). 
During the sampling, to a greater extent the sample returns were successful; however, there were 
some samples received that confounded the methodological protocols and therefore were not able 
to support the hypothesis testing. Of note, was that these reflected, to some extent, the 
involvement (or not) of the principle investigator. It could be seen that the greater the 
communication and proximity of the principle investigator, the more reliable the sample taking. This 
was particularly evident in the repeat measure design, where, third-party sampling fell afoul of 
maturation, washout and order effect confounding. This was due to a convenience approach 
sometimes taken by the third-party investigators (timetabling, access, curricula time-management), 
rather than the methodological rigor needed for the sampling criteria. 
Barring the usual ethical caveats (e.g. consent, instructions, etc.), this third party involvement had 
strengths and weaknesses. Ultimately, however, the adversity found in this sampling methodology 
provided useful in support for the Divergent Criticality hypothesis: any confounding displayed itself 
in unusual or ‘unexpected’ reporting (in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis), a 
reporting at odds with the predicted domain Divergent Criticality expectations (e.g. an exciting 
glacier walk reporting as if it were a classroom learning activity). On follow up with the investigators, 
it was found that the questionnaire had been delivered in an evening classroom lesson, rather than 
on the activity! 
The most reliable sampling took place with greatest proximity and guidance from the principle 
investigator, where a more detailed training-protocol was able to be delivered and administered. 
Despite the instructions and details of the supporting, sampling-guidance, a more reliable training-
protocol would be advantageous in future study.  
 
 Ethical Limitations – Does any ethical confounding introduce doubt to the findings? 
Throughout the sampling and results, though the overall results reported significance, Challenge 
reported weaker regressions than other constructs of the Interdependence Profile. This may be due, 
quite reasonably, to ‘protective’ ethical parameters avoiding taking participants close to their edge 
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of their neural control or stability (an optimal tolerance point ‘at the limit’ of physical or 
psychological control). This ethically protective limitation might be addressed as to its possible test-
effects in challenge-restricted ‘learning’ samples.  
To truly test the Divergent Criticality hypothesis in an experimental design across the ‘continuum of 
surprise and challenge function’, in being able to push the Divergent Criticality hypothesis 
predictions to the extreme of its hypothesised control parameter (both sensory excess and cognitive 
demand), would require some innovative and well-crafted research designs to accommodate the 
ethical-necessity of protecting the participant throughout. 
 
 A Way Forward for Divergent Criticality and Tolerance Optimisation 
The study has opened up a number of new approaches to observing and understanding not only 
how we perceive and learn, but how the brain functions in regard to a fundamental ecological 
‘adaptive’ or ‘learning’ mechanism. 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis has been predicated on a number of theoretical propositions 
formulated from ‘fundamental’ laws. Further research would, therefore, need to be conducted using 
a similar ‘functional’ approach in order to support, test and clarify the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis.  
The fundamental tenets of Divergent Criticality, as formulated in this study, are discussed below, 
along with pathways of further research in each case:  
1) Divergent Criticality is defined as the behaviour of Self-Organising Criticality in respect of an 
increasing entropic criticality, necessary for all biological life. 
2) Tolerance Optimisation is a selectionist proposition for optimal dynamic resilience or 
ecological Tolerance in biological complexity (non-linear dynamical systems such as the 
brain). Here, the fundamental entropic behaviour of Divergent Criticality (Self-Organisation 
/adaptation) will spontaneously self-organise towards a maximal Optimisation function. 
Divergent Criticality and Tolerance Optimisation demands a non-converging or increasing entropy-
production, and may be explored through a Divergent Criticality signal (White-shift in fractal-scaling). 
As a ‘proposed’ fundamental property for biological life, this should be evident throughout 
behavioural and functional observation. This ‘White-shift’ signal has been aligned with 
‘intentionality’ by Van Orden et al. (2011); however, what is important here is that Tolerance 
Optimisation recognises an ‘agential’ selectionist proposition, allowing the differentiation of agency 
between affective behaviour and mediated behaviour. Such a relative (to the individual) agency 
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when applied through an Effectivity, provides a relative Effectivity functionality that allows agency to 
be with biological-value. As such, it can be shown that a White-shift is better considered as a 
composite of agency, but not able to be parsed as intentionality. Relative Effectivity, however, as 
providing a counter affective function in beyond cusp entropic-behaviour, produces a Brown Shift 
that can only be appropriated to an intentionality mediating affective-behaviour. This ‘historic’ 
parsing (Van Orden et al., 2011) of ‘intentionality’ over Voluntary Control is now addressed: 
3) Relative Effectivity proposes a phenomenological definition to coordinate subjective 
perceptions within a model of Tolerance Optimisation in ecological engagement. As an 
agential proposition of capability and efficiency, a relative Effectivity enables perception to 
be parsed as: ‘within’ Effectivity function (bottom-up affective behaviour) and ‘beyond’ 
Effectivity function (top-down intentional mediation of affective cognitions). 
4) Functional Affordance is a ‘state’ of function in a ‘phase’ of agential capability or relative 
Effectivity. 
5) The Divergent Criticality Hypothesis is a selectionist proposition, which brings together 
Divergent Criticality, Tolerance Optimisation and relative Effectivity. It proposes that 
affective agential behaviours aligned with Divergent Criticality, will drive cognition and 
behaviour to an Tolerance Optimisation and maintenance, the self-organisation around the 
‘relative’ cusp point of maximal criticality.  
Relative Effectivity is the relative functioning of Tolerance Optimisation, and approached through a 
functional Affordance ‘state’ (as inferred through the interdependence of attentional processes). 
Functional Affordance has been proposed as a Tolerance definition able to align perception with 
‘state’ of neural function in response (or resonance) to ecological demand. 
Within a control paradigm (behavioural), it should be possible to differentiated ‘entropic-phase’ 
function in the fractal-scaling signal. Different ‘relative’ neural-networks, will display different 
dynamical properties in relation to entropic-surprise (criticality). This would be discernible from the 
White-shift behaviour ‘within phase’ and the Brown-shift behaviour ‘beyond phase’, revealing the 
phase behaviour in accordance (or not) with the Tolerance hypothesis. Electroencephalography 
(EEG) provides one route for measuring a holism of brain function and could provide a productive 
tool for further exploration.  
It is in a functional imperative in explaining behaviour, that Tolerance Optimisation and its relative 
functioning might be considered ubiquitous across cognitive and behavioural studies. Tolerance 
Optimisation operationalised by Divergent Criticality, may be applicable to a wider body of research 
into neural function and behaviour. Such application is discussed in relation to key psychological 
Effectivity (phase) and agential control concepts, in the ‘Discussion’ chapter. 
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In regard to the functional prerogative of the Divergent Criticality hypothesis, Optimisation is one of 
agential adaptation to the ecological demands (situated, social and self), fundamentally, an 
ecological ‘learning’ hypothesis. Perception might then be considered as reflecting the functioning of 
learning. This study, therefore, investigated perception as reflecting the Tolerance Optimisation 
function, using self-report as the basis of measurement.  
One possible way forward would be to explore the hypothesis further through the stability and 
learning behaviours in coordination dynamics (Haken et al., 1985; Kelso, 1995) as a mirror of neural 
functioning, which has been experimentally tested across many disciplines through the use of 
coupling “The non-random linking between two or more processes” (Root-Bernstein & Dillon, 1997 , 
p449). Through the observation of stability in non-random movement-fluctuations – a stability of 
relative phase (Effectivity) – it is possible to access ‘control parameters’ to empirically explore 
learning behaviour in action-perception tasks (Kelso, 2012; Zanone & Kelso, 1992; Zanone & Kelso, 
1994; Zanone & Kelso, 1997). 
Another option would be to explore  the ‘inverse’ of perception studies; not so much what is 
unconscious, but what is ‘perceptually’ missed. Attentional biases have provided a rich context for 
cognitive function from a perceptual perspective, it might be that these can be explored from the 
perspective of functional properties rather than the behavioural effects. What is biased for and why, 
and how might such bias relate to the Divergent Criticality hypothesis? 
6) An Interdependence Profile measure was developed to model perception as the cognitive 
functioning of a composite of top-down and bottom-up attentional process – perception as 
an ‘attentional’ awareness, able to infer neural function and an Effectivity state – functional 
Affordance.  
The measures used in this study were adapted from pre-existing measures. It therefore should be 
possible to refine such a measure for more ‘accurately’ inferring the attentional processes explored 
in this study (see, Sampling, p213). Using more accessible or nuanced questionnaire, it might be 
possible to align such a phenomenological tool with an empirical measure of brain function. 
Measurements in the criticality-signature (as theoretically aligned with the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis) may be investigated from the examples given above (e.g. Electroencephalography and 
the phenomenon of ‘Brown-shift’ as an indication a Tolerance Optimisation state). The application of 
the Divergent Criticality hypothesis is discussed now in relation to key psychological theory and 
modelling of cognition and behaviour. 
If formulated within a mixed methodology of phenomenological experience and neural-function, this 
amalgamation of perception and function (neural) offers a triangulation in the study of brain, 
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behaviour and experience (Roepstorff & Jack, 2004), providing a better understanding of not only 
the Divergent Criticality hypothesis, but as a dynamic learning moment of not only what and why we 
learn, but ‘how’ we learn and importantly how we might learn ‘best’. This offers a new ‘landscapes’ 
of ontology in the field of Pedagogy research and its applications. 
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT – Discussion 
The Divergent Criticality Hypothesis has developed a theory of agential mediation around an 
ecological Tolerance Optimisation proposition – the optimal function of a learning mechanism.  
Perceptions as affective-cognitions are made aware and will reflect the agential mediation 
of a self-regulating, optimal learning mechanism – A Divergent Criticality Hypothesis 
As a learning theory, Divergent Criticality naturalises perception as the ‘awareness’ of neural 
functioning in ecological engagement and a self-regulating ‘Tolerance’ mechanism. Affective-
cognitions drive behaviour towards an ‘edge’ of agential Effectivity (control) as a selectionist 
proposition for cognition and behaviour. It is hypothesised that attentional-awareness will reflect a 
‘state’ of neural self-organisation (Criticality) as a perception of Effectivity towards ecological 
demands – The Divergent Criticality Hypothesis. 
Figure 43 – Divergent Criticality: An Agential-Mediation Hypothesis for Tolerance Optimisation 
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Discussion Part One: Divergent Criticality – A Research Question 
“One motivation for neuroscience to look at the physical laws governing other complex systems is the 
hope that universality will give the field an edge. Instead to search for ad-hoc laws for the brain, 
under the pretence that biology is special, most probably a good understanding of universal laws 
might provide a breakthrough since brains must share some of the fundamentally laws of nature.” 
(Chialvo, 2010, p6) 
This study has developed a theory of Divergent Criticality which can be formulated in terms of a 
coordinating-definition of Tolerance Optimisation. Divergent Criticality provides a ‘universality’ to 
perception as an objective neural efficiency (or entropic-functioning of Self-Organising Criticality); a 
functional Affordance relative to a state of Effectivity.  Perception as functional Affordance can, in 
this regard, be equated to functional determinants, and not only behavioural observation (i.e. 
ensuring it is not the ‘behaviour’ being assigned causality, but the functioning of a an ecological 
mechanism). This study investigated Divergent Criticality as an entropy function, one able to 
naturalise perception in a Tolerance definition of maximal entropy production. The Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis is one of an agential-mediated Tolerance Optimisation for biological-value. 
This Research Question was pursued through the testing of perception as an ‘awareness of the 
cognitive processes’, able to be modelled as the functioning of entropy in complex (neural) systems 
– Self-Organising Criticality. An inductive analysis of the Situational Interest perception 
questionnaire, informed the development of a measure of functional Affordance able to infer a state 
of Tolerance Optimisation. Supported through the Structural Equation Modelling of Divergent 
Criticality, significant model effects conferred with the hypothesised model across all functioning 
(see, 6.11 – SEM Hypothesis Testing, p187), and further triangulation found significance across all 
hypotheses supporting both Divergent Criticality and the Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis as 
functional (see, 7.2 – Findings: Situational Interest Triangulated with Self-Concept, p207). 
H1 – Correlations of measures Self-Concept (ROPELOC) and functional Affordance, will report in 
accordance with agential-mediation of the Divergent Criticality hypothesis. 
H2 – A measure of Self-Concept will be differentiated between high and low states of functional 
Affordance in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. 
H3 – A Repeat Measures design will find significant difference between ‘Learning Outside the 
Classroom’ and ‘Traditional Classroom Learning’ in accordance with the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. 
This thesis was able to naturalise perception and learning objectivity as a state of functional 
Affordance relative to an Ecological Effectivity, and the findings supported the Divergent Criticality 
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hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation as a self-regulating mechanism for perception and learning. 
The research findings are now discussed in relation to contemporary theory and how the findings 
contribute to the literature, along with the pragmatic application for learning of Divergent Criticality. 
 Divergent Criticality a Dynamical Theory of Perception 
H1 – Correlations of measures Self-Concept (ROPELOC) and functional Affordance, will report in 
accordance with agential-mediation of Tolerance Optimisation  
The reporting of ‘beyond’ relative Effectivity agential perceptions concurred with the agential-
mediation hypotheses of agential ‘approach’ behaviour. Such agential mediation of ‘affect’ when set 
within the Divergent Criticality hypothesis, is able to modelled as a beyond-cusp function in 
Catastrophe Theory through the agential-mediation of Self-Organising Criticality (SOC). This finding 
of ‘beyond’ cusp function in criticality, is developed in a Cusp-Hopf formulation of Catastrophe 
behaviour, a new approach accommodating an agential-mediation behavioural dimension. This 
finding better explains previous variation and confounding observed in Cusp-Fold criticality function 
(see, 0, p104). Such criticality function in perception is able to be triangulated against another 
affective ‘perception’ measure, Self-Concept. 
In the hypothesis (H1), correlations reported a positive relationship supporting the Cusp-Hopf 
behaviour as affective in perception (states of functional Affordance) as predicted in the Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. This has implications for optimisation outcomes 
(e.g. learning) in agential behaviour and the maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation:  
Tolerance Optimisation as a selectionist proposition supporting a dynamic mechanism for learning, 
in particular, needing to be specific to the individual or agent. This finding requires a shift in the 
understanding of the criticality or ‘catastrophe’ function as applied to biological dynamic-function 
and value. It redefines the Cusp-Fold model in a more complex model of agential ‘Cusp-Hopf’ 
function, where it is not affective behaviour as parameterised by catastrophe we are observing, but 
the agential-mediation of catastrophe and affective behaviour (e.g. agential goal motivations). The 
pragmatic applications of such agential mediation around a Tolerance Optimisation function are 
discussed in (Discussion Part Three: The Application to Learning of the Divergent Criticality 
Hypothesis, P258). 
Previous observations in cusp-function (e.g. Croll, 1976; Hardy et al., 2007; Sussmann & Zahler, 
1978; Thom, 2018; Zeeman, 1976), are better explained within an agential Cusp-Hopf formulation. 
This is discussed now in relation to Dynamical Theory (8.4 – Setting Divergent Criticality within 
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Dynamical Theory, p224), and how agential-mediation of the Tolerance Optimisation model allows a 
spectrum of criticality behaviour, underpinned by a fundamental mechanism – Divergent Criticality.  
 
 Divergent Criticality for Agency and Intentionality 
 SEM – Structural Equation Modelling of Situational Awareness perception supports a ‘beyond’   
Effectivity function (Intentionality) 
H1 – Correlations of measures Self-Concept (ROPELOC) and functional Affordance, will report in 
accordance with agential-mediation of Tolerance Optimisation  
The function of agential mediation around Tolerance Optimisation is able to be situated within the 
literature of agency and motor control, as to its functioning and behavioural outcomes. Here, 
Divergent Criticality is hypothesised to being able to differentiate agential affective-behaviour and 
agential-intentionality through the observed Tolerance Optimisation behaviour in the SEM and 
hypothesis (H1) correlations. This differentiation (an affective bias for functional Affordance states 
beyond relative Effectivity) allows the exploration of intentionality as agential ‘end-goals’ or 
motivations, over and above affective behaviour for dispositional biological value. That the 
Divergent Criticality hypothesis accommodates such a ‘beyond’ Tolerance Optimisation proposition, 
and that this is seen to be  supported in the SEM analysis and triangulated (H1) hypothesis testing, 
allows the consideration of how volition or intentionality can be theoretically aligned to perception 
reporting: A functional and identifiable distinction between “consciously controlled, strategic, 
voluntary behaviour versus unconscious, involuntary behaviour” (Van Orden et al., 2011, p658). This 
has long been sought in neuroscience, and whereas Van Orden et al. proffer a White-noise or shift 
(fractal signal) identification for intentionality, the Divergent Criticality hypothesis critiques this and 
provides an alternative ‘Brown-noise’ proposition, fractal scaling able to naturalise intentionality in a 
criticality function (see, 8.5.1 – Intentionality as an Extension of Agential Perception, p234). 
This beyond Effectivity function emerges from the Structural Equation Modelling of self-concept (as 
an attentional awareness) where an Interdependence Profile is able to align a top-down dominance 
in Divergent Criticality function (of bottom-up and top-down attentional processes) favouring a 
‘beyond’ or a ‘limited’, Cusp-Hopf functional Affordance state (7.1 – p206; 7.2 – p207). This Cusp-
Hopf state of beyond relative Effectivity, was observed in 15 of the 24 sample domains, 69.8% of the 
sampling (see, 0 – APPENDIX XV: Sample Interdependence Profiles, p363) with functional Affordance 
states concurring with observations of self-concept as – intentionality. This is a top-down ‘beyond’ 
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relative Effectivity dominance, able to isolate the functioning of intentionality in Divergent Criticality 
and allows the hypothesised ‘Brown-shift’ Criticality to be considered through the concept of 
‘learning optimisation’. 
 Divergent Criticality as a Mechanism of Perception and Learning 
H2 – A measure of Self-Concept will be differentiated between high and low states of functional 
Affordance in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance 
Optimisation 
H3 – A Repeat Measures design will find significant difference between ‘Learning Outside the 
Classroom’ and ‘Traditional Classroom Learning’ in accordance with the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis is applied to learning domains as either a high functional 
Affordance state (of Tolerance Optimisation) or a low functional Affordance state. Increased 
affective cognitions (hedonic) was found to be significantly supported in the hypothesis testing of 
(H2 – p200) and (H3 – p209) – that functional Affordance states as a ‘Tolerance’ function reflect a 
composite of situative and contextual prerogatives towards learning. It is as a composite learning 
hypothesis, that Divergent Criticality is able to be differentiated in its Tolerance Optimisation for 
either the functioning of a situative ‘learning-potential’ and/or a contextual ‘learning-gain’. These 
learning functions and behaviours are discussed in terms of learning prerogatives (see, 8.6 – The 
Functioning of Divergent Criticality: , p243) and the biasing of a situated learning-potential 
supported in the (H3) testing of contextual ‘Traditional Classroom Learning’ (TCL) verses more 
situative ‘Learning Outside the Classroom’ (6.22 – p203). The pragmatic applications of this finding 
are discussed in Application 2: Learning Centred on the Learner (p259). 
Support for greater learning optimisation (higher functional Affordance states) and importantly, 
learning motivation, was found in positive situative Learning Outside the Classroom (LOtC) effects, 
over and above the TCL sampling; adds to the understanding of educational methodologies. A case is 
made for greater ‘situative’ experiential learning approached through less-guided, agential oriented 
educational practices. An engagement-oriented approach of biasing learning-potential, towards 
providing a constructivist-platform on which to build specific learning-gain (see APP1 – APP5, p258). 
It is in the recognition of Divergent Criticality as a selectionist hypothesis, that perception as a 
dynamic adaptation or ‘ learning-state’ is explored as a neural-efficiency or learners Tolerance or 
capability towards ecological challenges; whether contextual knowledge or skills acquisition – 
Divergent Criticality is a learning mechanism for life. 
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Discussion Part Two: The Theoretical Application of Divergent Criticality 
 Setting Divergent Criticality within Dynamical Theory Literature 
Dynamical ‘self-organisation’ in Non-linear Dynamical Systems Theory (NDS) has provided one of the 
more successful approaches to explaining perception in agent-ecological coupling (Guastello, 2009). 
Perception explained through Dynamical Theory has provided two dominant models for neural 
functioning of cognition and behaviour:  
(1) Dynamical Self-Organisation: the coupling of perception and behaviour in Non-linear 
Dynamical Systems Theory (NDS) through Self-Organisation (e.g.,Kelso, 1995; Kelso, 2012; 
Tuller, 2005; Turvey & Carello, 2012; Zanone et al., 2010); 
(2) Attentional Control and Agential Mediation: attentional and agential processes on neural 
capabilities (e.g.,Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley, 2007; Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck et 
al., 2007; Hardy & Fazey, 1987; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000; Yantis, 
1998).  
Both these functional models may be challenged by setting Divergent Criticality function within Non-
linear Dynamical Systems Theory, and is discussed here in relation to Dynamical Theory, as to how 
Divergent Criticality contributes to this research body. 
 Divergent Criticality: A Theory supported in Dynamical Theory 
The ‘functional’ as opposed to ‘behavioural’ robustness of NDS has been commented on (see, 
Section 3: Non-linear Dynamical Systems, p65), where the functional-attributions made towards 
‘coupling observation and inference’98 in Dynamical research are found wanting in the literature as 
to their universal application, therefore, Dynamical Theory might be questioned as to its functional 
validity in perception research (as in addressing behavioural-complexity rather than functionality).  
Dynamical Theory in behavioural coupling (e.g. Haken et al., 1985; Kelso, 1995), though 
incorporating nested Self-Organising behaviour, does not adequately describe a Self-Organising 
function able to accommodate the behaviours observed in research (such an agential drive for 
mono-stability, Kello, Beltz, Holden & Van Orden, 2007; Kelso, 2012). The Haken, Kelso & Bunz 
model (KHB, 1985; Kelso, 2012) as the “most widely discussed example of a dynamical model in 
cognitive science” (Kaufer & Chemero, 2015, p198), though accommodating multi-stability of nested 
                                                          
98 Coupling defines the agreement between functionality (theory) and observed outcome behaviour, “The non-
random linking between two or more processes” (Root-Bernstein & Dillon, 1997 , p449). 
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Criticality and a ‘potential’ function (in an updated HKB model – see, 3.3.1, p91), the HKB model 
does not provide the functionality as to ‘what drives’ nested stabilities towards such mono-stability? 
This is a seemingly inefficient and less stability-robust behaviour than a multi-stability in behaviour 
(e.g. of expert habitation) which would seem to offer a more functionally efficient proposition.  
Divergent Criticality, is able to accommodate such obtuse behaviour observed in stability through 
the application of agency-mediation towards Tolerance Optimisation. Support for this Tolerance 
Optimisation proposition was found throughout the SEM testing and in the triangulation hypothesis 
in perception measures of Situational Interest and Self-Concept (see, Chapter 7 – p206). Divergent 
Criticality, therefore, can offer a number of better explanations for observed behaviour in Dynamical 
Theory, than offered by the KHB model: 
1) By representing an ensemble of intensive and extensive entropic-function, Divergent 
Criticality provides for the observation of criticality function ‘emergent at a local level’ in 
response to the demands on the system. Importantly, relative Effectivity is able to provide a 
dynamic-landscape of criticality to model ‘behaviour in function’, not only through affective 
agency and towards a Tolerance Optimisation, but also through agential mediation to 
‘maintain optimisation’. Observations of local criticality99 are better viewed as behaviour 
‘driven’ toward Tolerance Optimisation and a criticality behaviour dependent on agential 
mediation. This agential ‘Cusp-Hopf’ function allows criticality to be observed as either 
‘shifting’ and/or ‘switching’ behaviour100 (evident across many cognitive and behavioural 
studies using dynamical theory, e.g. Grigolini & Chialvo, 2013; Hardy et al., 2007; He, 2014; 
Humphries, Schaefer, Fuller, Phillips, Wilding & Sims, 2016; Kelso, 2012; Kostrubiec et al., 
2012; Rhea, Kiefer, D’Andrea, Warren & Aaron, 2014; Scheffer et al., 2009; Zanone et al., 
2010). In particular, attentional perception models of neural function and behaviour  
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; Hardy et al., 2007; Kelso, 1995), might be 
better analysed through a Divergent Criticality and agential mediation.  
2) Importantly, the Divergent Criticality hypothesis drives systems towards Tolerance 
Optimisation as a mono-stability proposition (see, 2.6, Tolerance and Generative Models of 
                                                          
99 Bi-furcation observations at a local level of criticality (Scheffer, Bascompte, Brock, Brovkin, Carpenter, Dakos, 
Held, Van Nes, Rietkerk & Sugihara, 2009) 
100 Shifting and Switching (Updating) may be considered synonymous with a local criticality phase change. 
Mediated inhibition (shifting) though functionally determined by criticality at a micro/intensive phase, 
emerges as a shift in a local criticality phase of observation, rather than switching. 
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Control, p25). Here, a ‘Cusp’ of mono-stability is selected-for rather than an ‘equilibrium of 
multi-stability’: Though this represents a seemingly counterintuitive ‘inefficient’ proposition 
to further ‘prevarication’ or surprise101, when considered through the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis, however, it is at this tolerance ‘cusp’ that criticality behaviours (as observed in 
hysteresis, critical slowing down, and other catastrophe behaviour), emerge as an adaptive 
(learning) functioning of affective-agency and mediation, thus increasing the system’s future 
optimisation Tolerance-capabilities to cope with future surprise. These entropy expressions 
for Tolerance towards dynamic environments both support the literature (e.g. Chialvo, 2010; 
Grigolini & Chialvo, 2013; Kelso, 2010) and are experimentally supported in the Divergent 
Criticality findings through affective adherence towards an optimisation function 
(Hypothesis testing H1, 6.20, p199) and affective cognitions rewarded at such functional 
Affordance states of criticality (Hypothesis testing 3). This functional prerogative supports 
neural entropic-behaviour for neural-function ‘At the Edge of Chaos’ a mono-stability (Kelso, 
2012) – An observation that has been not yet been adequately addressed functionally in 
Dynamical Theory (Hollis, Kloos & Van Orden, 2009; Kauffman, 2000). 
The Divergent Criticality theory addresses the long sought naturalistic102 explanation for neural 
function and its effects; how cognitions and behaviours as ‘outcomes of function’, might be better 
explained and understood in relation to Tolerance Optimisation. This hypothesis when applied to the 
literature, is better able to identify and better explain the behaviours and properties criticality such 
as the modelling of reduced Voluntary Control in the maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation as 
observable the hysteresis-effects observed in a phase-stability coupling (perception-action) learning 
paradigms (Kelso, 2012; Kostrubiec et al., 2012; Zanone et al., 2010). Tolerance Optimisation 
determines not a duality in neural function, but a fundamental mechanism of learning (adaptive) 
functionally dependent on agential mediation. This is the prerogative for learning in dynamic 
ecologies, and the agential mediation of Tolerance Optimisation for a composite of situational or 
contextual ecological demands. 
                                                          
101 A selectionist confounding that is not adequately addressed in Dynamical Theory 
102 Naturalistic referring to conforming to the ‘laws of nature’. 
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 Divergent Criticality: Contributions to Dynamical Theory 
When interrogated, explanations of neural-function in Dynamical theory are often confounded by 
exoentropogenic103 effects on the control-parameters within coupling-designs, which may be both 
dependent and independent in any emergent phases of behaviour being observed (Deutsch, 2011; 
Guastello, 2009). This questions the functionality being observed in coupling-behaviour (Kelso, 2012; 
Zanone & Kostmbiec, 2004), and requires the reappraisal of the inference made in functionality 
(such as by Zanone et al. (2010) – where a scanning probe in a duel task approach suggested 
different ‘novice’ and ‘expert’ mechanisms of learning (e.g. Shift and Switch behaviours) 104. Zanone’s 
(2010) duel-function hypothesis would seem to contradict a frugal approach to neural resources in a 
functional-redundancy (Clark, 2015); therefore, is theoretically questionable in its ‘inefficiency’ (of 
different ‘functionality’ approaches respond to a dynamical ecological-demand). Such dualism 
presents a dispositional rather than representational function – an approach now discredited as 
‘limited’ in explaining cognition and behaviour. 
These explanations are not only subject to selectionist criticism as inefficient, but their observations 
may also be questioned as to their accuracy and sensitivity in recognising the dynamic functionality 
being presented: Though the scanning probe suggests a difference between a ‘shifting’ function and 
a ‘switching or updating’ function, dependent on expertise, it maybe that the observations made are 
not supported by the necessary theory to interpret them correctly. The Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis is able to accommodate ‘phase’ patterns as observations of the same ‘functional’ 
mechanism as it flows through ‘nested’ criticality (levels of) – a functionality absent or not addressed 
in many coupling observations (Haken et al., 1985; Kelso, 2012; Kelso, 2010; Zanone et al., 2010).  
Previous dynamical-models such as Kelso’s and Zanone’s might be critiqued as to their interpretation 
of observations of observed ‘phase-patterns’ when viewed through these limitations and functional 
confounding in coupling/phase observations. It is suggested here that such behaviour (observation) 
has been wrongly defined as function (e.g. Zanone’s duel-learning hypothesis, 2010). If a Divergent 
                                                          
103 There is a confounding in the level of observation that questions whether macro (extensive) behaviours or 
micro (intensive) properties are in effect; this questions the accuracy of observing true function and not just 
‘macro’ outcome behaviour. A Divergent Criticality of relative Tolerance Optimisation seeks to functionally 
interrogate observation through a coherent functionality applicable to ‘all’ behavioural outcomes of the Non-
linear Dynamical System. 
104 Switching and Shifting behaviours are extensively reported across agent-environment research, and have 
been theorised in neural Executive Function and Attentional Control ((Baddeley, 2007; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).  
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Criticality hypothesis is applied as a mechanism for explaining the emergence of such diverse and 
complex behaviours (a simple mechanism with ‘many’ behavioural outcomes that provides a more 
efficient and therefore more robust explanation in evolutionary terms as to what is being observed), 
then Divergent Criticality as a unifying function is able to accommodate such seeming duality: The 
steepening of the ‘hysteresis’ observed in shifting patterns and switching patterns in Zanone et al. 
(2010, p112) can be explained by the criticality function in a Tolerance Optimisation of ‘beyond’ 
relative Effectivity. Here a ‘reducing’ Voluntary Control and Tolerance (of phase, see 3.5 – p100) 
predicts the observed ‘steeping’ in functional efficiency (Tolerance) terms. This again, is seen 
supported in the SEM and Hypothesis H1 testing (7.1 – p206), therefore, Zanone may be critiqued as 
displaying a duality of behaviour, rather than a duality of function.  
When coupling behaviours are observed as nested criticality (Bak et al., 1987; Thom, 2018; Thom & 
Fowler, 1975), stability-profiles of ‘shifting’ and ‘switching’ (Kelso, 2012; Zanone et al., 2010) reveal a 
‘hysteresis’ outcome or behaviour as an ‘asymmetrical’ direction of ‘steepening’ of entropy-function. 
This hysteresis profile may now be related to the non-linear formulation of entropic criticality in the 
Divergent Criticality hypothesis, and the agential-mediation of Tolerance Optimisation (i.e. the 
agential differentiation or mediation of relative Effectivity). Here, observations as macro-effects 
from intensive features, emerge as phase behaviours and are able to be observed at a ‘local’ level as 
switching or shifting behaviour. At such local-observation (emergent phase), though the ‘measures’ 
used may not be able to isolate and observe the ‘intensive’ nested-stabilities, the  Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis allows the interrogation of such macro stability profile(s), as ‘relative’ 
landscapes of phase ‘hysteresis’ able to be interpreted in consideration of their intensive criticality-
functioning, rather than as isolated macro-function (an isolation that has led to macro behaviour 
being considered as causal, rather than the actual micro-functionality of criticality being causal). 
Divergent Criticality is a theory accommodating such micro functionality and therefore, able to 
interpret the relative Effectivity behaviour observed in a steepening of entropic-function (see, 3.5, 
p100) as the predicted behaviour in a ‘hysteresis profile’, from the reduced Voluntary Control of 
agential mediation (a shifting catastrophe rather than switching collapse of phase). 
The observed ‘learning’ behaviours that emerge (Zanone et al., 2010) are able to be better explained 
as states of a relative Effectivity function, either in a ‘shifting’ of phase through intentionality (a 
limited Cusp-Hopf criticality), or a ‘normal’ cusp collapse and ‘switching’ of phase (at the emergent 
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level of observation)105. It is, however, in the ‘intensive’ functionality of criticality that observations 
of macro-phase stability are functionality grounded (indeed, all phase behaviours), including an 
affective Divergent Criticality for Tolerance Optimisation observed as a ‘drive’ for mono-stability 
over multi-stability (see, 3.3.1 – p91). Shifting and switching might be better considered as the 
agential ‘tuning’ of Divergent ‘Criticality’ for optimal learning. In this way, Divergent Criticality 
surmises not two separate ‘learning’ mechanisms, but one Self-Organising Criticality, functional at all 
levels (intensive and extensive), but observed in a local-phase as the emergence of extensive 
criticality behaviours as either a macro phase of ‘switching’ in a cusp-collapse response to surprise, 
or a phase of ‘shifting’ dependent on the agential mediation of criticality behaviour – a Cusp-Hopf 
maintenance of ‘Tolerance’ Optimisation. Such iterations of criticality function around a Tolerance 
Optimisation proposition, as agential mediation, are discussed further in 8.5 – Setting Divergent 
Criticality within Agency and Intentionality, p233. 
 Divergent Criticality: Contributions to Cusp Catastrophe Theory 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis testing provided support for Tolerance Optimisation as a relative 
‘phase of function’ (Effectivity). In particular, that a hypothesised Tolerance-state (as a state of 
functional Affordance) correlates with a limited,106 ‘beyond’ normal-function of relative Effectivity. 
The findings from the SEM hypothesis and the Triangulation correlations with self-concept (H1) (7.2 
– p207) were found to be concurrent with a Cusp-Hopf of reduced Voluntary Control beyond 
‘normal’ function (the maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation), and supported function around a 
relative Tolerance Optimisation, a cusp of criticality. The Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance 
Optimisation was also supported in the Structural Equation Modelling of the differentiation in 
functional Affordance states at a cusp of Tolerance Optimisation – the dominance of top-down 
processes functioning beyond relative Effectivity as effortful, but ‘preferred’ states of function (6.15 
– p193).  
Divergent Criticality, through a Cusp-Hopf function, allows the parsing of agency into affective 
behaviour and intentionality behaviour within a composite of an agential mediated Effectivity 
function. Agential ‘affective’ cognitive behaviour utilises a Tolerance Optimisation to favour dynamic 
                                                          
105 Criticality as a flux proposition of time and space requires that there was always be criticality at some ‘level’ 
of the intensive structures of emergent phase, a non-zero proposition of intensive criticality. When criticality is 
observed at the macro-level, that, cusp-observation sees an observed ‘local’ phase become intensive to a 
greater – macro proposition as new phase structure emerges.  
106 ‘Limited’ and ‘normal’ are functional exponents or descriptions of Cusp-Hopf behaviour. 
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adaptation (learning) with intentionality maintaining a Tolerance Optimisation function towards 
agential ‘end-points’ or goals. Divergent Criticality requires, then, not only a re-designation of 
criticality function and behaviour in terms of agency and intentionality, but the defining of a third 
dimension of agent intentionality in catastrophe theory – a Cusp-Hopf asymmetrical control 
parameter. If cognitive processes are considered as affective and intentional on a continuum of 
agency affect, then all agency (as a reduced Effectivity) should accommodate ‘some’ Cusp-Hopf of 
catastrophe functioning and reduced Voluntary Control (again the intensive criticality function 
supports a macro phase of efficiency function). This challenges previous models such as fold and 
cusp and their inability to formulate how variation in ‘macro’ (phase) catastrophe behaviour 
emerges as either cusp or fold from (e.g. ‘fold’ behaviour such as Inverted U-hypothesis may emerge 
through agential ‘effort’ from what should theoretically be a hypothesised cusp catastrophe and 
visa-versa). When Divergent Criticality is applied to interpret such variation, rather than be tied to a 
two dimensional ‘control dimension’ (as in cusp-fold behaviour), a better explanation emerges that 
allows not only an agential proposition for ‘maintaining’ Tolerance Optimisation (criticality) at the 
cost of Voluntary Control (reduced Voluntary Control) but delivers the variation seen in cusp and 
fold behaviour107. Divergent Criticality is able to be universal in its application to the observed Cusp-
Catastrophe behaviour. 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis had allowed catastrophe theory to be developed as a Cusp-Hopf 
formulation (see, 0, p104). This is a change of theoretical focus for catastrophe models of ‘affective’ 
cognition and behaviour, to include the mediation of an agency dimension (intentionality) as a 
dynamic Cusp-Hopf function and the maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation. 
  
                                                          
107 Of ethological interest here is that the original Inverted U hypothesis (Yerks & Dobson, 1908), would 
suggest that rodents (the sample), if considered through Divergent Criticality as reduced Voluntary Control 
function of a Cusp-Hopf, must have been displaying ‘intentionality’ for such an Inverted U to be observed. This 
demands that research not only reappraises the validity of many animal-behavioural experiments that do not 
take account of intentionality in animal behaviours (Cloutier, Panksepp & Newberry, 2012), but also considers 
what and how such observed behaviour(s) might be agential-situated and how this might impact on 
experimental results: Not just considering the goal-directed agency in animal experiments (most animal 
experiments are predominantly ‘affective’ oriented), but also the possible salience and ‘intentionality’ of our 
animal cousins in such interventions – experimental end-point determinants beyond simplistic ‘affective’ 
manipulations. 
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Here, the associated behavioural-outcomes become dependent on both internally generated (top-
down) and externally constrained (bottom-up) cognitive demands. Importantly, an agential ‘end-
goal’ of intentionality is able to ‘drive’ optimisation function and behaviour beyond ‘hedonic-affect’ 
towards ‘intentional-affect’ in maintaining a relative Tolerance Optimisation avoiding catastrophic 
collapse. When neural-efficiency is mapped through such a relative dimension, the behaviours 
associated with Cusp-Fold can be better explained and mapped in Cusp-Hopf criticality (see, Figure 
44, below), as trajectories of stability and behaviour:  (A) Intentionality appeases catastrophe via a 
reallocation of resources in a reduced Voluntary Control (at the cost of internal entropic-dissipation), 
then a Tolerance Optimisation as non-stable equilibrium is maintained, and fold ‘like’ behaviours are 
observed; or (B) the ‘cusp control’ determinants of agential and external constraint demands 
(arousal and cognitive anxiety), exceed the intentionality control (effortful reallocation of attentional 
resources), then the system is taken far away from cusp, and a phase collapse results (see below). 
Figure 44 – Cusp Criticality in a relative Effectivity Divergent Criticality hypothesis 
Whereas the ‘absolute’ landscape of two dimension Cusp-Fold may only ever deliver a catastrophic 
collapse of behaviour, not the fold like ‘effortful’ behaviour often observed, when a Divergent 
Criticality model is applied to a relative cusp-catastrophe function (Figure 44, above), the 
behaviour(s) of both the Inverted U and ‘cusp-catastrophe’ models are observable (Cohen et al., 
2003; Hardy et al., 2007; Tenenbaum & Becker, 2005).  
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The determining factor in a ‘relative’ Effectivity is the interaction of the attentional processes of top 
down or bottom up resource components. Absolute Effectivity has to collapse in accordance with 
criticality and bifurcation theory – entropic function has no-where to go but phase collapse. 
However, a Cusp-Hopf of entropic-function, though displaying the behaviours of a criticality, 
(relative-cusp) attracts an agential mediation of Tolerance Optimisation and was observed in the 
SEM and Hypothesis H1 testing (7.1 – p206). It is therefore possible to divert neural resources to off-
put entropic phase collapse (i.e. diminishing top-down demand allowing entropic export within the 
system). This behavioural-outcome, as recognised as ‘effort’ by Hardy and Hutchinson (2007), is able 
to be formulated as an expression of  intentionality as an agential-control of cusp function 
(Baddeley, 2007; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).  
Though some of the criticisms of catastrophe modelling and catastrophe-testing (Croll, 1976; 
Sussmann & Zahler, 1978), were addressed by Hardy et al. (2007), the functional determinants still 
needed to be theoretically ‘situated’ (Chemero, 2008). This reallocation of neural resources as top-
down cognitive processes are recognised in ecological theory as; ‘Affordance demands attentional-
resources to be shifted from top-down to bottom-up cognitive processes, allowing an increase in  
agential (relative) Effectivity (Chemero, 2003; Van Orden et al., 2011). Divergent Criticality, when 
applied to catastrophe, not only offers an explanation for the duality of behaviour observed (of near-
cusp and far from cusp-criticality), but is functionally able to accommodate observations of 
intentionality and effort (Eysenck et al., 2007; Hardy et al., 2007). Divergent Criticality allows for the 
concept of a deliberate agency of ‘intentionality’ for going ‘beyond’ cusp criticality in what will be 
discussed as ‘the Brown-shift of intentionality’ (see, 8.5 – Setting Divergent Criticality within Agency 
and Intentionality, over). This is a deliberate ‘goal-oriented functioning’ of cognitive agency in the 
maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation, where affective-cognitions are mediated towards agential 
behaviour and goals. 
Divergent Criticality not only provides the mechanistic basis to situate behaviour, but also 
theoretically grounds Cusp-Hopf function in a continuum of physiological, psychological and agential 
dimensions. The application of Divergent Criticality to Catastrophe Theory, then, requires the 
consideration of neural function in terms of Tolerance Optimisation and suggests a shift in 
methodology for phase-coupling research (perception-environment): not only to re-appraise 
observations of behaviour as agential ‘relative’ affective cognitions, but in considering intentionality, 
agential mediated ‘goal-orientation’ or ‘end-point’ motivations on affective behaviour. If the 
physiological and cognitive affective demands dominate over an ‘agential-intentionality’, when 
analysed using Divergent Criticality, perceptions will be observed with a greater Cusp-catastrophic 
tendency (Tolerance Optimisation, but less robust towards cusp collapse); Conversely, greater 
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intentionality behaviours will affect a Cusp-Hopf, maintenance that in avoiding collapse reports a 
diminished functional Affordance state (this was observed in the sampling domains (see, APPENDIX 
XV: Sample Interdependence Profiles higher functional Affordance states for learning activities that 
might be considered as ‘intentional’ (e.g. Duke of Edinburgh, Canoe Awards, Glacier Geography, etc. 
– see APPENDIX XV: Sample Interdependence Profiles). We should therefore attribute such observed 
behaviour as not only indicative of a cognitive demand, but also as an end-point (or agential-goal) of 
intentionality.  
Intentionality then, as an agential ‘mediation’ has the potential to affect hedonic behaviour as a 
predictive end-point cognition – a future oriented cognitive-belief system that becomes 
motivationally-affective over hedonic-affective (wanting over liking). Divergent Criticality, if proven 
to be robust, offers a theory with which to better understanding such motivations and agential end-
points. Future body and brain research might consider the application of a composite of affective 
and intentionality cognitions in experiment and observation. 
 Setting Divergent Criticality within Agency and Intentionality 
It has been suggested by Van Orden et al. (2011), that reduced Voluntary Control might be 
considered as indicative of an ‘intentionality’ evident in cognitive function, a contextual volition of 
the individual towards the environment rather than ‘of’ the environment, affective on the organism: 
“The proposal presents a historical opportunity. Since Freud, the distinction has been made between 
consciously controlled, strategic, voluntary behavior versus automatic, unconscious, involuntary 
behavior. However, no empirical evidence for reduced voluntary control has yet stood the test of 
time. …………… Presently, the distinction is supported by intuition alone but if whiter noise108 in task 
coupling (departing from pink) is a reliable consequence of reduced voluntary control, then we have 
naturalized intentionality.” (Van Orden et al., 2011, pg 658) 
Van Orden’s et al. (2011) observation of white-noise scaling (a divergence from the 1/f1 fractal as a 
‘signature’ in Self-Organisation), as a signal of reduced Voluntary Control and intentionality presents 
a quandary: though the 1/f scaling exponents can be aligned to a hypothesis of agency, such fractal 
                                                          
108 Nomenclature such as ‘white’ and ‘pink’ refers here to patterns of feedback in a scaling function. It 
originates from the descriptions of excess ‘noise’ or uncontrolled signals in radio transmissions, the clarity and 
ability of a radio-receiver to accurately represent an electromagnetic signature or a stability within the static. 
Such accuracy is explored in probability and information theory, as a state of entropy, the ‘quality of the 
information’ with regards to the accuracy of the system to represent the information presented. These 
concepts will form the theoretical foundations for Divergent Criticality as White-shift. 
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scaling actually represents a signature of ‘all’ criticality-function, therefore, will represent both 
agential and ecological determinants. This consideration of using a White-noise (which concurs with 
affective Divergent Criticality towards a Tolerance Optimisation) as indicative of intentionality, 
demands the acceptance that these observations may be due to ‘other’ ecological demands causing 
reduced Voluntary Control. Even if all possible sensory demands could be constrained and 
accounted for, is the white-noise observed, agency or intentionality? Divergent Criticality, through 
its entropic criticality profile, is able to offer a way forward for developing a ‘reliable consequence of 
reduced Voluntary Control’: Rather than Van Orden’s White-noise, it is the ‘Brown-shift’ (noise) of 
Cusp-Hopf function in the maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation, that is able to parse intentionality 
from agency. 
 Intentionality as an Extension of Agential Perception 
Bandura (2001) in defining the behaviours of agency as planner, fore-thinker and self-regulator 
(motivation), offers some precedence in parsing of agency. Here, intentionality and volition might be 
considered as different manifestations of an ’affective’ agential cognition: not only a hedonic ‘drive’ 
towards Tolerance Optimisation, but also a goal-mediated ‘drive’ towards ‘agential’ intentionality. 
The problem is that within a Tolerance Optimisation driven by the White-shift of Divergent 
Criticality, all agency; affective behaviour, volition and intentionality, may be considered confounded 
in an agential-homogeny. In this thesis, the dynamic ecological learning perspective towards 
biological-value, hypothesises that all biological life is affectively driven towards Tolerance 
Optimisation and therefore has ‘some’ agency and a Divergent Criticality of White-shift. 
Intentionality, therefore, cannot be confidently isolated from this agential-composite through 
White-shift alone (as suggested by,Van Orden et al., 2011). Such issues with Van Orden’s et al. 
proposition are now critiqued and the agential-confounding exposed (using the functionality of 
White-shift in Divergent Criticality Theory). 
Three very different behaviours; Entrainment, Accuracy Feedback and Expert Behaviour – rather 
than a ‘reliable distinction’ of intentionality are observed when white-shift is interrogated through 
criticality function. Though all three deliver White-shift as a fractal signature (≈ 1minus, ibid), such 
White-shift, is found to confound assumptions of intentionality. However, when set within Divergent 
Criticality functioning, they are able to be functionally-defined as different agential behaviours of 
very different functioning (though all produce White-shift). This infers very different affect and 
intentional determinants to Van Orden’s et al. ‘white-noise’ proposition (see, Figure 45, over). When 
considering function for behaviour from a Divergent Criticality hypothesis, such White-shift is better 
considered as agency-affect towards Tolerance Optimisation rather than agential-mediated 
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intentionality, and white-noise better explained as the functioning of a homogeneity of all ‘agential’ 
processes (affective and intentional) and unable to naturalise intentionality. Even what might be 
surmised as a clear-‘intentionality’ (e.g. Expert Practice), when attributed to White-shift as a 
“reliable consequence of reduced voluntary control” (Van Orden et al., 2011, pg 658), is confounded 
in the agential-homogeny encompassed within the White-shift signature (see, Figure 45, p235). 
White-shift in relation to an ‘agency’, has been explored in studies that have observed the 
behaviours of reduced Voluntary Control: (1) Entrainment as ‘bottom-up’ demands (Chen, Ding & 
Scott Kelso, 2001b; Hausdorff et al., 1999); (2) Feedback Accuracy as a maturation-effect of 
‘reduced’ accuracy from biological ageing (Hausdorff et al., 1999) and ; (3) The Expert Behaviour, or 
‘over training’ of expertise (Schmit, Regis & Riley, 2005) . All display a White-shift (≈ 1minus) in their 
fractal signature. 
Figure 45 - White-shift in 1) Entrainment, 2) Accuracy Feedback, and 3) Deliberate Practice (Expert) 
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The White-shift observations (above), when explored through the Divergent Criticality hypothesis, 
see White-shift functionality in (1) Entrainment109 and (2) Feedback Accuracy, subject to agent-
environment ‘surprise’ (surprise from engaging with the new, or conversely, constrained ecological-
information or information-accessibility), and driven from one functional Affordance state towards 
Tolerance Optimisation by Divergent Criticality.  
However, in example (3), Deliberate or Expert Practice, Divergent Criticality sees a constrained 
expertise and the functioning of  rVC  operating within ‘normal’ phase, not a ‘limited’ Cusp-Hopf 
function (as with ‘normal’ Effectivity function, such White-shift cannot be considered an unequivocal 
signal of intentionality). Here, White-shift is seen in the ‘expert’ constraining of behaviour (e.g. a 
ballerina’s over-trained posture), as an agential ‘deliberate practice’ easily constrained within the 
expertise or habituation of the agent (Schmit et al., 2005). In such agential ‘expert practice’, White-
shift is due to increasing top-down ‘agential’ demands, mediating a ‘cognitive dampening’ of 
Effectivity (see, Figure 45, above). The result is a decreasing ratio-function of available Effectivity-to-
Affordance (state), and the resultant White-noise signature observed in neural function.  
Though this expert or deliberate practice is clearly indicative of ‘intentionality’ (such as the non-
efficient constraining behaviour seen in the dancers), it cannot be isolated from the other agential 
behaviours displaying White-shift signatures in criticality. Deliberate behaviour might well be 
intentional; however, such ‘intentionality’ is not qualitatively or functionally equivalent to ‘normal’ 
(affective behaviour) Divergent Criticality function of Entrainment or Accuracy Feedback, their neural 
behaviour displaying the same ‘White-shift’ signature.  
However, in applying the Divergent Criticality hypothesis to intentionality, this enables consideration 
as to how an intentionality might be ‘functionally’ parsed from other ‘agency’, and be identified, 
obviating the confounding issues presented in White-shift. It is in a neural system being taken 
beyond its affective ‘normal’ Tolerance Optimisation, that intentionality must be recognised as 
agential-mediated, a “consciously controlled, strategic, voluntary control” over affective behaviour 
(Van Orden et al., 2011, pg 658). Such ‘beyond’ Tolerance Optimisation (relative Effectivity) is 
                                                          
109  The White-shift of ‘entrainment’ provides an interesting proposition: A selectionist interpretation, is that 
we are driven to entrain as a Tolerance Optimisation proposition, an agential-environment resonance with 
entrainment, ecologically informs the individual as a societal and/or environmental response as vicarious 
cognitive-emotional behaviour. A selectionist value of experience of ecological-demand at a distance. 
Entrainment then becomes an ‘extra’-perceptual information re-‘source’ of ecological-demand (surprise) and 
of an ecological ‘learning’ that will ‘eventually’ pay associative or future dividends. 
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identifiable in entropic-function as a ‘Brown-shift (≈ 1plus)’ in fractal scaling and offers the 
opportunity to naturalise intentionality over and above the white-noise of agency.  
In the Divergent Criticality hypothesis, ‘beyond’ relative Effectivity function as an agential-mediated 
affective behaviour, is proposed as intentionality and volition – an affective (cognitive-emotional) 
fractal-signature of the neural-system moving beyond from a Tolerance Optimisation affective state. 
Such a states of hypothesised, neural behaviour, was seen supported in the affective reporting of 
the SEM hypothesised functional Affordance states, and the triangulation hypothesis H1 (see, 7.1, 
p206). 
 Determining Intentionality Through a Divergent Criticality Hypothesis   
As an empirical measure, Brown-shift is dependent on the functioning of criticality in the system and 
may be attributed to divergence or convergence properties in relation to a Tolerance Optimisation. 
It is therefore necessary to determine a Brown-shift of ‘Divergent’ Criticality as a ‘limited’ 
maintenance of Optimisation and able to isolate intentionality in Brown-shift. This requires the need 
to understand better the functioning and behavioural outcomes of the criticality function in a 
‘beyond’ Brown-noise and how such a divergent Brown-noise of rVC intentionality or ‘effort’ 
presents itself over a decreasing or convergent function. Some guidance for ‘direction’ of a 
‘divergent Brown-shift’ presents itself in the none-‘normal’ functioning of physiologically inhibited 
systems (e.g. Morbidity) a Divergent Criticality function akin to intentionality, but via a reduced 
neural-capacity of ‘ability to function’ within relative Effectivity. 
Morbidity, a Function of Reduced Voluntary Control and Intentionality 
Morbidity-behaviour (as a degenerative disease affecting neural complexity) seen in elderly people, 
differs functionally from the White-shift fractal-scaling from the normal ‘maturation’ of ‘accuracy-
feedback’ (the effects of getting older in ‘accuracy feedback’ due to loss of sensory-adeptness). 
Whereas ‘maturation’ reports a White-shift (coupled with reduced information feedback), 
‘Morbidity’, interestingly, reports a Brown-shift (Glass & Mackey, 1988; Schmit, Riley, Dalvi, Sahay, 
Shear, Shockley & Pun, 2006). It is in the different relative Effectivity function of morbidity, that 
‘functional differences’ enable the different behaviour to be theoretically explained and in turn, 
provides an extremum of function to inform how a Brown-shift of ‘intentionality’ might be 
differentiated from other criticality signatures. 
It is in the functional profile of relative Effectivity (as a neural efficiency function) that the difference 
is seen. Whereas maturation (accuracy-feedback) is not degenerative upon the relative functionality 
or ‘complexity-capability’ of the entropic system, it is a deficiency in ability to ‘access’ efficient 
bottom-up information (the mind is willing, but the body weak - neurally). Morbidity, however, sees 
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a ‘degenerative’ neural-complexity (e.g. Parkinson’s effects the synapse behaviour). This is a chronic 
reduced capability in Effectivity, a permanent diminishing of the complexity opportunities of the 
system rather than the ‘neural’ reduced Voluntary Control of maturation.  
 
Figure 46 – Reduced Voluntary Control Takes System beyond ‘Cusp’ and Relative Effectivity 
Though there may be a maturation-effect in observed morbidity (a White-noise of feedback 
inaccuracy from natural ageing), this will be subsumed in the morbid or ‘structural-ebbing’ of 
complexity capability, entropic-function, mirroring an extreme reduced Voluntary Control (Figure 46, 
above). It is the loss of relative-capability (not accuracy-feedback) that dominates morbidity 
behaviour. Rather than function within ‘normal’ relative Effectivity (as seen with the ‘expert’ 
Ballerinas, Figure 45), morbidity forces a relative Effectivity as a ‘limited’ Tolerance Optimisation 
beyond ‘normal’ function – one that yields ‘Brown-shift’. This is akin to a reduced Voluntary Control 
taken into the ‘limits of capability’ in function, therefore, morbidity function as ‘any’, 
 
 relative Effectivity, allows the consideration of how criticality functions as an ‘intentionality’ beyond 
relative Effectivity affective behaviour, ‘at the limits’ of agential capability. 
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Brown-shift, Intentionality and the Limits of Capability 
By being able to identify intentionality through the Brown-shift of Tolerance Optimisation 
‘maintenance’, this not only provides for a differentiated signature for intentionality over other 
possible agency function, but also an optimal proposition for learning110. White-shift in expertise 
cannot delineate itself from other ‘agential’ function as intentional, as it infers a less than optimal 
state of criticality function (and therefore a ‘lesser’ learning proposition in Tolerance Optimisation). 
However, as criticality is driven towards Tolerance Optimisation, we would expect to see a White to 
Brown shift as reduced Voluntary Control is taken through cusp optimisation into the ‘limits of 
capability’. It is at this cusp that an optimal learning proposition may be hypothesised: 
The diminishment of function at the limits of capability (beyond Effectivity) provides an entropic-
profile – a functional efficiency ‘slope’ able to differentiate between two possibilities: a) Function 
‘within’ reduced Voluntary-Control and a normal Tolerance Optimisation; b) Function ‘beyond’ 
relative Effectivity and a limited Optimisation or Maintenance of cusp criticality (see, Figure 47, 
below). Here, an intentionality of ‘beyond’ relative Effectivity is theorised to exhibit a steeper 
efficiency trajectory in rVC (decreasing entropic-function in order to maintain functional stability), 
than a trajectory ‘within’ relative Effectivity. Brown-shift therefore will display different trajectories 
(of efficiency) dependent on ‘within’ or ‘beyond’ relative Effectivity as seen in Figure 47 (below) and 
thus allows a divergent Brown-shift of intentionality to be identified in agential functioning.  
                                                          
110 The transition from ‘affective behaviours’ towards Tolerance Optimisation, the ‘intentionality’ of 
maintaining Tolerance Optimisation  (White-shift to Brown-shift in Divergent Criticality) marks an optimal 
learning proposition in criticality behaviour. As a composite function of top-down and bottom-up cognitive 
processes, no two ‘optimal’ learning propositions are the same – this is discussed in terms of learning-potential 
and learning-gain see (8.6.7 – Optimising Learning-Potential or Learning-Gain, p262). 
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If Brown-shift is observed in a steepening efficiency profile, then a ‘naturalising’ definition may be 
considered as an objective definition for intentionality. Such ‘limited’ Tolerance Optimisation 
(agential mediation), can be identified as a Brown-shift where profiles exhibiting steeper slopes infer 
a state of function in a ‘limited’ Cusp-Hopf state of Tolerance Optimisation. If fractal-scaling is seen 
to progress from divergent White-shift to Brown-shift, it may be considered that the individual is 
functioning in  a ‘beyond’ relative Effectivity (functional Affordance state), inferring intentionality 
rather than affective agency.   
Though White-shift as an affective behavioural function takes the system towards Tolerance 
Optimisation in the ‘normal’ function, it is in the going ‘beyond’ or more correctly ‘maintaining’ 
Tolerance Optimisation at cusp, that a Brown-shift signature emerges, with reduced Voluntary 
Control indicative of a continued volition (beyond) the normal form of Tolerance Optimisation. 
Whereas White-shift has to consider that all agency, intentionality and ecological determinants may 
be in effect, Brown-shift in a Divergent Criticality hypothesis, however, must be of goal-oriented 
planning and forethought and evident as rVC behaviour as ‘dominant’ over affective behaviour – 
that can only be the signature of intentionality. 
  
Figure 47 – Brown Shift within Relative Effectivity and beyond Relative Effectivity rVC 
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It is proposed here, that Divergent Criticality in a reduced Voluntary Control function  provides a 
fractal-signature for intentionality as a ‘Brown-shift’, addressing Van Orden’s et al. ‘goal’ of a  
“reliable consequence of reduced voluntary control, then we have naturalized intentionality.” (2011, 
pg 658). 
A clear distinction for intentionality in a Divergent Criticality model of Tolerance Optimisation is 
proposed: that of intentionality as defined by  Cusp-Hopf bifurcation (Catastrophe Theory,  see, 8.4.3 
– Divergent Criticality: Contributions to Cusp Catastrophe Theory, p229). This can be considered as 
the ‘maintenance’ of Tolerance Optimisation, through ‘effort-full’ cognitive reallocation of resources 
when a relative Cusp-Criticality is exceeded (top-down cognitive effort, exerts intentional control 
over the other ‘affective’ dimensions, a ‘limited’111 dissipative-temporal proposition (Harlim & 
Langford, 2007). Such seemingly ‘counter-affective’ behaviour cannot be considered an ‘innate’ 
agential drive, but a “temporal extension” of ‘conscious’ intentionality (Bandura, 2001, p3). As a 
reduced Voluntary Control, this proposition of intentionality-effect over agential-affect, allows a 
criticality-function to emerge as an intentionality with a signature of ‘Brown-shift’ in fractal scaling, 
as the system is taken away from ‘normal’ Tolerance Optimisation. Brown-shift therefore is able to 
infer ‘intentionality’ in the Divergent Criticality hypothesis. The Divergent Criticality theory  proposes 
brown-shift as an intentionality signature – a dissipating112 entropy-function of agential ‘cusp’ 
mediation.  
 Considerations of Habituation and Expertise 
Much of the research into 1/f signalling (associated White-shift) might be considered to have had an 
experimental-confounding in utilising learnt behaviours with a high-degree of habituation or 
expertise-bias in observation (e.g. walking and deliberate practice experiments where we are at our 
‘most’ practiced). This expertise-bias is a confounding of neural functioning ‘within’ a relative 
Effectivity where additional cognitive-demands are accommodated easily within the efficiency of an 
expert Effectivity of function. If considering the examples from morbidity and ageing (Glass & 
Mackey, 1988; Schmit et al., 2006) Divergent Criticality is in a White-shift which does not represent 
an optimal ‘learning’ proposition for Tolerance Optimisation (as able to still functioning ‘within’ 
                                                          
111 ‘Normal’ and ‘Limited’ denote Tolerance Optimisation function of ‘normal’ affective-attractor and ‘limited’ 
effective-attractor in Catastrophe Theory (Cusp Hopf bifurcation). 
112 There is no such thing as a ‘free lunch’: any stability away from one equilibrium-attractor (of Tolerance 
Optimisation) to another (Tolerance Maintenance) must be paid for in entropy, a reduced Voluntary Control  
and a dissipating relative Effectivity.  
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cusp). Brown-shift, however, represents the system working at the ‘limits of its capability’ in a 
Tolerance Optimisation, a maintenance proposition – as agency mediates Effectivity at a cusp of 
criticality.  
If expertise is considered as ‘just another’ relative Effectivity, though end-goals may well be 
intentional in ‘expert practice’ (such as gait control) this adaptive behaviour as White-shift does not 
reflect a system at a learning-optimal. This offers an exciting prospect for Divergent Criticality in 
learning: We should expect to see White-shift become Brown-shift as relative expertise is taken into 
an optimal learning function and then maintains a cusp of learning criticality. This not only offers 
opportunities for ‘skill-acquisition’ in expert performers where the ‘edge of criticality’ (a maximal 
Self-Organising emergence as optimal system learning) is parameterised where white-shift changes 
to brown-shift, but also an approach to understanding criticality function in regards to situative and 
contextual learning (learning gain or learning potential) as functions of Tolerance Optimisation and 
Maintenance. This application of Divergent Criticality to expertise is discussed further in relation to 
Tolerance Optimisation as a learning function (see, 8.6.1 – The Optimisation in Learning, p244). It is 
that learning behaviours (such as shifting and switching) may be extrapolated towards further 
predicated or desired ‘learning’ outcomes, that the fundamental underpinning in Dynamical Systems 
Theory allows the application of Divergent Criticality to better understand and intervene in expertise 
acquisition, through a balance of affective constraint and reward towards desired end-goals 
(learning goals). Importantly, it is in the agential-mediation of a Divergent Criticality learning 
function, that consideration of the relative agential proclivities of the individual must be 
foundational in the shaping of this learning composite of agential determinants towards (expertise) 
end-goals.  
As such, though expertise speaks of a ‘learning-gain’ and a contextual-function (of Brown-shift), the 
functional-refining of a neural-network’s capability; it is in the ‘bottom-up’ situative-bias for learning 
that expertise, as a structural increase in neural capacity (the building of new neural pathways), 
reflects the entropic duality of criticality behaviour in habituation and expertise. This requirement in 
expertise for constraint-defined Tolerance Optimisation (the neural efficiency in ecological or 
perception-action coupling), is an optimal learning proposition for both the emergence of new 
neural-networks and in the refinement of existing neural-complexity, what Kello et al. (2012) have 
parsed into functional and structural Self-Organisation. This is a composite of Divergent Criticality 
function and agential mediation towards expertise that is discussed further in its pragmatic 
application (see, 8.10 – Application 4: Developing Expertise, p263). 
Such agential functioning and mediation in learning has been explored in Attentional Control Theory 
where the role of an ‘Executive Function’ in working memory has directed much research into neural 
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function and efficiency (Baddeley, 2007; Eysenck et al., 2007; Miyake et al., 2000). Therefore, 
Divergent Criticality is now considered in relation to these theories and its application towards such 
functionally differentiated learning. 
 
 The Functioning of Divergent Criticality: A Learning Mechanism 
Illeris (2009) suggests that learning may be defined by two pivotal processes those of ‘interaction’ 
and ‘acquisition’ for the ‘making meaning from experience’. When approached through a Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis, these processes may now be aligned to the agential mediation of Tolerance 
Optimisation in relation to a ‘neural’ state of ecological function. This confers an agential-
prerogative to learning, that, in addition to the accommodation of ecological-demands of a situated-
engagement (Chemero, 2013; Gibson, 1977; Greeno, Collins & Resnick, 1996; Thompson & Varela, 
2001; Varela et al., 1991), is the need to accommodate an agential-intentionality as we learn to 
resonate with our environments experientially (an ecology of the self, the social and the situated). It 
is in such agential-ecological learning, that Lakoff’s “abstract thought is largely metaphorical, making 
use of the same sensory-motor system that runs the body” (2003, p3), sees relative Effectivity 
propagate top-down cognitions as agential ‘mediated’ bottom-up processes in neural function. 
Divergent Criticality (hypothesised as a drive towards a ‘relative’ Tolerance Optimisation), is seen as 
conferring a ‘learning moment’ through the emergent properties of a composite of top-down and 
bottom-up cognitive-processes (attentional) in neural function. It is in the essence of an attentional-
awareness (to cognitive processes) as reflecting neural efficiency in function, that a perception of 
functional Affordance is a perception of the ‘state’ of learning function. The Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis allows learning to be considered as a continual-constructivist process of action and 
thoughts; rather than the delineation of experiential and transformative learning as separate 
processes (Illeris, 2009), it suggests that ‘all learning’ as being driven towards Tolerance Optimisation 
in a composite of Tolerance Optimisation and Tolerance  Maintenance function. This accommodates 
Kello’s et al. (2012) neural-complexity requirements of i) a situated optimisation (neural or structural 
criticality); and ii) ‘contextual’ optimisation (intentionality). Divergent Criticality functions around a 
Tolerance Optimisation for a perception of learning. 
“Adaptive human behavior should be bursty appearing unstable, as it was always at the “edge of 
failure”. Life-long learning continuously “raises the bar” to more challenging tasks, making 
performance critical as well.”  (Chialvo, 2010, p7) 
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 The Optimisation in Learning 
Divergent Criticality supports Chialvo (2010), in presenting neural functionality from both a 
contextual ‘raising the bar’ and a situative ‘ecological engagement’ in optimising learning as a 
‘relative’ Effectivity. This optimal function as an optimal Tolerance state functional Affordance 
(Tolerance Optimisation ) is affective in two ways: 1) an affective ‘drive’ of cognitive behaviour (as 
determined by the functional Affordance state in relation to a relative Effectivity, see, Hypothesis 
(H2, p200) and Hypothesis (H3, p209); or 2) as a ‘maintenance’ function (see SEM hypothesis – p206 
and Hypothesis (H1, p207). In such an affective drive for Tolerance Optimisation through the 
associated behaviours of affective-drive and agential-maintenance, the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis, as a selectionist proposition, is as much a theory of agential ‘learning’ as it is of 
ecological perception. Divergent Criticality as a learning hypothesis manifests itself in a perception 
for ecological engagement and in this regard, is an attentional awareness of the ‘state of learning’. 
We might more accurately describe perception as an attentional-awareness of the ‘state of neural 
learning’. Therefore, perception as a functional Affordance (neural state of attentional function) is 
an awareness of the functional determinants of learning, a ‘learning-moment’ of a flow of functional 
and structural – Criticality. 
As a ‘relative’ function, such criticality(s) are different in their functional-composite and learning-
behaviour(s), learning determined by agential mediation of top-down ‘reduced’ Voluntary Control). 
Tolerance Optimisation, therefore, as a unique ‘agential’ Effectivity, will be subject to different 
functional situative and contextual determinants in defining a learning optimisation. An agential  
functional landscape (of criticality), requiring the consideration that any learning optimisation will be 
‘unique’ as a composite of situative and contextual criticality in any learning-moment. The 
application of such an agential composite is discussed in 8.8 – Application 2: Learning Centred on the 
Learner (p259). 
 A Learning-Moment as a Composite of Function 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis as a learning-moment is able to accommodate and inform a 
composite of function: i) At one extreme it provides an optimal-learning function for ecological 
engagement as a situated optimisation (bottom-up attentional processes bias) reflecting an 
‘absolute’ of Voluntary Control (see, functional State-A, Figure 48, over); this is a proposition for the 
brain’s resources (neural networks) totally dedicated to being in the now and responding and 
adapting to the present; Conversely, ii) functional State-B, (Figure 48, over), shows an extreme 
reduced Voluntary Control (rVC) of relative Effectivity. This is an Affordance State beyond relative 
Effectivity (a contextual top-down and ‘intentionality’ proposition), and though still an optimisation, 
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is an internal generative capability (requiring neural resources) and a reduced state of Complexity 
function (rVC) in order to accommodate a Cusp-Hopf function of ‘beyond’ function for the 
maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation.  
 A Learning Potential 
Though both states (A) and (B) represent a Tolerance Optimisation or learning optimisation, it is in 
‘situated learning’ State (A), that there is greater emergence of new learning structure that increases 
the ‘learning-potential’ of the complexity system (neural).  
Figure 48 – The Learning Moment 
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It is tempting here to suggest that such a situated-function offers the greatest ‘learning potential’ 
and is primary in terms of learning value, however, though functionally correct, ecologically, this 
might provide for a less ‘dynamically-oriented’ proposition for forward-facing learning in a changing 
or dynamic world.  
Such a situated ‘absolute’ function113 (State A) is a ‘disposition to the situated now’ and not able to 
fulfil the selectionist criteria of frugality in ecological-engagement (there will be times of low and 
high entropic-function in such learning states of function, resulting in times of ‘less than efficiency 
function’ in a systems Tolerance Optimisation). If purely a dispositional ‘flow’ of experience and 
entropy, a situative function represents a poor selectionist proposition as there is a ‘void’ to fulfil in 
Tolerance Optimisation114.  
 A Learning Gain 
Van Orden et al. (2011, p658) proffers that “Volition picks up the slack”. If bottom-up demands or 
ecological ‘surprise’ do not fulfil the requirements for Tolerance Optimisation or utilise the capacity 
and complexity of the entropy system (brain), then an agential drive of not only ‘affective’ but 
agential-mediated ‘top-down’ behaviour towards optimisation ‘fills this void’ (ibid). Now, in terms of 
optimisation, a ‘maintenance’ State-B (above) presents the greatest contextual refining of learning, a 
                                                          
113 Though no true ‘absolute’ is possible in a dynamic system. Absolute here reflects a minimal top-down 
(reduced) Voluntary Control function, that of bottom-up dominance in attentional processes. 
114 However, such absolute ‘situative’ optimisation ‘is’ seen in some learning and cognitive development: e.g. 
Brown-noise has been observed in infant walking (Hausdorff et al., 1999) where, the Affordance ‘exceeds’ 
relative Effectivity (Tolerance Optimisation) and the system goes into Brown-shift. It is questionable what 
intentionality there is in such infant ‘innate behaviour’, and therefore a White-shift of ‘affective’ agency might 
have been expected. This infant-anomaly might be explained in the behaviour as a naive ‘disinhibition’; an 
affective-bias in behaviour driven towards ‘normal’ Tolerance Optimisation rather than intentionality end-
goals. This naïve ‘self-organisation’ takes the individual beyond Tolerance Optimisation (hence Brown-shift), 
though this is not prescient of a ‘limited’ cusp-maintenance, but an affective ‘normal’ self-organising 
regulation around optimisation. It seems that there are other processes in ‘affect’ at crucial developmental-
periods in our learning, affective-biases which may exhibit extremes of function in behaviour for building 
learning-potential over learning-gain (Castillo, Kloos, Holden & Richardson, 2015; Kiefer, Wallot, Gresham, 
Kloos, Riley, Shockley & Van Orden, 2014; Kloos et al., 2009). Learning as a contextual functional, needs to be 
grounded on a situative-structural platform. Karmiloff-Smith (2012) assertion of functionality over modularity 
and developmental times of greater, bottom-up functioning (the applications of this as addressed in APP 1, 
p267). 
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‘learning-gain’ (see State (B), Learning-Gain, Figure 48, above). Though seemingly a ‘lesser’ learning 
‘moment’ from a reduced Voluntary Control state of criticality, such rVC provides a contextual 
richness and a ‘temporal facilitation’ towards optimisation, therefore, greater optimisation or 
‘maintenance’ in regards to temporal end-points such as agential goals or motivations.  
It is in this unique agential function and the need to accommodate the proposition of contextual 
volition or intentionality as well as a situated learning, that learning and its optimisation needs to be 
considered in terms of its composite of Tolerance Optimisation function: Not all learning function is 
the same and not all Tolerance Optimisations are ‘edges of’ the same criticality functioning. 
Divergent Criticality provides a functional explanation for this composite of agential learning: 
Situative affect and contextual intentionality are accommodated and naturalised in an affective 
‘drive’ (Divergent Criticality) and the Cusp-Hopf (maintenance) of Tolerance Optimisation. An agency 
to maximise Tolerance and therefore learning optimisation is a proposition that learning will be 
subject to differing criticality-landscapes of agential affect and intentionality a unique situational and 
contextual ‘optimisation’ (the application of learning gain is discussed in, 8.7 – Application 1: 
Increasing Learning Potential, p258). 
In this study’s findings, it was seen that contextually dominant learning-gain was affectively favoured 
(selected for) with the greatest adherence to Tolerance Optimisation being achieved by ‘top-down’ 
functionally dominant states being reported as high functional Affordance states (see, 6.16 – p194). 
This concurred with triangulation analysis with ‘contextual’ learning domains correlating self-
concept with functional Affordance states positively biased towards Tolerance Optimisation: A bias 
seen across learning domains where; developmental ‘experiential contextual’ learning was rewarded 
over experiential learning (e.g. ‘team building’ sampling reported higher in affective perceptions of 
self-concept than ‘team challenge’ sample domains: see, 6.22 – p203). That contextual and 
developmental determinants of learning were found to be positively biased over situative affective 
cognitions (more ‘experiential’ challenge activities), does not necessarily infer that a contextual bias 
is selectively preferred over situative experience, but concurs with intentionality (top-down 
function) in that it fills the functional ‘void’ in achieving and/or maintaining Tolerance Optimisation.  
This presents interesting questions with regards to motivational theories, learning interest and 
pedagogy: i) What is the Divergent Criticality functioning for an agential ‘drive or motivation for 
learning’ beyond the necessities and optimisation of Effectivity – a ‘wanting’ rather than hedonic  
‘liking’; ii) How is agential volition in learning, functionally grounded in Divergent Criticality – agential 
capabilities and control in cognitive processes and; iii) finally, when is learning-gain optimal and 
when is learning-potential optimal? – These questions are now addressed in relation to Divergent 
Criticality: 
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 A Drive or Motivation for Learning  
The concept of an agential cognition suggests that we perceive and ‘feel’ our ecological experiences 
as functional states, and this requires the consideration of an awareness as cognitions of affective-
emotional functioning (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Panksepp, 2017; Pessoa, 2013). Such affective 
cognitions have been explored as to how they might function, in a perception (functional 
Affordance) and in neurological function (Baddeley, 2007; Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Deci & Ryan, 2008; Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; 
Eysenck, 1992; Hanin, 2003). 
Affective cognitions as action-programmes are seen as ‘encoded’ by emotions, offering hedonic 
‘approach’ cognitions of liking in an agent-environment Tolerance Optimisation, and such ‘operant’ 
feelings mediated towards an intentionally of ‘wanting’.  
“action programme and the respective feeling are often referred to by the same name, although they 
are distinct phenomena. Thus ‘fear’ can refer to either an emotion [the set of programmed 
physiological actions triggered by a fear-inducing stimulus] or a feeling [the conscious experience of 
fear]” (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013, p144). 
It is in the functioning of Divergent Criticality around Tolerance Optimisation of relative Effectivity, 
that the iterations of criticality-behaviour provide better explanations towards situated and 
contextual agency in ecological engagement (and therefore, learning) – the mediation by the agent 
on ‘affective’ cognitions for biological-value (via top-down contextual cognitions). To be robust, 
these must not only be theoretically described, but Universality situated in functionality. 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis provides the criticality-function for such biasing of top-down 
contextual behaviours in learning (a ‘beyond’ relative Effectively of function). Importantly this does 
not compromise a selectionist hypothesis; an ‘apex of affective behaviour’ is still operant as a 
Tolerance Optimisation within agential Effectivity. It is in the re-appropriation of neural (generative) 
resources from a relative Effectivity (in a reduced Voluntary Control for intentionality), that top-
down biasing is parameterised within a ‘limited’ phase of Cusp-Hopf function. This is still a Tolerance 
Optimisation ‘zone’ that is affectively rewarded. This was tested in the SEM hypothesis which 
concurred with functional Affordance state affectively biased for contextual ‘top-down’ functioning 
found to be significantly supported (see, 6.17 – An Agential-Mediation of Tolerance Optimisation, 
p194). In addition, this contextual bias in affective function is significantly supported in all 
correlation and difference tests conducted in the triangulation hypothesis (H1 – H3), a situative 
contextual (top-down) dominance over a bottom-up processes (see, Findings, p206). 
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The parameters of Tolerance Optimisation and support for the Divergent Criticality hypothesis are 
resonant with much motivational theory and it is possible to align the Divergent Criticality optimal 
‘zone of function’ within the literature on Attribution, Goal Orientation, Attentional Focus, Self-
Determination, Zone of Optimal Performance, etc. (Ames, 1995; Bandura, 1997; Csikszentmihalyi, 
1990; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Eysenck et al., 2007; Hanin, 1980; Levesque et al., 2008; Roberts, Treasure 
& Balague, 1998; Vallerand, 1997). As a unique ‘temporal’ composite of situational and contextual 
functioning, this agential ‘zone of optimisation’, this requires the consideration as to ‘how’ these 
motivational drives are agential-mediated and/or ecologically-determined. Previous motivational 
literature might be critiqued in that affective cognitions have not been comprehensively defined 
theoretically; again, much theory of ‘optimisation’ in agential motivation (Catastrophe/Dynamic) 
needs to absolve itself from the criticism of reporting on behaviourism rather than causality.  
As no two functional Affordance states are the same (as Effectivity composites), no two learning 
optimisations or motivational moments are the same, but instead, are defined in a ‘dynamic’ neural-
landscape of ecological flux. Guided by agential-mediation within a zone of Tolerance Optimisation, 
the Divergent Criticality hypothesis allows the adherence of neural-function through an ecological 
learning or value-optimisation mechanism, to these complexity prerogatives. Divergent Criticality 
parameterises motivation in cognitive-function, as an efficiency and effort towards ecologically 
informed but agential mediated – perception end-points or functional goals. The pragmatic 
application of such agential motivations and end-point ‘drives’ are discussed in (8.9 – Application 3: 
Motivating Long-Term Learning, p261) 
The concept of cognitive effort and an efficiency in neural processes (e.g. such as attentional 
processes) is of a goal-oriented agency and mediation. Perceptions as ‘awareness of attention’ are 
seen as directed attentional processes or neural resources in response to stimulatory cues (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002; Posner & Petersen, 1990). Attention therefore becomes subject to ‘agency and 
control’ facilitated through an ‘Executive Function’ (Baddeley, 2007; Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; 
Eysenck et al., 2007; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Yantis, 1998). Such mediation of affective behaviour 
become attentional top-down cognitive functions, hence, any attention and ‘awareness of attention’ 
is agential and of ‘some’ top-down effect, and may be considered in a dynamic Divergent Criticality 
landscape as a capability mediated by a ‘reduced Voluntary Control’. 
 Agential Capabilities and Control in Cognitive Processes 
The observation of agential motivations, control and efficiency towards outcome-behaviours (of 
learning), manifests itself within Miyake et al. (2000) in the identifying of three central capabilities 
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(neural beahviours) associated with an agential mediated cognitive-control or ‘Executive Function’ 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974): 
“Updating – constant monitoring and rapid addition/deletion of working memory contents;  
Shifting  – switching flexibly between tasks or mental sets; and  
Inhibition -deliberate overriding of dominant or prepotent responses” (Miyake & Friedman, 2012, p9) 
This is observed as two operant ‘diversity outcomes’, seen as operationalised by an Executive ‘Unity’ 
on the function of three neural ‘Abilities’ as illustrated (Figure 49, below). 
Figure 49 – Attentional behaviour in Executive Function (taken from, Miyake & Friedman, 2012, p11) 
 
It is in the ‘behavioural-diversity’ when this model is applied that we see deviations from the 
expected functioning of the three ‘Ability’ determinants, with only Shifting and Updating (Switching) 
emergent as outcome ‘Diversity’ behaviours. This behavioural duality is seen across agent-
environment studies (for example, Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Humphries et al., 2016; Miyake & 
Friedman, 2012; Wilson, 2008; Zanone et al., 2010), and therefore, a theoretical inadequacy 
critiqued within ‘executive’ unity models in their failing to develop ‘Inhibition’ function towards 
‘outcome’ diversity. 
Rather than question ‘Inhibition’ (a ubiquitous agential-capability observation), this speaks more of 
‘model-inadequacies’ in formulating correct function, resulting in only Updating and Shifting as 
outcome-Diversity. The Executive Function (EF) seems a ‘catch-all’ to operationalise observed 
behavioural Diversity (in ‘attempting’ to accommodate a functional mechanism through a Unity 
mechanism (Baddeley, 2007; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). However, it might be argued that such a 
Common EF does not theoretically or adequately address the functional imperative of where such 
agential ‘inhibition’ ability comes from. It is in the very nomenclature of ‘Ability’ (in suggesting an 
agential neural-capacity), that function is given a behavioural-like capability and therefore, subject to 
a behaviourist critique of observation rather than functional explanation – What might be 
questioned is how inhibition is affective and why is inhibition subsumed within the Central Executive 
Function? 
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The Divergent Criticality hypothesis offers a better explanation to the observed diversity: Divergent 
Criticality in an agential ‘relative’ Effectivity, proposed Tolerance Optimisation as the ‘Unity’ 
function, where Tolerance Optimisation incorporates Inhibition as a cusp-phase of agential-
mediation and intentionality. In re-defining the Common EF ‘Unity’ function through Divergent 
Criticality, Shifting and Switching become the expected diversity of an agential-mediated goal 
attribution and control function, resonating with the ‘shifting’ and ‘switching’ (Updating) found 
within Dynamical Theory observations (Kelso, 2012; Zanone et al., 2010) as discussed (see, 8.4 – 
Setting Divergent Criticality within Dynamical Theory, p224). If considered through Tolerance 
Optimisation, an agential Unity is able to accommodate determinants of executive function as 
described in Miyake and Friedman (Figure 50, below). 
Figure 50 –  Executive Function: as a Divergent Criticality Function                                                           
(adapted from, Miyake & Friedman, 2012, p11) 
 
Updating (Switching) Specific – Diversity 
Updating represents Divergent Criticality observed directly through local phase behaviour. Divergent 
Criticality takes the system through nested Criticalities and new stability(s) emerge (intensive and 
extensive). Rather than the linear function of an Executive Function of ‘Unity’, Divergent Criticality 
incorporates ‘Updating’ at all emergent levels in a phase of function, but observed as at a local-level 
of criticality (or ‘Switch/Update’ in phase)  
Shifting Specific – Diversity 
Shifting, then, as a Divergent Criticality ‘Unity’, becomes an intentional mediation of Cusp-Hopf 
behaviour on an Updating-Criticality, mediated by agential-effort (for the maintaining of a phase of 
optimal function).  
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Here, at a ‘limited’ Tolerance Optimisation, top-down cognitive resources are ‘shifted’ to bottom-up 
function (at an entropic cost115) and a ‘shifting diversity’ manifests itself in the maintenance of 
stability. Such ‘shifting’ might be considered as an agential moderation to Updating via an 
intentional Inhibition ‘effect’.  
Inhibition Subsumed Diversity 
What emerges is that ‘Inhibition’ is not observed, but its effects on Updating are in effect. Inhibition 
is not lost in Divergent Criticality (as it is in the Unity of Executive Function), but made functional in a 
Shifting behaviour of agential-mediated Tolerance Optimisation. In defining Updating and Shifting 
within Divergent Criticality theory, behaviour may be hypothesised as; functionality in accordance 
with relative Effectivity and Tolerance Optimisation, therefore, may be used to investigate such 
agential ‘mediated’ behaviour – a diversity of a composite complexity and a conscious agential 
awareness from Divergent Criticality function. 
Agential Mediation and Regulation Shifting and Switching Behaviour 
As overt ‘morbidity’ behaviours exposed the base-functioning of intentionality (see, 8.5.2 – 
Determining Intentionality Through a Divergent Criticality Hypothesis, p237), similarly, a focus on the 
observations of ‘overt’ EF inhibition dis-function help expose the functional determinants of 
agential-mediation in a Unity – Executive Function. Such overt behaviour in agential regulation is 
observed in clinically termed ‘Attention Deficit Hyperactivity’ (ADHA). As such, ADHA as outcome-
behaviour (of neural function) has been considered as either a hereditary dis-inhibition or the 
untrained suppression of a moderating ability (inhibition), displaying itself in overt situative 
behaviour such as novelty seeking and risk taking116, etc. (Friedman, Miyake, Robinson & Hewitt, 
2011; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Young, Friedman, Miyake, Willcutt, Corley, Haberstick & Hewitt, 
2009). If considered through the model of Divergent Criticality functioning rather than an Executive 
                                                          
115  Stability or phase proposition as a temporal-flux in energy potential is a non-stable equilibrium, and must 
pay a price to ‘entropy’ (the dissipation of entropy in free energy) in maintaining that stability. This price is 
exacted as an entropic dissipation is maintaining equilibrium. At a local phase boundary, such dissipation is 
observed as either an extreme entropic-flux of catastrophic change (new intensive stabilities emerge as local 
phase collapses – as ‘switching/updating’), or a graduated ‘limited’ dissipation, permitted through a ‘shifting’ 
of the local phase-stability properties, a limited entropic decline within phase function. Switching and shifting 
represent then, the functioning of entropy within complexity structures or systems of stability;  an agential re-
payment route for entropy, as either a one-off payment (catastrophe) and/or a limited ‘local-decline’ and 
decreasing phase-inefficiency as entropy loss is tolerated within local-phase.   
116 As Divergent Criticality engages with overt challenge and surprise (entropic). 
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Function (EF), then such behaviour would be an outcome expectation from poor top-down or 
agential effect, therefore of ‘cognitive dis-inhibition’. These behaviours would be expected to display 
as an absolute relative Effectivity in functioning and as an affective behavioural outcome, a 
‘switching’ operant around criticality (Tolerance Optimisation), with little agential mediation or 
‘shifting’ (see, 8.4.3 – Divergent Criticality: Contributions to Cusp Catastrophe Theory, p229). This 
may be due to neural capability, or a ‘not yet learnt’ Inhibition ability (dis-inhibition). Such extremes 
of outcome behaviour are seen by Miyake and Friedman (2012), as a reduced ‘shifting -diversity’, 
one that correlates with externally-oriented outcome driven attentional or bottom-up cognitive 
function, rather internal agential mediated goal-orientations:  
“…. recent research has yielded substantial evidence that links individual differences in EFs to diverse 
self-regulatory behaviors, such as the expression and control of implicit racial biases and prejudice 
(e.g., Klauer, Schmitz, TeigeMocigemba, & Voss, 2010; Stewart, von Hippel, & Radvansky, 2009), 
staying faithful to romantic partners (e.g., Pronk, Karremans, & Wigboldus, 2011), and successfully 
implementing dieting and exercising intentions (e.g., Hall, Fong, Epp, Elias, 2008)”. 
 
Using a delayed gratification design to test the longitudinal stability in dis-inhibition behaviours 
(Friedman et al., 2011), such Shifting inability was seen to be genetically-biased (a seeming 
hereditary ‘trait’), displaying a dis-inhibition bias or ‘trait’, despite learning and maturation effects.  
This is the recognition of inhibition, rather than being only agential dependant, is moderated by a 
hereditary-bias (a fixed neural-trait as opposed to the flexibility of a functional state, such as agential 
mediation). Divergent Criticality, therefore, surmises that Inhibition as learnt or a trained-maturation 
is an agential mediation, though, one moderated by hereditary bias117 . 
 
As Inhibition functions in attentional behaviour (by goal-focused top-down agential mediations on 
value decisions), alternatively, a dis-inhibited bias provides a greater environmental resonance but 
exhibiting greater risk and instability (Goschke, 2000). These behaviours might be speculated to offer 
different selectionist benefits (and risks) to the individual as any trait must be considered as 
genetically retained, therefore must offer selectionist opportunities over and above agential 
mediation of ecological determinants. This very different perspective to a ‘homogeneity of 
Inhibition’ we educate for, the biasing of learning for inhibited behaviour. This requires that we 
                                                          
117 There have been shown to be hereditary antecedents that limit any trained or learnt Inhibition, possibly 
explaining some of the seemingly extreme hedonistic and external behaviours displayed in ‘attention deficit 
hyperactivity’ (Young et al., 2009). 
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reconsider not only the efficacy of our education methodologies (learnt and maturation), but also 
the Inhibition-bias(es) of agential hereditary (as considered in Application 2 and Application 3 – 
p259). It is in this Inhibition function that agential proclivities to learning presents themselves: how 
attentional process are operant as top-down dominant or bottom-up dominant in what McGilchrist 
(2009) describes as the balance and dominance of a continuum between a ‘focus on the present’, 
and a ‘future oriented’ attention. This is a composite of attentional (agential) processes towards 
biological-value, therefore, Divergent Criticality enables such behaviour to be explained through its 
simple functional mechanism (the mechanism is simple, not the outcome-complexity). When viewed 
through Divergent Criticality, Inhibition is easily subsumed in a composite function of contextual 
agential mediation (Cusp-Hopf) over situated biological drives. 
 
 Optimising Learning-Potential or Learning-Gain 
Such functional learning in Divergent Criticality asks what is be prioritised, selected for as an optimal 
composite of bottom-up ‘situative’ and top-down ‘contextual’ processes: 
1) A bottom-up dominance or dis-inhibition in functioning, through providing increased 
structural optimisation in building new neural structure and networks, increases capability 
(Effectivity) and learning-potential (Chialvo, 2010; Kello, 2013; Kello et al., 2012) 118. 
However, this learning is dispositional and contextually-restricted. 
2) Or, top-down cognitions of an agential-mediated Effectivity, a bias towards maintaining 
Tolerance Optimisation towards contextual end-points and a goal-oriented learning 
function, reinforcing of the existing network. This is a ‘temporal extension’ of optimal 
function as predictive-processing (Clark, 2013) and refining efficient function, does so within 
the parameters of learning-potential. 
Such a composite is reflected in the behavioural-outcomes accommodated within the Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis: An affective behavioural platform (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp & Biven, 2012)  
drives the system towards Tolerance Optimisation (situative dis-inhibition) then a reduced Voluntary 
Control or ‘maintenance’ function, extends behaviour towards future-oriented ‘contextual’ value. It 
might therefore be argued that it is in the individuality of the agent-environment relationship, that 
requires learning to be ‘functionally considered’ rather than ‘outcome considered’ if achievable 
                                                          
118 Experience and mistake contingent learning is rewarded, in the supporting glutamate and dopamine 
neurotransmitters we see reinforcing salient functionality and neural re-generation (plasticity) of new 
structure, with increased affective behaviour and structural – functionality. 
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learning gains are to be realised. Such functionality recognises a proposition that learning need be 
considered as an individual capability and potential (situative and contextual); the agential-learning 
proclivities directing individual goal optimisation, rather than a homogony of societal-goal oriented 
education.  
 Overt Contextual Behaviours 
It might be considered that in a goal-oriented society (one that favours contextual focus and effort), 
an overt dis-inhibition bias would present a negative perspective; indeed, such proclivities have 
found themselves medicalised and labelled as ‘disorder’ (e.g. as with ADHD). Conversely, overt 
inhibition and contextual functioning presents similar ‘non-normal’ considerations: An Inhibition 
‘suppression’ of affective behaviour is associated with Brown-shift (see, 8.6.6 – p249), this may be 
associated with avoid-affective cognitions (e.g. adverse psychological cognitive-emotional disorders 
such as depression and anxiety). Tolerance Optimisation as a self-organisation regulating 
mechanism, provides a Goldilocks-like proposition where overt neural function provides ‘disorder’ 
avoid cognitions (as any self-organising proposition should).  
It is in the appreciation of the Divergent Criticality hypothesis representing a spectrum of agential 
function around a relative Tolerance Optimisation, that the recognition of a hereditary bias 
mediated by agential maturation (contextual and situational) would allow the accommodation of the 
individual’s proclivities towards learning goals (whatever the ‘desired’ goals may be). In doing so, 
realistic interventions utilising Divergent Criticality theory might better direct educational and 
learning experiences to best achieve such behavioural outcomes119 in consideration of the individual 
(these are discussed in APP2, p259).  
This is from the perspective of neural functionality and the value of learning (as societal, ethical and 
philosophical); a ‘value’ constructed within opportunities ‘of’ the individual, not society dictating 
opportunities ‘for’ the individual which would seem to favour top-down intentionality as a 
selectionist proposition for social environments and the prioritising of contextual learning. It may be 
speculated that such contextual prerogatives have dominated in western culture, driving the 
appraisal of a quantitative learning-gain towards pre-specified linearly measures (Black & Wiliam, 
1998; Harlen & Deakin Crick, 2003), however, such contextual learning-gain is restrictive in terms of 
neural learning-potential. 
                                                          
119 ‘Desired’ outcomes may be as much self-oriented as societal-oriented. 
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Building Learning Potential 
A bias towards top-down appraisal in learning does not accurately reflect the multiple learning 
potentials possible across a composite multiple-functionality. Though student centred learning has 
addressed this somewhat (e.g. Gardner, 2008; Garner, 1983; Nijhuis, Segers & Gijselaers, 2007), 
learning as a contextual function, needs to be grounded on a structural-optimisation or flexibility: 
the situational realigning of neural behaviour, accommodating the experiential unknown, in a 
neural-constructivism. This is supported by Karmiloff-Smith (2012) in her assertion of functionality 
over modularity, providing a neo-constructivism emphasis for times of greater, bottom-up 
‘structural’ functionality in learning, the building of a knowledge ‘pool’ (see, 8.7 – Application 1: 
Increasing Learning Potential, p258). Observed as periods of seemingly ‘restricted’ Inhibition or 
unrestricted learning behaviours, developmental extremes as situative-bias functional states of 
learning become evident (e.g., Castillo et al., 2015; Hausdorff et al., 1999; Jessor, 1991; Kiefer et al., 
2014, ; Hollis, G., 2008, in Van Orden, et al. 2011; Kloos et al., 2009). This bottom-up dominance in 
functioning might be considered as exhibiting enhanced ‘dis-inhibition’ (Miyake et al., 2000), and 
might be speculated to represent a structuralism prerogative in developmental learning.  
This emphasises a situative platform on which contextual learning may be constructed, and requires 
that the composite of Tolerance Optimisation function in relative Effectives be addressed. Here, 
both situative and contextual function are operational, where ‘situative’ structures are ‘contextually’ 
refined in functionality, increasing neural-efficiency and ‘Effectivity’ (towards Tolerance and 
ecological-resilience (Blake, Heiser, Caywood & Merzenich, 2006; Plunkett et al., 2006; Wise, 2004)). 
Inhibition as primarily a learnt (top-down) behaviour, sees behaviours of contextual goal-orientation 
emerge. Such agential-function in Divergent Criticality, together with the ecological and societal 
prerogatives (a perception from the self, situation and society), can be abstracted further to explain 
the complexity and richness of our psychological experiences. Perception, naturalised as a 
selectionist proposition of agential-mediation, accommodates the iterations of agency, habitation, 
flow, self-concept, self-determination, intentionality and the many value-drives of motivation 
(e.g.,Bandura, 2001; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Deci & Ryan, 2008; Dweck, 1999; Graziano, 2013). Such a 
composite of agential function and affect in ecological engagement can be seen across species – 
from the increased dopamine release in ‘playing’ rats in interesting ‘environments’ (Panksepp & 
Biven, 2012), to the leaps of imagination and ‘contextualisation’ of bored children dreaming 
themselves out of classrooms, agential goal-orientation(s) towards increased Tolerance and future 
biological-value. 
The fundamental simplicity of a Divergent Criticality mechanism when mediated through a 
composite of function, provides for a complexity in perceptual awareness and conscious behaviour. 
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It could be said that Divergent Criticality provides a ‘space for consciousness’ and may be used to 
parametrise ‘some’ of its behavioural outcomes. Though the mechanism may be simple, the 
outcomes can be infinitely complex. 
The exploratory testing of the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation found 
significant results across all its research-designs supporting a Divergent Criticality entropic-
mechanism for a cognitive drive and maintenance of Tolerance Optimisation through agential 
mediation. This supports the naturalistic hypothesis that we are truly ‘ecology defined’, and that 
creativity, intentionality and agential belief and desire, can only ever be borrowed from the potential 
of our biological functioning: a ‘limited’ function of reduced Voluntary Control and Effectivity. 
Therefore, the greater the Effectivity of the agent, the greater the potential for such contextual gain 
and a resilience and Tolerance to define a ‘spectrum of learning-function’ for the demands and 
learning-outcomes is required to tolerate the dynamic diversity and complexity in life. The practical 
application of this to learning is discussed in (Application 5: Healthy Learning and Wellbeing, p265). 
In considering the Divergent Criticality hypothesis, it suggests that education methodologies and 
policies may need to define more clearly the value concepts that will not only benefit society but will 
also utilise and benefit the optimisation of the individual’s abilities and capabilities. 
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Discussion Part Three: The Application to Learning of the Divergent 
Criticality Hypothesis  
We learn innately, but how and what we learn are determined by our ecological engagement; an 
attentional-composite of situational and contextual neural-function influencing learning and 
perception processes. The functioning of Divergent Criticality self-organises to a state of Tolerance 
Optimisation, a learning state that may be considered as optimal in ecological function. Therefore, 
Divergent Criticality hypothesis has been presented as, primarily, an optimal learning theory – 
Tolerance Optimisation as an awareness and purposeful agency towards engaging with the 
opportunities available to the individual. 
The findings from this study have inferred that there is the opportunity to enhance learning 
outcomes through a better understanding and application of Tolerance Optimisation. How the brain 
functions and responds to the learning environment, and how learning for the individual could be 
enhanced is discussed through five distinct applications: 
Application 1: Increasing Learning Potential 
Application 2: Learning Centred on the Learner 
Application 3: Motivating Long-Term Learning 
Application 4: Developing Expertise 
Application 5: Healthy Learning and Wellbeing 
 
 Application 1: Increasing Learning Potential 
Learning in Divergent Criticality is the refinement of the individual’s learning-potential – 
Developmental interventions in education should therefore look to increase learning-potential. 
There is a natural ‘drive’ to engage, experience and learn from the world, which, as a situative or 
dispositional proposition might be considered as the developing of neural ‘structures’ and building a 
learning potential (see, 8.6.2 – A Learning-Moment as a Composite of Function, p244). Divergent 
Criticality in a self-organising Tolerance Optimisation, sees affective behaviour oriented towards an 
‘experience contingent learning’. Though addressing a ‘structural optimisation’ (the building of 
neural structures of complexity), if only ever situationally-responsive, this would be a ‘dynamically 
inefficient’ proposition for learning in a changing world of unknown challenges (see, 8.6.3 – A 
Learning Potential, p245). However, such ‘situative’ function does provide a ‘learning platform’ on 
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which to develop further ‘refined understanding’ through the learner’s contextualising of their 
experiences – a dynamic ‘optimisation’ of both situational and contextual determinates. Education, 
in this regard, might consider not only learning interventions attuned for an ‘optimisation’ of 
learning-potential, but also be able to align this to greater effect by considering the learning-
proclivities and capabilities of the learner (see, Application 2: Learning Centred on the Learner, 
below). 
Example: In building a learning-potential as a ‘learning platform’, it might be considered that an 
experiential ‘situative’ learning approach (see, Building Learning Potential, p256), favours a 
‘developmental’ period in educational induction and introduction processes. Higher Education (HE) 
would favour times of student exploration and academic uncertainty (such as first year students 
getting to ‘explore’ the University’s systems and complexity before specific directed learning.  
Here, the focus on experiential and exploratory learning over overt (top-down) contextualising, 
would favour motivation and attribution for learning and not detrimentally affect intentionality 
through non-essential cognitive distractions (specific academic-gain and specialisation are eschewed 
in favour of a generic exploration of the HE learning environment by the learner). Such an 
experientially biased learning approach might allow the student to develop agential ‘interest’ that 
though initially, situational, may later become mediated (agential or educator-guided) towards more 
‘contextual’ curriculum or specific end-goals. In this way, biasing a student potential, in turn provides 
a functional platform for developing student capability (Tolerance) and learning gain. 
 
 Application 2: Learning Centred on the Learner 
Divergent Criticality sets the student at the centre an optimal-learning methodology, 
individualised learning engagement informing learning-gain. 
At the crux of Divergent Criticality is an embodied constructivism for the implementation of situative 
and contextual end-points in learning. This prerogative considers the individual’s ‘learning 
functioning’, over and above pre-determined aims and goals when developing learning interventions 
– interventions which at the very least, should operate within the learner’s Tolerance Optimisation.  
In order to develop long term learning as an agential behaviour (a learning motivation), requires 
focusing on the student mediation of Tolerance Optimisation: the developing of Interest and 
hedonic-biases towards learning skills (see, 8.6.5 – A Drive or Motivation, p248). Thus, in defining 
learning-gain (a contextual bias in the functional composite of learning: 8.6.2, p244), education-
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methodologies might look to the relative Effectivity of the student and their agential-mediating of 
Tolerance Optimisation as learning proclivities and intentionality. It is in Divergent Criticality’s 
recognition of the learner’s neural functionality, that learning is not tailored only to the ‘required’ 
end-points, but also to the individual’s functional capabilities. This is not a stating of the obvious in 
re-describing, good teaching and methodological practice, but a ‘teaching’ that concurs with 
Tolerance Optimisation, a recognition of an individualised functionality requiring an individualised 
‘pedagogical’ approach to learning. – Rather than the differentiation of teaching practice, different 
pedagogical learning journeys are required for each learner, so that learning-gain is achieved and 
maintained at an optimal function.  
Learning-gain may be guided through experiential and contextual interventions, continually adapted 
to the learner’s ‘functional’ optimisation – a resonance with learner’s capabilities and motivations.  
Example: where there is ‘contextual’ paucity (learnt or hereditary dis-inhibition), then a more 
situative/ experiential grounding to learning would bias learning-potential as a platform on which to 
refine future contextual depth (building learning potential before refining learning gain). Conversely, 
where a contextual focus is detrimental to the learner’s wellbeing (inducing anxiety from overt top-
down cognitions), then a more experiential or ‘situative’ intervention might help ‘reset’ normal 
function within learner Tolerance (see, 8.6.7 – Optimising Learning-Potential or Learning-Gain, p254).  
Divergent Criticality and Tolerance Optimisation do not advocate ‘situative learning’ over ‘contextual 
learning’ – both are necessary in a ‘composite of function’ for learning-gain. It is not that education 
should be parsed into experientially-biased or contextually-refined pedagogies, but using Divergent 
Criticality functionality (for Tolerance Optimisation), traditional ‘Classroom Education’ and its 
contextual focus might better inform ‘Learning outside the Classroom’, and ‘Learning outside the 
Classroom’ provide a greater situative guidance for Classroom Education.  
This is the recognition of the ‘functional prerogative’ in any agent/environment learning 
engagement, over and above goal-oriented or specific end-points (academic or skill acquisition). 
Functionally, in response to what might be considered predominately, ‘contextual’ post-industrial 
end-points for education, Divergent Criticality suggests that a greater ‘situative’ application for 
education methodologies and pedagogy, would better address the learner’s capabilities and 
proclivities towards learning as central and foremost (see, Building Learning Potential, p256). As a 
‘developmental-learning’ approach, this may also offer opportunities for learner capabilities 
(hereditary and/or learnt-ability to contextualise) to be recognised and education be better aligned 
to the student and not the system (see, Agential Mediation and Regulation Shifting and Switching 
Behaviour, p252).  
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Example: such ‘student centred learning’, might offer multi-assessment criteria that accommodates 
‘flexible’ achievement goals (student centred), rather than a ‘conformity towards assessment’. 
Subsequently, it might be critiqued that, many ‘Learning Support Plans’ in attempting to 
accommodate the student’s learning needs, actually ‘manipulate’ the student’s learning-weaknesses 
towards ‘too-ridged’ end-point assessments. A Divergent Criticality functional approach would look 
to accentuate the learning-strengths of the student in an individualised learning optimisation – 
personalised end-points and assessment criteria, made fungible in achievement and learning-gain.   
As learning becomes a habitualised behaviour, it may be contextualised by the student as a ‘learnt 
skill’ – a learning capability that reflects the functional determinants applied to the individual. This 
offers a spectrum of educator influence and functional guidance that can be aligned and applied to 
the learner, a ‘guided learning’ that ranges from the more traditional contextual-interventions, to 
less-guided experiential environments of exploration, surprise and adventure. This enables an 
attentional-continuum to be tailored to the learner’s cognitive resources and learning demands 
guided through: i) cognitively-engaging with experientially ‘wide’ (situative) experiences; ii) to a 
more ‘narrow’, contextually-focused attention. Both these wide and narrow attentional-states are 
intrinsically interwoven in the Divergent Criticality hypothesis as a ‘composite’ of cognitive 
functioning, which can be manipulated to favour building learning-potential and/or learning-gain 
(see, 8.6.2 – A Learning-Moment as a Composite of Function, p244). 
 
 Application 3: Motivating Long-Term Learning 
Tolerance Optimisation as a ‘functional’ learning-state, informs perceptions of self-belief, self-
control and of agency. Such cognitive-emotional ‘states’ perpetuate behavioural ‘traits’ that may 
motivate long term learning. 
If we consider the student at the centre of learning, then learning that is accessible to the student’s 
functional capability becomes a learner-perception of cause and consequence, attributions that 
emerge as end-point motivations or learner mediated Tolerance Optimisation towards learner 
salient-goals (Bandura, 2001; Bandura & Locke, 2003; Dickinson & Balleine, 2000; Honicke & 
Broadbent, 2016; Vancouver, Thompson & Williams, 2001). In a ‘reciprocal determinism’ (a 
resonance between agent and environment), these goal-oriented ‘beliefs’ develop an agency for 
future achievements and self-determination. It is in how the educator helps to shape the functional 
landscape (the composite of situative and contextual learning) as a unique optimisation, that 
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learning motivations may be guided and determined by Divergent Criticality and learner mediated 
Tolerance Optimisation (see, 8.6.5 – A Drive or Motivation, p248). 
As such, motivation is an attentional ‘dynamic’ state, a ‘learning moment’ mediated by attentional 
processes (situative and contextual). Divergent Criticality allows the manipulation of situative and 
contextual bias in learning interventions (e.g. guided and experientially less-guided learning, see, 
Barrows & Tamblyn, 1980; Greeno et al., 1996; Guay, Ratelle & Chanal, 2008; Kirschner, Sweller & 
Clark, 2006; Noë, 2008; Schmidt et al., 2007). What emerges is a continuum of ‘guided learning’ 
towards maintaining an optimal learning-moment, learning interventions continually oriented 
towards the relative Effectivity ‘state’ of the learner (their self-attributions and relatedness learning 
end-points). This individualising of learning is a proposition considered “germane” to a learning-
constructivism (Schmidt et al., 2007, p93); a ‘level of guidance’ that puts the learner at the locus of a 
self-regulating, self-directed learning experience, but a learning-experience constrained to the 
learners capabilities, acceptance and mediation of – Tolerance Optimisation. 
Education policies that have predominately focused on specific-goals as societal/cultural end-points 
(such as academic-examination and deliberate/repetitive practice), are contextual-biased learning 
methodologies that may exclude the individual’s relatedness, intentionality and Effectivity therefore, 
restricting the optimising of learning-potential and future learning-gain. Therefore, a situative 
learning-approach of ‘experiential’ education has been suggested as a more student-centred 
approach, than that of the traditional classroom-learning environments (Cason & Gillis, 1994; Dillon 
et al., 2005; Hans, 2002; Hattie et al., 1997; Malone, 2008; 2004).  
This experiential ‘situative-bias’ for student relatedness and mediation, was supported in this study’s 
hypothesis H2 and H3, with greater learner-interest and ‘intrinsic’ motivation being reported 
(perception measures of self-concept), over more traditional ‘contextual’ classroom learning (see, 
7.3 – Difference Tests between High and Low states of functional Affordance, p208). Here, positive 
self-concept was reported in learning environments that maximised Tolerance Optimisation through 
a learning-moment or ‘composite’, of situative and contextual attentional demands. It is in 
maintaining the ‘relatedness’ of the learning-moment to the end-point or goals of education, that 
learning traits become affective as learning-motivations through situational interest and hedonic-
bias – the long-term functional regulation (situative/contextual) and learner motivation(s) for 
learning goals. The educator therefore should look to both short and long term learning goals of 
agential-relatedness, to develop for long term learning capabilities and learning motivation. 
Example: Long term educational goals are known to illicit student ‘amotivation’, be it mid-module or 
mid-course phenomena such as ‘second year drop-out’ of HE students (e.g. Jacobs & Newstead, 
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2000; Lieberman & Remedios, 2007; Thompson, Milsom, Zaitseva, Stewart, Darwent & Yorke, 2013). 
Divergent Criticality allows greater attention to the ‘learning moment’ as a functional-state needing 
to be attended towards agential goals; the mediation of Tolerance Optimisation in maintaining an 
agential ‘relatedness’ state, therefore, a long term learning-trait (as a key motivational drive). This 
requires a collaborative and continuous communication between learner, the educator and the 
curricula as discussed in (Cook-Sather, Bovill & Felten, 2014; Murphy, Nixon, Brooman & Fearon, 
2017). This is a student/educator collaboration, relating student capabilities to motivational goals 
(informed from experience and understanding of ‘previous’ learning behaviours), developing an 
optimal ‘learning function’ related to student proclivities.  
Such continual ‘attention to learning’ allows long-term learning-gains to be functionally guided and 
contextually grounded – the ‘how’ underpinning the student being ‘enabled’ to achieve their best. 
Importantly, this must not be an expectancy (student or educator) of ‘success or restriction’, but an 
optimisation of the unique learning-functioning in each student – a learning-composite with many 
different learning-routes to ‘optimal’ learner-specific goals.  
Divergent Criticality suggests that there may be many different ‘Learning Moments’ for a learner 
across a continuum of learning function. Using Tolerance Optimisation to guide a ‘functional state’ 
might help identify and parameterise learning-goals as accessible to the capabilities of the learner. 
These learning-states can then become long term traits, a meta-cognition where learning-gain is 
contextualised beyond short term gratification – A learning-moment focusing on salient goals, 
becomes internalised as ‘agential-attributions’ of learning motivation, autonomy and relatedness to 
educational end-points. Divergent Criticality provides a functional approach for long-term learning 
through optimising learner-interest and motivation, the functional determinants of learnt-behaviour  
(Chen et al., 2001a; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Hidi & Anderson, 1992; Rotgans & Schmidt, 2011). 
 
 Application 4: Developing Expertise 
Expertise may be considered as a ‘deliberate-habituation’ – an efficient resonance between the 
agent and the ecological demands of ‘the expertise’.  
A Tolerance Optimisation represents the individual’s optimal (neural) functioning for learning; 
however, not all Tolerance Optimisation states are the same learning-composite; they encompass a 
spectrum of optimisation-function from situative skill-acquisition through to contextual theorising. 
This allows the manipulation of this composite of learning function in two ways: for either greater 
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situational interventions grounding learning in action to optimise skill-acquisition; or an agential-
mediation (cognitive focus) towards contextual goals (see, 8.6.4 – A Learning Gain, p246). Thus to 
optimise a deliberate expertise, we need to consider the specific demands (ecological) of a directed 
expertise and the optimal learning interventions in achieving that expertise. 
As an ecological function, expertise is ‘represented’ as a neural-efficiency in relation to the ecological 
(expertise) demands. Such ‘efficiency’ relates cognitive-effort to expertise – the greater the 
habituation towards a ‘specific’ expertise interaction, the less cognitive-effort required and less 
attention given to that interaction. If the agent is able to dedicate their neural resources to the 
engagement in the ‘here and now’, what has been documented as an optimal affective behaviour 
(e.g. 'flow', Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Hanin, 1980, etc.), then such optimising of a functional 
habituation as a neural-efficiency proposition sees expertise-habituation represent an automatic, 
non-attentive state of Voluntary Control. 
Educating to ‘maximise efficiency’ might then be considered as a priority in coaching and learning; 
however, ‘neural efficiency’ in Divergent Criticality terms, does not build neural-potential or increase 
agent Effectivity, it instead, focuses existing neural-capability towards agential (mediated) expertise 
end-goals. There is an expertise dichotomy, therefore, that in deliberately focusing learning function 
for expertise (the contextual refining of expertise as specific learning-gain), the learner’s potential 
‘capability’ may be limited through too restrictive a focus. It might, therefore, be argued, that there 
has been an overt focus on expertise as a niche’ optimisation through deliberate practice (e.g. 
Ericsson, 1993). This approach restricts learning-potential when considered within Divergent 
Criticality functionality; if we educate for only a ‘niche’ of potential (a deliberate expertise), this 
misses the opportunity of our more expansive, dynamic capability for increasing learning-
potential120. Though we need to consider the determinants of the expertise required for specific 
end-points (the need to match desired-goal characteristics with the resonate learning engaged in by 
the learner, i.e. skill acquisition will ultimately require contextual skill learning), there is also a need 
to build a situated ‘platform of experience’ from which to contextually refine ‘acquisition in learning-
gain’. It is in the optimising of a learning-potential that educators and coaches of expertise could 
consider generalise learning (experientially novel and new) – especially in the developmental stages 
of expertise. 
                                                          
120 Complexity function in Divergent Criticality provides a fundamental perspective to expertise potential, in 
that contextual learning moments are analogous to that of the agent, therefore optimising the complexity 
potential of the agent that will allow greater contextual (expertise) and future focus. 
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The Divergent Criticality hypothesis guides strategies for optimising function (situative and 
contextual) towards the desired end-goals of expertise (either physical skill or knowledge 
acquisition). Though skill acquisition should be ‘deliberately’ educated for, it should be part of a 
learning composite that aims to optimised the situative ‘potential’ as well as the contextual 
expertise-focus of the individual. The optimising of a ‘situative’ Tolerance Optimisation (increasing 
learning-potential), provides a greater neural base on which to develop future contextual skill or 
learning gain.  
Example: In practical terms, to optimise expertise, learning-potential should first be promoted, then 
learning-gain expertly refined –  First, to achieve a maximal learning potential learners should be 
taken to the limits of their capabilities, but functioning ‘at the edge’ of their comfort zone (Tolerance 
Optimisation), not the limit ‘beyond’ Tolerance Optimisation (which favours the deliberate, 
intentional learning-gain). This emphasises expansive engagement with a ‘wide’ approach to 
ecological dynamics (rather than the constraint and specificity in a learning-engagement directed for 
expertise). This is a ‘learning for expertise’, a Tolerance Optimisation that is parameterised by 
functioning at a state where affective behaviour becomes effortful, a learning state that has been 
parameterised in Divergent Criticality as where White-shift becomes a Brown-Shift in entropic flux 
(see, 8.5.3 – Considerations of Habituation and Expertise, p241). In concert with learning-potential, 
deliberate practice focused on expertise may be integrated by taking learning ‘function’ to the edge 
of Tolerance, as parameterised in Divergent Criticality as a Brown-Shift in entropic flux taken to the 
limits of Tolerance Optimisation (i.e. before performance collapse). 
 
 Application 5: Healthy Learning and Wellbeing   
Divergent Criticality is a self-organising (learning) mechanism where cognitive-behaviour is 
affectively regulated to optimal ‘Tolerance’ function and emotionally rewarded for. Learning 
function, therefore, may be associated with cognitive-emotional behaviour and wellbeing. 
Affective emotion-regulation as a perception affects an innate and goal-oriented drive for a 
Tolerance Optimisation (a composite balance of situative and contextual function), the learning-
mechanism driven by Divergent Criticality. When learning function is emotionally aligned to affective 
cognitions at a ‘cusp’ of Tolerance Optimisation (see, 3.10 – How the Brain Knows: Tolerance 
Optimisation, p113), as a self-regulating mechanism around an ‘optimal-cusp’, Criticality ‘affects’ 
both positive cognitive-emotions when close to cusp, and negative cognitions when or far ‘beyond’ 
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cusp (adverse affective-cognitions of boredom and deprivation anxiety, or fear and overt anxiety – 
see, 2.14 – Cognitive Processes of Attention, p44).  
It could be argued that modern world and western education structures have become overtly 
‘contextualised’ in their delivery and assessment, with a focus on technological and academic 
minutiae (such as exam end-points and overtly contextual – Information Technology); a bias 
excluding the ‘situative’ balance from an expansive, ecological engagement (a human ‘nature’ 
evolved into the demands of the self, the social and physical environments). Such ‘overt’ academic 
methodologies {Robinson, 2010 #1801}, with an ‘attention to contextual learning’ function (see, 
8.6.8 – Overt Contextual Behaviours, p255), risks affective-cognitions functioning far from a cusp of 
Tolerance Optimisation – a ‘less than optimal’ state of functional Affordance (and negative 
perception). Here, a relative cusp-collapse ensues as function is taken beyond Tolerance 
Optimisation and elicits adverse behavioural and cognitive effects.  
Such states of functional Affordance represent increasing distraction121 and anxiety, ‘less than 
optimal’ function that may well manifest as abnormal or dis-functional goal-directed behaviours and 
detachment cognitions. If education is able to accommodate a functional approach to learning 
methodologies, it might look to implement greater situative demand (especially in formative 
teaching and coaching periods of learning-development), in balancing the functional composite of 
situative and contextual demand. This greater adherence to the functioning composite necessary for 
Tolerance Optimisation, results in a greater functional resilience to a learner’s contextual-mediations 
and greater emotional regulation – states of function inducing affective cognitive behaviours of less 
anxiety in learning. 
Example: The encouraging of grade-boundaries as end-point metrics in education represents an 
exaggerated ‘contextual-demand’ on the learning-function, one that may lead to learning dis-
function (e.g. study obsessive ‘top-down’ cognitions and behaviours – Tolerance Optimisation is 
compromised at the cost of affective-behavioural and psychological wellbeing); thus being counter-
productive to achieving the very contextual ‘optimisation’ end-points it seeks. 
In addition, learning, if overtly contextually-biased in its functional demands towards non-salient 
end-points (not related to agential goals), may also deliver dysfunction in learning behaviour as 
affective-cognitions realise a ‘lesser’ functional Affordance state –  affective-cognitive behaviours of 
‘amotivation’ may result, i.e. boredom, dis-engagement and eventually, learning drop-out (as seen in 
                                                          
121 Distracting, as in taking neural resources ‘away’ from ecological representation and action/perception 
efficiency (Voluntary Control) –  a reduced Voluntary Control (rVC). 
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the sampling of some theoretically-obtuse sampling domains (see functional Affordance states (IP7), 
0 – APPENDIX XV: Sample Interdependence Profiles, p363). In this study, most of the education 
domains sampled ‘did not’ reflect such overt contextual-demands. It is in addressing the balance of 
situative and contextual learning demands, that a composite of learning-function might be 
promoted for student well-being and health. 
Example: In overtly contextually-demanding learning environment, re-balancing the learning function 
through increasing ‘situative’ or experiential activities may be applied. This is evident in a resurgence 
of experiential activity and therapy interventions – be it cognitive-behaviour or ‘mindfulness’ 
techniques of attentional mediation (an attention to the ‘now’, of being in the moment), to the 
restorative benefits of physical exercise and green spaces (for education, anxiety and recuperation). 
Using Divergent Criticality and the Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis allows a ‘taught’ capability to 
be emotionally-regulated, the situative and the contextual demands on attention to be varied and 
compartmentalised, and allows not only a functional grounding of cognitive-emotional behaviours 
(and a wellbeing through Tolerance Optimisation), but also increases the learning-potential (see, 8.7, 
p258) increasing Tolerance and resilience of the learner towards future contextual demand. 
Throughout the application of the Divergent Criticality, it is in this ‘functional balance’, that we are 
reminded that we are products of our evolution – an evolution of social-engagement and situative-
demands. This study does not advocate that one approach to learning is necessarily better than 
another, rather it requires us to consider all the determinants of learning, both the situational and 
contextual functional demands. These are set within the needs and context of a ‘dynamic’ 
methodology: a learning function directed towards achievement goals, but guided by hereditary and 
agential proclivities. This is an educational proposition that optimises agential well-being, but also 
accommodates the contextual and learning values and gains society determines.
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9 CHAPTER NINE – Conclusion 
 Divergent Criticality: A Radical Ecological Psychology  
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis has been presented as a theory of ecological perception. When 
set within the self-organising processes of non-linear physics, biology emerges as a self-replicating 
autopoiesis, and Dynamical Theory is able to be formulated for perceptions and cognitions 
resonating with ecological demand. In doing so, a hypothesis of agential-mediation of affective 
behaviour is formulated and tested in the Divergent Criticality Hypothesis. Here, cognition and 
behaviour, rather than being ecologically bound, become conscious as an agential-mediated 
function. Such agential mediation of neural ‘entropic’ processes can then be considered as a 
functional imperative for learning in dynamic environments of surprise and change. The Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis, therefore, is proposed here as a fundamental mechanism for perception and 
learning. 
Chemero (2003) has argued that although an ecological approach to perception is an agential 
concept, it cannot be considered as selectionist since in its animal-environment autonomy, it is 
individual and niche-limited rather than species-oriented. Chemero (2008, 2013), though justifiably 
sceptical in attaching a selectionist label to perception, does, however, recognise the beginnings of 
agent-environment ‘agency’ in having affective-behavioural (biological) value:  
“Combining Affordances 2.0 with enactivist studies of the organism makes for a fully dynamical 
science of the entire brain-body-environment system: non-representational neuro-dynamic studies of 
the nervous system and sensorimotor abilities (Cosmelli, Lachaux, & Thompson, 2007; Thompson & 
Varela, 2001) match up with ecological psychological studies of affordances and sensorimotor 
abilities” (Chemero, 2008, p267). 
In suggesting that perception (as an Affordance) might be naturalised and aligned with biological-
value, though parsimonious in his attaching a selectionist function to Ecological Psychology, 
Chemero, does bring together the functionalism of Ecological Psychology with the structuralism of 
Cognitive Science in a ‘Radical Embodied Cognitive Science’ (see over, Chemero, 2013). 
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Figure 51 – Intellectual lineage of modern psychological traditions (from, Chemero, 2013, p147) 
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science (Chemero, 2009; Kaufer & Chemero, 2015; Thompson, 2007), 
sets perception within a Darwinian/Jameson ‘functionalism’, but, as grounded in Dynamical theory, 
provides an objectivity and structuralism to agent-environment autonomy: As such, agential 
subjectivity is able to be ecologically-coordinated in a ‘naturalised’ neural-function. This permits the 
Divergent Criticality theory to be set ‘within’ a Radical Functionalism, and can be aligned with the 
Phenomenological and Cognitive Science traditions. This enables Darwinian principles (of biological-
value in perception) to be fulfilled and the selectionist definition applied to the Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis as a perception of and from, dynamic entropic-function. Divergent Criticality may be 
considered, therefore, as a selectionist hypothesis. 
 
 Developing a Theory of Divergent Criticality and Tolerance Optimisation 
This study set out to explore the functioning of a Divergent Criticality hypothesis through perception 
measures as inferring the functioning of the processes which drive learning. The research developed 
a fundamental concept for explaining perception and understanding learning, that of a Self-
Organising Tolerance Optimisation – a mechanism for ecological adaptation and learning. 
The literature review explored perception from a phenomenological and neuro-psychological 
perspective, enabling a relationship between attentional processes and affective behaviour to be 
proposed. Entropic behaviour (formulated in Free Energy principles), was then applied to an 
ecological framework for biological-value, providing a coordinating-definition of ‘Tolerance’ with 
which subjective perceptions may be empirically observed. Awareness of attentional processes was 
hypothesised as a neural state of Tolerance and a ‘perception’ of a functional Affordance state. This 
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‘state’ of functioning represents neural-efficiency in a landscape of neural (entropic) function, and 
perception measures, therefore, can be modelled on agential mediated Affordance in terms of 
Tolerance Optimisation. 
Divergent Criticality, in developing a functional imperative for neural processes towards biological-
value, proposes that learning is optimised at a point of maximum entropic-dissipation and that 
cognitions and behaviours are driven to this threshold by Divergent Criticality as a fundamental 
entropy-mechanism. By utilising a biological-value model and formulating function as a ‘relative’ 
Effectivity, the Divergent Criticality hypothesis is able to parameterise a Tolerance Optimisation, and 
coordinate observation of perceptions as ‘awareness of attentional-processes’, the neural processes 
of situative and contextual adaptation in neural complexity and Self-Organising Criticality.  
 
 The Testing of the Divergent Criticality hypothesis 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) of perception measures, as a situational-awareness of a state of 
neural-function, allowed an inductive ‘Interdependence Profile’ to be derived as a ‘state’ of 
functional Affordance. These ‘states’ of functional Affordance not only correlated with the Divergent 
Criticality hypothesis predicted ‘affective behaviour’, but were able to differentiate between relative 
high and low (Effectivity) states. When set within the ‘agential’ functioning of relative-Effectivity, the 
Divergent Criticality hypothesis was significantly supported in the SEM modelling of affective 
cognitions inferring Tolerance Optimisation. 
The Triangulation of the Interdependence Profile  
Further support for the hypothesis was conducted in the triangulation of the Interdependence 
Profile (as a ‘state of functional Affordance’), with a measure of ‘self-concept’; correlation and 
difference testing were seen to concur significantly with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of 
Tolerance Optimisation.  
A Repeat Mixed-Measures Design 
The repeat measures study (Two-Way Mixed ANOVA) exhibited significant inference in a difference 
test for the Divergent Criticality hypothesis. The differentiation here was of a qualitative-split of 
‘Traditional Classroom Learning’ vs ‘Learning Outside the Classroom’ (LoTC). The findings 
significantly supported the hypothesis of LoTC eliciting greater affective cognitions for ‘high’ 
functional Affordance states (function near or at the cusp of Optimisation). These results were 
further supported with post-hoc triangulation with an Interdependence Profile. The 
Interdependence Profile for the two sample groups concurred with the hypothesised high/low states 
of functional Affordance, further supporting the Divergent Criticality hypothesis. 
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 Further Directions for the Divergent Criticality Hypothesis  
It is in the composite of ecologically-determined demands on cognitive function, that there is the 
opportunity to better define and manipulate the functional determinants of learning optimisation, a 
Tolerance Optimisation of affective-behaviour towards goal-oriented outcomes. This study, in 
suggesting Divergent Criticality as a functional mechanism, provides empirical support for its 
function and application. The ideas presented, are the early foundations of a Divergent Criticality 
Theory and further research is necessary to substantiate the hypothesis of Tolerance Optimisation. 
In defining a ‘Universality’ of neural-functioning for perception and learning, Divergent Criticality 
provides an opportunity for understanding not only how the brain learns, but the process that effect 
and shape that learning.  
This study has in some small way, addressed Chalmers (1995) ‘Hard Problem’ of naturalising 
perception and conscious intentionality through an objective definition of Tolerance and relative 
Effectivity –  functional Affordance. If accepted as a working hypothesis, a Divergent Criticality of 
Tolerance Optimisation has the potential to be applied to the exploration of neural function and 
aligned to nomothetic research (e.g. dynamical coupling paradigms and fractal-scaling research in 
ever more reductive-scanning of neural behaviour). If such observations are able to be situated 
within a mixed-methodology of enquiry, then it has the potential to provide the functional-holism 
demanded for the enquiry of brain and body function, a functional imperative to underpin 
perception-research with a Universality and to naturalise the explanations of the human condition – 
an Ecological Psychology. 
 
 Concluding thoughts 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis has presented a fundamental theory for neural function, in 
particular, the functioning of perception and learning in dynamic environments. By naturalising 
perception and behaviour within Universal principles, a model of learning as ecological adaptation, 
contributes to our understanding of the functioning of the brain and more pertinently, ‘how’ we 
learn. The results of this study provide support for the Divergent Criticality hypothesis and offer an 
exciting prospect, not only in the informed exploration of learning, but also the unravelling and 
understanding of how a perception of agency and intentionality in neural function inform our 
conscious experience. If substantiated, since all life is dynamic, Divergent Criticality may be applied 
more widely to encompass greater biological and ethological function.
References 
272 
 
REFERENCES 
Allison, P.D. (2003). Missing data techniques for structural equation modeling. Journal of abnormal 
psychology, 112, (4), 545. 
Ames, C. (1995). Achievement goals, motivational climate, and motivational processes. 
Anderson, M.L. (2003). Embodied cognition: A field guide. Artificial intelligence, 149, (1), 91-130. 
Anderson, M.L. (2016). Précis of after phrenology: neural reuse and the interactive brain. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 39. 
Arbuckle, J.L. (2016). IBM SPSS Amos 24 user’s guide. Crawfordville, FL: Amos Development 
Corporation, 635. 
Atkins, P. (2007). Four laws that drive the universe.  Oxford University Press. 
Bacciu, D., Etchells, T.A., Lisboa, P.J. & Whittaker, J. (2013). Efficient identification of independence 
networks using mutual information. Computational Statistics, 28, (2), 621-646. 
Bach-Y-Rita, P., Collins, C.C., Saunders, F.A., White, B. & Scadden, L. (1969). Vision Substitution by 
Tactile Image Projection. Nature, 221, (5184), 963-964. 
Baddeley, A. (1986). Working memory. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Baddeley, A. (2007). Working memory, thought, and action Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Baddeley, A.D. & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. Psychology of learning and motivation, 8, 47-
89. 
Bagozzi, R.P. & Yi, Y. (1988). On the evaluation of structural equation models. Journal of the academy 
of marketing science, 16, (1), 74-94. 
Bak, P. (1997). How nature works: the science of self-organized criticality. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Bak, P., Tang, C. & Wiesenfeld, K. (1987). Self-organized criticality: An explanation of the 1/f noise. 
Physical review letters, 59, (4), 381. 
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall. 
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York, Freeman. 
Bandura, A. (1999). Social cognitive theory of personality. Handbook of personality: Theory and 
research, 154-196. 
Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. Annual review of psychology, 52, 
(1), 1-26. 
Bandura, A. & Locke, E.A. (2003). Negative self-efficacy and goal effects revisited. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 88, (1), 87-99. 
Barker, J.E., Semenov, A.D., Michaelson, L., Provan, L.S., Snyder, H.R. & Munakata, Y. (2014). Less-
structured time in children's daily lives predicts self-directed executive functioning. Frontiers 
in psychology, 5. 
Barret, J. & Greenaway, R. (1995). The Role and Value of Outdoor Adventure in Young  People's 
Personal and Social Development, Coventry, Foundation for Outdoor Adventure. 
 
Barrows, H.S. & Tamblyn, R.M. (1980). Problem-based learning: An approach to medical education.  
Springer Publishing Company. 
Bates, E., Elman, J., Johnson, M., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Parisi, D. & Plunkett, K. (1998). Innateness and 
emergentism. A companion to cognitive science, 590-601. 
Bentler, P.M. (1983). Some contributions to efficient statistics in structural models: Specification and 
estimation of moment structures. Psychometrika, 48, (4), 493-517. 
Bentler, P.M. (1990). Comparative fit indexes in structural models. Psychological bulletin, 107, (2), 
238. 
Berkeley, G. (1709). An essay towards a new theory of vision. 2008 ed.: Arc Manor LLC. 
Berlyne, D.E. (1971). Aesthetics and psychobiology. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
References 
273 
 
Bernstein, A. (1967). The Coordination and Regulation of Movements. London, Pergamon Press. 
Berridge, K.C. & Kringelbach, M.L. (2008). Affective neuroscience of pleasure: reward in humans and 
animals. Psychopharmacology, 199, (3), 457-480. 
Berridge, K.C. & Kringelbach, M.L. (2013). Neuroscience of affect: brain mechanisms of pleasure and 
displeasure. Current opinion in neurobiology. 
Berridge, K.C. & Robinson, T.E. (2003). Parsing reward. Trends in Neurosciences, 9, 507–513. 
Bertschinger, N. & Natschläger, T. (2004). Real-time computation at the edge of chaos in recurrent 
neural networks. Neural computation, 16, (7), 1413-1436. 
Bialosiewicz, S., Murphy, K. & Berry, T. (2013). Do our Measures Measure up? The Critical Role of 
Measurement Invariance. In:  American Evaluation Association, October., 2013 Washington, 
DC. Claremont Evaluation Center. 
Birnbaum, A. (1962). On the foundations of statistical inference. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 57, (298), 269-306. 
Black, P. & Wiliam, D. (1998). Assessment and classroom learning. Assessment in Education: 
principles, policy & practice, 5, (1), 7-74. 
Blake, D.T., Heiser, M.A., Caywood, M. & Merzenich, M.M. (2006). Experience-dependent adult 
cortical plasticity requires cognitive association between sensation and reward. Neuron, 52, 
(2), 371-381. 
Bollen, K.A. (1990). Overall fit in covariance structure models: Two types of sample size effects. 
Psychological bulletin, 107, (2), 256. 
Bollen, K.A. & Pearl, J. (2013). Eight myths about causality and structural equation models. In: 
Handbook of causal analysis for social research. pp. 301-328. Springer. 
Boltzmann, L. (1872). Weitere Studien uber das Wirmegleichgewicht unter Gasmolek~len. 
. Wiener Berichte, 66, 275-370. 
Boltzmann, L. (1886). The second law of thermodynamics. Populare Schriften, Essay 3,  (1974)Address 
to a formal meeting of the Imperial Academy of Science, 29 May 1886. Boston, Reidel. 
Boltzmann, L. (1887). Neuer Beweis zweier Sätze über das Wärmegleichgewicht unter mehratomigen 
Gasmolekülen.  Kk Hof-und Staatsdruckerei. 
Bong, M. & Skaalvik, E.M. (2003). Academic self-concept and self-efficacy: How different are they 
really? Educational psychology review, 15, (1), 1-40. 
Boomsma, A. (1982). The robustness of LISREL against small sample sizes in factor analysis models. 
Systems under indirect observation: Causality, structure, prediction, 149-173. 
Brace, N., Snelgar, R. & Kemp, R. (2012). SPSS for Psychologists.  Palgrave Macmillan. 
Brillouin, L. (1953). Negentropy Principle of Information. Journal of Applied Physics, 24, (9), 1152-
1163. 
Brooks, R.A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. Artificial intelligence, 47, (1), 139-159. 
Browne, M.W. & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. Sage focus editions, 154, 
136-136. 
Bruner, J. (2009). Culture, mind and education. In: Contemorary Theories of Learning. Learning 
theorists ... in their own words. . Illeris, K. (ed.). Oxford: Routledge. 
Burton, R. (2008). On Being Certain: Believing You Are Right Even When You're Not. New York, St. 
Martin's Press. 
Buzzi, C.A., De Carvalho, T. & Teixeira, M.A. (2012). ON THREE-PARAMETER FAMILIES OF FILIPPOV 
SYSTEMS—THE FOLD–SADDLE SINGULARITY. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 
22, (12), 1250291. 
Byrne, B.M. (2008). Testing for multigroup equivalence of a measuring instrument: A walk through 
the process. Psicothema, 20, (4). 
Carnot, S. (1824a). Reﬂections on the Motive Power of Fire,  (1960)Trans. and ed. RH Thurston. In E. 
Mendoza, ed., Reﬂections on the Motive Power of Fire and Other Papers on the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics. 
References 
274 
 
Carnot, S. (1824b). Réflexions sur la Puissance Motrice du Feu et Sur les Machines Propres a 
Développer Cette Puissance, Bachelier. Paris. 
Cason, D. & Gillis, H.L. (1994). A meta-analysis of outdoor adventure programming with adolescents. 
Journal of Experiential Education, 17, (1), 40-7. 
Castillo, R.D., Kloos, H., Holden, J.G. & Richardson, M.J. (2015). Long-range correlations and patterns 
of recurrence in children and adults' attention to hierarchical displays. Frontiers in 
physiology, 6, 138. 
Cave, S. (2012). Immortality. New York, USA, Crown. 
Chalmers, D.J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of consciousness studies, 2, 
(3), 200-219. 
Chemero, A. (2000). What events are. Ecological Psychology, 12, (1), 37-42. 
Chemero, A. (2001). What We Perceive When We Perceive Affordances: Commentary on Michaels 
(2000)" Information, Perception, and Action". Ecological Psychology, 13, (2), 111-116. 
Chemero, A. (2003). An Outline of a Theory of Affordances. Ecological Psychology, 15, (2), 181-195. 
Chemero, A. (2008). Self-organization, writ large. Ecological Psychology, 20, (3), 257-269. 
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, MIT. 
Chemero, A. (2013). Radical embodied cognitive science. Review of General Psychology, 17, (2), 145. 
Chemero, A., Klein, C. & Cordeiro, W. (2003). Events as Changes in the Layout of Affordances. 
Ecological Psychology, 15, (1), 19-28. 
Chen, A. (2014). RE: Permission on Situational Merasure Adaptation. Type to Larkin, D. 
Chen, A. & Darst, P.W. (2002). Individual and Situational Interest:The Role of Gender and Skill. 
Contemporary Educational Psychology, 27, 250–269. 
Chen, A., Darst, P.W. & Pangrazi, R.P. (1999). What constitutes situational interest? Validating a 
construct in physical education. Measurement in Physical Education and Exercise Science, 3, 
(3), 157-180. 
Chen, A., Darst, P.W. & Pangrazi, R.P. (2001a). An examination of situational interest and its sources. 
British Journal of Educational Psychology, 71, 383-400. 
Chen, S., Sun, H., Zhu, X. & Chen, A. (2014). Relationship between motivation and learning in physical 
education and after-school physical activity. Research quarterly for exercise and sport, 85, 
(4), 468-477. 
Chen, Y., Ding, M. & Scott Kelso, J. (2001b). Origins of timing errors in human sensorimotor 
coordination. Journal of Motor Behavior, 33, (1), 3-8. 
Chialvo, D.R. (2008). Emergent complexity: what uphill analysis or downhill invention cannot do. 
New Ideas in Psychology, 26, (2), 158-173. 
Chialvo, D.R. (2010). Emergent complex neural dynamics. Nature physics, 6, (10), 744-750. 
Chialvo, D.R. & Bak, P. (1999). Learning from mistakes. Neuroscience, 90, (4), 1137-1148. 
Cisek, P. (2007). Cortical mechanisms of action selection: the affordance competition hypothesis. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 362, (1485), 
1585-1599. 
Cisek, P. & Kalaska, J.F. (2010). Neural mechanisms for interacting with a world full of action choices. 
Annual review of neuroscience, 33, 269-298. 
Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive 
science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36, (03), 181-204. 
Clark, A. (2015). Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind.  Oxford University 
Press. 
Clausius, R. (1856). On a Modified Form of the Second Fundamental Theorem in the Mechanical 
Theory of Heat. Philosophical Magazine, 12, (4), 81-98. 
Clayton, K. & Frey, B.B. (1997). Studies of Mental “Noise”. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life 
Sciences, 1, (3), 173-180. 
Close, F. (2014). The Asymetric Universe [Online]: The Royal Society. Available: 
https://royalsociety.org/events/2014/asymmetric-Universe/ [Accessed 22 December 2015]. 
References 
275 
 
Cloutier, S., Panksepp, J. & Newberry, R.C. (2012). Playful handling by caretakers reduces fear of 
humans in the laboratory rat. Applied animal behaviour science, 140, (3), 161-171. 
Cochran, W.G. (1952). The χ2 test of goodness of fit. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 315-345. 
Cohen, A., Pargman, D. & Tenenbaum, G. (2003). Critical elaboration and empirical investigation of 
the cusp catastrophe model: A lesson for practitioners. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 
15, (2), 144-159. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences, 2 ed. Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum. 
Collins, L.M., Schafer, J.L. & Kam, C.-M. (2001). A comparison of inclusive and restrictive strategies in 
modern missing data procedures. Psychological methods, 6, (4), 330. 
Cook-Sather, A., Bovill, C. & Felten, P. (2014). Engaging students as partners in learning and 
teaching: A guide for faculty.  John Wiley & Sons. 
Cook, R.D. (1979). Influential observations in linear regression. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 74, (365), 169-174. 
Corbetta, M. & Shulman, G.L. (2002). Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention in the 
brain. Nat Rev Neurosci, 3, (3), 201-215. 
Correll, J. (2008). 1/f noise and effort on implicit measures of bias. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 94, 48-59. 
Cosmelli, D., Lachaux, J.-P. & Thompson, E. (2007). Neurodynamics of consciousness. The Cambridge 
handbook of consciousness, 2, 229-239. 
Craig, A.D. (2014). How Do You Feel? : An Interoceptive Moment with Your Neurobiological Self. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Creswell, J.W. & Clark, V.L.P. (2011). Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research.  SAGE. 
Croll, J. (1976). Is catastrophe theory dangerous. New Scientist, 70, (630), 630. 
Cronbach, L.J. (1958). Proposals leading to analytic treatment of social perception scores. Person 
perception and interpersonal behavior, 353, 379. 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. New York, Harper Perennia. 
Curtis, V., Aunger, R. & Rabie, T. (2004). Evidence that disgust evolved to protect from risk of 
disease. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 271, (Suppl 4), 
S131-S133. 
Damasio, A. (2010). Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. London, Heinemann. 
Damasio, A. & Carvalho, G.B. (2013). The nature of feelings: evolutionary and neurobiological origins. 
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14, (2), 143-152. 
Damasio, A.R., Grabowski, T.J., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Ponto, L.L., Parvizi, J. & Hichwa, R.D. (2000). 
Subcortical and cortical brain activity during the feeling of self-generated emotions. Nature 
neuroscience, 3, (10), 1049-1056. 
Dancy, J. & Sandis, C. (2015). Philosophy of action: An anthology.  John Wiley & Sons. 
Danner, F.W. & Lonky, E. (1981). A cognitive-developmental approach to the effects of rewards on 
intrinsic motivation. Child Development, 52, 1043-1052. 
Darley, J.M. & Fazio, R.H. (1980). Expectancy Confirmation Effects Arising in the Social Interaction 
Sequence. American Psychologist, 35, 867-881. 
Dawid, A.P. (1979). Conditional independence in statistical theory. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society. Series B (Methodological), 1-31. 
Dawkins, R. (2006). The selfish gene, 2nd ed. Milton Keynes, Oxford University Press. 
Dayan, P. & Daw, N.D. (2008). Decision theory, reinforcement learning, and the brain. Cognitive, 
Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 8, (4), 429-453. 
De Donder, T. & Van Rysselberghe, P. (1936). Thermodynamic theory of affinity.  Stanford university 
press. 
Deacon, T.W. (1990). Fallacies of progression in theories of brain-size evolution. International 
Journal of Primatology, 11, (3), 193-236. 
References 
276 
 
Deci, E.L. (1992). The relation of interest to the motivation of behaviour: A self-determination theory 
perspective. In: Renninger, K. A., Hidi, S. & Krappe, A. (eds.) The Role of Interest in learning 
and development. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Deci, E.L. & Ryan, R.M. (1985). Intrinsic Motivation and self-determination in human behaviors. New 
York, Plenum Press. 
Deci, E.L. & Ryan, R.M. (1991). A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality. In: 
Dientsbier, R. (ed.) Nebraska symposium on motivation: Perspectives on motivation. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Deci, E.L. & Ryan, R.M. (2008). Self-determination theory: A macrotheory of human motivation, 
development, and health. Canadian Psychology, 49, (3), 182-185. 
Derakshan, N. & Eysenck, M.W. (2009). Anxiety, processing efficiency, and cognitive performance: 
New developments from attentional control theory. European Psychologist, 14, (2), 168-176. 
Descartes, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy: in The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes 
vol. 2.Translated by Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R. & Murdoch, D. (1984). Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Descartes, R. (1644). Principia philosophiae (Principles of Philosophy).Translated by Miller, 
V.Principles of Philosophy. Dordrecht, Reidel  
Deutsch, D. (2011). The beginning of infinity: Explanations that transform the world.  Penguin UK. 
Diamantopoulos, A., Siguaw, J.A. & Cadogan, J.W. (2000). Export peformance: The impact of cross-
country export market orientation. In:  American Marketing Association. Conference 
Proceedings, 2000. American Marketing Association, 177. 
Diamantopoulos, A. & Winklhofer, H.M. (2001). Index construction with formative indicators: An 
alternative to scale development. Journal of marketing research, 38, (2), 269-277. 
Dickinson, A. & Balleine, B.W. (2000). Causal cognition and goal-directed action. In: The evolution of 
cognition. Heyes, C. & Huber, L. (eds.), pp. 185-204. MA, US: The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Dillon, J., Morris, M., O'donnell, L., Reid, A., Rickinson, M. & Scott, W. (2005). Engaging and Learning 
with the Outdoors - The Final Report of the Outdoor Classroom in a Rural Context Action 
Research Project. National Foundation for Education Research. 
Dotov, D.G. (2014). Putting reins on the brain. How the body and environment use it. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 8, (795). 
Dunbar, R. (1998). The social brain hypothesis. brain, 9, (10), 178-190. 
Dunbar, R.I. (2003). The social brain: mind, language, and society in evolutionary perspective. Annual 
Review of Anthropology, 32, (1), 163-181. 
Durkheim, E. (1895/1982). The Rules of Sociological Method.Translated by Halls, W. D. In: Lukes, S. 
NY, Simon & Scbuster. 
Durso, F.T., Dattel, A.R., Banbury, S. & Tremblay, S. (2004). SPAM: The real-time assessment of SA. A 
cognitive approach to situation awareness: Theory and application, 1, 137-154. 
Dweck, C.S. (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality and development. Philadelphia, 
PA, Psychology Press. 
Ebenbauer, C., Raff, T. & Allgöwer, F. (2009). Dissipation inequalities in systems theory: An 
introduction and recent results. In:  Invited lectures of the international congress on 
industrial and applied mathematics, 2009. 23-42. 
Emery, N.J. & Clayton, N.S. (2004). The mentality of crows: convergent evolution of intelligence in 
corvids and apes. science, 306, (5703), 1903-1907. 
Endsley, M.R. (1988). Situation awareness global assessment technique (SAGAT). In:  Proceedings of 
the IEEE 1988 National Aerospace and Electronics Conference, 1988. IEEE, 789-795. 
Endsley, M.R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human factors, 
37, (1), 32-64. 
Engestrőm, Y. (1987). Learning by expanding: An activity-theoretical approach to developmental 
research. Helsinki, Orienta-Kunsultit. 
References 
277 
 
Ericsson, K.A. (1993). The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance. 
Psychological Review, 100, (3), 363-406. 
Eysenck, M.W. (1992). Anxiety: The cognitive perspective. Hove, UK, Erlbaum. 
Eysenck, M.W. & Calvo, M.G. (1992). Anxiety and Performance: The Processing Efficiency Theory. 
Cognition & Emotion, 6, (6), 409-434. 
Eysenck, M.W., Derakshan, N., Santos, R. & Calvo, M.G. (2007). Anxiety and cognitive performance: 
Attentional control theory. Emotion, 7, (2), 336-353. 
Feinberg, T.E. & Mallatt, J.M. (2016). The ancient origins of consciousness: How the brain created 
experience.  MIT Press. 
Feldman, A.G. (1986). Once more on the equilibrium-point hypothesis (λ model) for motor control. 
Journal of motor behavior, 18, (1), 17-54. 
Feldman, A.G. (2011). Space and time in the context of equilibrium‐point theory. Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 2, (3), 287-304. 
Feynman, R.P. (1994). No ordinary genius: the illustrated Richard Feynman.  WW Norton & 
Company. 
Fiennes, C., Oliver, E., Dickson, K., Escobar, D., Romans, A. & Oliver, S. (2015). The existing evidence-
base about the effectiveness of outdoor learning. Institute of Outdoor Learning, Blagrave 
Trust, UCL & Giving Evidence Report. 
Fisher, R.A. (1939). The comparison of samples with possibly unequal variances. Annals of Human 
Genetics, 9, (2), 174-180. 
Fodor, J.A. & Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1981). How direct is visual perception?: Some reflections on Gibson's 
“ecological approach”. Cognition, 9, (2), 139-196. 
Franchak, J. & Adolph, K. (2014). Affordances as Probabilistic Functions: Implications for 
Development, Perception, and Decisions for Action. Ecological Psychology, 26, (1-2), 109-
124. 
Freestone, P.P. & Lyte, M. (2008). Microbial endocrinology: experimental design issues in the study 
of interkingdom signalling in infectious disease. Advances in applied microbiology, 64, 75-
105. 
Friedman, N.P., Miyake, A., Robinson, J.L. & Hewitt, J.K. (2011). Developmental trajectories in 
toddlers' self-restraint predict individual differences in executive functions 14 years later: A 
behavioral genetic analysis. Developmental psychology, 47, (5), 1410. 
Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 
11, (2), 127-138. 
Friston, K.J., Daunizeau, J., Kilner, J. & Kiebel, S.J. (2010). Action and behavior: a free-energy 
formulation. Biological cybernetics, 102, (3), 227-260. 
Friston, K.J. & Stephan, K.E. (2007). Free-energy and the brain. Synthese, 159, (3), 417-458. 
Galantucci, B., Fowler, C.A. & Turvey, M.T. (2006). The motor theory of speech perception reviewed. 
Psychonomic bulletin & review, 13, (3), 361-377. 
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L. & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the premotor cortex. 
Brain, 119, (2), 593-609. 
Gardner, H.E. (2008). Multiple intelligences: New horizons in theory and practice.  Basic books. 
Garner, H. (1983). Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences. New York, Basic Books. 
Gaskin, J. (2016a). Common Latent Factor Connector, Gaskination's Statistics [Online]. Available: 
http://statwiki.kolobkreations.com [Accessed 28 November 2016]. 
Gaskin, J. (2016b). Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Gaskination's Statistics [Online]. Available: 
http://statwiki.kolobkreations.com [Accessed 29 November 2017]. 
Gaskin, J. (2016c). Data Screening, Gaskination's StatWiki [Online]. Available: 
http://statwiki.kolobkreations.com [Accessed 11 August 2017]. 
Gaskin, J. (2016d). Pattern Matrix Model Builder, Gaskination's Statistics [Online]. Available: 
http://statwiki.kolobkreations.com [Accessed 28 November 2016]. 
References 
278 
 
Gaskin, J. (2016e). "Validity Master", Stats Tools Package [Online]. Available: 
http://statwiki.kolobkreations.com [Accessed 18 August 2016]. 
Gaskin, J. (2017a). "Chi Square Difference", Stats Tools Package. [Online]. Available: 
http://statwiki.kolobkreations.com [Accessed 18 November 2016]. 
Gaskin, J. (2017b). User Defined Estimand, Gaskination's Statistics [Online]. Available: 
http://statwiki.kolobkreations.com [Accessed 6th December 2017]. 
Gavrilov, N.K. (1978). On some bifurcations of an equilibrium with one zero and a pair of pure 
imaginary roots,. Methods of the Qualitative Theory of Differential Equations, Gorkii State 
University, pp. 33–40. 
Gershman, S.J. & Daw, N.D. (2012). Perception, action and utility: The tangled skein. Principles of 
brain dynamics: Global state interactions, 293-312. 
Gibbs, J.W. (1873). A method of geometrical representation of the thermodynamic properties of 
substances by means of surfaces.  Connecticut Academy. 
Gibbs, J.W. (1876). On the equilibrium of heterogenous stubstances. Transactions of the Connecticut 
Academy of Arts and Sciences III. New Haven. 
Gibbs, J.W. (1885). On the fundamental formula of statistical mechanics, with applications to 
astronomy and thermodynamics.  Salem Press. 
Gibbs, J.W. (1902). Elementary Principles in Statistical Mechanics. New Haven, CT, Yale Univ. Press. 
Gibson, J.J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. . Oxford, England, Houghton 
Mifflin. 
Gibson, J.J. (1977). The Theory of Affordances. In: Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing: Toward an 
Ecological Psychology. Shaw, R. & Bransford, J. (eds.). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Glansdorf, P. & Prigogine, I. (1971). Structure, stability and fluctuations. Interscience, New York. 
Gläscher, J., Daw, N., Dayan, P. & O'doherty, J.P. (2010). States versus rewards: dissociable neural 
prediction error signals underlying model-based and model-free reinforcement learning. 
Neuron, 66, (4), 585-595. 
Glaser, B.G. & Strauss, A.L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative 
research. New York, Aldine de Gruyer. 
Glass, L. & Mackey, M.C. (1988). From clocks to chaos: The rhythms of life.  Princeton University 
Press. 
Glasser, M. (1964). Linear regression analysis with missing observations among the independent 
variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 59, (307), 834-844. 
Gleick, J. (1997). Chaos: Making a new science.  Random House. 
Glenberg, A.M., Havas, D., Becker, R. & Rinck, M. (2005). Grounding Language in Bodily States: The 
Case for Emotion. In: The grounding of cognition: The role of perception and action in 
memory, language, and thinking. Zwaan, R. & Pecher, D. (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gold, J.I. & Shadlen, M.N. (2007). The neural basis of decision making. Annu. Rev. Neurosci., 30, 535-
574. 
Gómez, J.-C. (2005). Species comparative studies and cognitive development. Trends in cognitive 
sciences, 9, (3), 118-125. 
Goschke, T. (2000). " I A Intentional Reconfiguration and J-TI Involuntary Persistence in Task Set 
Switching. Control of cognitive processes: Attention and performance XVIII, 18, 331. 
Grandy, W.T. (2008). Entropy and the time evolution of macroscopic systems. Oxford; New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
Graziano, M.S. (2013). Consciousness and the social brain.  Oxford University Press. 
Graziano, M.S. & Kastner, S. (2011). Human consciousness and its relationship to social 
neuroscience: a novel hypothesis. Cognitive neuroscience, 2, (2), 98-113. 
Greeno, J.G., Collins, A.M. & Resnick, L.B. (1996). Cognition and learning. In: Berliner, D. C. & Calfee, 
R. C. (eds.) Handbook of Educational Psychology. London: Prentice Hall. 
References 
279 
 
Greffrath, G., Meyer, C., Strydom, H. & Ellis, S. (2011). Centre‐based and expedition‐based 
(wilderness) adventure experiential learning regarding personal effectiveness: an explorative 
enquiry. Leisure Studies, 30, (3), 345-364. 
Gregory, R. (1972). Seeing as thinking: and active theory of perception. Times Literary Supplement. 
London: The Times. 
Grigolini, P. (2015). Emergence of biological complexity: Criticality, renewal and memory. Chaos, 
Solitons and Fractals, 81, 575-588. 
Grigolini, P. & Chialvo, D.R. (2013). Special Issue: Emergent Critical Brain Dynamics. PERGAMON-
ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD THE BOULEVARD, LANGFORD LANE, KIDLINGTON, OXFORD OX5 1GB, 
ENGLAND. 
Guardia, M., Seara, T. & Teixeira, M.A. (2011). Generic bifurcations of low codimension of planar 
Filippov systems. Journal of Differential Equations, 250, (4), 1967-2023. 
Guastello, S.J. (2009). Introduction to Nonlinear Dynamics and Complexity. In: Chaos and complexity 
in psychology. Guastello, S. J., Koopmans, M. & Pincus, D. (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Guay, F., Ratelle, C.F. & Chanal, J. (2008). Optimal learning in optimal contexts: The role of self-
determination in education. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie canadienne, 49, (3), 233-240. 
Hair, J.F., Black, W.C., Babin, B.J., Anderson, R.E. & Tatham, R. (2013). Multivariate data analysis (7th 
Eds.). NY: Pearson. 
Haken, H., Kelso, J.a.S. & Bunz, H. (1985). A theoretical model of phase transitions in human hand 
movements. Biological Cybernetics, 51, (5), 347-356. 
Hanin, Y. (1980). A cognitive model of anxiety in sports. Sport psychology: An analysis of athlete 
behavior, 236-249. 
Hanin, Y.L. (2003). Performance related emotional states in sport: a qualitative analysis. In:  Forum 
Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 2003. 
Hanin, Y.L. (2007). Emotions in sport: Current issues and perspectives. 
Hans, T.A. (2002). A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Adventure Programming on Locus of Control. 
Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 30, (1), 33-60. 
Harari, Y.N. (2011). Sapiens: A brief history of humankind. New York: HarperCollins. 
Hardy, L., Beattie, S. & Woodman, T. (2007). Anxiety‐induced performance catastrophes: 
Investigating effort required as an asymmetry factor. British Journal of Psychology, 98, (1), 
15-31. 
Hardy, L. & Fazey, J. (1987). The inverted-U hypothesis: a catastrophe for sport psychology. 
Unpublished Conference Paper, 1-26. 
Hardy, L. & Hutchinson, A. (2007). Effects of performance anxiety on effort and performance in rock 
climbing: A test of processing efficiency theory. Anxiety, Stress & Coping, 20, (2), 147-161. 
Hardy, L. & Parfitt, G. (1991). A catastrophe model of anxiety and performance. British Journal of 
Psychology, 82, (2), 163-178. 
Harlen, W. & Deakin Crick, R. (2003). Testing and motivation for learning. Assessment in Education: 
Principles, Policy & Practice, 10, (2), 169-207. 
Harlim, J. & Langford, W., F (2007). The cusp–Hopf bifurcation. International Journal of Bifurcation 
and Chaos, 17, (08), 2547-2570. 
Harter, S. (1978). Pleasure derived from optimal challenge and the effects of extrinsic rewards on 
children’s difficulty level choices. Child Development, 53, 87-97. 
Hastings, J. & Greenberg, E. (1999). Quorum sensing: the explanation of a curious phenomenon 
reveals a common characteristic of bacteria. Journal of bacteriology, 181, (9), 2667-2668. 
Hatfield (1988). Representations and content in some Actual Theories of Perception. (Reprinted). In: 
Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology (2009). Hatfield, G. (ed.). 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
References 
280 
 
Hattie, J., Marsh, H.W., Neill, J.T. & Richards, G.E. (1997). Adventure education and outward bound: 
out-of-class experiences that make a lasting difference. Review of Educational Research, 67, 
(1), 43-87. 
Hausdorff, J.M., Zemany, L., Peng, C.-K. & Goldberger, A.L. (1999). Maturation of gait dynamics: 
stride-to-stride variability and its temporal organization in children. Journal of Applied 
Physiology, 86, (3), 1040-1047. 
He, B.J. (2014). Scale-free brain activity: past, present, and future. Trends in cognitive sciences, 18, 
(9), 480-487. 
Hebb, D.O. (1949). The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory. NY, John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Hebb, D.O. (2002). The organization of behavior: A neuropsychological theory.  Psychology Press. 
Hedayat, A. & Zhao, W. (1990). Optimal two-period repeated measurements designs. The Annals of 
Statistics, 1805-1816. 
Heidegger, M. (1927). Being and time.Translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (1962).  New York: 
Harper & Row. 
Held, R. & Hein, A. (1963). Movement-produced stimulation in the development of visually guided 
behavior. Journal of comparative and physiological psychology, 56, (5), 872. 
Helmholtz, H. (1882). On the thermodynamics of chemical processes: Scientific Papers. Vol. 30. The 
Harvard Classics [Online] 43-97 New York: Collier & Son. Available: www.bartleby.com/30/ 
[Accessed 30 October 2017]. 
Helmholtz, H.V. (1847). On the conservation of force; a physical memoir. Selected Writings of 
Hermann von Helmholtz (1971). Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, CT, 3-55. 
Hens, Z. & De Hemptinne, X. (1996). Non-equilibrium Thermodynamics approach to Transport 
Processes in Gas Mixtures. arXiv preprint chao-dyn/9604008. 
Henseler, J., Ringle, C.M. & Sarstedt, M. (2015). A new criterion for assessing discriminant validity in 
variance-based structural equation modeling. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
43, (1), 115-135. 
Hickok, G. (2009). Eight problems for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding in monkeys 
and humans. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 21, (7), 1229-1243. 
Hickok, G. (2014). The myth of mirror neurons: The real neuroscience of communication and 
cognition.  WW Norton & Company. 
Hidi, S. (2006). Interest: A unique motivational variable. Educational Research Review, 1, (2), 69-82. 
Hidi, S. & Anderson, V. (1992). Situational interest and its impact on reading and expository writing. 
In: The role of interest in learning and development. K. A. Renninger, S. & Hidi, A. K. (eds.), 
pp. 215–238. NJ: Erlbaum: Hillsdale. 
Hidi, S. & Renninger, K.A. (2006). The four-phase model of interest development. Educational 
psychologist, 41, (2), 111-127. 
Hobson, A. & Cheng, B.-K. (1973). A comparison of the Shannon and Kullback information measures. 
Journal of Statistical Physics, 7, (4), 301-310. 
Hollis, G., Kloos, H. & Van Orden, G.C. (2009). Origins of order in cognitive activity. Chaos and 
complexity in psychology: The theory of nonlinear dynamical systems, 206-241. 
Honicke, T. & Broadbent, J. (2016). The influence of academic self-efficacy on academic 
performance: A systematic review. Educational Research Review, 17, 63-84. 
Hopf, E. (1942). Abzweigung einer periodischen LiSsung von einer station~iren L/Ssung eines 
Differen- tialsystems,. Ber. Math.-Phys. Kl. Siichs. Akad, Wiss. Leipzig, 3, (94), 22. 
Howard-Jones, P. & Demetriou, S. (2009). Uncertainty and engagement with learning games. 
Instructional Science, 37, (6), 519-536. 
Hu, L.T. & Bentler, P.M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: 
Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural equation modeling: a 
multidisciplinary journal, 6, (1), 1-55. 
References 
281 
 
Hubel, D.H. & Wiesel, T.N. (2005). Brain and visual perception: The story of a 25-year collaboration. 
New York, NY, US, Oxford University Press. 
Hughlings Jackson, J. (1884). On the evolution and dissolution of the nervous system. Croonian 
lectures 3, 4 and 5 to the Royal Society of London. Lancet, 1, 555-739. 
Humphries, N.E., Schaefer, K.M., Fuller, D.W., Phillips, G.E., Wilding, C. & Sims, D.W. (2016). Scale-
dependent to scale-free: daily behavioural switching and optimized searching in a marine 
predator. Animal Behaviour, 113, 189-201. 
Husserl, E. (1913). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy.Translated by Kersten, F. (1983).  Springer Science and Business Media. 
Iberall, A.S. (1970). On the general dynamics of systems. General Systems, XV, 7-13. 
Illeris, K. (2003a). Three Dimensions of Learning: Contemporary learning theory in the tension field 
between the cognitive, the emotional and the social.  Roskilde University Press (distributed 
by NIACE). 
Illeris, K. (2003b). Towards a contemporary and comprehensive theory of learning. International 
Journal of Lifelong Education, 22, (4), 396-406. 
Illeris, K. (2007). How we learn: Learning and non-learning in School and Beyond. London/New York, 
Routledge. 
Illeris, K. (ed.) (2009). Contemorary Theories of Learning. Learning theorists ... in their own words. 
Oxford: Routledge  
Jacobs, P. & Newstead, S. (2000). The nature and development of student motivation. British Journal 
of Educational Psychology, 70, (2), 243-254. 
James, G., Witten, D., Hastie, T. & Tibshirani, R. (2013). An introduction to statistical learning.  
Springer. 
Jaynes, E.T. (1957). Information theory and statistical mechanics. Physical Review, 106&108, 620-
630&171-190. 
Jessor, R. (1991). Risk behavior in adolescence: a psychosocial framework for understanding and 
action. Journal of adolescent Health. 
Jones, B. & Kenward, M.G. (2003). Design and analysis of cross-over trials.  CRC Press. 
Jöreskog, K.G. & Sörbom, D. (1978). LISREL IV: A general computer program for estimation of linear 
structural equation systems by maximum likelihood methods.  University of Uppsala, 
Department of statistics [Uppsala univ., Statistiska inst.]. 
Kahneman, D., Fredrickson, B.L., Schreiber, C.A. & Redelmeier, D.A. (1993). When more pain is 
preferred to less: Adding a better end. Psychological Science, 4, (6), 401-405. 
Kahneman, D. & Riis, J. (2005). Living, and thinking about it: Two perspectives on life. In: The science 
of well-being. Huppert, F., Baylis, N. & Keverne, B. (eds.), pp. 285-304. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kaiser, H. (1974). An index of factorial simplicity, Psychometrics 39: 31–36. 
Kant, I. (1781). Critique of pure reason.Translated by Meiklejohn, J. (1990). Amherst, NY, Prometheus 
Books. 
Kant, I. (1987). Critique of judgment, trans. W.S Pluhar. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2012). From Constructivism to Neuroconstructivism: The Activity-Dependent 
Structuring of the Human Brain. In: After Piaget. Marti, E. & Rodriguez, C. (eds.), pp. 1 - 15. 
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
Karmiloff‐Smith, A. (2009). Preaching to the converted? From constructivism to neuroconstructivism. 
Child development perspectives, 3, (2), 99-102. 
Kaufer, S. & Chemero, A. (2015). Phenomenology: An Introduction.  John Wiley & Sons. 
Kauffman, S.A. (2000). Investigations.  Oxford University Press. 
Kcheema, J.R. (2014). Some general guidelines for choosing missing data handling methods in 
educational research. Journal of Modern Applied Statistical Methods, 13, (2), 3. 
Kello, C.T. (2013). Critical branching neural networks. Psychological Review, 120, (1), 230. 
References 
282 
 
Kello, C.T., Beltz, B.C., Holden, J.G. & Van Orden, G.C. (2007). The emergent coordination of cognitive 
function. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, (4), 551. 
Kello, C.T., Rodny, J., Warlaumont, A.S. & Noelle, D.C. (2012). Plasticity, Learning, and Complexity in 
Spiking Networks. Critical Reviews™ in Biomedical Engineering, 40, (6). 
Kello, C.T. & Van Orden, G.C. (2009). Soft-assembly of sensorimotor function. Nonlinear Dynamics. 
Psychology, and Life Sciences, 13, 57-78. 
Kelso, J.A. (1984). Phase transitions and critical behavior in human bimanual coordination. The 
American journal of physiology, 246, (6 Pt 2), R1000-4. 
Kelso, J.a.S. (1995). Dynamic patterns: The self-organization of brain and behavior. Cambridge, MA, 
MIT Press. 
Kelso, J.a.S. (2012). Multistability and metastability: understanding dynamic coordination in the 
brain. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367, (1591), 906-
918. 
Kelso, J.a.S., Del Colle, J.D. & Schöner, G. (1990). Action-perception as a pattern formation process. 
Kelso, S. (2010). Instabilities and phase transitions in human brain and behavior. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience. 
Kendall, S. & Rodger, J. (2015). Evaluation of Learning Away: final report. London. 
Kenny, D.A. (2015). Structural Equation Modeling (SEM): Fit [Online]. Available: 
http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm [Accessed 21st December 2016]. 
Kiefer, A.W., Riley, M.A., Shockley, K., Villard, S. & Van Orden, G.C. (2009). Walking Changes the 
Dynamics of Cognitive Estimates of Time Intervals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 35, (5), 1532-1541. 
Kiefer, A.W., Wallot, S., Gresham, L.J., Kloos, H., Riley, M.A., Shockley, K. & Van Orden, G. (2014). 
Development of coordination in time estimation. Developmental psychology, 50, (2), 393. 
Kilner, J.M. & Lemon, R. (2013). What we know currently about mirror neurons. Current Biology, 23, 
(23), R1057-R1062. 
Kirschner, P.A., Sweller, J. & Clark, R.E. (2006). Why minimal guidance during instruction does not 
work: An analysis of the failure of constructivist, discovery, problem-based, experiential, and 
inquiry-based teaching. Educational psychologist, 41, (2), 75-86. 
Kline, P. (2013). Handbook of psychological testing.  Routledge. 
Kloos, K., Kiefer, A.W., Gresham, L., K. Shockley, K., Riley, M.A. & Van Orden, G.C. (2009 of 
Conference). Response time dynamics of children and adults. Talk presented at the 15th 
International Conference on Perception and Action. In:  Minneapolis, 2009. 
Knudsen, E.I. (2007). Fundamental components of attention. Annu. Rev. Neurosci., 30, 57-78. 
Koffka, K. (ed.) (1935). Principles of Gestalt Psychology. New York: Harcourt and Brace. 
Kohn, M., Senyak, J. & Jarrett, M. (2018). Sample Size Calculators for Designing Clinical Research 
[Online]. Available: http://www.sample-size.net/ [Accessed 26 April 2018]. 
Kolb, D.A. (1984). Experiential Learning. London, Prentice Hall. 
Kostrubiec, V., Zanone, P.-G., Fuchs, A. & Kelso, J.S. (2012). Beyond the blank slate: routes to 
learning new coordination patterns depend on the intrinsic dynamics of the learner—
experimental evidence and theoretical model. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 6. 
Krapp, A. (2002). Structural and dynamic aspects of interest development: Theoretical 
considerations from an ontogenetic perspective. Learning and instruction, 12, (4), 383-409. 
Krubitzer, L. & Kaas, J. (2005). The evolution of the neocortex in mammals: how is phenotypic 
diversity generated? Current opinion in neurobiology, 15, (4), 444-453. 
Kullback, S. (1959). Information theory and statistics. New York: Dover, 1968, 2nd ed. 
Kuzmin, E.A. (2012). Uncertainty & Certainty in Management of Organizational-Economic Systems. 
Lakoff, G. (2003). How the Body Shapes Thought: Thinking with an All Too Human Brain. In: The 
Nature and Understanding: The 2001 Gifford Lectures at the University of Glasgow. Stanford, 
A. & Johnson-Laird, P. (eds.), pp. 49-74. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Publishers, Ltd. 
References 
283 
 
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human conceptual system. 
Cognitive science, 4, (2), 195-208. 
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to 
Western Thought. New York, Basic Books. 
Lane, D.M., Scott, D., Hebl, M., Guerra, R., Osherson, D. & Zimmer, H. (2014). Introduction to 
statistics. Rice Univ., Houston, TX, 474-476. 
Langford, W.F. (1979). Periodic and steady-state mode interactions lead to tori. SIAM Journal on 
Applied Mathematics, 37, (1), 22-48. 
Lave, J. (1988). Cognition in practice: Mind, mathematics and culture in everyday life.  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lave, J. & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation.  Cambridge 
university press. 
Lavie, N., Hirst, A., De Fockert, J.W. & Viding, E. (2004). Load theory of selective attention and 
cognitive control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, (3), 339. 
Lende, D.H. & Downey, G. (2012). Neuroanthropology and its applications: an introduction. Annals of 
Anthropological Practice, 36, (1), 1-25. 
Levene, H. (1960). Robust tests for equality of variances. Contributions to probability and statistics, 
1, 278-292. 
Levesque, C., Copeland, K.J. & Sutcliffe, R.A. (2008). Conscious and nonconscious processes: 
Implications for self-determination theory. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie canadienne, 
49, (3), 218-224. 
Liberman, A.M., Cooper, F.S., Shankweiler, D.P. & Studdert-Kennedy, M. (1967). Perception of the 
speech code. Psychological review, 74, (6), 431. 
Lieberman, D.A. & Remedios, R. (2007). Do undergraduates' motives for studying change as they 
progress through their degrees? British Journal of Educational Psychology, 77, (2), 379-395. 
Linden, D.J. (2003). From Molecules to Memory in the Cerebellum. Science, 301, (5640), 1682-1685. 
Liouville, J. (1838). Note sur la Théorie de la Variation des constantes arbitraires. Journal de 
mathématiques pures et appliquées, 342-349. 
Little, R. & Rubin, D. (1987). Statistical analysis with missing data, J. Wiley. 
 
Little, R.J. (1988). A test of missing completely at random for multivariate data with missing values. 
Journal of the American statistical Association, 83, (404), 1198-1202. 
Llinas, R. (1989). Mindness’ as a functional state of the brain. In: Mindwaves. Blakemore, C. & 
Greenfield, S. (eds.). Blackwell Publishers. 
Lomax, R.G. & Schumacker, R.E. (2004). A beginner's guide to structural equation modeling.  
psychology press. 
Macklem, P.T. (2008). Emergent phenomena and the secrets of life. Journal of Applied Physiology, 
104, 1844-1846. 
Malone, K. (2008). Every Experience Matters: An evidence based research report on the role of 
learning outside the classroom for children’s whole development from birth to eighteen 
years. Report commissioned by Farming and Countryside Education for UK: Department 
Children, School and Families, Wollongong, Australia. 
Mann, H.B. & Whitney, D.R. (1947). On a test of whether one of two random variables is 
stochastically larger than the other. The annals of mathematical statistics, 50-60. 
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational approach. San Fransisco: Freeman. 
Marsh, H.W., Pekrun, R., Parker, P.D., Murayama, K., Guo, J., Dicke, T. & Arens, A.K. (2018). The 
murky distinction between self-concept and self-efficacy: Beware of lurking jingle-jangle 
fallacies. Journal of Educational Psychology. 
Marsh, H.W., Richards, G.E. & Barnes, J. (1986). Multidimensional self-concepts: The effect of 
participation in an Outward Bound program. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
50, 195-204. 
References 
284 
 
Massieu, M. (1869). Thermodynamique - Sur les fonctions caract´eristiques des divers ﬂuides. 
Comptes Rendus 69, 858-862; 1057-1061. 
Matthews, J.N.S. (1988). Recent Developments in Crossover Designs. International Statistical Review 
/ Revue Internationale de Statistique, 56, (2), 117-127. 
Maturana, H. & Varela, F. (1972). Autopoiesis and cognition D Reidel: Dordrecht. Holland. 
Maynard Smith, J. (1974). The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of 
theoretical biology, 47, (1), 209-221. 
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games.  Cambridge university press. 
Mccarthy, J. & Hayes, P. (1969). Machine intelligence. In: Some Philosophical Problems from the 
Standpoint of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. Meltzer, B. & Mitchie, D. (eds.), 4 ed. New York: 
American Elsevier. 
Mccune, B. (2006). Non‐parametric habitat models with automatic interactions. Journal of 
Vegetation Science, 17, (6), 819-830. 
Mcgilchrist, I. (2009). The master and his emissary: The divided brain and the making of the western 
world.  Yale University Press. 
Merker, B. (2007). Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and 
medicine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, (01), 63-81. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phenomenology of Perception.Translated by Landes, D. A. (2014). New 
York, Routledge. 
Merton, P. (1972). How We Control the Contraction of Out Muscles. Scientific American, 226, (5), 30-
37. 
Mezerow, J. (1985). Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass. 
Mezirow, J. (1985). Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass. 
Milner, A. & Goodale, M. (1995). Oxford psychology series, No. 27. The visual brain in action. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Miron-Shatz, T., Stone, A. & Kahneman, D. (2009). Memories of yesterday's emotions: does the 
valence of experience affect the memory-experience gap? Emotion, 9, (6), 885. 
Mitchell, M. (1993). Situational interest: Its multifaceted structure in the secondary school 
mathematics classroom. Journal of educational psychology, 85, (3), 424. 
Miyake, A. & Friedman, N.P. (2012). The nature and organization of individual differences in 
executive functions: Four general conclusions. Current directions in psychological science, 21, 
(1), 8-14. 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N.P., Emerson, M.J., Witzki, A.H., Howerter, A. & Wager, T.D. (2000). The unity 
and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex “frontal lobe” tasks: 
A latent variable analysis. Cognitive psychology, 41, (1), 49-100. 
Mso (2013). Microsoft Office Profesional Plus 2013. Microsoft Corporation. 
Mueller, R.O. (1997). Structural equation modeling: Back to basics. Structural Equation Modeling: A 
Multidisciplinary Journal, 4, (4), 353-369. 
Mundhenk, T.N. (2009). Computational modeling and utilization of attention, surprise and attention 
gating.  University of Southern California. 
Murphy, R., Nixon, S., Brooman, S. & Fearon, D. (2017). “I am wary of giving too much power to 
students:” Addressing the “but” in the Principle of Staff-Student Partnership. International 
Journal for Students as Partners, 1, (1). 
Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 83, (4), 435-450. 
Neill, J.T. (2002 of Conference). Meta-Analytic Research on the Outcomes of Outdoor Education. In:  
6th Biennial Coalition for Education in the Outdoors Research Symposium, 11-13 January 
2002, Bradford Woods, IN. 
Neill, J.T. (2009). ROPELOC: Review of Personal Effectiveness with Locus of Control [Online] 
Conditions of use for ROPELOC. Available: http://wilderdom.com/tools/leq/ROPELOC.html 
[Accessed 1st June 2013]. 
References 
285 
 
Neill, J.T. & Dias, K.L. (2001). Adventure education and resilience: The double-edged sword. Journal 
of Adventure Education & Outdoor Learning, 1, (2), 35-42. 
Neill, J.T., Marsh, H. W., & Richards, G. E. (2003). The Life Effectiveness Questionnaire: Development 
and psychometrics. [Online] Sydney: University of WesternSydney 
Available: http://wilderdom.com/tools/leq/ROPELOC.html [Accessed 11 2013]. 
Newman, D.A. (2014). Missing data: Five practical guidelines. Organizational Research Methods, 17, 
(4), 372-411. 
Newman, D.A. & Sin, H.-P. (2009). How do missing data bias estimates of within-group agreement? 
Sensitivity of SD WG, CVWG, rWG (J), rWG (J)*, and ICC to systematic nonresponse. 
Organizational Research Methods, 12, (1), 113-147. 
Newsom, J. (2012). Some clarifications and recommendations on fit indices. USP, 655, 123-133. 
Nicholis, G. & Prigogine, I. (1977). Self-organization in nonequilibrium systems. New York, Wiley. 
Nicolis, C. (1999). Entropy production and dynamical complexity in a low‐order atmospheric model. 
Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, 125, (557), 1859-1878. 
Nijhuis, J., Segers, M. & Gijselaers, W. (2007). The interplay of perceptions of the learning 
environment, personality and learning strategies: a study amongst International Business 
Studies students. Studies in Higher Education, 32, (1), 59-77. 
Nithianantharajah, J., Komiyama, N.H., Mckechanie, A., Johnstone, M., Blackwood, D.H., Clair, D.S., 
Emes, R.D., Van De Lagemaat, L.N., Saksida, L.M., Bussey, T.J. & Grant, S.G.N. (2013). 
Synaptic scaffold evolution generated components of vertebrate cognitive complexity. Nat 
Neurosci, 16, (1), 16-24. 
Niv, Y., Daw, N.D., Joel, D. & Dayan, P. (2007). Tonic dopamine: opportunity costs and the control of 
response vigor. Psychopharmacology, 191, (3), 507-520. 
Niven, R.K. (2009). Steady state of a dissipative flow-controlled system and the maximum entropy 
production principle. Physical Review E, 80, (2), 021113. 
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception.  MIT press. 
Noë, A. (2008). Précis of Action In Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76, (3), 
660-665. 
Noë, A. (2009). Out of our heads: Why you are not your brain, and other lessons from the biology of 
consciousness. New York, NY, Hill & Wang. 
Noë, A., Pessoa, L. & Thompson, E. (2000). Beyond the grand illusion: What change blindness really 
teaches us about vision. Visual Cognition, 7, (1-3), 93-106. 
Northoff, G. & Hayes, D.J. (2011). Is Our Self Nothing but Reward? Biological Psychiatry, 69, (11), 
1019-1025. 
Nowak, M.A., Tarnita, C.E. & Wilson, E.O. (2010). The evolution of eusociality. Nature, 466, (7310), 
1057-1062. 
Nundy, S. (1999). The fieldwork effect: the role and impact of fieldwork in the upper primary school. 
International Research in Geographical and Environmental Education, 8, (2), 190-8. 
O'neill, R. (1977). A report on the two-period crossover design and its applicability in trials of clinical 
effectiveness, Report of Biostatistics and Epidemiology Methodology Advisory Committee of 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. 
 
Ofsted (2008). Learning Outside the Classroom, London, HMSO. 
 
Olds, J. & Milner, P. (1954). Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of septal area 
and other regions of rat brain. Journal of comparative and physiological psychology, 47, (6), 
419-27. 
Onsager, L. (1931). Reciprocal relations in irreversible processes, I. Physical Review, 37, (4), 405-426. 
Outdoor-Council. (2010). Nothing ventured… balancing risks and benefits in the outdoors. Available: 
englishoutdoorcouncil. org/wp-content/uploads. 
References 
286 
 
Pajares, F. (2009). Toward a positive psychology of academic motivation: The role of self-efficacy 
beliefs. 
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience : the foundations of human and animal emotions. New 
York ; Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Panksepp, J. (2003). At the interface of the affective, behavioral, and cognitive neurosciences: 
Decoding the emotional feelings of the brain. Brain and Cognition, 52, (1), 4-14. 
Panksepp, J. (2005). "Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans,". 
Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 30-80. 
Panksepp, J. (2017). The psycho-neurology of cross-species affective/social neuroscience: 
understanding animal affective states as a guide to development of novel psychiatric 
treatments. Social Behavior from Rodents to Humans: Neural Foundations and Clinical 
Implications, 109-125. 
Panksepp, J. & Biven, L. (2012). The Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human 
Emotions.  WW Norton. 
Pavlov, I.P. (1927). Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral 
Cortex.Translated by Anrep, G. V. London, Oxford University Press. 
Pearl, J. (2011). The mediation formula: A guide to the assessment of causal pathways in nonlinear 
models, CALIFORNIA UNIV LOS ANGELES DEPT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE. 
 
Pearlmutter, B.A. (1994). Fast exact multiplication by the Hessian. Neural computation, 6, (1), 147-
160. 
Pekrun, R., Elliot, A.J. & Maier, M.A. (2006). Achievement goals and discrete achievement emotions: 
A theoretical model and prospective test. Journal of educational Psychology, 98, (3), 583. 
Pekrun, R., Goetz, T., Frenzel, A.C., Barchfeld, P. & Perry, R.P. (2011). Measuring emotions in 
students’ learning and performance: The Achievement Emotions Questionnaire (AEQ). 
Contemporary Educational Psychology, 36, (1), 36-48. 
Pekrun, R. & Perry, R.P. (2014). Control-value theory of achievement emotions. International 
handbook of emotions in education, 120-141. 
Pessoa, L. (2013). The cognitive-emotional brain: From interactions to integration.  MIT press. 
Piaget, J. (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence: An essay on the 
construction of formal operational structures. New York, Basic Books. 
Planck, M. (1945). Treatise on Thermodynamics: translation of the 7th german edn. New York, Dover. 
Plunkett, K., Karmiloff‐Smith, A., Bates, E., Elman, J.L. & Johnson, M.H. (2006). Connectionism and 
developmental psychology. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 38, (1), 53-80. 
Posner, M.I. & Boies, S.J. (1971). Components of attention. Psychological review, 78, (5), 391. 
Posner, M.I. & Petersen, S.E. (1990). The attention system of the human brain. Annual review of 
neuroscience, 13, (1), 25-42. 
Prigogine, I. (1945). Modération et transformations irreversibles des systemes ouverts. Bulletin de la 
Classe des Sciences: Academie Royale de Belgique, 31, 600-606. 
Prigogine, I. (1947). Etude thermodynamique des phénomènes irréversibles. 
Prigogine, I. (1996). La Fin des Certitudes. Paris, Odile Jacob. 
Prigogine, I. & Stengers, I. (1997). The end of certainty.  Simon and Schuster. 
Prigogine, I. & Time, S. (1977). Fluctuations, Nobel Lecture in Chemistry. Free University of Brussels 
preprint. 
Purdie, N., Neill, J.T. & Richards, G.E. (2002). Australian identity and the effect of an outdoor 
education program. Australian Journal of Psychology, 54, (1), 32-39. 
Reichenbach, H. (1937/2012). The philosophy of space and time.  Courier Corporation. 
Renninger, A., Hidi, S. & Krapp, A. (2014). The role of interest in learning and development, 2 ed.  
Psychology Press. 
References 
287 
 
Rhea, C.K., Kiefer, A.W., D’andrea, S.E., Warren, W.H. & Aaron, R.K. (2014). Entrainment to a real 
time fractal visual stimulus modulates fractal gait dynamics. Human movement science, 36, 
20-34. 
Richard, J.M. & Berridge, K.C. (2012). Prefrontal cortex modulates desire and dread generated by 
nucleus accumbens glutamate disruption. Biological Psychiatry. 
Richards, G.E., Ellis, L.A. & Neill, J.T. (2002 of Conference). The ROPELOC: Review of Personal 
Effectiveness and Locus of Control: A comprehensive instrument for reviewing life 
effectiveness. In:  Paper presented at: Self-Concept Research: Driving International Research 
Agendas, 6-8 August 2002, Sydney. 
Rickinson, M., Dillion, J., K, T., Morris, M., Choi, M.Y., Sanders, D. & Benefield, P. (2006). The value of 
outdoor learning: evidence from research in the UK and elsewhere. School Science Review, 
March 2006, 87, (320), 107-111. 
Rickinson, M., Dillon, J., Teamey, K., Morris, M., Choi, M.Y., Sanders, D. & Benefield, P. (2004). A 
Review of Research on Outdoor Learning, National Foundation for Educational Research and 
King's College London UK. 
 
Roberts, G.C., Treasure, D.C. & Balague, G. (1998). Achievement goals in sport: The development and 
validation of the Perception of Success Questionnaire. Journal of Sports Sciences, 16, (4), 
337-347. 
Roepstorff, A. & Jack, A.I. (2004). Trust or interaction? Editorial introduction. Journal of 
consciousness studies, 11, (7-8), 7-8. 
Root-Bernstein, R.S. & Dillon, P.F. (1997 ). Molecular complementarity I: the complementarity theory 
of the origin and evolution of life. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 188, (4), 447–479. 
Rotgans, J.I. & Schmidt, H.G. (2011). Situational interest and academic achievement in the active-
learning classroom. Learning and Instruction, 21, (1), 58-67. 
Rotgans, J.I. & Schmidt, H.G. (2014). Situational interest and learning: Thirst for knowledge. Learning 
and Instruction, 32, (0), 37-50. 
Rothwell, J.C. (2012). Control of human voluntary movement.  Springer Science & Business Media. 
Rubin, D.B. (1986). Statistical matching using file concatenation with adjusted weights and multiple 
imputations. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 4, (1), 87-94. 
Ryan, R.M. & Deci, E.L. (2008). A self-determination theory approach to psychotherapy: The 
motivational basis for effective change. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie canadienne, 49, 
(3), 186-193. 
Ryan, R.M., Mims, V. & Koestner, R. (1983). Relation of reward contingency and interpersonal 
context to intrinsic motivation: A review and test using cognitive evaluation theory. Journal 
of personality and Social Psychology, 45, (4), 736. 
Ryan, T.J. & Grant, S.G. (2009). The origin and evolution of synapses. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 
10, (10), 701-712. 
Ryan, T.J., Kopanitsa, M.V., Indersmitten, T., Nithianantharajah, J., Afinowi, N.O., Pettit, C., Stanford, 
L.E., Sprengel, R., Saksida, L.M., Bussey, T.J., O'dell, T.J., Grant, S.G.N. & Komiyama, N.H. 
(2013). Evolution of GluN2A/B cytoplasmic domains diversified vertebrate synaptic plasticity 
and behavior. Nat Neurosci, 16, (1), 25-32. 
Schafer, J.L. (2003). Multiple imputation in multivariate problems when the imputation and analysis 
models differ. Statistica Neerlandica, 57, (1), 19-35. 
Schafer, J.L. & Graham, J.W. (2002). Missing data: our view of the state of the art. Psychological 
methods, 7, (2), 147. 
Schall, J.D. (2004). On building a bridge between brain and behavior. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 55, 23-50. 
Scheffer, M., Bascompte, J., Brock, W.A., Brovkin, V., Carpenter, S.R., Dakos, V., Held, H., Van Nes, 
E.H., Rietkerk, M. & Sugihara, G. (2009). Early-warning signals for critical transitions. Nature, 
461, (7260), 53. 
References 
288 
 
Schmidt, H.G., Loyens, S.M.M., Van Gog, T. & Paas, F. (2007). Problem-based learning is compatible 
with human cognitive architecture: Commentary on Kirschner, Sweller, and Clark (2006). 
Educational psychologist, 42, (2), 91-97. 
Schmit, J.M., Regis, D.I. & Riley, M.A. (2005). Dynamic patterns of postural sway in ballet dancers and 
track athletes. Experimental Brain Research, 163, (3), 370-378. 
Schmit, J.M., Riley, M.A., Dalvi, A., Sahay, A., Shear, P.K., Shockley, K.D. & Pun, R.Y. (2006). 
Deterministic center of pressure patterns characterize postural instability in Parkinson’s 
disease. Experimental brain research, 168, (3), 357-367. 
Schrödinger , E. (1926). An Undulatory Theory of the Mechanics of Atoms and Molecules. The 
Physical Review, 28, 1049-1070  
Schrödinger, E. (1944). What is Life - the Physical Aspect of the Living Cell. Cambridge Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schroeder, C.E., Wilson, D.A., Radman, T., Scharfman, H. & Lakatos, P. (2010). Dynamics of active 
sensing and perceptual selection. Current opinion in neurobiology, 20, (2), 172-176. 
Shannon, C.E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System Technical Journal, 27, 
379-423, 623-656. 
Shapiro, L.E.C. (2010). Embodied Cognition. London, Routledge. 
Shavelson, R.J., Hubner, J.J. & Stanton, G.C. (1976). Self-concept: Validation of construct 
interpretations. Review of educational research, 46, (3), 407-441. 
Shaw, R., Turvey, M.T. & Mace, W. (eds.) (1982). Ecological psychology:The consequences of a 
commitment to realism. In: Weimer, W. & Palermo, D. Cognition and the symbolic processes 
II. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Silhavy, M. (1997). The mechanics and thermodynamics of continuous media. Berlin, Springer. 
Silhavy, M. (2013). The mechanics and thermodynamics of continuous media.  Springer Science & 
Business Media. 
Skinner, B. (1938). The behavior of organisms: an experimental analysis. Appleton-Century. New 
York. 
Skinner, B. (1953). Behaviourism. Science and Human Behaviour. New York, The Free Press. 
Smelser, N.J. & Baltes, P.B. (2001). International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences.  
Elsevier Amsterdam. 
Sontag, E.D. & Wang, Y. (1995). On characterizations of the input-to-state stability property. Systems 
& Control Letters, 24, (5), 351-359. 
Spelke, E.S. & Kinzler, K.D. (2007). Core knowledge. Developmental science, 10, (1), 89-96. 
Spencer, J.P., Blumberg, M.S., Mcmurray, B., Robinson, S.R., Samuelson, L.K. & Tomblin, J.B. (2009). 
Short arms and talking eggs: Why we should no longer abide the nativist–empiricist debate. 
Child development perspectives, 3, (2), 79-87. 
Sposito, V., Hand, M. & Skarpness, B. (1983). On the efficiency of using the sample kurtosis in 
selecting optimal estimators. Communications in Statistics-simulation and Computation, 12, 
(3), 265-272. 
Steenkamp, J.-B.E. & Baumgartner, H. (1998). Assessing measurement invariance in cross-national 
consumer research. Journal of consumer research, 25, (1), 78-90. 
Stein, (2013). Radio. Stein. BBC. 
Stevens, J.P. (2002). Applied Multivariate Statistics for the Social Science, 4 ed. Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum. 
Stoffregen, T. (2000a). Affordances and events. Ecological Psychology, 12, 1–28. 
Stoffregen, T.A. (2000b). Affordances and Events: Theory and Research. Ecological Psychology, 12, 
(1), 93-107. 
Stoffregen, T.A. (2003). Affordances as Properties of the Animal-Environment System. Ecological 
Psychology, 15, (2), 115-134. 
Strawson, P.F. (1959). Individuals (London: Methuen). StrawsonIndividuals1959. 
Suchman, L.A. (1987). Plans and situated actions: The problem of human-machine communication.  
Cambridge university press. 
References 
289 
 
Sundarasaradula, D. & Hasan, H. (2004). A unified open systems model for explaining organisational 
change. 
Sur, M., Angelucci, A. & Sharma, J. (1999). Rewiring cortex: The role of patterned activity in 
development and plasticity of neocortical circuits. Journal of Neurobiology, 41, (1), 33-43. 
Sussmann, H.J. & Zahler, R.S. (1978). Catastrophe theory as applied to the social and biological 
sciences: A critique. Synthese, 37, (2), 117-216. 
Tabachnick, B.G. & Fidell, L.S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics.  Allyn & Bacon/Pearson 
Education. 
Tanaka, J.S. & Huba, G.J. (1985). A fit index for covariance structure models under arbitrary GLS 
estimation. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 38, (2), 197-201. 
Taylor, R. (1990). Situational Awareness Rating Technique (SART): The development of a tool for 
aircrew systems design. Situational Awareness in Aerospace Operations (AGARD-CP-478). 
Neuilly Sur Seine, France: NATO-AGARD. 
Tenenbaum, G. & Becker, B. (2005). Is self-confidence a bias factor in higher-order catastrophe 
models? An exploratory analysis—A critique. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 27, 
(3), 375-381. 
Thom, R. (2018). Structural stability and morphogenesis.  CRC Press. 
Thom, R. & Fowler, D.H. (1975). Structural Stability and Morphogenesis: An Outline of a General 
Theory of Models 1St English Ed.  Benjami. 
Thompson, E. (2007). Life in Mind. Cambridge, M.A., Harvard University Press. 
Thompson, E. & Varela, F.J. (2001). Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends 
in cognitive sciences, 5, (10), 418-425. 
Thompson, R.F. (2009). Habituation: a history. Neurobiology of learning and memory, 92, (2), 127. 
Thompson, R.H. & Swanson, L.W. (2010). Hypothesis-driven structural connectivity analysis supports 
network over hierarchical model of brain architecture. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 107, (34), 15235-15239. 
Thompson, S., Milsom, C., Zaitseva, E., Stewart, M., Darwent, S. & Yorke, M. (2013). The forgotten 
year? Tackling the second year slump. York, UK: The Higher Education Academy. 
Tolfrey, K. (2004). Research Methods and Exercise Science. MMU, Cheshire. 
Tremblay, S. (2017). A cognitive approach to situation awareness: theory and application.  
Routledge. 
Tuller, B. (2005). Categorization and learning in speech perception as dynamical processes [Online]. 
Available: http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/bcs/pac/nmbs/nmbs.jsp [Accessed]. 
Tuller, B., Case, P., Ding, M.Z. & Kelso, J.a.S. (1994). The nonlinear dynamics of speech 
categorization. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 20, 
(1), 3-16. 
Turing, A.M. (1936). On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem. J. of 
Math, 58, (345-363), 5. 
Turvey, M. (1992). Affordances and prospective control: An outline of the ontology. Ecological 
Psychology, 173–187, (4). 
Turvey, M.T. & Carello, C. (2012). On intelligence from first principles: Guidelines for inquiry into the 
hypothesis of physical intelligence (PI). Ecological Psychology, 24, (1), 3-32. 
Ulrich, R.S. (1993). Biophilia, biophobia, and natural landscapes. The biophilia hypothesis, 73-137. 
Uttal, W. (2011). Mind and Brain: A Critical Appraisal of Cognitive Neuroscience. Mass: US, MIT Press. 
Vallerand, R.J. (1997). Toward a hierarchical model of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In: Advances 
in experimental social psychology. pp. 271-360. Elsevier. 
Van De Schoot, R., Lugtig, P. & Hox, J. (2012). A checklist for testing measurement invariance. 
European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, (4), 486-492. 
Van Orden, G.C., Kloos, H. & Wallot, S. (2011). Living in the pink: Intentionality, wellbeing, and 
complexity. In: Philosophy of complex systems: Handbook of the philosophy of science. 
Hooker, C. A. (ed.) pp. pp. 639–684. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier. 
References 
290 
 
Vancouver, J.B., Thompson, C.M. & Williams, A.A. (2001). The changing signs in the relationships 
among self-efficacy, personal goals, and performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, (4), 
605. 
Varela, F. & Maturana, H. (1972). Mechanism and biological explanation. Philosophy of Science, 39, 
(3), 378-382. 
Varela, F., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and the Human 
Experience. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
Vivek, P., Singh, S., Mishra, S. & Todd, D. (2007). Parallel Analysis Engine to Aid Determining Number 
of Factors to Retain [Computer software]. [Online]. Available: 
http://smishra.faculty.ku.edu/parallelengine.htm [Accessed 12 August 2016]. 
Von Neumann, J. (1945). First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC.Translated by Godfrey, M. D. IEEE 
Annals of the History of Computing, 15(1), 11-21. 
Walker, R., Brooks, H. & Holden-Dye, L. (1996). Evolution and overview of classical transmitter 
molecules and their receptors. Parasitology, 113, (S1), S3-S33. 
Wallot, S. & Van Orden, G. (2011). Grounding Language Performance in the Anticipatory Dynamics of 
the Body. Ecological Psychology, 23, (3), 157-184. 
Ward, L. (2002). Dynamical cognitive science. Cambridge Mass, MIT Press. 
Warren, W. (2006). The dynamics of perception and action. Psychological Review, 113, 358-389. 
Weiner, B. (1986). An Attribution Theory of Motivation and Emotion. New York, Springer-Verlag. 
Weiner, B. (1997). A Theory of Motivation for some Classroom Experience. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 71, 3-25. 
Weiner, B. (2000). Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Theories of Motivation from an Attributional 
Perspective. Educational Psychology Review, 12, (1), 1-14. 
White , R.W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: the concept of competence. Psychological Review, 66, 
297-333. 
Wieland, A., Durach, C.F., Kembro, J. & Treiblmaier, H. (2017). Statistical and judgmental criteria for 
scale purification. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 22, (4), 321-328. 
Wijnants, M.L., Bosman, A.M.T., Hasselman, F., Cox, R.F.A. & Van Orden, G.C. (2009). 1/f Scaling in 
movement time changes with practice in precision aiming. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, 
and the Life Sciences, 13, 79-98. 
Wilson, D.I.G., Laidlaw, A., Butler, E., Hofmann, D. & Bowman, E.M. (2006). Development of a 
behavioral task measuring reward “wanting” and “liking” in rats. Physiology & Behavior, 87, 
(1), 154-161. 
Wilson, M. (2008). From processing efficiency to attentional control: a mechanistic account of the 
anxiety-performance relationship. International Review of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 1, 
(2), 184-201. 
Wise, R.A. (2004). Dopamine, learning and motivation. Nat Rev Neurosci, 5, (6), 483-494. 
Wolf, E.J., Harrington, K.M., Clark, S.L. & Miller, M.W. (2013). Sample size requirements for structural 
equation models: An evaluation of power, bias, and solution propriety. Educational and 
psychological measurement, 73, (6), 913-934. 
Won, J. & Hogan, N. (1995). Stability properties of human reaching movements. Experimental brain 
research, 107, (1), 125-136. 
Wright, J.S. & Panksepp, J. (2012). An evolutionary framework to understand foraging, wanting, and 
desire: the neuropsychology of the SEEKING system. Neuropsychoanalysis, 14, (1), 5-39. 
Wulf, A. (2015). The invention of nature: Alexander von Humboldt's new world. London, John 
Murray. 
Yanai, M., Kenyon, C.M., Butler, J.P., Macklem, P.T. & Kelly, S.M. (1996). Intracellular pressure is a 
motive force for cell motion in Amoeba proteus. Cell Motility and the Cytoskeleton, 33, (1), 
22-29. 
Yantis, S. (1998). Control of visual attention. In: Attention. Pashler, H. (ed.) pp. 223-256. Hove 
England: Psychology Press/Erlbaum (UK) Taylor & Francis. 
References 
291 
 
Yerks, R.M. & Dobson, J.D. (1908). The Relation of Strength of Stimulus to Rapidity of Habit-
Formation. Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, 18, 459-482. 
Young, S.E., Friedman, N.P., Miyake, A., Willcutt, E.G., Corley, R.P., Haberstick, B.C. & Hewitt, J.K. 
(2009). Behavioral disinhibition: Liability for externalizing spectrum disorders and its genetic 
and environmental relation to response inhibition across adolescence. Journal of abnormal 
psychology, 118, (1), 117. 
Zahm, D.S., Parsley, K.P., Schwartz, Z.M. & Cheng, A.Y. (2013). On lateral septum‐like characteristics 
of outputs from the accumbal hedonic “hotspot” of Peciña and Berridge with commentary 
on the transitional nature of basal forebrain “boundaries”. Journal of Comparative 
Neurology, 521, (1), 50-68. 
Zanone, P., G., Kostrubiec, V., Albaret J, M. & Temprado J, J. (2010). Covariation of attentional cost 
and stability provides further evidence for two routes to learning new coordination patterns. 
Acta psychologica, 133, (2), 107-118. 
Zanone, P.G. & Kelso, J.A. (1992). Evolution of behavioral attractors with learning: nonequilibrium 
phase transitions. Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and performance, 
18, (2), 403-21. 
Zanone, P.G. & Kelso, J.A. (1994). The coordination dynamics of learning: Theoretical structure and 
experimental agenda. In: Interlimb coordination: Neural, dynamical, and cognitive 
constraints. Swinnen, S. P., Heuer, H., Massion, J. & Casaer, P. (eds.), pp. 461-490. San Diego, 
CA: Academic Press. 
Zanone, P.G. & Kelso, J.A. (1997). Coordination dynamics of learning and transfer: collective and 
component levels. Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and performance, 
23, (5), 1454-80. 
Zanone, P.G. & Kostmbiec, V. (2004). Searching for (Dynamic) Principles of Learning. In: Coordination 
Dynamics: Issues and Trends. Jirsa, V. K. & Kelso, J. a. S. (eds.), pp. 57 - 89. Berlin: Springer. 
Zeeman, E.C. (1976). Catastrophe theory. Scientific American, 234, (4), 65-83. 
Zhu, X., Chen, A., Ennis, C., Sun, H., Hopple, C., Bonello, M., Bae, M. & Kim, S. (2009). Situational 
interest, cognitive engagement, and achievement in physical education. Contemporary 
Educational Psychology, 34, (3), 221-229. 
 
Appendix I 
292 
 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I: Initial Pathway Analysis 
Pathway guidance using original authors methodology (Chen et al., 2001a): Correlation – Partial 
Correlation and Regression inform the ‘Apriori’ SEM Assumptions 
 
Table 37 – Correlations – 2 tailed – df (37) 
  InsEn Nov Att Chall SitIn 
Eng Pearson 
Correlation 
.655** .583** .415* .496** .672** 
Sig .000 .000 .011 .002 .000 
InsEn Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .582** .805** .409** .929** 
Sig  .000 .000 .012 .000 
Nov Pearson 
Correlation 
 1 .485** .621** .637** 
Sig   .002 .000 .000 
Att Pearson 
Correlation 
  1 .326* .831** 
Sig    .049 .000 
Chall Pearson 
Correlation 
   1 .457** 
Sig     .004 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 (2-tailed) 
 
Table 38 – Partial Correlations 
Partial Correlations Of Interest (Instant Enjoyment Controlled – 2 
Tailed – df (34) 
Partial Correlations Of Interest (Instant Enjoyment –
Controlled – 2 Tailed – df (34) Control Variables Eng Nov Att Chall Sitin Control Variables Eng Nov Chall Sitin 
InsEn Eng Corr 1.000 .328 -.251 .331 .226 Att Eng Corr 1.000 .480 .419 .645 
Sig  .051 .14 .049 .185 Sig  .003 .011 .000 
Nov Corr  1.000 .033 .516 .320 Nov Corr  1.000 .560 .482 
Sig   .850 .001 .057 Sig   .000 .003 
Att Corr   1.000 -.007 .376 Chall Corr   1.000 .354 
Sig    .970 .024 Sig    .034 
Chall Corr    1.000 .227 InsEn Corr    .788 
Sig     .182 Sig    .000 
 
Table 39 – Regressions of Model 1 
Model  R R Square Adjusted Std. Error  
1 .951 .904 .888 1.1606  
Unstandardized  Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SitIn <--- Eng .134 .083 1.622 .105 
SitIn <--- InsEn .679 .130 5.207 *** 
SitIn <--- Nov .095 .080 1.198 .231 
SitIn <--- Att .249 .084 2.975 .003 
SitIn <--- Chall .021 .085 .253 .800 
a. Dependent Variable: SitIn 
  
 
Exploratory Interest   -  
Instant Enjoyment -  
Novelty   -  
Attention Demand  -  
Challenge   -  
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Apriori – Situational Interest Path Analysis  
MODEL 1     MODEL 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MODEL 3     Twin Pathway MODEL 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 40 – Model Fit Threasholds for Twin Pathway Model 4 
Recommended Threshold Twin Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 2.834 good 
p-value for the model     <.05  .0001 *  
CFI >.95  .981   good  
GFI  >.95 .958   good 
IFI    >.95 .981   good 
SRMR   <.08 .0533 good 
RMSEA <.06  .121   poor 
PCLOSE >.05 .040   poor 
Note: Thresholds from Hu and Bentler’s “Cutoff Criteria and Fit Indexes” (1999) 
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
Figure 52 - Initial Pathway Assumptions (AMOSIBM24) 
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APPENDIX II: Questionnaire Development and Providence 
Pilot Study One: MK 1 – ORIGINAL SITUATIONAL INTEREST 
Self-Concept and Cognitive Functioning: A Perception Study 
Research request: 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important that you 
understand why the research is being done and what it involves. Please take time to read the following 
information. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take 
time to decide if you want to take part or not. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This research considers the effects of Experiential Learning on the ability of the brain to process new 
and challenging experiences and how this might affect your perceptions and self-concept. It is based 
on the premise that neural-efficiency may be assessed by measuring factors such as; interest, 
confidence, self-esteem, satisfaction, awareness, etc. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. You are free to withdraw at any time and 
without giving any reason. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be asked to complete a two-page questionnaire on Interest and Self-Concept, this should take 
no longer that 10 minutes.  
You should only consider the activity or lesson you have just done when answering. 
How do I complete this? 
Please read the statements and circle the answer that indicates to what extent you AGREE or 
DISAGREE with that statement; e.g. 
I don’t agree                  I Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
6 = I agree, but not too strongly! 
 
Are there any risks / benefits involved? 
Knowing what interests you and makes you feel good about yourself lets us design great teaching that 
you hopefully enjoy and learn from. 
As with all psychological studies: some of the questions ask you to think about how you feel towards 
a situation, or about yourself. If any question causes you concern, please do not answer that question. 
If you are upset by any question, then please talk to your teacher, other pastoral care, or Head. 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
This type of questionnaire does not show the final answer in your statement answers. Any personal 
information collected during the study will be anonymised and remain confidential. Personal data is 
requested on the questionnaire, you do not have to give this if you do not want to. All results are 
presented as a population statistic – there will be no way to identify your information. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
David Larkin: c/o/LJMU, I M Marsh, Barkhill House, Aigburth, Liverpool , L17 6BD email-d.larkin@ljmu.ac.uk 
If you wish to make a complaint, please contact researchethics@ljmu.ac.uk and your communication will be re-
directed to an independent person as appropriate. 
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NAME   ___________________    AGE:____(years) ____(mths)    TODAY’S DATE:___ /___ /____  
MALE          FEMALE       ACTIVITY / EVENT  DESCRIPTION:______________________ 
Part 1 
This activity is exciting.  
InEn121 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This is a difficult activity.  
Chal252 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is complicated.  
Chal152 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
My attention needed to be high.  
Att141 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is interesting.  
ToIn161 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I was very attentive all the time.  
  Att242 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I like to find out more about how to do it.   
ExIn212 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This is a unique type of activity.  
Nov434 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I want to analyse it, to have a grasp on it.  
ExIn313 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is appealing to me.  
InEn414 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
The activity look fun to me.  
ToIn262 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This was a new-fashioned activity for me to do.  
Nov333 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
It is an enjoyable activity to me.  
InEn222 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I want to discover all the tricks in this activity.  
ExIn111 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is fresh.  
Nov232 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is new to me.  
Nov 131 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I was focused.  
Att343 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I was concentrated  
Att444 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Its fun to try this activity.  
ToIn363 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is a demanding task.  
Chal353 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This is an interesting activity.  
ToIn161 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
The activity inspires me to participate.  
ToIn323 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
It is hard for me to do this activity.  
Chall454 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I like to inquire into details of how to do it. 
ExIn414 
        
Situational Interest Scale: Chen, A., Darst, P.W. & Pangrazi, R.P. (1999). 
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STUDY ONE - ORIGINAL ROPELOC QUESTIONNAIRE                                   GER20/9/00 
PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST  
This is not a test - there are no right or wrong answers.   
 
This is a chance for you to look at how you think and feel about yourself. It is important that 
you: 
 are honest 
 give your own views about yourself, without talking to others 
 report how you feel NOW (not how you felt at another time in your life, or how 
you might feel tomorrow) 
 
Your answers are confidential and will only be used for research or program development.  
Your answers will not be used in any way to refer to you as an individual. 
 
Use the eight point scale to indicate how true (like you) or how false (unlike you), each 
statement over the page is as a description of you.  Please do not leave any statements blank. 
FALSE                                                                                                                       TRUE 
       NOT LIKE ME                                                                                                       LIKE ME 
 
1  2     3  4  5  6  7  8 
 This statement doesn’t               More false                         More true                    This statement 
 describe me at all; it isn’t              than true                            than false             describes me very well; 
         like me at all                                                                                                it is very much like me. 
SOME EXAMPLES  
 
A. I am a creative person.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 (The 6 has been circled because the person answering believes the statement “I am a creative person” is 
sometimes true.  That is, the statement is sometimes like him/her.) 
 
B. I am good at writing poetry.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 (The 2 has been circled because the person answering believes that the statement is mostly false as 
far as he/she is concerned.  That is, he/she feels he/she does not write good poetry.) 
 
C I enjoy playing with pets.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 (The 6 has been circled because at first the person thought that the statement was mostly true but 
then the person corrected it to 7 to show that the statement was very true about him/her.) 
If still unsure about what to do, ASK FOR HELP. 
© Noels 2000 
Review of Personal Effectiveness and Locus of Control Instrument (ROPELOC), Richards, G. E., Ellis, L. 
A. & Neill, J. T. (2002). 
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STATEMENT                                         FALSE not like me - TRUE like me 
01. When I have spare time I always use it to paint. CI101  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
02. I like cooperating in a team. CT102                          1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
03. No matter what the situation is I can handle it SF103  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8  
04. I can be a good leader. LA104     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
05. My own efforts and actions are what will determine my future IL105 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
06. I prefer to be actively involved in things. AI106   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
07. I am open to different thinking if there is a better idea. OT107 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  8 
08. In everything I do I try my best to get the details right. QS108 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
09. Luck, other people and events control most of my life. EL109 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
10. I am confident I have the ability to succeed anything I want to do. SC110 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
11. I am effective in social situations. SE111    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
12. I am calm in stressful situations. SM112    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
13. My overall effectiveness in life is very high. OE113   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
14. I plan and use my time efficiently. TE114    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
15. I cope well with changing situations. CH115    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
16. I cooperate well when working in a team. CT216   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
17. I prefer things that taste sweet instead of bitter. CI217  1    2    3    4    5    6   7   8 
18. No matter what happens I can handle it. SF218   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
19. I am capable of being a good leader. LA219    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
20. I like being active and energetic. AI220    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
21. What I do and how I do it will determine my successes in life. IL221 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
22. I am open to new thoughts and ideas. OT222    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
23. I try to get the best possible results when I do things. QS223 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
24. When I apply myself to something I am confident I will succeed. SC224 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
25. My future is mostly in the hands of other people. EL225  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
26. I am competent and effective in social situations. SE226  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
27. I can stay calm and overcome anxiety in almost all situations. SM227 1    2    3    4    5   6   7    8 
28. I am efficient and do not waste time. TE228    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
29. Overall, in all things in life, I am effective. OE229   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
30. When things around me change I cope well. CH230   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
31. I am good at cooperating with team members. CT331  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
32. I can handle things no matter what happens. SF332   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
33. I solve all mathematics problems easily. CI333   1    2    3    4    5   6   7    8 
34. I am seen as a capable leader. LA334     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
35. I like to get into things and make action. AI335   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
36. I can adapt my thinking and ideas. OT336    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
37. If I succeed in life it will be because of my efforts. IL337  1    2    3    4    5   6   7    8 
38. I try to get the very best results in everything I do. QS338  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
39. I am confident in my ability to be successful. SC339   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
40. I communicate effectively in social situations. SE340  1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
41. My life is mostly controlled by external things. EL341  1    2    3    4    5   6   7    8 
42. I am calm when things go wrong. SM342    1    2 3    4   5    6   7    8 
43. I am efficient in the way I use my time. TE343   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
44. I cope well when things change. CH344    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
45. Overall, in my life I am a very effective person. OE345   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8 
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Questionnaire and Providence Study Two: Mk 2  
Self-Concept and Cognitive Functioning: A Perception Study 
Research request: 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important that you 
understand why the research is being done and what it involves. Please take time to read the following 
information. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take 
time to decide if you want to take part or not. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This research considers the effects of Experiential Learning on the ability of the brain to process new 
and challenging experiences and how this might affect your perceptions and self-concept. It is based 
on the premise that neural-efficiency may be assessed by measuring factors such as; interest, 
confidence, self-esteem, satisfaction, awareness, etc. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. You are free to withdraw at any time and 
without giving any reason. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be asked to complete a two-page questionnaire on Interest and Self-Concept, this should take 
no longer that 10 minutes.  
You should only consider the activity or lesson you have just done when answering. 
How do I complete this? 
Please read the statements and circle the answer that indicates to what extent you AGREE or 
DISAGREE with that statement; e.g. 
I don’t agree                  I Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
6 = I agree, but not too strongly! 
 
Are there any risks / benefits involved? 
Knowing what interests you and makes you feel good about yourself lets us design great teaching that 
you hopefully enjoy and learn from. 
As with all psychological studies: some of the questions ask you to think about how you feel towards 
a situation, or about yourself. If any question causes you concern, please do not answer that question. 
If you are upset by any question, then please talk to your teacher, other pastoral care, or Head. 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
This type of questionnaire does not show the final answer in your statement answers. Any personal 
information collected during the study will be anonymised and remain confidential. Personal data is 
requested on the questionnaire, you do not have to give this if you do not want to. All results are 
presented as a population statistic – there will be no way to identify your information. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
David Larkin: c/o/LJMU, I M Marsh, Barkhill House, Aigburth, Liverpool , L17 6BD email-d.larkin@ljmu.ac.uk 
If you wish to make a complaint, please contact researchethics@ljmu.ac.uk and your communication will be re-
directed to an independent person as appropriate. 
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Situational Interest Mk 2 
Part 1- (this is about what you have ‘just’ been doing – NOT your thoughts on this questionnaire)
   
This activity is exciting.  
This activity is exciting.                                                                          InEn121 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This is a difficult activity.  
This activity is complicated                                                                   Chal252 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is complicated.  
This activity is complicated                                                                   Chal152 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
My attention needed to be high.  
My attention was high                                                                              Att141 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is interesting.  
This activity is interesting                                                                     ToIn161 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I was very attentive all the time.  
                 I was very attentive all the time                                                             Att242 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I like to find out more about how to do it.   
I like to find out more about how to do it                                         ExIn212 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This is a unique type of activity.  
This is an exceptional activity                                                               Nov434 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I want to analyse it, to have a grasp on it.  
l want to analyse it to have a grasp on it                                            ExIn313 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is appealing to me.  
This activity is appealing to me                                                          InEn414 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
The activity look fun to me.  
The activity look fun to me                                                                 ToIn262 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This was a new-fashioned activity for me to do.  
This is a new-fashioned activity for me to do                                     Nov333 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
It is an enjoyable activity to me.  
It is an enjoyable activity to me                                                          InEn222 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I want to discover all the tricks in this activity.  
l want to discover all the tricks in this activity                                  ExIn111 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is fresh.  
This activity is fresh                                                                              Nov232 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is new to me.  
This activity is new to me                                                                    Nov 131 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I was focused.  
I was focused                                                                                          Att343 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I was concentrated  
I was concentrated                                                                                Att444 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Its fun to try this activity.  
Its fun to try this activity                                                                   ToIn363 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is a demanding task.  
This activity is a demanding task                                                      Chal353 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This is an interesting activity.  
This activity is interesting                                                                  ToIn161 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
The activity inspires me to participate.  
The activity inspires me to participate                                            ToIn323 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
It is hard for me to do this activity.  
lt is hard for me to do this activity                                                   Chall454 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I’d like more details of how to do this type of activity 
I like to inquire into details of how to do it                                     ExIn414 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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ROPELOC Mk 2                 
Part 2- what is your perception of yourself? 
 
        
I enjoy working with others. 
02. I like cooperating in a team.                                      CT102 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I can handle things, whatever I might be asked to do. 
03. No matter what the situation is I can handle it                       SF103 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I am open to new ideas. 
22. I am open to new thoughts and ideas.                       OT222 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I try my best in everything I do. 
23. I try to get the best possible results when I do things.     QS223 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I know I have the ability to do anything I want to do. 
10. I am confident that I have the ability to succeed in anything I want todo SC110 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I am calm when things go wrong. 
12. I am calm in stressful situations.      SM112 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I plan and use my time efficiently. 
14. I plan and use my time efficiently.      TE114 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I cope well with changing situations. 
15 I cope well with changing situations.                                                             CH115 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I cooperate well with others.  
16. I cooperate well when working in a team.                      CT216 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No matter what happens, I can handle it. 
18. No matter what happens I can handle it.                                        SF218 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I can change my mind easily if there is a better idea. 
07. I am open to different thinking if there is a better idea.                     OT107 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I tried my possible best. 
23. I try to get the best possible results when I do things.     QS223 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
When I really try, I believe I will succeed. 
24. When I apply myself to something I am confident I will succeed.              SC224 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I stay calm in almost all situations. 
27. I can stay calm and overcome anxiety in almost all situations.   SM227 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I do not waste time. 
28. I am efficient and do not waste time.       TE228 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I cope well when unexpected things happen. 
30. When things around me change I cope well.                                       CH230 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I communicate well with others. 
31. I am good at cooperating with team members.                       CT331 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I can handle most things, no matter what. 
32. I can handle things no matter what happens.                      SF332 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I like new ideas. 
36. I can adapt my thinking and ideas.                      OT336 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I try to get the very best results in everything I do. 
08. In everything I do I try my best to get the details right.                      QS108 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I believe I am confident and will be successful. 
39. I am confident in my ability to be successful.                       SC339 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I am calm in stressful situations 
42. I am calm when things go wrong.                                                         SM343 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I am efficient in the way I use my time. 
43. I am efficient in the way I use my time.                                                        TE343 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I don’t mind when things change. 
44. I cope well when things change.                                                          CH344 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I Don’t agree                            I strongly Agree 
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Situational Interest Questionnaire and Providence Study Three  Mk 3 
Part 1- what do you think about the activity you have ‘just’ been doing – NOT this questionnaire!
   
This activity is exciting 
This activity is exciting.                                                                                     InsEn121 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
It is hard for me to do this activity 
lt is hard for me to do this activity                                                                   Chall454 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is new to me 
This activity is new to me                                                                                   Nov 131 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I was determined during this activity                                 Att141 
My attention was high Att141: now Toin 363 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity looked an interesting activity 
This activity is interesting                                                                                  ToIn161 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I’d like to find out more about how to do this sort of activity 
I like to find out more about how to do it                                                        ExIn212 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This is an unique activity 
This is an Unique activity                                                                                   Nov434 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I want to analyse it to have a grasp on it 
l want to analyse it to have a grasp on it                                                          ExIn313 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is appealing to me 
This activity is appealing to me                                                                       InsEn414 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
     I was curious to try this activity 
The activity looked fun to me                                                                           ToIn262 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is fresh 
This activity is fresh                                                                                           Nov232 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
It was a tense activity                                                               Chall151 
This is a complex activity Chall151 adapted to: I was determined during this 
activity Att141 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity is an unusual activity for me to do 
This is a new-fashioned activity for me to do                                                  Nov333 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
It is an enjoyable activity to me 
It is an enjoyable activity to me                                                                     InsEn222 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I want to discover all the ways of doing this type of activity 
l want to discover all the tricks in this activity                                              ExIn111 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This activity was demanding  
This activity is a demanding task Chall353                                                      Att242 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I was nervous at times 
I was anxious during this activity InDis171                                                   Chal252 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I was focused 
I was focused                                                                                                       Att343 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
My attention was high 
Its fun to try this activity                                                                                 ToIn363 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
The activity inspires me to participate  
The activity inspires me to participate                                                         InsEn323 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I had to concentrate   
I was concentrated                                                                                              Att444 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 This can be considered a challenging activity 
This is an interesting activity for me to do                                                    ToIn464 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I was uncertain at times 
This activity is a demanding task Chall353 now Att242                              Chall353 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I’d like more details of how to do this type of activity 
I like to inquire into details of how to do it                                                   ExIn414 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
I Don’t agree                I strongly Agree 
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ROPELOC Mk3
I enjoy working with others 
02. I like cooperating in a team.                       CT102 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I can handle things no matter what the situation is 
03. No matter what the situation is I can handle it        SF103 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
My own efforts and actions will determine my future 
05. My own efforts and actions are what will determine my future.       IL105
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I can change my mind easily if there is a better idea  
07. I am open to different thinking if there is a better idea.      OT107 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I try my best to get the details right in everything I do  
08. In everything I do I try my best to get the details right.      QS108 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I know I have the ability to do anything I want to do 
10. I am confident that I have the ability to succeed in anything I want to do.      SC110 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I cope well with changing situations. 
15 I cope well with changing situations.                                                                         CH115 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I plan and use my time efficiently  
14. I plan and use my time efficiently.         TE114 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I cooperate well with others 
16. I cooperate well when working in a team.                          CT216 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No matter what happens, I can handle it 
18. No matter what happens I can handle it.        SF218 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
What I do and how I do it will determine my success 
21. What I do and how I do it will determine my successes in life.                           IL221 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I am open to new thought and ideas  
22. I am open to new thoughts and ideas.                           OT222 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I tried to do my possible best 
23. I try to get the best possible results when I do things.      QS223 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
When I really try, I believe I will succeed 
24. When I apply myself to something I am confident I will succeed.                      SC224 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I do not waste time 
28. I am efficient and do not waste time.         TE228 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I cope well when unexpected things happen. 
30. When things around me change I cope well.                                             CH230 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I work well with others 
31. I am good at cooperating with team members.       CT331 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I can handle most things no matter what 
32. I can handle things no matter what happens.        SF332 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I like new ideas 
36. I can adapt my thinking and ideas.                           OT336 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
If I succeed in life it will be because of my efforts 
37. If I succeed in life it will be because of my efforts.                            IL337 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I try to get the very best results in everything I do 
38. I try to get the very best results in everything I do.                                            QS338 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I believe I am confident and will be successful 
39. I am confident in my ability to be successful.                          SC339 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I am efficient in the way I use my time 
43. I am efficient in the way I use my time.                           TE343 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I don’t mind when things change. 
44. I cope well when things change.                                                                 CH344 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I Don’t agree                     I strongly Agree 
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APPENDIX III: Goodness of Fit Indices 
Confounding Considerations of Chi-square (χ2) tests in Absolute Fit Indices 
This Chi-square (χ2) test forms the bases of many ‘fit indices’ and is almost ubiquitously reported in 
SEM. However,  χ2 comes with inherent issues in relation to the data used (Newsom, 2012, p1): 
1) It is confounded by large sample-size over 200 giving significance and possible Type I errors. 
2) It can reject small sample models, Type II errors. 
3) Chi-square is affected by skew and kurtoses, confounding multivariate normality. 
4) Chi-square does not easily accommodate missing variables. 
5) Complex models produce greater χ2  confounding positive reporting (Kenny, 2015).  
Where Chi-square forms the basis of other fit indices (transformations based on χ2 ), similar 
confounding must be considered, e.g. Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), adjusted Goodness of Fit Index 
(AGFI), root means residual (RMR) and standardised root means residual (SRMR). 
Relative Fit Indices 
It might therefore be advisable to look to test the ‘assumed’ model fit against an independent or 
null-model (all measured variables are un-correlated, i.e. no latent variables exist). When the 
assumed model is compared against the null model, a ratio or ‘normed’ relative measure of fit 
indices can then be produced such as Bollen’s Incremental Fit Index (IFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI). Of note is that Bollen (1990, in Newsom, 2018, p3) was able to show that IFI and TLI were 
relatively unaffected by sample size. 
However, in acknowledging that any Chi-Square (χ2) test is a normative distribution measure, there is 
a centrality to the null-hypothesis (no difference in model fit) causing concern in both Absolute 
parametric assumptions and Relative (alternative model) assumptions, as both are χ2 fit generated. 
That is to say, that such multivariate ‘normality’ assumptions are not tested in both Absolute and 
Relative fit indices (Newsom, 2012). To accurately test normality, we need consider ‘non-centrality’:  
Non-centrality fit indices aim to reject an ‘alternative’ hypothesis in a method where the χ2 is given 
for a ‘perfect fit’ of non-centrality (1 rather than 0); if rejected, the multivariate data might be 
assumed ‘normally distributed’, obfuscating the χ2 skew and kurtoses issues discussed above. Two 
such indices able to be considered normed-Relative fit indices (where ratios between 0 and 1 can be 
obtained), are the Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) and Bentler’s Comparative Fit Index (CFI). 
Such indices, then, are relative models and contemporary cut-off values for ‘assumed fit’ are 
accepted when the researcher-assumed model and the relative-alternative model (normed for non-
centrality), are ‘different’ to a ratio measure of .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
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APPENDIX IV: Bias Considerations In Situational Domain Sampling 
Expectation Bias  
The possibility of an expectation-bias of ‘euphoric’ reporting, question the timing of the data 
collection (i.e. as at the beginning of a new phase of education, experience or life). The internal 
validity of such a measure is questionable in such instances, as it may represent ‘euphoric’ reporting 
(Marsh, Richards & Barnes, 1986). Rather than a measure of a current ‘state’, it may well be that an 
agential bias exists towards a percieved future state, one where an ‘emotional bias of expectation’ 
again informs a present cognition (Clark, 2013; Kahneman & Riis, 2005). 
Frame of Reference Trait over State Bias 
The positive reporting of cognitions of Organisational Skills (OS), saw Time Effectiveness (TE), provide 
more trait-like inference than ‘supposed’ appraisals of competence such as Self-Confidence (SC). 
These are seemingly more prevalent and might be considered to be trait-like cognitions of robust 
temporal effect. That some constructs of Self-Concept are more susceptible to a temporal ‘trait’ 
influence, and that their reporting might under-report the ‘state’ requirements of a Self-Concept 
perception measure. To this end, the duration of engagement might have a moderating effect on 
state reporting through a maturation ‘trait’ effect. Such a possible ‘duration’ effect on Self-Concept 
interventions has been reported in the literature (see, Rickinson et al., 2004, meta-analysis), and 
might well be considered as a positive confounding of ‘state’ measurement. Therefore, constructs of 
Self-Concept that seemingly reflected more ‘state’ like perceptions were investigated in future 
studies. 
Age, Activity and Gender 
In addition to the maturation effect above, past reporting of Self-Concept has also reported the 
mediating effects of age, gender and environment (Dillon et al., 2005; Hattie et al., 1997; Malone, 
2008). However, rather than a bias of non-homogeneity between sample groups, it is considered in 
Ecological Psychology that these effects as situational and mediating of a domain-effect on 
perception, present a supporting rather than confounding bias effect: If it is in ecologies of situation, 
self and environment that perception is formulated, sampling (if homogeneity ‘within’ group is 
maintained), statistical analysis of the ‘group’ will reflect a situational-bias effective on the 
functional state of individual’s perception. It is therefore in appropriate Divergent Criticality 
hypothesis to reflect such group-effect biasing as much a part of any individual perception effect and 
therefore, situationally valid in this studies ‘between’ groups (situational domains) hypothesis.
Appendix V 
305 
 
APPENDIX V: Study Two – ROPELOC Factor Analysis 
Study Two: ROPELOC Factor Extraction  
 
Table 42 – Initial Maximum Likelihood Components 
 
Total Variance Explained   
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues   Parallel Analysis - Study 2 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative %   Mean SD 
95 
percentile 
1 9.642 40.173 40.173 F_1 1.559 0.0469 1.6364 
2 2.342 9.759 49.932 F_2 1.4776 0.0397 1.5431 
3 1.543 6.430 56.362 F_3 1.4116 0.0307 1.4622 
4 1.231 5.129 61.492 F_4 1.3529 0.0304 1.403 
5 1.064 4.433 65.925 F_5 1.297 0.027 1.3416 
6 0.767 3.196 69.121 F_6 1.2494 0.0277 1.2952 
7 0.743 3.097 72.218 F_7 1.1995 0.0239 1.2389 
8 0.686 2.858 75.076 F_8 1.1526 0.0236 1.1916 
9 0.647 2.696 77.772 F_9 1.1093 0.0213 1.1445 
10 0.606 2.524 80.296 F_10 1.0696 0.0214 1.105 
11 0.530 2.208 82.504 F_11 1.0302 0.0195 1.0623 
12 0.506 2.109 84.613 F_12 0.9939 0.0223 1.0307 
13 0.473 1.969 86.582 F_13 0.9536 0.02 0.9867 
14 0.431 1.797 88.379 F_14 0.917 0.0212 0.952 
15 0.362 1.507 89.886 F_15 0.8842 0.0206 0.9183 
16 0.344 1.431 91.317 F_16 0.8479 0.0197 0.8804 
17 0.321 1.337 92.654 F_17 0.8119 0.0207 0.846 
18 0.298 1.242 93.895 F_18 0.7796 0.0215 0.815 
19 0.285 1.188 95.083 F_19 0.7446 0.0214 0.7799 
20 0.273 1.136 96.220 F_20 0.7119 0.019 0.7432 
21 0.257 1.072 97.292 F_21 0.6735 0.0209 0.7079 
22 0.236 0.982 98.274 F_22 0.6378 0.0223 0.6746 
23 0.217 0.904 99.178 F_23 0.5926 0.0237 0.6318 
24 0.197 0.822 100.000 F_24 0.5428 0.0344 0.5996 
Note: Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood Analysis. 
  
Table 41 – KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Measure                                                                                                                 Threshold Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin             
 
>.90  .919 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  
 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
  Approx. Chi-Square 3769.863 
  df 276 
 p <.05 Sig. .000 
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Communalities 
 
From this initial factor analysis, it was also possible to explore the 
Communalities between the variables; expecting variables that loaded 
sufficiently with a latent factor, to display reciprocal communality with 
other similar variables. In this instance, strong communalities 
suggested that communality above .30 would provide a guide to the 
initial investigation of variables, but a more stringent .40 could 
highlight variables less likely of causing potential validity problems 
further down the factor analysis. 
(TE114 = .292), (OT222 = .286), (QS223 = .398), (TE288 = .339), (TE343 
= .365)   and (CH344 = .390) were highlighted as potential issues and 
though not removed at this stage, was monitored through the 
remainder of the EFA and future Confirmatory Factor Analysis. 
A following Rotated Matrix (see, Table 44, below) was produced 
suppressed loadings less than (0.40). 
  
Table 43 – Communalities 
CT102 0.626 
SF103 0.480 
OT107 0.452 
QS108 0.525 
SC110 0.587 
SM112 0.646 
TE114 0.292 
CH115 0.505 
CT216 0.583 
SF218 0.653 
OT222 0.286 
QS223 0.398 
SC224 0.435 
SM227 0.606 
TE288 0.339 
CH230 0.665 
CT331 0.534 
SF332 0.605 
OT336 0.408 
QS338 0.478 
SC339 0.554 
SM342 0.680 
TE343 0.365 
Note: Extraction Method: 
Maximum Likelihood. 
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Two cross-loadings were seen at this .40 
threshold. Of concern were variables 
(QS108) and (QS223) as these did not 
express clear discriminatory loadings (r > 
.60) towards any one particular latent 
factor. These variables were not removed at 
this point, but was noted for future 
consideration (if there was a problem in 
later Confirmatory Factor Analysis). To help 
simplify the loading matrix further, a pattern 
matrix was now produced suppressing for 
discriminatory loadings. 
  
Table 44 – Rotated- Matrix 
 
 FACTOR 
 
Variable 
  
 1 2 3 
SM342  0.804 
 
 
CH230  0.795 
 
 
SM112  0.765 
 
 
SM227  0.738 
 
 
SF218  0.697 
 
 
SF332  0.684 
 
 
CH115  0.559 
 
 
CH344  0.495 
 
 
TE288  0.452 
 
 
TE114  0.446 
 
 
TE343  0.441 
 
 
CT102  
 
0.770  
CT216  
 
0.716  
CT331  
 
0.613  
OT107  
 
0.600  
QS108  
 
0.534 0.488 
OT336  
 
0.512  
OT222  
 
0.487  
QS223  
 
0.467 0.425 
SC110  
  
0.694 
QS338  
  
0.618 
SC339  0.402 
 
0.607 
SC224  
  
0.566 
 Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization."    
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Study Two - Confirmatory Factor Analysis: ROPELOC  
Using the Rotated Factor Matrix, a basic model with all factors co-varied was built in AMOSIBM24 (see 
below, Gaskin, 2016d), allowing the EFA to be taken forward for convergent and discriminatory 
validity within a model fit – a Confirmatory Factor Analysis CFA: 
Figure 53 – EFA Suggested Factor Model (AMOSIBM24) 
Initially, no clear discrimination between the original ROPELOC Factors of Personal Abilities and 
Beliefs (PAB), Organisational Skills (OS) and Cooperative Teamwork. However, biased on the Study 1 
correlations, nominal labels were applied to the factors in (Figure 53) representing the dominant 
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bias. Of interest may the emergence of a self-confidence (SC) factor. As Study Two had identified 
‘Internal Locus’ as a significant correlation, it was considered that such LOCUS might be in evidence. 
Initial Confirmatory Model Analysis 
The following guidance metrics were used in an initial-fit model to gauge validity. 
Validity Issues 
Time Effectiveness 
Weak convergence validity was see across the Time Effectiveness variable (r≤.59)  (see, Figure 53, 
above). This was thought to indicate a lack of convergence on PAB from TE and the possibility of a 
latent factor not being adequately represented in a three factor model. However, Time Effectiveness 
was removed in this exploratory model to assess the modeling of the PAB factor, but noted for 
possible reintroduction in future analysis as TE had reported strongly in previous correlation analysis 
(see Study One). 
Quality Seeking (QS223), Open Thinking (OT222) and Coping with Change (CH344) 
CH344 and QS223 approached convergent validity (r =.59 and r =.56 respectively) and where 
retained though QS223 was subject to co-varying as per modification indices (below). Open Thinking 
(OT222) had displayed  poor Communality and was therefore removed from the model.  
Modification Indices 
Available co-variances were applied to variables displaying high Modification Indices (AMOSIBM24) 
where a priori knowledge (e.g., item similarity) provided enough face explanation for covariance:  
QS223 and QS108 are thought to express the ‘Quality Seeking’ perceptions. QS223 and QS108 were 
therefore co-varied. This however did not improve the variables convergence (r=.56 reduced to 
r=.50) and therefore, QS223 was though eligible for removal. 
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A model with Time Effectiveness, QS223 and OT222 removed (Figure 54, below) was now taken 
forward to confirmatory factor analysis. 
Figure 54 – Initial Confirmatory Analysis Model (AMOSIBM24) 
 
Model Fit 
Using the model fit indices to test the validity of our model, the following was derived: 
Recommended Threshold Twin Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 3.687 
p-value for the model     <.05 p<.0001 
CFI >.95  .862 
GFI  >.95 .829 
IFI    >.95 .863 
SRMR   <.08 .0745 
RMSEA <.06  .098 
PCLOSE >.05 .000 
Note: Taken from Hu and Bentler’s “Cutoff Criteria and Fit Indexes” (1999, p.27)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
 
Model fit was found not to achieve threshold’s. 
Table 45 – Model-Fit Thresholds 
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APPENDIX VI: Study Three – Situational Interest EFA and CFA 
Study 3: Situational Interest Factor Extraction  
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues   
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative %   Mean 95 
percentile 
1 9.246 38.526 38.526 F_1 1.309 1.384 
2 2.825 11.771 50.297 F_2 1.263 1.323 
3 1.682 7.008 57.305 F_3 1.224 1.276 
4 1.469 6.119 63.424 F_4 1.193 1.242 
5 1.015 4.230 67.654 F_5 1.164 1.198 
6 0.773 3.219 70.873 F_6 1.138 1.171 
7 0.693 2.886 73.759 F_7 1.112 1.143 
8 0.590 2.457 76.216 F_8 1.091 1.130 
9 0.533 2.222 78.438 F_9 1.067 1.107 
10 0.509 2.122 80.560 F_10 1.047 1.084 
11 0.472 1.965 82.525 F_11 1.027 1.061 
12 0.459 1.914 84.440 F_12 1.004 1.036 
13 0.449 1.869 86.309 F_13 0.982 1.013 
14 0.412 1.718 88.028 F_14 0.961 0.988 
15 0.387 1.612 89.640 F_15 0.940 0.968 
16 0.383 1.597 91.236 F_16 0.918 0.943 
17 0.338 1.406 92.643 F_17 0.899 0.926 
18 0.320 1.333 93.976 F_18 0.879 0.903 
19 0.302 1.260 95.236 F_19 0.858 0.888 
20 0.275 1.147 96.383 F_20 0.834 0.863 
21 0.240 0.998 97.381 F_21 0.813 0.846 
22 0.223 0.930 98.310 F_22 0.787 0.813 
23 0.206 0.859 99.169 F_23 0.761 0.796 
24 0.199 0.831 100.000 F_24 0.729 0.771 
  
Factor extraction simplifies the matrix values from the linear transformations of correlation loading 
inherent in the analysis extraction. It provides an Eigenvalue for each variable, that signifies how 
much of the variance in all the data is explained by that single factor: Eigenvalue values greater than 
1.0 (the default in SPSS) might now be used to indicate significant discrimination and compare how 
the latent variables load towards significant factors). Five factors displayed Eigenvalues greater than 
1.0 using SPSS23. As a comparative, a parallel ‘Random Data Eigenvalue’ analysis was conducted 
Table 46 – KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Measure                                                                                                                 Threshold Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin             
 
>.90  .934 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  
 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
  3769.863 3769.863 
  276 276 
 p <.05 .000 .000 
Note: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)   Measure of Sampling Adequacy          
Table 47 – Initial Maximum Likelihood Components 
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using bootstrapped resampling (Vivek et al., 2007). By comparing the Random Data Eigenvalue 
(Random-Factor Mean= Initial Eigenvalue) with the Maximum Likelihood Extraction (this should be 
equal to or higher than the ‘comparative’ means), only the first four of the factors accounting for 
63.48% of the total variance was confirmed (see, Table 47)  
However, in lieu of the ‘a priori’ model from (Chen et al., 1999) suggesting Six factors. Therefore, 
rather than discard the 5th factor, the Eigenvalues above 1.0 were investigated with a Scree Plot. The 
Scree Plot was used to gauge the visual difference in the 5th factor when compared to the mean; if it 
was above the leveling-off of the scree-profile then some discriminatory validity in such a 5th factor is 
acceptable. This, in addition to the Eigenvalue being above 1.0, was considered to display sufficient 
face-validity in order for a 5th factor to be taken forward for further analysis. Five extracted factors 
were therefore taken forward.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 49 (above) correlations between factor 1 and factors 3 & 5 were greater than 0.5 (r = 0.509 
& 0.571 – respectively), displaying a moderately oblique relationship. However, as these two were 
the only cases out of 10 pairwise correlations, no overall obliqueness was considered evident in the 
Table 48 – Communalities 
InEn121 0.681 
Chall454 0.319 
Nov131 0.512 
Att141 0.631 
Toin161 0.782 
ExIn212 0.702 
Nov434 0.612 
Exin313 0.520 
InEn424 0.742 
ToIn262 0.620 
Nov232 0.575 
Chal151 0.500 
Nov333 0.490 
InEn222 0.735 
ExIn111 0.682 
Att242 0.543 
Chal252 0.362 
Att343 0.717 
ToIn363 0.767 
InEn323 0.631 
Att444 0.398 
ToIn464 0.540 
Chal353 0.430 
Note: Extraction Method: 
Maximum Likelihood. 
Table 49 – Factor Correlation Matrix 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1.000 0.129 -0.571 0.275 0.509 
2 0.129 1.000 -0.276 0.305 0.238 
3 -0.571 -0.276 1.000 -0.181 -0.419 
4 0.275 0.305 -0.181 1.000 0.278 
5 0.509 0.238 -0.419 0.278 1.000 
Note: Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.   
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
Figure 55 – Scree Plot Displaying Independence of Factor 5 
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factors, therefore the factors were considered not obliquely related. The matrix was therefore 
investigated through an orthogonal rotation using Varimax to extract factor loadings from the 
variables. Using a cutoff of .40 could highlight variables less likely of causing potential validity 
problems further down the factor analysis. 
Chall454 = .32, Chall252 =.36 and Att444 were highlighted as potential issues and though not 
removed at this stage (greater than .30 value is acceptable within the EFA), they were to be 
monitored through the remainder of the EFA and future Confirmatory Factor Analysis. 
Table 50 –-Structural Matrix 
 
 FACTOR 
 
Variable 
    
 1 2 3 4 5 
Toin161  0.808     
InEn222  0.782     
InEn121  0.761     
InEn424  0.758     
Att141  0.632     
ToIn262  0.630   0.421  
InEn323  0.574     
Nov232  0.509    0.493 
Att242   0.680    
ToIn464   0.652    
Chal151   0.649    
Chal353   0.634    
Chal252   0.571    
Chall454   0.546    
ExIn414    0.772   
ExIn111  0.402  0.700   
ExIn212  0.454  0.669   
Exin313    0.645   
Att343     0.757  
ToIn363     0.752  
Att444     0.412  
Nov131      0.701 
Nov333      0.615 
 Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization."    
  
 
Reliability of Factor Loading 
As part of this initial analysis, factor-1 displayed oblique rotations with r>.50 across factors (3 & 5). 
As an ‘a prior’ assumption (based on the original questionnaire SEM in Study One) of the variables 
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loading on factor-1 were thought to be indicative of Enjoyment and Total Interest constructs. This 
might highlight a possible confounding of these constructs or psychological-domains of emotion 
(Enjoyment), and attention (Interest) on one factor; alternatively, as convergent variables 
representing one dominant factor enjoyment and interest might indeed represent one cognitive 
emotional-construct. To this end, a further Factor Analysis was conducted using a 3 factor rotation 
to represent these construct possibilities on the variables loading to the original, single, factor-1. 
As inference of oblique loadings might signify possible cross-loadings weakening this factor’s items 
reliability, a further 3 factor orthogonal-rotation was performed using a Oblimin-rotation on factor-1 
only (an initial rotation provided high correlations between two sub-factors in this sub-rotation = 
0.828). This questioned the robustness of variables towards this dominant factor’s convergence and 
an investigation to identify if secondary or sub-factors might be hidden within. 
Cross-loading values of sub-factors that are similar (i.e. 
not greater than .2) require us to question their 
convergence validity towards the original factor-1 and 
the possibility that sub-influences might be in 
operation within the latent factor. Such questionable 
loadings are seen for all variables across two of the 
three sub-factors  (Table 51), requiring us to assess the 
discriminatory validity of assigning variables to the 
original factor-1  Cronbach’s Alpha (Cronbach, 1958). 
Cronbach’s (1958) as a ‘reliability of factor loading’, is a measure of internal-consistency of variables 
towards a loading a latent factor. It is a measure taken of the correlation between the variance 
(within item) and covariance across all items or variables thought to relate to that latent factor. This 
is able to provide a ratio measure  of increasing reliability in consistency of item correlations 
(internal consistency reliability) as Crombach’s Alpha () approaches 1. Therefore high Cronbach’s  
is essential internally, if a latent factor is to be considered valid to correlated against other 
measures122: “reliabilities should ideally be high, around .9, especially for ability tests. Certainly 
alphas should never drop below .7” (Kline, 2013, p13) 
                                                          
122 It should be noted that Cronbach's Alpha has a positive relationship with large sample sizes and increasing 
degrees of freedom, therefore questioning its use as a true measure of (Hair et al., 2013). However, there is no 
caveat for low Crombach’s Alpha () and is therefore, is used at this Exploratory phase. More accurate 
measures of reliability are pursued in the Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
Table 51 – Sub-Factor Structure Matrix 
  Factor 1 
1 2 3 
InEn222 0.876 0.688 
 
Toin161 0.873 0.772 -0.349 
InEn424 0.840 0.766 
 
InEn121 0.819 0.678 
 
InEn323 0.752 0.660 
 
Att141 0.731 0.631 
 
ToIn262 0.744 0.897 
 
Nov232 0.597 0.684 
 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
a. 3 factors extracted. 12 iterations required. 
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Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability 
Cronbach’s  test was applied on Latent factor-1 items. In addition, a sensitivity analysis  or ‘scale 
purification’ framework applies statistical inference to which importantly, judgement criteria should 
be considered (Wieland, Durach, Kembro & Treiblmaier, 2017) a framework to consider item 
removal, or not. 
All factor-1 variables, displayed a 
consistency in their reporting on the 
latent variable factor-1 and were 
retained. However, Nov232 was noted 
from cross-loading on factor-5 in the 
Structural Factor Matrix (Table 50, p313) 
and resulted in little reliability loss to 
factor 1 if removed. Therefore a 
Cronbach’s  was conducted on factor-5 
including Nov232: 
Here, there is significant loss of reliability 
if Nov232 is removed, suggesting that it 
may have more discriminatory validity 
assigned to this factor 5 rather than 
factor 1. This is supported in the initial 
structure matrix where Nov232 reported 
strongly toward a second sub-factor. As latent factor-3 had also displayed oblique loading against 
factor-1 questioning the discriminatory adherence of that factor’s items, Cronbach’s  test was 
applied to factor-3: 
All factor-3 variables, displayed a 
consistency in their reporting on the 
latent variable factor-3 and were 
retained. 
  
Table 52 – Sub-Factor 1: Crombach’s Alpha ( = .928) 
Item-Total Statistics     
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Toin161 36.8120 127.252 0.837 0.912 
InEn222 36.7570 128.249 0.809 0.914 
InEn121 36.9488 132.116 0.772 0.917 
InEn424 37.1520 126.978 0.814 0.913 
Att141 36.7922 136.151 0.701 0.922 
ToIn262 37.0539 129.363 0.761 0.918 
InEn323 37.0327 134.187 0.717 0.921 
Nov232 37.2494 135.291 0.618 0.929 
Table 53 – Sub-Factor 5: Crombach’s Alpha ( =.769) 
Item-Total Statistics     
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Nov131 14.6569 27.313 0.571 0.717 
Nov232 14.2737 31.809 0.560 0.720 
Nov333 14.5870 30.602 0.521 0.739 
Nov434 14.3259 29.809 0.643 0.678 
Table 54 – Sub-Factor 3: Crombach’s Alpha ( =.875) 
Item-Total Statistics     
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
ExIn414 12.7289 28.219 0.758 0.829 
ExIn111 12.6129 28.228 0.755 0.830 
ExIn212 12.3837 28.708 0.746 0.833 
Exin313 12.7712 31.164 0.665 0.864 
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Table 55 – Rotated-Structural Matrix 
 
 FACTOR 
 
Variable 
    
 1 2 3 4 5 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
 α=.928 α=.805 α=.875 α=.785 α=.768 
Toin161  0.808     
InEn222  0.782     
InEn121  0.761     
InEn424  0.758     
Att141  0.632     
ToIn262  0.630     
InEn323  0.574     
Att242   0.680    
ToIn464   0.652    
Chal151   0.649    
Chal353   0.634    
Chal252   0.571    
Chall454   0.546    
ExIn414    0.772   
ExIn111    0.700   
ExIn212    0.669   
Exin313    0.645   
Att343     0.757  
ToIn363     0.752  
Att444     0.412  
Nov131      0.701 
Nov333      0.615 
Nov434      0.602 
 Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization."    
  
 
Using the Rotated Factor Matrix, a basic model with all factors co-varied was built in allowing the 
EFA to be taken forward for convergent and discriminatory validity within a model fit – a 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis CFA 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Situational Interest  
Using the Rotated Factor Matrix, a basic model with all factors co-varied was built in AMOSIBM24 (see 
below, Gaskin, 2016d), allowing the EFA to be taken forward for convergent and discriminatory 
validity within a model fit – a Confirmatory Factor Analysis CFA. This EFA Pattern Matrix was taken 
forward for CFA: 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
α=.928 α=.805 α=.875 α=.785 α=.768 
Toin161 0.808         
InEn222 0.782         
InEn121 0.761         
InEn424 0.758         
Att141 0.632         
ToIn262 0.630         
InEn323 0.574         
Att242   0.680       
ToIn464   0.652       
Chal151   0.649       
Chal353   0.634       
Chal252   0.571       
Chall454   0.546 
 
    
ExIn414     0.772     
ExIn111     0.700     
ExIn212     0.669     
Exin313     0.645     
Att343       0.757   
ToIn363       0.752   
Att444       0.412   
Nov131         0.701 
Nov333         0.615 
Nov434         0.602 
Nov232       
 
0.509 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
Using this pattern matrix, a basic model with all factors co-varied was built in AMOSIBM24 (Gaskin, 
2016d), to use in a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to test for Convergence and Discriminatory 
validity: 
Rotated Factor Matrix 
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Figure 56 –Pattern Matrix for Taking Forward AMOSIBM24 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Study Three – Situational Interest  
Convergence and Discriminatory Validity 
The following guidance metrics were used in an initial-fit model to gauge validity. 
High correlations on latent factor loading for convergence validity requires correlations greater than 
0.7 (r >.70) for variables towards a factor, with an overall average above 0.60 towards a particular 
factor (Hair et al., 2013).  
Low factor co-variance for discriminatory validity requires correlations less than 0.8 (r <.80) between 
factors with strong discriminatory validity requiring loadings of below 0.70 (ibid). 
CFA Validity Issues  
Challenge 454 
The initial convergence validity (Figure 56) required the variable (Chal454=.48) to be questioned. 
This is seen to provide a significant effect for ‘poorer’ overall convergence validity for Challenge, and  
needs consideration in light of its poor ‘Communality’ Analysis (Chal454 = .32). The variable Chal454 
was therefore removed from this CFA model analysis. 
Instant Enjoyment 323 and Total Interest 262 
Discriminatory confounding from the Instant Enjoyment (InEn) latent factor (expressed in high 
discriminatory loadings (r>.7) to the Approach (App) factor and the Attention Demand (Att) factor 
when (r<.7) are required, might correspond to the confounding of cross-loading from InEn323 and 
ToIn262 seen in the EFA across these factors. 
The Variables (InEn323 and ToIn262), when removed, improved the discriminatory loadings across 
one of these pathway (Instant Enjoyment – Attention Demand). To further address Convergence and 
Discriminatory validity, modification indices were applied to variables displaying high Modification 
Indices (MI >.40, AMOSIBM24) where apriori similarity provided enough explanation for covariance: 
(Chal353 + Chal252) describe overtly negative aspects as affective emotions and were therefore co-
varied. 
Novelty 333 
NOV333 displayed poor weighting of the CFA model, together with the cross-loading seen in the EFA 
and considering its co-variance with NOV131, it was considered acceptable to remove NOV333. 
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A model with Chal454, InEn323, ToIn262 and Nov333 removed and co-variances on (Chal353 &252) 
applied was now used for initial confirmatory analysis (Figure 57). 
Figure 57 – Initial Confirmatory Analysis Model AMOSIBM24 
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APPENDIX VII: Measurement Invariance Tests 
Configurable Invariance for Gender  
Adequate configurable-invariance was observed in model fit across gender groups when a freely-
estimated model was run for two gender groups. A Chi-square (χ2) test between groups looking for 
non-independence or non-variance in the goodness of model fit was run on AMOSIBM24 (i.e. there is 
no significant difference between the groups in terms of data variance).  
Model fit indices, CFI, SRMR, and RMSEA (Table 56), are considered acceptable using less restrictive 
thresholds for multivariate models in respect to sample size and item number (Byrne, 2008, p876).  
Table 56 – Gender Configurable Invariance 
Recommended Threshold Invariance Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 3.543 
p-value for the model     <.05 .0001 
CFI >.92-.95  .920 
SRMR   <.06-.08 .067 
RMSEA <.06-.08  .056 
Note: Strict Thresholds (Hu & Bentler, 1999);                                                  
Acceptable Thresholds (Hair et al., 2013; Lomax & Schumacker, 2004) 
 
Result: Configurable Invariance (INTEREST) for gender grouping was found in the primary CFI model. 
Metric Invariance for Gender 
This next step in data validity explores how group data is invariant in respect of how the variable 
items load towards latent factors. Rather than an overall ‘model equivalence’, metric invariance 
requires that the item loadings towards a latent factor are also equivalent. This is achieved by 
constraining the factor loadings and letting the intercepts freely estimate in AMOSIBM24 (Van de 
Schoot et al., 2012).  A Chi-square (χ2) test between a constrained and a freely estimated group 
looking for non-invariance in the model fit was conducted in Microsoft Excel10 (Gaskin, 2017a), to 
test to see if the two models are found invariant (i.e. there is no significant difference between the 
groups in terms of data variance towards individual latent factors (Table 57). 
Table 57 – Metric Invariance for gender 
 Overall Model Chi-square DF P Invariant? 
Unconstrained 1119.6 316     
Fully constrained 1132.5 336     
Number of groups   2     
     Difference 12.9 20 0.882 YES 
Note: Chi-square Difference Measure (Gaskin, 2017a) 
Result: Metric Invariance (INTEREST) for gender grouping was found in the primary CFI model. 
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Scalar Invariance for Gender 
This tests invariance as to how individual items report to a particular latent factor – a ‘similarity in 
item invariance’ across the groupings. Scalar invariance for gender was performed by comparing the 
partially Constrained model (factor loadings) with a fully Constrained (loadings and Intercepts) using 
a  χ2test across gender groups in AMOSIBM24 (Table 58).  
Table 58 – Scalar Invariance 1) for gender 
Model DF CMIN P 
Measurement intercepts 32 43.268 0.082 
Note: Assuming model Unconstrained to be correct 
 
Result: Scalar Invariance (INTEREST) for gender grouping was found in the primary CFI model. 
Configurable Invariance for Age 
Table 59 – Age Configurable Invariance 
Recommended Threshold Invariance Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 2.578 
p-value for the model     <.05 .0001 
CFI >.92-.95  .901 
SRMR   <.06-.08 .061 
RMSEA <.06-.08  .043 
Note: Strict Thresholds (Hu & Bentler, 1999);                                                  
Acceptable Thresholds (Hair et al., 2013; Lomax & Schumacker, 2004) 
 
Result: Though not quite achieving CFI fit, in consideration of reduced thresholds for ‘multivariate’ 
models (Byrne, 2008, p876). Configurable Invariance (INTEREST) for age was accepted here in order 
to further develop the CFI model. However, it was introduced as a possible extraneous factor in the 
final SEM to account possible variance (age grouping). 
Metric Invariance for Age 
Table 60 – Age Configurable Invariance 
 Overall Model Chi-square DF P Invariant? 
Unconstrained 1618.7 628     
Fully constrained 1662.7  684     
Number of groups   4     
     Difference 44 56 0.877 YES 
Note: Chi-square Difference Measure (Gaskin, 2017a) 
 
Result: Metric Invariance (of INTEREST above) for age grouping was found in the primary CFI model.  
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Scalar Invariance for Age 
Individual items reporting to particular latent factors, are tested for ‘similarity in variance’ across the 
groupings (below).  
Table 61 – Scalar invariance 1) for age 
 
Model DF CMIN P 
Measurement intercepts 30 301 0.000 
Note: Assuming model Unconstrained to be correct 
 
Here, there is ‘non-invariance’ (a difference between models), therefore a difference in the way that 
age influences the reporting on certain items towards factors. 
As with Gender invariance, the intercept-estimates were interrogated in the freely-estimated model 
using a pairwise analysis for items with the largest absolute value (regardless of positive/negative). 
From this, the following items were identified as possibly confounding scalar invariance in age: 
ToIn464, Nov434, Chal353, Att343 and Nov434. However, when set to freely estimate, still no scalar 
invariance was evident and it was considered detrimental to scalar invariance to further remove 
further intercept constraints. 
However, if invariance is not found in scalar ‘goodness of fit’, but invariance is found in 1) 
configurable and 2) metric Invariance, partial measurement invariance across groups is still plausible 
(Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Therefore, the model was taken forward to Validity and 
Reliability testing.  
Strict Invariance for Gender and Age 
The final Measurement Invariance test is one of ‘Strict Invariance’, which compares the residuals or 
error reporting across items and factors. As only gender had reported scalar invariance, and age, no 
scalar invariance, it was not thought practicable to gain more validity inference from such a ‘strict’ 
and seldom used procedure in social science. 
The initial Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Model (Figure 31, p171), is accepted for the further 
metrics to establish factor validity and reliability. 
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APPENDIX VIII: Tests for Multivariate Influence and Multi-Collinearity  
Multivariate Influence: Outliers and Influence using Cooks Distances 
Cook’s distances (Cook, 1979) were calculated using liner regression to determine if there were any 
non-normal influential items. A Cook’s Threshold of 3.0 (Gaskin, 2016b) is used to judge the adverse 
influence of Independent Variables (IV) on a Dependent variable (DV). DVs were assigned using the a 
priori hypothesised SEM model from Study One (see, APPENDIX I: Initial Pathway Analysis, p292). 
Here, though the a priori factor of Total Interest (ToIn) had been subsumed into the Study Three 
factors, pathways between Novelty, Exploratory Interest, Instant Enjoyment, Challenge and 
Attentional Demand, were still considered to be able to provide Dependent and Independent 
relationships for this test. We therefore entered pairwise IV on DV: Nov→InEn; Nov→Att; 
Nov→Chal; Att→InEn; Chal→InEn; InEn→App; ExIn→Att; ExIn→InEn. 
Example: a calculated Cook’s Distance (SSPSIBM23) for Novelty on Instant Enjoyment (graphically 
represented in a simple scatter-plot to help identify outliers (Figure 58), displays clearly an outlier, 
data-point 469, but one that lies within tolerance (Cooks= .0366). 
Figure 58 – Example of Cooks Distance Scatter Plot 
Results: Cooks distances showed no significant values (Cooks < 1), indicating that no one case had 
undue or abnormal influence on the data set. 
Tests of Multi-Collinearity  
 A Collinearity test is conducted to see if there is an acceptable ‘degree of accuracy’ in the a priori 
Independent Variables (IV) predicting a Dependent Variable (DV). This was conducted using liner  
regression and the collinearity-diagnostics (SSPSIBM23) to produce a Tolerance Inflation Factor (TIF) 
and a Variable Inflation Factor (VIF). Again using the SEM pathway model from Phase II to determine 
a priori DVs (Novelty and Exploratory Approach) on IVs (Instant Enjoyment, Challenge and 
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Attentional Demand) are regressed. Ideally, collinearity is accepted across all DVs where: Tolerance 
(TIF) > 0.1 and (VIF) < 3 (Gaskin, 2016b). This would indicate that the pathway model could be 
considered collinear between factors. The proposed CFA was found to be collinear (Table 62, below). 
Table 62 – Collinearity Coefficients: Tolerance (TIF) and Variable (VIF) 
Novelty t Sig. TIF VIF 
1 (Constant) -0.187 0.852     
Att -1.737 0.083 0.711 1.406 
Chal 10.050 0.000 0.913 1.095 
InEn 19.050 0.000 0.727 1.376 
Approach     
1 (Constant) -0.542 0.588     
Att 1.919 0.055 0.711 1.406 
Chal 11.590 0.000 0.913 1.095 
InEn 23.173 0.000 0.727 1.376 
Appendix IX 
326 
 
APPENDIX IX: Study Three ROPELOC EFA and CFA  
With consideration to the use of a modified measure of Review of Personal Effectiveness and Locus 
of Control – ROPELOC (Neill, 2009) and the adaption of its constructs.  As such changes had been 
made to the questionnaire to reflect feedback and descriptive statistical findings form the second 
phase of the study, An Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory Analysis was conducted: 
Table 63 – Rotated Pattern Matrix for ROPELOC suppressed to (.30)  
  1 2 3 4 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
α=.887 α=.837 α=.866 α=.776 
QS223 0.720       
QS338 0.687       
IL221 0.644       
IL105 0.615       
QS108 0.600       
SC110 0.597       
SC224 0.584       
IL337 0.508       
SC339 0.505       
TE343   -0.811     
TE228   -0.769     
TE114   -0.732     
SF332     0.772   
CH230     0.749   
SF218     0.736   
CH115     0.642   
CH344     0.539   
OT222     0.527   
SF103     0.486   
OT336     0.376   
CT216       -0.836 
CT331    -0.682 
CT102    -0.555 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
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Figure 59 - EFA Factor Model (AMOSIBM24) 
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Addressing CFA Model Fit Issues 
Internal Locus (IL337) 
The initial convergence validity (Figure 59) required the variable (IL337=.48) to be questioned. This is 
seen to provide a significant effect for ‘poorer’ overall convergence validity for Challenge, and needs 
consideration in light of its poor ‘Communality’ Analysis (IL337=.246) and it scale effect on 
Cronbach’s Alpha (an increase when removed). The variable IL337 was therefore removed from this 
CFA model analysis. 
Self Confidence (SF103) 
The initial convergence validity from required the variable (SF103=.50) to be questioned. This is seen 
to provide a significant effect for ‘poorer’ overall convergence validity for Challenge, and needs 
consideration in light of its poor ‘Communality’ Analysis (SF103=.50) and it scale effect on 
Cronbach’s Alpha (an increase when removed). The variable SF103 was therefore removed from this 
CFA model analysis. 
Modification Indices  
Modification indices recommended the following co-variances to be made to the model. A model 
with IL337 and SF103 removed and co-variances on error residuals (QS223 338; SC110-339; SF332-
218) applied (Figure 60,below). 
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Figure 60 – Initial Confirmatory Analysis Model AMOSIBM24 
 
Model Fit 
 
Recommended Threshold  CFA Pathway Model 
   
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5  5.731  
p-value for the model     <.05  .0001  
CFI >.92-.95   .923 
SRMR   <.06-.08  .061 
RMSEA <.06-.08   .074 
Note: Strict Thresholds (Hu & Bentler, 1999);                                                                                                
Acceptable Thresholds (Hair et al., 2013; Lomax & Schumacker, 2004)  
 
Table 64 – Model-Fit Thresholds taken from, Hu & Bentler (1999) 
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*The model fit did not achieve ‘strict’ model-fit thresholds under Hu and Bentler (1999). However, 
Hair et al. (2013, p584) and Lomax and Schumacker (2004, p112) have suggested acceptable model-
fit at lesser thresholds in consideration of sample size and the number of measure-items (e.g. 
RMSEA < .06 - .08) and therefore, this Initial CFA was thought to be acceptable in initial confirmatory 
analysis and able to continue the validity metrics. 
Measurement Invariance: For Non-independence threats 
Configurable Invariance for Gender  
Adequate configurable-invariance was observed in model fit across gender groups when a freely-
estimated model was run for two gender groups. A Chi-square (χ2) test between groups looking for 
non-independence or non-variance in the goodness of model fit was run on AMOSIBM24 (i.e. there is 
no significant difference between the groups in terms of data variance). Model fit indices, CFI, SRMR, 
and RMSEA (Table 65) were considered acceptable using less restrictive thresholds for multivariate 
models in respect to sample size and item number (Byrne, 2008, p876). 
Table 65 – Gender Configurable Invariance 
 
Recommended Threshold Invariance Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 2.821 
p-value for the model     <.05 .0001 
CFI >.92-.95  .927 
SRMR   <.06-.08 .050 
RMSEA <.06-.08  .048 
Note: Strict Thresholds (Hu & Bentler, 1999);                                                  
Acceptable Thresholds (Hair et al., 2013; Lomax & Schumacker, 2004) 
Result: Configurable Invariance (ROPELOC) for gender grouping was found in the primary CFI model. 
Metric Invariance for Gender 
This next step in data validity is how group data is invariant in respect of how the variable items load 
towards latent factors. Rather than an overall ‘model equivalence’, metric invariance requires that 
the item loadings towards a latent factor are also equivalent. This is achieved by constraining the 
factor loadings and letting the intercepts freely estimate in AMOSIBM24 (Van de Schoot et al., 2012).  A 
Chi-square (χ2) test between a constrained and a freely estimated group looking for non-invariance 
in the model fit was conducted in Microsoft Excel10 (Gaskin, 2017a), to test to see if the two models 
are found invariant (i.e. there is no significant difference between the groups in terms of data 
variance towards individual latent factors (Table 66).  
Appendix IX 
331 
 
 
 
 
Result: Metric Invariance (ROPELOC) for gender grouping was found in the primary CFI model. 
Scalar Invariance for Gender 
This tests invariance to how individual items report to particular latent factor – a ‘similarity in item 
invariance’ across the groupings.  
Table 67 – Scalar Invariance 1) for gender 
 
Model DF CMIN P 
Measurement intercepts 35 87.6 0.000 
Note: Assuming model Unconstrained to be correct 
 
Scalar invariance for gender was performed by comparing the partially Constrained model (factor 
loadings) with a fully Constrained (loadings and Intercepts) using a Chi-square (χ2) test across gender 
groups in AMOSIBM23 (Table 67). Here, no-significance would show invariance. 
There was variance found, suggesting a difference in the way that gender groupings influence the 
reporting on certain items towards one or more factor(s). This requires further consideration of 
possible issues with some of the items and their validity towards inferring similar reporting towards 
a latent factor across different groups. 
To identify any possible items causing this variance, the two gender group’s ‘intercept-estimates’ in 
the freely-estimated model are interrogated for outlier information (those with the largest 
‘absolute’ value). From this, the following items were identified as possible confounding scalar 
invariance; Ch115, CT216 and CT102. These items were allowed to freely estimate to obfuscate their 
effect. When set to freely estimate, still no scalar invariance was evident and it was considered 
detrimental to scalar invariance to further remove further intercept constraints. 
However, if invariance is not found in scalar ‘goodness of fit’, but invariance is found in 1) 
configurable and 2) metric Invariance, partial measurement invariance across groups is still plausible 
(Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Therefore, the model was taken forward to Validity and 
Reliability testing. 
 
Table 66 – Metric Invariance for gender via Chi-square Difference 
Measure  Overall Model Chi-square DF P Invariant? 
Unconstrained 1119.6 316     
Fully constrained 1132.5 336     
Number of groups   2     
     Difference 12.9 20 0.882 YES 
Note: Chi-square Difference Measure (Gaskin, 2017a) 
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Configurable Invariance for Age 
Table 68 – Age Configurable Invariance: 
Recommended Threshold Invariance Pathway Model 
Chi-square/df (cmin/df) <3-5 2.244 
p-value for the model     <.05 .0001 
CFI >.92-.95  .91 
SRMR   <.06-.08 .048 
RMSEA <.06-.08  .038 
Note: Strict Thresholds (Hu & Bentler, 1999);                                                  
Acceptable Thresholds (Hair et al., 2013; Lomax & Schumacker, 2004) 
Result: Using less restrictive thresholds for multivariate models (Byrne, 2008, p876). Configurable 
Invariance (INTEREST) for age was considered acceptable to further develop the primary CFI model. 
Metric Invariance for Age 
Table 69 – Age Configurable Invariance via Chi-square Difference 
Measure  Overall Model Chi-square DF P Invariant? 
Unconstrained 1615.4 720     
Fully constrained 1678.9  781     
Number of groups   4     
     Difference 12.9 61 0.388 YES 
Note: Chi-square Difference Measure (Gaskin, 2017a) 
 
Result: Metric Invariance (of ROPELOC above) for age grouping was found in the primary CFI model. 
Scalar Invariance for Age 
Individual items reporting to particular latent factors, are tested for ‘similarity in variance’ across the 
groupings (Table 70). 
Table 70 – Scalar invariance for age 
 
Model DF CMIN P 
Measurement intercepts 38 67.9 0.002 
Note: Assuming model Unconstrained to be correct 
 
There was non-invariance, therefore a difference in the way that age influences the reporting on 
certain items towards factors. 
As with Gender invariance, the intercept-estimates were interrogated in the freely-estimated model 
using a pairwise analysis for items with the largest absolute value (regardless of positive/negative). 
From this the following items were identified as possibly confounding scalar invariance in age: 
CH115, CH344 and OT336. However, when set to freely estimate, still no scalar invariance was 
evident and it was considered detrimental to scalar invariance to further remove further intercept 
constraints. 
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However, if invariance is not found in scalar ‘goodness of fit’, but invariance is found in 1) 
configurable and 2) metric Invariance, partial measurement invariance across groups is still plausible 
(Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Therefore, the model was taken forward to Validity and 
Reliability testing.  
Validity and Reliability Tests 
The initial Confirmatory Model Analysis above, now allows for the further validity metrics to 
establishing factor validity and reliability, such as Construct Reliability (CR). Though Cronbach's Alpha 
is often quoted for reliability, this does present problems for multi-construct models with large 
sample sizes as Cronbach has a positive relationship with increasing degrees of freedom, one that 
questions it as a reliability measure (Hair et al., 2013). More accurate reliability may be found 
through Construct Reliability (CR) where reliability might be  assumed if CR>.5 ideally CR>.7 (Hair et 
al., 2013, pg 605). In addition we test: 
Average Variance Extracted(AVE); Maximum Shared Variance(MSV); Average Shared Variance(ASV). 
Construct Reliability – CR > .70  
Convergent Validity – AVE > .50 explained variance is greater than residual variance (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988) 
Discriminant Validity  - MSV < AVE           and ; 
Discriminant Validity  - Square root of AVE greater than inter-construct correlations (Hair et al., 
2013, pg 605) 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceptions of Ability and Beliefs (PAB) and Self-Confidence/Locus of Control (Control) clearly pose 
validity issues. To address these validity concerns a further factor analysis was conducted across only 
the variables convergent on a latent factors PAB and Locus, to see how reliable the variable 
converge on these factors (see, Table 72,  below). 
  
Table 71 – Ropeloc Convergent and Discriminant Validity Metrics 
 
CR AVE MSV MaxR(H) PAB Control TE CT 
PAB 0.877 0.506 0.569 0.880 0.711 
 
    
Control 0.890 0.503 0.569 0.940 0.754 0.710 
 
  
TE 0.838 0.633 0.362 0.954 0.588 0.602 0.796 
 
CT 0.792 0.566 0.511 0.963 0.636 0.715 0.426 0.752  
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Table 72 – Factor Analysis of PAB and 
Locus variables 
 
  Factor  
Factor   
1 2 3 
CH230 .734   
SF332 .728   
SF218 .688   
CH115 .663 .310  
OT222 .615 .348  
CH344 .607   
OT336 .504 .405  
QS223  .754  
QS108  .697  
QS338  .692  
IL221 .302 .623  
IL105  .620  
SC110 .405 .522 .329 
SC224 .387 .493 .314 
SC339 .342 .376 .860 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
a. 3 factors extracted. 6 iterations required. 
 
In addition to the PAB and Locus factors, another latent variable provided some explanation to the 
validity issues observed in these primary factors: we see ALL the Self-Confidence variables in PAB, 
confounded in this latent variable123. 
As the purpose of the use of ROPELOC was to provide some perception reflecting ‘emotional 
awareness’ to correlate a differentiated model of Interest; this allows for the general constructs of 
ROPELOC (life effectiveness as an ‘awareness’ of a state neural function -Effectivity and the 
Divergent Criticality hypothesis). For that reason, rather than the need maintain the multi-construct 
structure of specific psychological variables (such as Self-Confidence), it was reasoned that the 
maintenance of main factor construct (PAB), would allow sub-constructs that caused discriminatory 
issues, such as Self-Confidence, to be removed.  
In conjunction with the PAB and Locus factor analysis, the following variables where removed for 
displaying weak extraction communalities less than (0.4) and that cross-loaded with other factors; 
CH115; SC110; SC339; SC224. 
                                                          
123 It should be remembered that this third factor does not display itself in the master model. It therefore is an 
effect specifically aligned to the factors of Locus and PAB. 
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  Figure 61 – Metric Validity Assumed CFA ROPELOC Model (below), achieved the following validity 
metrics that were deemed acceptable to continue with the CFA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 73 – Convergent and Discriminant Validity Metrics 
 
 
CR AVE MSV MaxR(H) PAB Control TE CT 
PAB 0.853 0.493 0.468 0.856 0.702 
 
    
Control 0.847 0.526 0.510 0.921 0.684 0.725 
 
  
TE 0.838 0.633 0.360 0.944 0.600 0.593 0.796 
 
CT 0.792 0.565 0.510 0.956 0.647 0.714 0.426 0.752 
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 Common Methods Bias  
This is done by creating the Common Latent Factor for all variables (Gaskin, 2016a) and then run as; 
i) a freely estimated model and then ii) a model constrained to zero. 
In such a ‘Common Method’ test, if there is significance using a Chi-square difference test between 
the: 1) freely estimated model, and 2) model constrained to zero across variables; this determines if 
there is enough shared variance with the CLF to warrant its inclusion in further analysis.  
  Figure 61 – Metric Validity Assumed CFA ROPELOC Model (AMOSIBM24) 
 
 
 
 
 
There is significance (p<.05) therefore shared variance will need to be assumed.   
Table 74 – Chi-square Difference Test CLF 
 
 
 Overall Model 
Chi-square DF P Invariant? 
Unconstrained 317.9 96     
Fully constrained 423.0 111     
Number of groups   2     
     Difference 105.1 15 0.000 NO 
Note: Chi-square Difference Measure (Gaskin, 2017a) 
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As shared variance is significant (i.e. not significantly invariant), the model is was investigated for 
convergence and discriminatory validity now that the variables are seen to share variance between 
the CLF and their EFA latent factors.  The final (see, Figure 62, below) acceptable model for imputing 
‘partialised’ values for all the variables whilst considering a CLF effects. 
Figure 62 – Final CLF Model (AMOSIBM24) 
The CLF now acts as a covariant on all variables and therefore, partialised-values are applied in 
defining the weightings towards other latent variables. These  values are now imputed onto the 
latent values. A final Model Fit was conducted on the unconstrained model with 4 latent variables 
(including a CLF). The following fit indices where achieved: 
Recommended Threshold 
Table 75 – Final Model Fit 
Metrics for the ROPELOC 
Measure 
CLF Pathway Model 
Chi-square/ f (cmin/df) <3-5 2.734 
p-value for the model     <.05 p<.0001 
CFI >.92-.95  .974 
SRMR   <.06-.08 .030 
RMSEA <.06-.08  .078 
Note: Strict Thresholds (Hu & Bentler, 1999);                                                  
Acceptable Thresholds (Hair et al., 2013; Lomax & Schumacker, 2004)  
* Large sample size so not unexpected 
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Finally, the CLF was used to create factor values for future analysis by imputation allowing for the 
‘Common Method Bias’ corrections. This is a partialization of the variables in accordance with the 
CLF. The variables are considered to covariate of the CLF and the latent factor, that is, they are 
produced by more than one pathway. Partialized ‘standardised’ betas now, will be reflections of the 
proportion of variance toward the latent factor.  
If we take the above into consideration, when allowed to co-vary and predict the latent variable, 
imputed factor values, will now represent partialized measures for the dependent variables and 
enable the model correlations to reflect the covariance of the CLF. 
As the ROPELOC questionnaire was not to be used for further SEM multi-variate assumptions for 
latent factors in such a model were not required.  Multi- variate ‘Influence’ and ‘Collinearity’ 
assumptions were not necessary.  
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APPENDIX X: Conditional Independence  
Conditional Independence (CI) provides a truly quantitative analysis and offers an alternative to 
interrogate possible qualitative confounding used in Structural Equation Modelling.  
Conditional Independence was conducted in this study to provide some triangulation to the 
Structural Equation Modelling. It also provides some suggestion that such a CI approach to model 
building offers an efficient and more accurate approach to structural modelling in the face of large 
data sets and multi-step methodologies (Bacciu et al., 2013). 
Conditional Independence assumes the null hypothesis, i.e. that there are no relationships between 
variables and that they are independent. By comparing one variable’s relationship to another – 
conditional on ‘no relationships’ with all the other measure variables; if any shared information is 
uniquely observed through this condition, then these ‘paired’ variables may be assumed to have a 
relationship (i.e. one variable’s condition informs the others uniquely ‘variable’ condition, to some 
extent)124. This suggests the variables cannot be considered independent and the null-hypothesis is 
disproved, i.e. if there exists a relationship, we decide to what level of significance to weight that 
significance.  
In multiple variables of CI, the conditional information is provided as a ‘measure of probability’, that 
of the probable state of shared information between variables based on an information-condition 
from multiple variables. This can be considered as a state of entropy of one variable’s distribution in 
comparison with all other variable’s condition, and is given as a property of information – the 
statistically expressed entropy of Shannon Theory (Shannon, 1948). This gives us an information-
distribution of one variable reflecting all the other variables, a unique condition able then to be 
compared against another variable’s unique ‘conditional’ state. 
                                                          
124 Rather than through direct correlation between pairwise variables (as in regression where such associations 
may be the result of associations with other, confounding, variables), CI requires that rather than a direct 
relationship, the variables are conditionally investigated via a third condition (e.g. via another measure 
variable[s]). These ‘conditions’ produce their own independent probability-distributions as a third condition. If 
and only if, there exists ‘shared information’ between these independent distributions, then a ‘conditional 
dependence’ or significant relationship exists. This significance is represented by the shared information 
between the two conditional, probability-distributions. This is the occurrence of one variable’s probability 
distribution providing information on the probability of other variable’s probability distribution. 
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What is in effect is a Chi-squared (χ2) probability-distribution, one able to calculate a goodness of fit 
between the ‘actual’ variable distribution and the expected ‘information’ distribution125. From this, a 
graphical model of Conditional Independence shows none biased, purely quantitative, statistical 
relationships between the variables presented as ‘edge-minimum entropy’ – A model of the shared 
information (true relationship) between variables. 
Sorting and Preparation of Data for Conditional Independence 
The raw Interest data was prepared and sorted in accordance with the EFA Phase. The only 
difference was the variable’s (Likert) reporting scale was collapsed into 4 groups from the 8, in order 
to reduce the polynomial calculations needed: 
Shannon information: 
(Shannon, 1948) 
Is adapted for a mutual-measure of shared entropy (information) as: 
(taken from, Bacciu et al., 2013, pg625) 
The software used was CiMAp version 1 – MatLab (R2011a) 64-bit (win64) (Bacciu et al., 2013). 
                                                          
125 Variable A and B are considered Independent (no relation) if, joint probability equals the product of their 
probabilities – p(A n B) = p(A) + p(B) (Birnbaum, 1962). 
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From this, a graphical representation of the relationships between variables provides an entropy 
measure (Ĩ) as a measure of mutual information between variables, and allows the pairwise 
relationships to build a multivariable model.  
Figure 63 – Conditional Interdependence map (adapted from CiMAp version 1, Bacciu et al., 2013) 
Interpreting the Multivariate Assumptions 
The above (Figure 63) has been extrapolated from the raw graphical analysis (see, Figure 65, p343) 
to clearly display significant convergent relationships. The weightings are in megabits (mbits) of 
mutual ‘shared’ information. 
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Factor Analysis 
Of interest here are the significant relationships within what might be considered, ‘latent factor 
groupings’ (see Figure 64, below). These generally display stronger grouped relationships. Shared 
inter-factor relationships (brown pathways) display cross-loading across grouping centres of shared 
variance. Here we see support for the 5 factor analysis from the EFA. 
Figure 64 – Latent Factor Boundaries 
Variables not obviously incorporated within a factor boundary: InEn323; Att141; Nov333; ToIn262 & 
Chal454 (Figure 63, above) can be seen to be cross-loaded with other factors through ‘multiple’ 
relationships. This again would support the confounding seen in the factor analysis tests, where it is 
these very variables are seen to be removed through CFA and SEM. 
Though the a Conditional Independence approach would seem to offer a quick and efficient 
approach to model building when compared with CFA and SEM, the interpretation of the 
relationships benefited from some a priori guidance to help identify and understand the raw data 
provided. For example, the inclusion of Nov333 had the effect of Nov 232 becoming non-
significant.126 
  
                                                          
126 When Nov333 was removed in CFA iteration, Nov 232 was seen to provide one of the strongest predictors 
of Novelty). This removal of Nov 333 was a direct result from an iterated CFA approach using knowledge about 
the confounding effects on this variable in relation to an ‘age group’ effect. This and the constructivist 
approach to SEM from a working knowledge of the measures and the sampling. 
 
Appendix X 
343 
 
Base Conditional Independence Analysis 
Figure 65 – Base Conditional Independence Analysis (CiMAp version 1) 127
                                                          
127 NOTE:  All the Conditional Independence analysis was conducted using a face differentiation of Activity 
Effectivity differentiation. Of interest would be further study of CI involving the Interdependence Profile . 
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APPENDIX XI: SEM Interdependence Profile – Congruence Assumptions 
The following provides an inductive rationale for an Interdependence Profile representing a state of 
functional Affordance. 
A. Within absolute Effectivity, an Approach cognition congruent with an agential learning 
assumption for Divergent Criticality (a learning motivation) will have a positive effect 
regardless of relative Effectivity (rVC).  This allows an assumption that as an affective-
behavioural construct for Divergent Criticality, Approach (as affective-agential), will be 
increasing in its relationships with all affective constructs in the Interest Model until 
absolute phase is exceeded. 
 
B. Affective cognitions will function around a phase of relative-Effectivity. This is perception as 
a state of neural efficiency towards ‘Tolerance Optimisation’ that will be dependent on a 
composite effect of situative bottom-up and contextual top-down attentional processes. As 
such, perceptions of neural efficiency will be congruent with Tolerance Optimisation from 
such attentional cognitive processes. This is to say, increasing Challenge should be congruent 
with increasing Novelty and/or Attentional Demand, as both are extraneous variables 
providing contextual and situative Divergent Criticality. 
 
C. A variable with multiple pathways will reflect a similar effect on these pathways. Approach 
cognition therefore will influence similar effect on its regressions from Attentional Demand 
and Novelty (i.e. both pathways will be subject to similar increasing or decreasing Approach 
effects). 
Using these pathway assumptions, it is possible to accept or reject possible pathway effects towards 
informing an Interdependence Profile to suggest states of functional Affordance. 
  
Appendix XI 
345 
 
Effect Assumptions for developing an Interdependence Profile 
As a Structural Equation Model, many direct pathways are mediated to a lesser or greater effect by 
indirect pathways. There exists then, direct and indirect effects to be considered before a total effect 
might be deconstructed128. In accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis, the ‘dependent’ 
variable of ‘Approach’ is investigated to suggest possible ‘indicator pathways’ as to the functioning 
of a profile analysis, pathways 1,2, and 6 (see, Figure 66, below). It is here that it is possible to truly 
utilise the analysis power of SEM to deconstruct and decipher the covariance effects in an 
Interdependence Profile that we may then apply to a further causal hypothesis (e.g. providing 
ordinal-differentiation for a functional Affordance scale to test against other perception measures 
such as ROPELOC). 
Figure 66 – Possible Pairwise Regression Pathways 
Direct Pathway Regressions 
Investigation of these ‘direct’ pathway assumptions lead to the selection of ‘two’ pathway 
regressions that were thought to offer the most useable information for an Interdependence Profile 
(Pathways- 1 & 2 (see, - Direct Pathway Regressions inferring Attentional Process Bias, below) were 
thought to infer the Effectivity landscape (relative Effectivity). Direct pathway (6) Instant Enjoyment 
→ Approach, offered no slope-differentiation as Instant Enjoyment is mediated by all other 
constructs, conflating any effect assumptions. This guides now the mediating indirect-pathways 
towards Instant Enjoyment for future profile information. 
Indirect Pathway Regressions 
Instant Enjoyment is thought a primary mediating variable (such primacy is supported here and 
throughout the Interest literature (e.g., Chen et al., 2001a; Chen, Sun, Zhu & Chen, 2014; Deci & 
Ryan, 2008; Harter, 1978; Hidi & Renninger, 2006; Rotgans & Schmidt, 2011), was investigated (in 
                                                          
128 The primary analysis strength in SEM is in the deconstructing of the functional effects between related 
variables, not in making causal effect estimates. 
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their application towards an Interdependence Profile) in terms of its indirect pathways towards 
Approach. From this, only one indirect pathways through (3) Challenge → Instant Enjoyment→ 
Approach, seemed to offer viable functional information (see,  
Challenge Indirect Pathway Regressions inferring a relative Effectivity State, below). Indirect 
pathways (4) (5) and (6) were not considered as offering differentiation information for any 
Interdependence Profile (see, Analysis and Rejection of ‘Other’ Regression Pathways, below). 
Direct Pathway Regressions inferring Attentional Process Bias 
Pathway 1)  Novelty on Approach pathway as bottom-up dominance 
Novelty → Approach is a ‘direct’ regression pathway. Congruence will see positive regressions 
reflecting increasing Approach (Exploratory Interest) in relation to increasing bottom-up Novelty on 
Approach as a relative Effectivity assumption. 
Pathway 2)  Attentional Demand on Approach pathway as top-down dominance 
Attentional Demand effects on Approach are indicative of an ‘attentional-awareness’ that must infer 
top-down (attentional) processes. As co-varied with Novelty, it may be hypothesised to reflect top-
down cognitive processes in relation towards surprise-appraisal. This composite awareness or co-
variance of SEM can be extrapolated to a ‘dominance’ proposition between Attentional Demand and 
its co-relationship with Novelty on Approach as a relative Effectivity assumption. 
The interdependence of pathways Novelty → Approach and Attentional Demand → Approach 
As Novelty is considered an attention awareness of ‘surprise’ from the known, then if Attentional 
Demand → Approach is seen to regress positively (positive effect observed) and Novelty → 
Approach negatively, such opposed regressions (in accordance with pathway-congruence 
assumption ‘C’) infer a ‘top-down’ dominance in effect, as Novelty (sensory surprise) is perceived as 
declining whilst Approach is increasing. Alternatively,  if a positive effect is observed in the Novelty 
→ Approach pathway and Attentional Demand is regressed negatively, then bottom-up processes 
may be considered dominant. If both pathways are seen to be positively regressed, then dominance 
bias is difficult to determine and therefore a ‘shared’ composite-attention must be inferred129.  
                                                          
129 It should be remembered that all pathways as awareness-constructs are ‘top-down’ to some extent. 
Novelty and Attentional Demand will co-vary as all ‘awareness’ must have some top-down cognition on 
attentionly-aware. However, dominance-biasing may still be inferred from the interdependence of these 
pathways. 
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Through these pathway regressions (1 & 2) we may infer ‘probable’ cognitive bias in attentional 
processes and infer cognitive-function reflecting an Effectivity landscape, it does not however, 
provide information inferring the state of function within that landscape (functional Affordance 
either within or beyond relative cusp Effectivity). 
To address this, Challenge as an antagonistic affective avoidance-cognition (dislike) is seen to 
meditate Novelty and Attentional Demand effects on Instant Enjoyment. It will illicit an antagonistic 
affective-cognition, on Instant Enjoyment mediated through Challenge indirect-pathway(s), Novelty 
→ Challenge → Instant Enjoyment; and Attentional Demand → Challenge → Instant Enjoyment. As 
such, Challenge as affective  
Challenge Indirect Pathway Regressions inferring a relative Effectivity State 
Pathways 3)  Challenge mediated on Instant Enjoyment inferring Affordance state   
Challenge, importantly in this study, had been developed as a construct representing an avoid 
affective-emotional cognition. Challenge is observed as an emotional-cognition inferring states of 
phase-function within and beyond relative Effectivity. That is to say, increasing Challenge represents 
an increasingly negative or ‘avoid’ cognition aligned with cognitive emotions of anxiety and 
uncertainty in accordance with the Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis. As relative Effectivity is 
exceeded, the Challenge → Instant Enjoyment ‘appraisal’ pathway, represents the antagonistic 
‘avoid’ mediations to hedonic ‘enjoyment’. It is hypothesised that this Challenge → Instant 
Enjoyment mediation regulates the affective approach behaviours of surprise ‘seeking’ (the Novelty 
→ Instant Enjoyment / Attentional Demand → Instant Enjoyment pathway) and such a proposition 
sees Challenge → Instant Enjoyment providing the self-regulation regulating ‘affect’ around a 
Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis and Divergent Criticality ‘cusp inflection’ Theory. 
As a functional Affordance state, emergent either ‘within’ or ‘beyond’ a relative-Effectivity, the 
Challenge → Instant Enjoyment affectively rewarded ‘within’ rVC, but needs agential ‘effort’ if 
Affordance is taken ‘beyond’ relative Effectivity and Approach goal-oriented is to be positive.  
As a state of Affordance determined by within or beyond relative Effectivity, cognitive function is 
able to be inferred from this Challenge → Instant Enjoyment pathway, dependent on the mediating 
surprise (Novelty) and Attentional Demands of the situated domain.  
The inference from these affective pathways (1,2 &3) in an Interdependence Profile (IP), now 
informs how perceptions as attentional awareness (Interest measure), might reflect the state of 
functional Affordance in relative Effectivity from the SEM of it’s attentional-antecedents and their 
inter-dependence. 
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Analysis and Rejection of ‘Other’ Regression Pathways 
Pathway 4) Attentional Demand and Novelty on the Challenge pathway 
Though these pathways would seem to offer inference as to the functioning of bottom up and top-
down cognitions, as Challenge may always be seen of positive effect in Divergent Criticality, similar 
to that of the Approach assumption. However, Challenge had exhibited poor regression-power in the 
local tests of the model. This is possibly an issue with the accuracy of the questionnaire, and TYPE II 
errors missing Challenge effects. Therefore, it was considered that these pathways are better 
considered through their total-effects, a summation thought to offer greater validity in the effect of 
Novelty and Attentional Demand on → Approach (see 1) above.  
Pathway 5)  Attentional Demand and Novelty on Instant Enjoyment pathway 
The pathways Attentional Demand → Instant Enjoyment and Novelty → Instant Enjoyment, are 
deemed to represent an affective inference (for life-regulation through cognitive-emotions). 
However, these pathways as direct effects on Instant Enjoyment reflect a paucity of agential affect 
as direct pathways and are better accommodated through the indirect Challenge → Instant 
Enjoyment pathway.  
Pathway 6) Instant Enjoyment on Approach 
The multi-relationship influences mediating Instant Enjoyment preclude inductive reasoning as the 
causal effects of this reporting pathway. 
 
An Interdependence Profile 
There exists, then, the possibility of interpreting pathway regressions in a profile that infers inter-
dependence effects in relation to Tolerance Optimisation. It is in the interdependence between: 
Novelty → Exploratory Approach; Attentional Demand → Exploratory Approach; and Challenge →  
Figure 67 - Interdependence Profile 
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Instant Enjoyment), that an ‘Interdependence Profile’ might infer a composite of bottom-up and top-
down attentional processes inferring a state of relative Effectivity and function. 
The regression pathways seen in SEM Final Model 2 between the Interest’s questionnaire constructs 
(Figure 67) provided many possible pathways that might be considered to offer inference for an 
Interdependence Profile (able to infer the possible functioning of an attention’s cognitive processes 
in effect). Therefore, some a priori assumptions are necessary.  
A State of Attentional Function in Direct and Indirect Effects  
In the Pathway Final Model 2, the factor of Exploratory Approach (App) is seen as an affective 
cognitive behavioural construct mediated or ‘dependent’ on all other constructs within the model. 
This would seem to concur the hypothesised mechanism of Divergent Criticality for life regulation: 
Here a ‘driving’ or agential ‘Approach’ is seen as influenced or mediated by the other ‘Interest’ 
constructs in a functional (cognitive) perception. This is supported in research on affective-
behaviour, such as a motivational ‘wanting’ or ‘cognitive-drive’ over and above the hedonic ‘liking’. 
Approach as dependent on, not only ‘situated’ cognitive demands (bottom-up) but also contextual 
‘top-down’ agential processes, is seen as affective and agential (see, Berridge & Robinson, 2003; 
Northoff & Hayes, 2011; Panksepp, 2005). 
From all the Interdependence Profiles possible, we can identify three pathways that may be 
considered as the ‘most probable’ in relation to construct-inferred, attentional processes (see, 
Figure 67, above) for identifying  a ‘state(s) of functional Affordance’. Voluntary Control Theory 
suggests criticality functioning in different relative landscapes (of Effectivity), and is able to be 
graphically represented through a model of Voluntary Control as ‘reduced Voluntary Control’ or the 
‘relative’ functioning of criticality (see, Figure 68, over).  
Criticality functioning as Voluntary Control sees internal top-down cognitions exact a cost and as 
‘limiting’ of Voluntary Control ‘reducing’ of the generative reservoir available for criticality function. 
Increasing top-down attentional components not only reduce the functioning through their 
cognitive-demands, but reduce the functional phase of criticality (relative Effectivity). The effect is a 
steeper ‘criticality’ slope (the rate of temporal flux in neural efficiency) and such temporal flux 
behaviour is a signal of ‘reduced Voluntary Control’  indicative of relative Effectivity (Van Orden et 
al., 2011). This provides the prospect of differentiating a state of Affordance objectively, when 
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different ‘Effectivity landscapes’ (of criticality) are acknowledged (below) as relative Effectivity. A 
functional Affordance and Effectivity able to be inferred through the SEM Interdependence Profile. 
Figure 68 – Reduced Voluntary Control 
Importantly, this ‘reduced’ Effectivity is not an ‘absolute of function’. It is possible for a cusp-
function in a rVC landscape to permit greater Effectivity as top-down attentional processes are 
diverted to bottom-up processing, in an agential-focus on sensory over contextual cognitions (Van 
Orden et al., 2011). This, however, is not an easily realised cognitive capacity. Such a focus requires 
cognitive ‘effort’ (Eysenck et al., 2007), and represents a ‘lesser’ optimal functioning proposition for 
Agential drive, tolerance and therefore function beyond relative cusp exerts an exponential cost of 
rVC. This ‘beyond’ relative Effectivity is seen as a transitional ‘cusp’ of function from a relative 
Effectivity towards an absolute parameter of possible function – absolute Effectivity. Once such an 
absolute is reached function will exhibit catastrophic functional collapse as compliant with Phase-
criticality (Bak et al., 1987; Van Orden et al., 2011). 
The Approach construct then, reflects an Agential capability or Effectivity due to reduced Voluntary 
Control. Here, as cognitive function goes through a relative cusp of Effectivity, there will be a 
reversal in hedonic-affect in accordance with the Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis. Though 
Divergent Criticality is still increasing within an ‘absolute’ of agential Effectivity, affective cognitions 
will display a correlation reversal with Instant Enjoyment as the systems moves beyond the relative 
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Tolerance Optimisation. Approach cognitions however, are able to remain positive through an 
agential motivation or goal-oriented ‘drive’ overriding hedonic cognitions. Goal directed behaviour 
will function at reduced efficiency until an absolute of phase (Effectivity) is reached. Here, 
catastrophic-collapse in is inevitable as parameters in phase-function are breached. 
Pathway regressions as an awareness of cognitive criticality function, may therefore be expected to 
reflect such a relative Effectivity as either a ‘WITHIN’ relative Effectivity cognitions or ‘BEYOND’ 
relative Effectivity cognitions, a prerogative that allows us to make Congruence Assumptions on SEM 
pathway effects (congruence with a Tolerance Optimisation hypothesis). Such assumptions (see, 
APPENDIX XI) allow inference from the SEM ‘effects’ (Total, Direct and In-direct) to be applied in an 
Independence Profile, reflecting a state of function (functional Affordance) with which to investigate 
the Divergent Criticality hypothesis. 
Even extracting only three pathways, eight-fold combinations and 64 different possible regressions 
exist. Using the Congruence Assumptions (APPENDIX XI), these regression possibilities may be 
reduced to one for each of the eight-fold combinations (see,Table 76). 
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Table 76 – Example of Regression Effects 
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Using the regression and congruence assumptions, the following Interdependence Profiles emerge 
as congruent in an eight-fold possibility matrix for an Interdependence Profile (Table 77). 
Table 77 – Base Interdependence Profiles 
 
Divergent Criticality and Congruence Assumptions – Notable Exceptions 
There are congruence ‘issues’ with two Interdependence Profiles: 
I. The Interdependence Profile IP = (-  -  + )  did not provide for any Divergent Criticality within 
an absolute Effectivity.  
 
Instant Enjoyment on Approach should, in a ‘within’ absolute phase of Effectivity, produce a positive 
Divergent Criticality effect from either increasing Novelty or Attentional Demand and a Positive 
Approach assumption (Congruence Assumption A & C). This effect is not seen in the profile for 
Interdependence Profile where either Nov→ App or Att→ App would be seen to report positive. 
That Instant Enjoyment reports a positive Divergent Criticality effect (as it must in its pathway with a 
positive Approach) this further confounds non Divergent Criticality observed in this profile. That such 
a profile (-  -  +) is ‘not’ reported in any of the 24 sampling domains (see , APPENDIX XV), its absence 
might be inferred as further support for the ethical sampling of Divergent Criticality ‘within’ absolute 
Effectivity (Methodological Considerations). 
 
II. The Interdependence Profiles IP = (- - -) might similarly seem to challenge Divergent 
Criticality with Novelty and Attentional Demand reporting negative, however: 
 
This profile either represents a negative Instant Enjoyment→ Approach pathway possible in a  
functional Affordance state beyond Effectivity (an unusual ‘absolute’ consideration given the 
sampling criteria but a possibility in a ‘beyond’ relative Effectivity). Such reporting of a lack of 
agential drive or motivation, is an ‘amotivational’ state causing relative Effectivity to report like 
absolute Effectivity. Such amotivation is well known within the motivational literature (Deci & Ryan, 
1985). 
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APPENDIX XII: Interdependence Profile –Functional Affordance  
The Interdependence Profile – IP 1 (+ – –): Bottom-up Attentional Dominant  
Dominance – This is one where the interaction between attentional components is bottom-up 
dominant. In that, with any ‘awareness of attention’ there must be a top-down construct to even be 
aware of attending, therefore some ‘reduced Voluntary Control’ (rVC) is in effect. However, the 
perception of decreasing ATT in relation to increasing NOV suggests bottom-up dominance. 
reduced Voluntary Control – The Interdependence profile of regression-betas (+ – –) is one that 
offers the most probable function for a narrow rVC cusp-effect (see, Figure 68, p350). 
Effectivity – The negative Challenge → Enjoyment regression infers a relative Effectivity state 
BEYOND the rVC functional (tolerance) optimal (see Figure 69, below). 
 
Slope      Inference 
βeta = 
+ 
1 NOVELTY →Exploratory APPROACH 
Here, a cognitive appraisal of Novelty is positively regressed with an Approach motivation. This is 
congruent with an increasing Divergent Criticality which, in the absence of a ‘top-down’ positive 
effect (Attentional Demand → Approach is negative) may infer a bottom-up attentional influence. 
βeta = 
– 
2 Attention DEMAND → Exploratory APPROACH 
That awareness of Attentional Demand (cognitive-effort) is perceived as negative in its regression 
with Approach allows us to consider that, top-down effects on attentional cognition are limited. 
βeta = 
– 
3 CHALLENGE →Instant ENJOYMENT  
Challenge, here, as a measure indicative of an inverse measure of anxiety and uncertainty, if found 
to be negatively regressed with an increasing Instant Enjoyment suggests a state within rVC criticality. 
  Figure 69 – Interdependence Profile 1 (+ – –) 
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The Interdependence Profile – IP 2 (+ + –): Shared Attentional Processes 
Dominance – This is one where the interaction between attentional components is shared, a 
composite of both bottom-up and top-down cognitions in affect. 
Reduced Voluntary Control – The Interdependence Profile of regression-betas (+ + -) is one that 
offers the most probable function for a medium rVC cusp-effect (see, Figure 68, p350). 
Effectivity –  The negative Challenge → Enjoyment regression infers an Effectivity state BEYOND the 
rVC Tolerance optimal (see, below). 
 
 
 
Slope      Inference 
βeta = 
+ 
1 NOVELTY →Exploratory APPROACH 
Here, a cognitive appraisal of Novelty is positively regressed with an Approach motivation. This is 
congruent with an increasing Divergent Criticality and infers a bottom-up influence on awareness 
cognitions of Interest. 
 
βeta = 
+ 
2 Attention DEMAND → Exploratory APPROACH 
Cognitive effort as a top-down awareness of Attentional Demand, is perceived as positive in its 
regression with Approach.  This is congruent with an increasing  Divergent Criticality and infers a top-
down influence on awareness cognitions of Interest. 
 
βeta = 
– 
3 CHALLENGE →Instant ENJOYMENT  
Challenge here, as a measure indicative of anxiety and uncertainty, if found to be negatively 
regressed with a decreasing Instant Enjoyment suggests a state within rVC criticality. 
Figure 70 – Interdependence Profile 2 (+ + –) 
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The Interdependence Profile – IP 3 (– +  –): Top-down Attentional Dominance 
Dominance – This is one that offers the most probable explanation for a reduced Voluntary Control 
of top-down bias. 
Reduced Voluntary Control – The Interdependence Profile of regression-betas (– + –) is one that 
offers the most probable function within a wide rVC cusp-effect (see Figure 68, p350). 
Effectivity –  The negative Challenge → Enjoyment regression infers an Effectivity state BEYOND the 
rVC tolerance optimal (see, below). 
 
  
 
Slope      Inference 
βeta = 
– 
1 NOVELTY →Exploratory APPROACH 
Here, as Novelty is negatively regressed with a positive (congruent) Approach, inferring bottom-up 
cognitions of  attention are of limited effect in view of top-down biased effect from ATT→APP. 
βeta = 
+ 
2 Attention DEMAND → Exploratory APPROACH 
Cognitive effort as a top-down awareness of Attentional Demand is perceived as positive in its 
regression with Approach.  This is congruent with an increasing  Divergent Criticality and infers a top-
down influence on awareness cognitions of Interest. 
 
βeta = 
– 
3 CHALLENGE →Instant ENJOYMENT  
Challenge, here, as a measure indicative of increasing anxiety and uncertainty, if found to be 
negatively regressed with an decreasing Instant Enjoyment suggests a state BEYOND rVC Criticality. 
  Figure 71 – Interdependence Profile 3 (– + –) 
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The Interdependence Profile – IP 4  (– + +): Top-down Attentional Processes 
Dominance – This is one that offers the most probable explanation for a reduced Voluntary Control 
of top-down bias. 
Reduced Voluntary Control – The Interdependence Profile of regression-betas (– + +) is one that 
offers the most probable function within a wide rVC cusp-effect (see, Figure 68, p350). 
Effectivity –  The positive Challenge → Enjoyment regression infers an Effectivity state WITHIN the 
rVC functional optimal (see, below). 
The Interdependence Profile – IP 5 (+ + +): Shared Attentional Processes 
Dominance – This is one where the interaction between attentional components is shared, a 
composite of both bottom-up and top-down cognitions in affect. 
 
  
 
Slope      Inference 
βeta = 
– 
1 NOVELTY → Exploratory APPROACH 
Here, as Novelty is negatively regressed with a positive (congruent) Approach, and infers bottom-up 
cognitions of attention are of limited effect in view of top-down biased dominance. 
βeta = 
+ 
2 Attention DEMAND → Exploratory APPROACH 
Cognitive effort as a top-down awareness of Attentional Demand, is perceived as positive in its 
regression with Approach.  This is congruent with an increasing Divergent Criticality and infers a top-
down influence on awareness cognitions of Interest. 
 
βeta = 
+ 
3 CHALLENGE → Instant ENJOYMENT  
Challenge, here as a measure of anxiety and control-uncertainty, if found to be positively regressed 
with Instant Enjoyment, suggests that such increasing anxiety is still able to be affective-positive 
(hedonic) instant enjoyment when congruent with Divergent Criticality, indicating an Effectivity state 
still WITHIN functional phase. 
  Figure 72 – Interdependence Profile 4 (– + +) 
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The Interdependence Profile – IP 5 ( + + +): Top-down Attentional Processes 
Reduced Voluntary Control – The Interdependence Profile of regression-betas (+ + +) is one that 
offers the most probable function for a medium rVC cusp-effect (see Figure 68, p350). 
Effectivity –  The positive-reporting congruent in Approach and Instant Enjoyment is indicative of 
functioning within absolute Effectivity – a probable rVC criticality still within relative Effectivity (see, 
below ).  
 
 
Slope      Inference 
βeta = 
+ 
1 NOVELTY →Exploratory APPROACH 
Here, a cognitive appraisal of Novelty is positively regressed with an Approach motivation. This is 
congruent with an increasing Divergent Criticality and infers a bottom-up influence on awareness 
cognitions of Interest. 
βeta = 
+ 
2 Attention DEMAND → Exploratory APPROACH 
Cognitive effort as a top-down awareness of Attentional Demand, is perceived as positive in its 
regression with Approach.  This is congruent with an increasing  Divergent Criticality and infers a top-
down influence on awareness cognitions of Interest. 
βeta = 
+ 
3 CHALLENGE →Instant ENJOYMENT  
Challenge here, as a measure of anxiety and control-uncertainty can be considered as positively 
regressed with Instant Enjoyment. That such increasing anxiety is still able to be affective-positive 
hedonic reporting when congruent with Divergent Criticality, indicates an Effectivity state still within 
relative Effectivity. 
  Figure 73 – Interdependence Profile 5 (+ + +) 
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The Interdependence Profile – IP 6 (+ – +): Bottom-up Attentional Dominance 
Attentional Dominance – That in any ‘awareness of attention’ there must be a top-down construct 
to even be aware of attending, therefore some ‘reduced Voluntary Control’ (rVC) is in effect. 
However, the perception of decreasing ATT in relation to increasing NOV suggests bottom-up 
dominance. 
reduced Voluntary Control – The Interdependence profile of regression-betas (+ – +) is one that 
offers the most probable function for a narrow rVC cusp-effect (see, Figure 68, p350). 
Effectivity – The positive-reporting evident in Approach and Instant Enjoyment is indicative of 
probable functioning ‘within’ relative Effectivity – a state possible within a wide spectrum but able to 
be determined to a probable function by the Criticality slope of bottom-up attentional processes  
(see, below). 
  
βeta 
+ 
1 NOVELTY → Exploratory APPROACH 
Here, a cognitive appraisal of Novelty is positively regressed with an Approach motivation. This is 
congruent with an increasing Divergent Criticality which, in the absence of a ‘top-down’ positive 
effect (Attentional Demand → Approach is negative) may infer a bottom-up attentional influence. 
βeta 
– 
2 Attention DEMAND → Exploratory APPROACH 
That awareness of Attentional Demand (cognitive-effort) is perceived as negative in its regression 
with Approach allows the consideration that top-down perceptions on attentional cognition are 
limited. 
βeta 
+ 
3 CHALLENGE → Instant ENJOYMENT  
Challenge here, as a measure of anxiety and control-uncertainty can be considered as positively 
regressed with Instant Enjoyment. That such increasing anxiety is still able to be affective-positive 
hedonic reporting when congruent with Divergent Criticality, indicates an Effectivity state still within 
relative Effectivity. 
  Figure 74 – Interdependence Profile 6 (+ – +) 
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The Interdependence Profile – IP 7 (– – –): Amotivational Agency Effects 
Dominance – This is one where the interaction between attentional components is shared, a 
composite of both bottom-up and top-down cognitions in affect. 
Reduced Voluntary Control – The Interdependence Profile of regression-betas (- - -) is one that 
offers the most probable function for a medium rVC cusp-effect (see, Figure 68, p350). 
Effectivity –  The negative Challenge → Enjoyment regression infers an Effectivity state BEYOND the 
rVC Tolerance optimal (see, below). 
 
Slope      Inference 
βeta = 
– 
1 NOVELTY →Exploratory APPROACH 
Here as Novelty is negatively regressed with Approach, but in a state of function ‘beyond’ relative 
Effectivity, such negative or decreasing Approach infers negative Agential effort to drive Approach 
cognitions (in effect focusing top-down attentional demand towards Agential goal-orientations) 
resulting in ‘Amotivational’ affective-cognitions and greater probability of relative criticality 
collapse, a cusp-collapse similar to absolute Effectivity collapse. 
βeta = 
– 
2 Attention DEMAND → Exploratory APPROACH 
As it is considered unlikely that bottom-up cognitions take Effectivity beyond phase collapse, it is 
therefore hypothesised that overt amotivation cognitions created a negative or decreasing Approach 
inferring negative Agential effort or drive resulting in ‘Amotivational’ affective-cognitions and greater 
probability of relative criticality collapse, a cusp-collapse similar to absolute Effectivity collapse. 
βeta = 
– 
3 CHALLENGE →Instant ENJOYMENT  
Instant enjoyment, here, as an affective hedonic emotional-cognition will be seen to be decreasing 
as Challenge takes function beyond relative Tolerance Optimal into a ‘beyond’ or inflection point of 
phase transition, a cusp-collapse similar to absolute Effectivity collapse. 
Figure 75 – Interdependence Profile 7 (– – –) 
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APPENDIX XIII: Hypothesis (H1) – Initial Correlation Analysis 
H1 – Correlations of measures Self-Concept (ROPELOC) and functional Affordance, will report in 
accordance with agential-mediation of the Divergent Criticality hypothesis 
If a Divergent Criticality hypothesis is in effect, then states of function as suggested by the 
Interdependence Profile, should correlate with perceptions of personal effectiveness. The following 
results were obtained through a Spearman’s Rank Order One-tailed correlation (Table 78, above). 
The Divergent Criticality hypothesis predicted a positive correlation using SPSSIBM24. 
 
 
 
Before accepting such 
seemingly poor reporting, there is the need to account for the non- continuous ‘IP' scale: That 
though ordinal in terms of functional Affordance state  actually represents behaviour around an 
‘inflection of affect’ (Tolerance Optimisation), the scale reverses at IP3 - IP1.  
Applying a continuous scale with the ‘beyond’ Tolerance Optimisation IP-scale reversed and in  
orientation with the ROPELOC scales (1=low and 6= high), a further correlation was conducted. 
 
 
 
Though again finding limited correlation, what is interesting here is that the correlation is similar 
(though reversed as would be expected), emphasising the influence of the ‘beyond’ Tolerance 
Optimisation reporting. Such a result is in accordance with the Divergent Criticality hypothesis of 
Tolerance Optimisation: though recognising the rank-order of the data, Spearman’s does not 
account for the non-linear functioning of Divergent Criticality and therefore the assumptions of 
similar ‘non-normality’ in non-parametric reporting, cannot be - assumed. However, this 
confounding would not be so prevalent ‘beyond’ Tolerance Optimisation as this represents a 
‘limited’ (Cusp-Hopf function) of Tolerance Optimisation maintenance. We should therefore expect 
the negligible influence of the ‘within’ IP-scale as the Divergent Criticality hypothesis is a Tolerance 
Optimisation functioning hypothesis. Therefore it is appropriate to analyse the IP-scales (1-3) in 
isolation (see 6.20, Hypothesis Testing (H1,xiii p199).
Table 78 – IP Spearman’s rho Correlations 
 
                          IPcont CT Control TE PAB 
Correlation 
Coefficient        
n 
1.000 0.040 -0.018 .089** 0.028 
 p 0.135 0.305 0.007 0.219 
767 767 767 767 767 
Note:**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
Table 79 – Continuous IP Spearman’s rho Correlations 
 
                          IPcont CT Control TE PAB 
Correlation 
Coefficient        
n 
1.000 0.037 -0.018 -.087** 0.027 
 p 0.311 0.618 0.016 0.447 
767 767 767 767 767 
Note:**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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APPENDIX XIV: Hypothesis H(3) Repeat Measures Two-Way Mixed ANOVA 
Mixed box designs have received some criticism (such as baseline measurements, ‘biasing’ repeat-
measures through carryover effects, questioning testing sequence validity (O'neill, 1977)). In order 
to accommodate for possible order confounding and to account for any intervention-expectancy 
that might be in effect (Matthews, 1988), the use of an alternated-intervention model and a two 
week ‘wash-out’ period to the sampling (see, Table 80), intended to accommodate such ‘periodicity’ 
and ‘carry-over’ effects in the data (Hedayat & Zhao, 1990). 
 
What would be a simple paired-means test now becomes factorial: a two- dependent variable (High 
and Low Situational Domain DV’s), a between sampling-order of presentation (ORDER). The use of 
factorial ANOVA analysis of the data aims to avoid compound-probability problems (a validity issue 
of more simplistic, multiple paired t-tests analysis).The results are presented for the ROPELOC 
constructs: Cooperative Teamwork (CT), Time Effectiveness (TE), Locus of Control (Locus) and 
Personal Abilities and Beliefs (PAB). 
Two sample groups where removed in the sorting for confounding the sampling criteria: 
1) The paired samples 10 and 11 from (MHA) were sampled prior to the wash-out period of 
two weeks, negating the sampling criteria. 
2) The sample 18 (CHS), on enquiry, was found to have been conducted as an evening review 
(residential-based), rather than the ‘situated’ sampling required for a ‘state’ measure.  
Paired samples 17 & 18 were also removed.
Table 80 – Mixed Box Design (counter-balances measure-order and intervention) 
Sample ID Description                              Cross Order 
Order (c ORDER 
Date Activity Activity 
Ordinal 
IP  
TCL Sampling TRADITIONAL CLASSROOM LEARNING  
 
    
10 3.12b MHA1 School Classroom 1 20/11/2015 3 3 2 
9 3.10b LJMU CO 1 Coach Lecture 2 02/12/2015 3 3 2 
13 3.142b LJMU PE 1 Phys Ed - Lecture 1 02/11/2015 3 3 5 
7 3.4b LJMU TE 1 Teach Direct Lecture 2 23/05/2016 3 3 7 
15 3.16b  LJMU OE 1 Developm' Lecture 1 03/11/2015 3 3 5 
17 3.19a CHS 1 School Classroom 2 03/03/2016 3 3 3 
LoTC Sampling LEARNING OUTSIDE THE CLASSROOM  
OUTSIDE 
  
  
  
  
  
11 3.11a MHA2 Outdoor Activity 1 25/11/2015 7 1 1 
8 3.9b LJMU CO 2 Coaching   Activity 2 22/09/2015 7 1 2 
12 3.13b LJMU PE 2 Outdoor Activity 1 01/12/2015 7 1 1 
5 3.3a LJMU TE 2 Outdoor Walk  2 03/03/2015 7 1 1 
14 3.15b LJMU OE 2 Team Activity 1 02/12/2015 3 3 2 
18 3.20b CHS 2 Glacier Walk 2 12/02/2016 9 2 3 
Note: Cross Order (1) = TCL sampled first;  Cross Order (2) = LoTC sampled first 
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APPENDIX XV: Sample Interdependence Profiles 
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Full Interdependent profile Example for Sample 1 – IP6 (+- - +); All samples overleaf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal -.811 ***
Nov Chal 0.185
3 Chal InEn 0.089
Nov InEn .575 ***
Att InEn .524 ***
2 Att App -.428 *
1 Nov App 0.169
InEn App .827 **
SAMPLE 1 - IP6 = (+ - +)
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Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal -0.424
Nov Chal 0.19
3 Chal InEn -0.144
Nov InEn .605 **
Att InEn 0.306
2 Att App -0.026
1 Nov App -0.058
InEn App .863 **
SAMPLE 2 - IP7 = (- - -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0.115
Nov Chal .494 **
3 Chal InEn -0.226
Nov InEn -.411 **
Att InEn .580 ***
2 Att App -.369 ✝
1 Nov App .521 *
InEn App .808 ***
SAMPLE 5 - IP1 = (+ - -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0.181
Nov Chal 0.145
3 Chal InEn -.220 *
Nov InEn .237 *
Att InEn .592 ***
2 Att App .189 ✝
1 Nov App .173 ✝
InEn App .558 ***
SAMPLE 8 - IP2 = (+ + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0
Nov Chal 0.213
3 Chal InEn -0.156
Nov InEn .535 ***
Att InEn 0.172
2 Att App -0.005
1 Nov App .497 ***
InEn App .352 *
SAMPLE 11 - IP1 = (+ - -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0
Nov Chal 0.217
3 Chal InEn -0.189
Nov InEn -0.051
Att InEn 0.314
2 Att App 0.109
1 Nov App 0.182
InEn App .443 *
SAMPLE 14 - IP2 = (+ + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal -0.131
Nov Chal .230 ✝
3 Chal InEn -.473 ***
Nov InEn .457 ***
Att InEn .306 **
2 Att App 0.123
1 Nov App .194 ✝
InEn App .721 ***
SAMPLE 3 - IP2 = (+ + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0.184
Nov Chal .242 ✝
3 Chal InEn -0.189
Nov InEn .324 *
Att InEn .467 ***
2 Att App 0.167
1 Nov App .257 ✝
InEn App .269 *
SAMPLE 6 - IP2 = (+ + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal -0.033
Nov Chal .425 **
3 Chal InEn -.316 **
Nov InEn .716 ***
Att InEn .485 ***
2 Att App .251 *
1 Nov App .580 ***
InEn App .367 ***
SAMPLE 9 - IP2 = (+ + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal -0.031
Nov Chal .428 ***
3 Chal InEn -.308 ***
Nov InEn .340 ***
Att InEn .547 ***
2 Att App -0.062
1 Nov App .285 ***
InEn App .627 ***
SAMPLE 12 - IP1 = (+ - -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal .584 *
Nov Chal 0.245
3 Chal InEn 0.183
Nov InEn 0.129
Att InEn .502 ✝
2 Att App 0.077
1 Nov App 0.071
InEn App .643 *
SAMPLE 15 - IP5 = (+ + +)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal -0.04
Nov Chal 0.205
3 Chal InEn -.453 *
Nov InEn 0.155
Att InEn .408 ✝
2 Att App 0.274
1 Nov App -0.108
InEn App 0.246
SAMPLE 4 - IP3 = (- + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0.039
Nov Chal .310 *
3 Chal InEn -.417 ***
Nov InEn .399 ***
Att InEn .449 ***
2 Att App -0.083
1 Nov App -0.045
InEn App .795 ***
SAMPLE 7 - IP7 = (- - -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0.062
Nov Chal 0.239
3 Chal InEn -.354 ***
Nov InEn .602 ***
Att InEn .379 ***
2 Att App 0.014
1 Nov App 0.214
InEn App .578 ***
SAMPLE 10 - IP2 = (+ + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal .269 ✝
Nov Chal .321 *
3 Chal InEn 0.091
Nov InEn -0.112
Att InEn .763 ***
2 Att App 0.022
1 Nov App 0.14
InEn App .656 ***
SAMPLE 13 - IP5 = (+ + +)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Chal .361 ✝
Nov Chal 0.212
3 Chal InEn 0.065
Nov InEn .477 *
Att InEn 0.009
2 Att App .524 **
1 Nov App 0.185
InEn App -0.042
SAMPLE 16 - IP5 = (+ + +)
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Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal -0.143
Nov Chal -.267 *
3 Chal InEn -0.129
Nov InEn .594 ***
Att InEn .288 **
2 Att App 0.073
1 Nov App -.331 *
InEn App .812 ***
SAMPLE 17 - IP3 = (- + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0.193
Nov Chal 0.389
3 Chal InEn 0.169
Nov InEn -0.201
Att InEn .523 *
2 Att App .290 ✝
1 Nov App -0.002
InEn App .711 ***
SAMPLE 20 - IP4 = (- + +)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0.472
Nov Chal -0.332
3 Chal InEn -0.035
Nov InEn 0.34
Att InEn -0.114
2 Att App 0.1
1 Nov App -0.404
InEn App .370 *
SAMPLE 23 - IP3 = (- + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal -0.065
Nov Chal 0.093
3 Chal InEn -.346 ***
Nov InEn .562 ***
Att InEn .432 ***
2 Att App 0.178
1 Nov App -0.173
InEn App .425 *
SAMPLE 18 - IP3 = (- + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal -0.127
Nov Chal -0.232
3 Chal InEn -.426 **
Nov InEn .632 ***
Att InEn .264 ✝
2 Att App -0.099
1 Nov App -0.036
InEn App .972 **
SAMPLE 21 - IP7 = (- - -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0.203
Nov Chal .521 ✝
3 Chal InEn -0.161
Nov InEn 0.432
Att InEn .572 *
2 Att App 0.021
1 Nov App -.295 *
InEn App .980 ***
SAMPLE 24 - IP3 = (- + -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal -0.086
Nov Chal 0.127
3 Chal InEn -.443 **
Nov InEn .308 *
Att InEn .456 **
2 Att App -0.06
1 Nov App .479 **
InEn App .520 **
SAMPLE 19 -  IP1 = (+ - -)
Predictor Outcome Std Beta
Att Chal 0.164
Nov Chal 0.032
3 Chal InEn -.350 ***
Nov InEn .553 ***
Att InEn .221 *
2 Att App .228 **
1 Nov App .242 *
InEn App .437 ***
SAMPLE 22 - IP2 = (+ + -)
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APPENDIX XVI: Sampling and Sampling Protocols 
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APPENDIX XVII: Permission for Adaptations to Questionnaire Measures: 
Situational Interest Scale (Chen et al., 1999) 
I apologize for replying late due to my extensive overseas travel. Sure, you have my permission to 
use the situational interest scale. I appreciate you sharing the details of your study. These are 
fascinating findings. At the theoretical level, however, interest does distinguish from other similar 
constructs such as arousal; and enjoyment seems to be one important indicator distinguish between 
the two. Perceptions with negative emotions (e.g. fear) may be representing the arousing aspect of 
an event, not necessarily that of situational interest. I believe your adding avoidance items may help 
distinguish these constructs. I look forward to reading your findings. 
Ang Chen 
 
Review of Personal Effectiveness and Locus of Control instrument (ROPELOC) 
(Richards et al., 2002) 
Thanks for your email and news about your research, much appreciated. Feel free to use a modified 
ROPELOC. We would be interested in a copy of your study when completed. 
 
I'm not sure of Garry's current email, but he has previously indicated that he's happy for me to 
response to ROPELOC requests. 
Let me know if I can do anything else. 
                     James Neill 
 
 
